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**INDIAN-INDONESIAN RELATIONS
(1961—1980)**

Indian-Indonesian Relations (1961—1980)

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


ASIAN EDUCATIONAL SERVICES
New Delhi, 1981

ASIAN EDUCATIONAL SERVICES

C-2/15, SDA, New Delhi-110016

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Published by : J. Jetley
For Asian Educational Services
C-2/15, SDA. New Delhi-110016,

Printed in India
by Paragon Ph. 271626
at Swatantra Bharat Press
423, Esplanade Road, Delhi-110006.

**Dedicated To The Memory
Of My Beloved Parents**

Foreword

This significant study by Dr. Bhagwan Dass Arora relates to an important facet of Indian foreign policy, *i.e.*, India's relations with Asian countries. Asian Relations Conference, though held before Indian independence may well have laid the foundations of the Asian Relations phase of Indian foreign policy. India's support for freedom struggles in Indonesia, Vietnam and countries of Asia-Africa and promotion of ties with China flowed from this phase. It was much later that India decided to devote a large part of its foreign policy resources to the non-aligned movement and improvement of relations between the Super Powers.

The special quality of the Indian-Indonesian relations was a product of India's historical relations with what constitutes Indonesia today in the fields of culture, religion and commerce. The periods of colonial rule in both the countries led to short disruptions in these relations. There cannot be a better indication of the richness of these relations than the very name Indonesians gave to their country.

During the Twentieth Century, India's freedom struggle inspired peoples of Asia from the Arab lands to Indonesia. President Soekarno's writings are full of references to Tilak, Rabindra Nath Tagore, Gandhi, Nehru. Hatta and Nehru came to know each other in the twenties. When Indian troops were sent by the British to Indonesia after the Second World War, India's Nationalist leaders demanded their withdrawal. Free India fought for Indonesia's freedom in the councils of the world. Thus India made a valuable contribution to the cause of Indonesian independence and thereby to Indian-Indonesian friendship. This friendship seemed to be flourishing well till the Bandung Conference.

It appears that after the Bandung Conference, relations between India and Indonesia did not develop as in the past. Indonesia seemed to have discovered that it would play a major role in Asian and African affairs by virtue of her being a major Asian nation. Particularly in the South-East Asian context, Indonesia found herself looming large over the neighbouring areas. If it had any doubts about its magnified image, the Bandung Conference may have dispelled them.

Dr. Arora's study covers the last two decades in Indian-Indonesian relations. This period almost encompasses the entire period of Guided Democracy and the post—1965 political system described as New Order. He has studied these two decades in Indian—

Indonesian relations with full understanding of the relations in the previous period, *i.e.*, from 1945 to 1961. In some ways, this has been a complex and difficult period to study as it had to unravel the contradictions in Indian and Indonesian approaches ranging from the role of the non-aligned movement and the convening of the Second Asian-African Conference to the question of the recognition of the Heng Samrin regime in Kampuchea. Though there is considerable cordiality between India and Indonesia since the emergence of New Order in Indonesia, the relations between the two countries cannot be described as close.

Dr. Arora has patiently gone through virtually all aspects of Indian-Indonesian relations : economic, political and cultural. He has tried to explain what went wrong in what could be described as special relationship in best sense of the term. He notes the absence of "institutional mechanism for interaction in the fields of trade and commerce" and non-materialization of hopes generated by the cultural Agreement of December 1955. In the Political arena, he remarks about the decline in personal relationship between Soekarno and Nehru side by side with their differences about questions of Colonialism and world peace. Further, Dr. Arora establishes that "in the framework of their foreign policies, neither Indonesia figured prominently in Indian calculations nor India did so in Indonesian calculations." While Dr. Arora appears hopeful about the future course of relations between the two countries, the writer of these lines feels that the progress in ties is hardly perceptible. The fault appears to lie with both the sides. India still shows an excessive fascination for global issues and has not yet satisfactorily married its global policy with regional relations which include ties with Indonesia and South-East Asia. Indonesia, on the other hand, has allowed its close ties with ASEAN countries and the United States to cloud the importance of its relations with India. Some of the early successes of Indonesian foreign policy were based on close co-operation with India. This element is significantly missing in the policy of the New Order in that country. Only through its revival can Indonesia project its influence beyond the confines of the Southern part of South-East Asia. It is in this region that *Konfrontasi* was practised. When Indonesia took an initiative on Cambodia in May 1970 after the fall of Sihanouk regime, India's non-cooperation was a decisive factor in its failure. The present differences between India and ASEAN countries over Kampuchea do indicate the relevance of India in South-East Asian affairs.

An Indonesian tilt towards India could be important for the credibility of Indonesia's policy of non-alignment. It may even be necessary in the context of the common fears of the two countries about China. In an ideal Asian world, all countries will have excellent relations but until that happy state is achieved, India and Indonesia may strengthen their ties to mutual advantage. Dr. Arora's study will be of considerable help in pursuing this objective.

(Sd/-)

(VISHAL SINGH)

New Delhi

24 July, 1981.

Preface

The present study is a revised version of the author's thesis approved for the Ph. D. degree of the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University. The text has been suitably altered and an additional chapter covering recent developments added to it.

This is the first comprehensive study on Indian-Indonesian relations in modern times. The choice of the starting year is deliberate. It is during 1961 that the process of alienation that started at the first Asian-African Conference in Bandung (West Java) in April 1955 came to a full circle. This Conference, which represents the high watermark of the friendly relations between the two countries also showed disturbing trends for the future. The year 1961 thus marks a turning point in the Indian-Indonesian relations in recent times.

The fund of mutual goodwill as bequeathed by centuries' old commercial and cultural ties and reinforced by India's spontaneous support to Indonesia during the struggle against the Dutch from 1945 to 1949, seemed to be fast diminishing by the close of the nineteen fifties. The two countries failed to fulfil the expectations aroused at the time of signing of the Friendship Treaty in March 1951. The unsatisfactory performance in the fields of trade and cultural co-operation merely reflected on their failure to evolve an institutional framework through which regular flow of men and materials from one country to the other could be assured. Besides, various forces and factors hindered the growth of cordial relations between India and Indonesia and thus set the trends for future relations between them.

The first Conference of Non-Aligned countries in Belgrade (Yugoslavia) in September 1961 provided the forum where these adverse trends were confirmed and strengthened. The following four years witnessed a sharp fall in Indonesia's image of India. The leaders in the two countries tended to ignore each other's susceptibilities on issues of vital interest to them. An important factor which led to developing strains was a divergent perception of the world view held by Prime Minister Nehru and President Sukarno. This was reflected in their differences in approach to the global issue of peace and war and to issue of colonialism in the region as well as in Asia and Africa. This produced misunderstandings between the two leaders, both at personal and ideological level. The pattern of

domestic politics, the nature of political leadership and the type of national priorities set by them, also did not prove to be conducive to the growth of normal relations. Disregard of each other's feelings on issues of vital importance showed the decreasing importance the two countries attached to each other in their foreign policy calculations. By the beginning of 1965, anti-Indian sentiment in Indonesia rose to a high pitch. Following a pro-China line of hostility towards India, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) made a major contribution to it. Friendship of the early fifties changed into mutual indifference, then into rivalry and, by September 1965, to actual hostility to each other.

All along these years, China and Pakistan proved to be significant external factors trying to damage the Indian-Indonesian relations. In pursuance of their avowedly hostile policies towards India, they co-ordinated their strategies and attempted to drive a wedge between India and Indonesia. Indonesia's anti-Indian posture during the Indo-Pakistan conflict in September 1965 showed the degree of success achieved by them.

The abortive coup in Indonesia in 1965 reversed the domestic and foreign policies of the country and led to the discrediting and elimination of various factors and forces which had practiced a policy of "axis" with China and of alignment with Pakistan. This provided India with an opportunity to seek normalization of its relations with Indonesia. The developments in the two countries' political attitudes on regional and international issues and bilateral relations in the following years showed encouraging trends.

For once sentimentalism gave way to pragmatism as the basis of the Indian-Indonesian relations. With a change in the political environment and shift in priorities from politics to economic development in Indonesia, the two countries found themselves in a serious search for a new equation in their relations. Through the sixties and seventies, as the interaction was in the process of being broadened and deepened, the political differences that arose were never permitted to have an adverse impact on it. This demonstrated the degree of maturity and mutual understanding that was growing between the two countries.

The present study raises certain important questions. For instance, inspite of firm foundations provided by centuries of history and the recent past, why didn't the Indian-Indonesian relations grow as expected? Could sentimentalism be a substitute for pragmatism in inter-state relations in modern times? How far did a

clash of personalities (in this case Nehru's and Sukarno's) affect the the two countries' relations? To what extent were the differing world views of Nehru and Sukarno during the early and mid-sixties responsible for the deterioration? What was the impact of *NASAKOM* politics during the Sukarno era? What were the implications of Sukarno's concept of struggle between the "NEFOS" and the "OLDEFOS" for Indonesia's independent and active foreign policy? How far was this concept a projection of the Indonesian domestic politics on its foreign policy? How and to what extent did the proposal for the formation of Malaysia become a factor in the Indian-Indonesian relations? There developed a sort of rivalry between India and its supporters (Ceylon, now Sri Lanka, the U A.R., and Yugoslavia) and Indonesia and its supporters (China and Pakistan) on the question of convening a second Bandung-type and/or a second Belgrade-type conference. What was the impact of this rivalry on relations between the two states? What was the role of the PKI and the Indonesian Muslim parties and groups? Why did Indonesia fail to pass a judgement on China's aggression on India in October 1962? What was the nature of the role played by China and Pakistan? When President Sukarno chose to support Pakistan during the Indo-Pakistan conflict in September 1965, how far, if at all, was he actuated by a commonly shared Islamic bond with Pakistan? What was the nature and extent of Indonesia's support to Pakistan against India. Following the 1965 coup in Indonesia, as the process of normalization was resumed, what were the difficulties faced and the problems of interaction identified. In the search for a new equation since then, did the two countries' relations ever reach the level of mutual understanding, friendship and co-operation witnessed in the early fifties? What are the newer forms and fields of interaction established during the seventies? What are the possibilities and prospects for the future?

For answers to these and several other questions, the author was able to study and examine most of the English source materials, both primary and secondary, relating not only to India and Indonesia but also China, Pakistan and some non-aligned countries. Besides, with a degree of proficiency in Bahasa Indonesia gained through his pre-Ph. D. Course, the author was also able to use the materials in that language available in India and Indonesia. However, the most important source of information and enlightenment for the author was his extensive interviews with a large number of high Indonesian personages in various fields of activity. The deep

insight in various aspects of the subject of this study gained through these interviews proved extremely valuable and beneficial for this book.

While surveying Indian-Indonesian relations between 1961 and 1980, the author has applied a historical-analytical approach. The two countries' attitudes to various issues of vital importance to them as these emerged during this period have been examined and analysed. The author has made an effort to critically examine the impact of political strains on bilateral trade and economic relations between India and Indonesia. In view of serious efforts on the part of the two countries to seek a new equation of relationship during the late sixties and seventies, the author has also perceived and suggested certain futuristic trends.

The thesis is divided into nine Chapters including Conclusions. For a proper perspective, the first Chapter on "The Background" surveys various facets of Indian-Indonesian relations until 1961. In the light of India's support to Indonesia during the latter's struggle against the Dutch, it studies the actual implementation of various bilateral agreements until 1961, examines the nature and strength of various factors inhibiting growth of normal relations and identifies certain disturbing trends emerging in the two countries' relations. The second Chapter is devoted to the study of Indian-Indonesian attitudes at the Conference of Non-Aligned countries in Belgrade in September 1961. An attempt has been made to focus differences, both at ideological and personal level, between the leaders of the two countries, as these emerged at this Conference. The third Chapter examines their reciprocal attitudes on various occasions and on various issues of direct interest to them. The study of the question of Malaysia in the two countries' relations as a backdrop of their policies towards South-East Asia form an important part of it. The fourth Chapter deals with the Indian-Indonesian attitudes towards the Second Asian-African Conference and highlights their differences of approach towards this Conference and the Conference of the Non-Aligned countries. The next two Chapters are devoted to the study of two external factors in the Indian-Indonesian relations, China and Pakistan. The author has endeavoured to examine these two countries' policies and diplomatic efforts which caused damage to the Indian-Indonesian relations. The seventh Chapter deals with the developments in the two countries' relations in the period following the attempted Indonesian coup in September-October 1965 until December 1967. A survey

and examination of the important developments in the growth and expansion of their interaction during 1968 and 1980 is included in the eighth Chapter. Finally, the conclusions contain the major findings of this study.

For reasons of convenience, the author has used the old system of spellings in Bahasa Indonesia for the names of Indonesian people and places.

In the course of his research work the author received generous help and guidance from a number of persons. First of all he is extremely pleased to acknowledge the debt of gratitude he owes to Dr. Vishal Singh, Professor of South-East Asian Studies of the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University. His constant inspiration, encouragement and guidance have been an important factor in the completion of this volume. The author also expresses his sincere thanks to Professor S.P. Varma, former Head of the Department of Political Science, University of Rajasthan and for some time a Visiting Professor in the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, and Professor Jayanta Kumar Ray, Centenary Professor of International Relations, and Director, Centre for South-East Asian Studies, University of Calcutta, for their extremely valuable comments and suggestions for improvement, abridgement and updating of this study. He is also thankful to Dr. Pushpesh Kumar Pant of the Centre for Diplomatic Studies of the School of International Studies, for having made valuable suggestions for delimiting the subject at the early stages of research. While in Indonesia, the author had the opportunity of discussing various aspects of the subject of this study with most of the top Indonesian political leaders of the nineteen-fifties and early nineteen-sixties including all the Indonesian Prime Ministers and many foreign ministers and diplomats, besides various leaders of Government, Parliament, Political parties, Press and Universities today. He is extremely grateful to all of them for their kind and useful suggestions and valuable pieces of information supplied by them during the interviews.

The author expresses his sincere thanks to the Indian School of International Studies (now School of International Studies of the Jawaharlal Nehru University) for the award of 3-year scholarship (utilized only for October 1966-December 1967), and also for bearing the expenses of his field trip to Indonesia for a period of six months from September 1969 to February 1970. The author collected materials relating to this study from various libraries in New Delhi and Djakarta. He did most of his work in the joint

library of the Indian Council of World Affairs and the School of International Studies at Sapru House. For this he is thankful to Shri Girja Kumar, the Librarian (Now Head of the JNU Library), and other members of the Library staff for their ungrudging help and co-operation. The author also thanks the staff members of the Press Information Bureau library and the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry library, for permitting him to consult some relevant materials. In Djakarta, the author consulted and collected materials relating to the subject from various libraries such as Department of Information library, Department of Foreign Affairs, Research Bureau library, Department of Education and Culture, Central Museum library, Antara National Newsagency Institute and Jajasan Idaju (Toko Buku Gunung Agung) for newspaper clippings. He expresses his thanks to the authorities of these institutions for their kind permission and spontaneous co-operation in facilitating his research work.

The author is grateful to all the friends in Indonesia who inspired and helped him in various ways. In this connection, he is happy to mention respectfully the names of Mrs. Miriam Budiardjo, Head of the Political Science Department, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Indonesia, Djakarta, Mr. Kapto Sunoto, Head, Foreign Information, Department of Information, Mr. Ilen Surianegara, Director, Education Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs and Mr. Izak Mahdi, Director, Research Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs, Djakarta. Still another person whom this author remembers with gratitude for his kindness and co-operation is Professor Sumantri Praptokusumo, Secretary and Treasurer, Jajasan Siswa Lokantara, Djakarta. The author owes a special debt of gratitude to his wife, Santosh Arora, and his son and daughter, Deepak and Nutan, who suffered all sorts of privations in the process of preparation of this book and without whose ungrudging help and co-operation this study may not have seen the light of the day. In the end, the author is thankful to all the friends in New Delhi who encouraged and helped him in various ways.

The author owes a sense of gratitude to the Jawaharlal Nehru University for offering a grant for facilitating the publication of his Ph. D. thesis.

Needless to say that the author alone is responsible for the views expressed in this book.

BHAGWAN DASS ARORA

New Delhi, July 1981.

Contents

	<i>Pages</i>
Foreword	vii
Preface	xi
Contents	xvii
 <i>Chapters</i>	
1. The Background	1—51
Geographical Aspects	1
Historical Contacts	3
Contacts During the Colonial Period	7
India and the Indonesian Freedom Struggle	9
Developments During 1950-1961	18
Co-operation Between Indian and Indonesian Armed Forces	19
Bilateral Trade Relations	25
Cultural Relations	29
Factors Impeding Growth of Normal Relations	33
Developments in the Domestic Field	42
Foreign Policy Attitudes	44
 2. India and Indonesia at the Belgrade Conference	 53—90
Importance of the Belgrade Conference	53
Early Attitudes and Initial Moves	54
India's Reactions and Indonesia's Responses	56
Attitudes at the Preparatory Meeting	61
India's Preparations	68
Indonesia's Preparations	69
International Situation	70
Introducing Belgrade Conference	71
President Sukarno's Views	73
Prime Minister Nehru's Views	74
Behind-the-Scenes Developments	77
Differences in the Open	82
India's Achievements	83
Indonesian Reactions to the Outcome of the Conference	85
Impact on Indian-Indonesian Relations	88
 3. Bilateral Relations and The Malaysia Question	 91—149
Goa Issue	91
West Irian question and India's Attitude	95

<i>Chapters</i>	<i>Pages</i>
Sondhi Episode	99
China's Attack on India and Indonesia's Reactions	107
Indonesia's Initial Reactions to Malaysia Proposal	113
India's Initial Responses	115
Indonesia Changes its Attitude	117
Indonesia's Aspirations for a Regional Role	122
Reactions in India	124
Indonesia, the Maphilindo Scheme and the Attitude of India	126
PKI's Opposition to Maphilindo	128
Inauguration of Malaysia and Indian Reactions	129
Attitude of the PKI	133
India's Later Reactions	134
Growing Tensions in Indian-Indonesian Relations	143
Impact on Bilateral Relations in the Trade, Cultural and Other Fields	144
4. India, Indonesia and the Second Asian-African Conference	151—189
Indonesia's Motivations and Efforts	151
India's Responses	153
Indonesia's Attitude After the "Sondhi Affair"	155
Efforts for the Second Non-Aligned Conference	156
Reactions in India	157
Indonesia's Attitudes	158
Preparatory Meeting of the Second Non-Aligned Conference	159
Indonesian Domestic Pressures Against Participation in the Non-Aligned Conference	161
Preparatory Meeting of the Second Asian-African Conference	163
Indian Proposals at the Preparatory Meeting and Reactions in Indonesia	166
Indonesia and India at the Second Non-Aligned Conference	172
Fall in Indonesia's Image of India	178
Indian Efforts to Seek Postponement of the Algiers Conference and Indonesian Reactions	184
5. China's Role	191—234
Indonesian Attitude Towards China Following the Bandung Conference, April 1955	192

<i>Chapters</i>	<i>Pages</i>
Difficulties over the overseas Chinese Issue and Patching up of Sino-Indonesian Differences	194
Anti-Indian Motivations of China's Attitude Towards Indonesia	196
China and the Belgrade Conference	198
China and the "Sondhi Affair", and the GANEFO	201
China and the Malaysia Question	204
China and Second Asian-African Conference	208
Misgivings in India	222
China and the Tenth Anniversary Celebrations	224
China's Role After April 1965	226
6. Pakistan's Role	235—274
First Phase	235
Second Phase	245
President Sukarno's visit to Pakistan	253
Pro-Pakistani Shift in Indonesia's Attitude	256
Third Phase	258
Pakistani-Indonesian Relations in the Field of Trade and Commerce	258
Developments in Political Relations	260
Indonesia and the Indo-Pakistan Conflict	268
7. Process of Normalization, September 1965—December 1967	275—310
Action Against the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI)	275
Replacement of Sukarno	277
Strains in Indonesian-Chinese Relations	278
Indian Assessment of Post-Coup Developments in Indonesia	285
Two Countries' Eagerness to Normalize Relations	288
Adam Malik's Visit to India	292
Relations in the Field of Trade and Commerce	294
M.C. Chagla's Visit to Indonesia	298
A New Phase in Indian-Indonesian Relations	305
8. Postscript : Interaction During 1968-1980	311—333
Conference on Cambodia	312
Bangladesh Question	315

<i>Chapters</i>	<i>Pages</i>
Indo-Soviet Treaty	316
Search for a new Equation	317
President Fakhruddin Ali Ahmad's Visit to Indonesia	321
Foreign Minister Adam Malik's Visit to India	321
Forging New Links	322
Indian-Indonesian Joint Industrial Projects	325
Misunderstandings on India's Attitude Towards Kampuchea	327
Healthy Trends in Indian-Indonesian Relations	330
Problems and Prospects	331
9. Conclusions	335—347
Bibliography	349
List of Persons Interviewed	368

1

The Background

Centuries before the British and the Dutch imposed their colonial rule over India and Indonesia, the two countries had been enjoying mutually beneficial trade and cultural relations. Colonialism only tended to create barriers between them. About two decades before independence, their leaders revived their age-old contacts at the Bierville Congress in August 1926 and the Brussels Conference in February 1927. During the mid-nineteen-forties when India appeared to be on the threshold of independence, the nationalist leadership in India became a source of inspiration and encouragement to its counterpart in Indonesia. India's spontaneous and ungrudging moral and political support to the Indonesian Republic before and during the Dutch "police actions" in July 1947 and December 1948, created among the Indonesians a reservoir of goodwill for India and its leaders. It roused expectations that after regaining independence the two countries would resume their ancient commercial and cultural ties.

But in about ten to fifteen years of their independence, the top leaders of India and Indonesia came to adopt divergent approaches to issues of national and international importance. Certain factors led to mutual prejudices even at personal level and ultimately to the hardening of attitudes at the first Conference of Non-Aligned States in Belgrade (Yugoslavia) in September 1961. A survey of such factors as well as those on the positive side would be meaningful if seen in the context of India's overall contribution to the cause of Indonesia's independence. But since India's moral, diplomatic and even material support to Indonesia in the late nineteen-forties was, at least partly, a product of warmth existing in the pre-colonial era, an examination of age-old relations between the two countries is relevant. In this connection it would be useful to examine the impact of geography on their relations.

Geographical Aspects

In the history of relations between India and Indonesia, geography has played an important role. Indonesia, an Archipelago with

over three thousand islands, has a population of about 113 million and an area of 735, 865 square miles.¹ In Asia, it is the third largest nation, after China and India. Lying across the Bay of Bengal, the Indonesian Archipelago provides a natural link between the two Oceans, the Indian and the Pacific, and between two continents, Asia and Australia. By virtue of its geographical situation on the ancient Asian sea trade route joining China in the north with India in the west and lands beyond it, Indonesia since the beginning of the Christian era came to form an important link in the eastern chain of "the powerful, wealthy, extensive overseas trade of the Indian coastal towns."² The rich potential resources of Indonesian islands provided a strong incentive to the Indian merchants and the proximity of the two countries facilitated links between their peoples. The highly developed shipping industry and the navigational skills developed in India coupled with the sea-faring traditions of both the coastal Indians and Indonesians facilitated the commercial links. Hippalus's discovery of the regular action of Trade winds, the "Monsoons", in 79 A.D.³ gave a push to the sea trade through the Bay of Bengal across the Straits of Malacca and Sunda.⁴ For the major part the trade was through the sea, the voyage being shorter from the Coromandel Coast to the Straits of Malacca and safer following the regular timings of the South-west Monsoons. With trade and commerce had spread India's culture and civilization, and this could be attributed to the geographical setting of Indonesia. The domestic pressures, a spirit of adventure and lure of wealth might have inspired the flow of Indian traders, settlers and missionaries

1 Luman, H. Long, ed., *The World Almanac and Book of Facts* (New York, 1970), p. 529. The population is according to the United Nations estimates of 1968. Today Indonesia's population has grown to between 135 and 140 million.

2 J. C. Van Leur, *Indonesian Trade and Society* (Essays in Asian Social and Economic History), (The Hague-Bandung, 1955), p. 90.

3 Kalidas Nag, "A Study in Indian Internationalism" (Greater India—III), *Greater India* (Calcutta, Institute of Asian-African Relations, 1960), p. 132. K.M. Panikkar mentions Hippalus's discovery in 45 A.D. See K.M. Panikkar, *India and Indian Ocean* (Second Impression) (London, 1946), p. 22.

4 It is well established that even before the Hippalus's discovery, the Indians thoroughly navigated the Bay of Bengal and knew trade routes in the east. Sylvain Levi has remarked in his *The Pre-Aryan and Pre-Dravidian in India*, thus : "The movement which carried Indian civilisation towards different parts of the globe about the beginning of the Christian Era was far from inaugurating any new route. Adventurers, traffickers and missionaries profited by the technical progress of navigation" which had already become familiar. Quoted in Panikkar, n. 3, pp. 26-27.

into the Archipelago. But one of the major contributory factors to the development of at least two thousand years of contacts between the two peoples was the short and easily navigable sea.

Strategically also Indonesia occupies an important position. It lies on the world trade routes. The Malacca and the Sunda Straits, the major sea-lanes of the Indonesian Islands, form the life-lines of India's sea-borne trade and commerce with the East. Even looked at from the defence angle, security of the entire eastern seaboard of India can be threatened in case Indonesia takes a hostile posture. The developments during the Second World War are a pointer in this direction.

Historical Contacts

Obviously, the civilization and culture that the Indonesians have inherited from their past carry the imprint of the rich ancient Indian culture. In fact pre-colonial Indonesian history, like that of the whole of South-East Asia, is an unbroken story of the inflow of religious and cultural influences from India. Though all the peoples across the Bay of Bengal have received varying degrees of the impress of Indian culture and civilization, the one received by Indonesia is the most profound. Java, one of the five largest islands, the most fertile and populous, witnessed what Quaritch Wales describes as "the heaviest Indianization".⁵ This did not, however, mean that Indonesia was always at the receiving end. Palembang, the capital of the Sumatran state of Srivijaya, which became a famous centre of Mahayana Buddhism, attracted scholars from far and wide. The renowned Atisha who reformed Tibetan Buddhism is said to have studied there from 1011 to 1023 A.D. under Dharmakirti, the head of the Buddhist clergy in Sumatra.⁶ In the long historical process of commercial and cultural exchange, Indonesia came to share with India her religions, her language, art and architecture. Before this process was interrupted by the arrival of the Portuguese during the first quarter of the sixteenth century, prolonged contacts with India and its culture and civilization had already enriched Indonesian languages, art and literature, architecture and its concepts of law and government. Commercial relations had a history longer than that of the cultural contacts between the

5 H.G. Quaritch Wales, *The Making of Greater India : A Study in South-East Asian Cultural Change* (London, 1951), p. 195.

6 The Tibetan biography of Atisha calls Sumatra the chief centre of Buddhism and Dharmakirti the greatest scholar of his time. See D.G.E. Hall, *A History of South-East Asia* (London, etc., 1964), p. 58.

two nations. Brian Harrison is "certain that from at least the sixth century B.C. onwards Indian traders were sailing to those lands, and down through the islands, in search of gold and tin."⁷ Indonesia's position as a link in the Asian trade route has already been described. The Indian trade settlements lying mostly on the fringes of the Indonesian territory bordering on the main seaways might have grown out of requirements of the monsoons and business necessities.

The merchants were followed by political adventurers and religious missionaries.⁸ It was the religious missionaries, the Brahmins of India, however, who spread the various forms and cults of Hinduism and Buddhism.⁹ But the Indonesians they originally met were certainly "not uncultivated savages but organised societies endowed with a civilization...that had some traits in common with their own."¹⁰ G. Coedes describes this position as Indian superstructure upon an indigenous sub-stratum, whereas van den Bosch refers to it as the product of the fecundation of the living matter of Indonesian society by the Indian spirit, procreating and allowing to develop an independent organism.¹¹

7 Brian Harrison, *Southeast Asia : A Short History* (London, 1966), p. 10.

8 R. C. Majumdar, *Ancient Indian Colonization in South-East Asia* (The Maharaja Sayajirao Gaekwad Honorarium Lecture, 1953-1954), (Baroda, Oriental Institute, 1963), edn. 2, pp. 8-9. Majumdar describes his "imaginary picture" of how Hindu cultural influences spread in South-East Asia. In his opinion these "were the pioneers of the Hindu Colonization in South-East Asia."

9 Van Leur, n. 2, p. 99. Van Leur rejects Krom's thesis of traders being the disseminators of Indian culture as "inaccurate to the core". He concedes that "large amount of cultural influence will have been transmitted by trade and the traders". But in the field of specific facets of Indian culture, he refuses to give as large a role to the trader as Krom gives in his *Geschiedenis*, pp. 67-81.

10 G. Coedes, *The Indianized States of South East-Asia*, (Walter F. vella ed. and Susan Brown Cowing tr.) (Honolulu, 1968), p. 9. Both Majumdar and K.A. Nilakanta Sastri, the two noted Indian writers on South-East Asia, broadly agree with this contention. Majumdar is, however, critical of Western writers such as Quaritch Wales and "others who think like him" for their "conscious or unconscious attempt to exaggerate the local factor and belittle the importance of Hindu element and thereby change the entire conception of the value and importance of Hindu culture in South-East Asia." See Majumdar, n. 8, pp. 14-15 and K.A. Nilakanta Sastri, *South Indian Influences in the Far East* (Bombay, 1949), pp. 4-5.

11 Hall, n. 6, pp. 21-22. See also B.R. Chatterji, *History of Indonesia* (Meerut, Delhi, Calcutta, 1967), edn. 3, pp. 1-2. Professor Chatterji

The process of intermingling continued for centuries and ultimately resulted in the evolution of a sort of composite culture and civilization. In due course, the Indonesians came to share with the Indians their traditions, cultural values, ways of worship, patterns of social and political behaviour and organisation. With the continuance of trade and spread of Indian culture, earlier trade settlements came to be converted into various "Hinduized" kingdoms.¹² The Western as well as Indian historians on South-East Asia and especially on Indonesia are convinced that the Hindu-Buddhist kingdoms existed in the Indonesian Islands of Java and Sumatra as far back as the beginning of the Christian era. The names of the empires of Srivijaya, Kalinga and Mataram, of Singhasari and Majapahit are the most prominent. The Hindu-Buddhist empires in the Indonesian Archipelago constitute a significant epoch in its pre-colonial history, and are even today looked upon as a source of unity and a symbol of national pride and identity.

Their major importance lies in the rich contribution made by their rulers in the fields of art, literature and architecture. The eighth century Buddhist monument of Borobudur, with three miles of galleries and four hundred statues of the Buddha, and the ninth century Hindu temple at Prambanan (both near Jogjakarta in Central Java), are a mute and magnificent testimony of Indo-Indonesian cultural relations in ancient times. The other living signs of it today are the Indonesian names, their languages and script, and the shadow plays based on the Ramayana and the Mahabharata.

The period of Hindu-Buddhist religious and cultural influences came to an end with the fall of the Majapahit empire.¹³ This was followed by two important events in Indonesian history - the spread of Islam and the capture of Malacca by the Portuguese. In the first quarter of the sixteenth century the coastal regions of Java had

stresses the point "that it was on soil, holding great promise as regards its richness, that seeds of Indian culture were sown. It was to bear a wonderfully fine harvest and each people in this region—the Khmers, the Chams, the Mons, the Javanese, was to develop and mould this culture according to its own traditions."

12 Coedes, n. 10, p. 24. Coedes mentions here two different ways in which a simple commercial settlement was transformed into an organised political entity.

13 According to the Javanese tradition, Majapahit was conquered by a coalition of Mohammedan States in 1478 A.D. In fact, as Hall asserts, there is a clear evidence that a Hindu king, Ranavijaya, was reigning there in 1486 A.D. See Hall, n. 6, p. 89.

come under Muslim rule.¹⁴ By then Goa, a port on the western coast of India, had also been occupied by the Portuguese. The following years saw the gradual eclipse of the Indonesian Muslim as well as Arab control over the Ocean trade routes and growing political hegemony of the Portuguese. In course of time, India became a part of the British overseas empire and Indonesia was controlled by the Dutch, the latter having ousted the Portuguese from Malacca in 1641.

It is, however, surprising that India whose religions, culture and civilization spread far and wide and left its lasting impression on the peoples to the east, does not find any record of its achievements in ancient and medieval history. A few names like "Suvarnadvipa" and "Yava-dvipa" appear in the Indian epics, the Ramayana and the Puranas, centuries before the first Indian kingdoms were established in the Indonesian Archipelago. In fact, the credit of restoring the Indonesian history and India's contribution to its making goes exclusively to the Dutch scholars. Thanks to their spirit of enquiry and their hard and consistent labour, they restructured in their famous works the rich and glorious cultural past of India and consequently consciousness began to dawn about the centuries old Indian-Indonesian give and take. But since what they wrote was in the Dutch language, it remained unknown to Indian scholars for a long time. Some knowledge of the Dutch works on South-East Asia induced the Indian scholars to peep through their nation's past. This led in 1926 to the establishment of Greater India Society in Calcutta. The next year saw publication by the Society of *India and Java*, which gave a well-documented history of the two countries' relations, and, as such, it represented the first—ever scholarly attempt by the Indians themselves towards rehabilitating their ancient history of cultural expansion across the Bay of Bengal.¹⁵

In 1927 Rabindra Nath Tagore visited Java. He was the first prominent Indian to have visited Indonesia after the British and the Dutch had occupied India and Indonesia. Pride of India's past reveals itself in Tagore's words which read : "To know my country one has to travel to that age, when she realized her soul and thus transcended her physical boundaries, when she revealed her being in a radiant magnanimity which illumined the eastern horizon,

14 Hall, n. 6, p. 89. This is evident from a report sent in January 1514 to the King of Portugal by di Brito, the Portuguese Governor of Malacca.

15 B.R. Chatterji. *India and Java*. Part I (History), Greater India Society, Bulletin 5, (Calcutta, 1933), edn. 2, pp. 86.

making her recognized as their own by those in alien shores who were awakened to the surprise of life.”¹⁶ Commenting on the first impression he had gathered from reading a detailed account of the history of South-East Asia, Jawaharlal Nehru said : “...how amazed I was and excited I became. New panoramas opened out before me, new perspectives of history, new conceptions of India’s past, and I had to adjust all my thinking and previous notions to them. Champa, Combodia and Angkor, Sri Vijaya and Majapahit suddenly rose out of the void, vibrant with that instinctive feeling which makes the past touch the present.”¹⁷

Contacts During the Colonial Period

During two hundred years of British rule in India and three hundred and fifty years of Dutch rule in Indonesia, contacts between the two countries were snapped. For their own reasons the colonial rulers imposed stringent barriers between them. Bound to the mother countries their trade and economy were channeled through capitals in Europe.

While under the colonial rule, the Indian and Indonesian delegates met in the Bierville Congress for Peace in Europe in August 1926 and in the Brussels Congress against Imperialism in February 1927. These Conferences provided the leaders of the two countries with an opportunity to revive their centuries old acquaintances. At Bierville Congress K.M. Panikkar of India joined Mohamad Hatta of Indonesia in voicing his opposition to the “unholy race for the imperialistic exploitation of weaker peoples.”¹⁸ They shared each other’s views on issues of world peace, European rivalry in Asia and the subjection of the Asiatic peoples. They signed the “Manifest” of the Asian delegates, which pleaded for freedom of Asian countries from European colonialism.¹⁹ The Brussels Congress which met next year was expected to “constitute a turning point in the history of the struggle for colonial emancipa-

16 Quoted in Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India* (Calcutta, 1946), p. 227. See also J.D. Casparis, “Historical Writings of Indonesia – Early Period” in D.G.E. Hall ed., *Historians of South-East Asia* (London, 1961), p. 129. Casparis considers it “a part of the national revival of India.” The quotation formed part of the preface to the Journal of the Greater India Society (1934) as written by Rabindra Nath Tagore.

17 Ibid., p. 228.

18 Mohammad Hatta, *Verspreide Geschriften* (Djakarta etc., 1952), p. 151

19 Ibid., pp. 152-53.

tion.”²⁰ It led to the creation of the “League Against Imperialism and for National Independence”. It declined in importance because of the stigma of Communism carried by it as also because of the conflict between the communist and the nationalist leaderships. It, however, provided an opportunity to revive contacts between the Indian and Indonesian representatives who were destined to be among the greatest leaders of their respective countries. They were Jawaharlal Nehru and Mohammad Hatta. Nehru evinced keen interest in the Indonesian representatives to the Brussels Congress and in the understanding of the Indonesian people, their names, their religion and culture.²¹

These early contacts, at a later stage, rendered the freedom struggles in the two countries mutually complementary. India’s struggle for independence became a source of inspiration to the freedom fighters in Indonesia. The thoughts and deeds of the Indian leaders like Rabindra Nath Tagore, Bal Gangadhar Tilak and Mahatma Gandhi left deep impression on the minds of the Indonesian leaders including Sukarno.²²

The Brussels Congress had greatly influenced Nehru and through him the Indian National Congress. Since then, the attitude of the Indian National Congress towards foreign policy issues had grown quite assertive.²³ With the contacts with the Asians and Africans established in Brussels, its interest in their nationalist movements had increased.²⁴ By 1942, the year of Quit India Resolution, the Indian struggle for freedom from British colonialism became a symbol of the struggle of the people of Asia and Africa. Yet India’s

20 *International Press Correspondence*, vol. 7, no. 11, February 3, 1927, p. 246.

21 See “Report submitted by Jawaharlal Nehru to the All India Congress Committee on the International Congress against Imperialism held at Brussels in February 1927”, in Bimla Prasad, *The Origins of Indian Foreign Policy* (Calcutta etc., 1962, edn. 2, p. 288.

22 Recalling his entry in politics in the 1920s, President Sukarno once said : “The great poet Tagore inspired me as a beginner in the national movement ; later Mahatma Gandhi electrified me with courage of conviction to carry the struggle to its logical end.” See Government of the Republic of Indonesia, *Friendly Relations : Indonesia-India*, Special Issue 27 (Djakarta, Ministry of Information, 1958), pp. 7-8.

23 Bimla Prasad, n. 21, p. 71. Assertion of an independent role in India’s foreign policy had already been indicated in the draft submitted by Mahatma Gandhi to the All India Congress Committee in November 1921.

24 *Ibid.*, p. 80. This became evident from the May 1927 declaration of the All India Congress Committee in Madras, supporting the anti-colonial struggles in China, Mesopotamia, Persia, Egypt, Syria and Palestine, and demanding of withdrawal of Indian troops from these and all other British and other European colonies.

direct support to Indonesia's cause for freedom had to wait until the end of the Second World War. The inter-war period only saw intensification of the struggle for freedom in both the countries. Whereas India continued its march towards independence under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru in its own non-violent way, the Japanese occupation of Indonesia gave a different, rather violent, turn to its nationalist struggle. Subsequently, under the leadership of Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta, Indonesia proclaimed its independence on August 17, 1945, two years before India achieved its independence from the British.

India and the Indonesian Freedom Struggle

In September 1945 the British Indian troops landed in Djakarta (now Jakarta) with the specific objective of disarming the Japanese forces. Finding the newly-established Indonesian Republic threatened with extinction, and that too at the hands of the British forces composed mostly of the Indian soldiers, India, still in bondage, responded actively and positively to forestall the reimposition of the Dutch rule.

Reacting sharply, the All India Congress Committee, on September 23, 1945, expressed its "anxiety" at the developments in Indonesia and other countries in South-East Asia and categorically stated that India would "deeply resent the continuation of an imperialist policy" in the region. It also took "strong objection to the use of Indian troops in maintaining imperialist domination over any of these countries."²⁵ In a statement on October 19, 1945, the President of the Indian National Congress, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, expressed his "deep resentment" over the "use of Indian troops" in suppressing the aspirations of the Indonesian nationalists. He declared: "Things have now come to such a point when the Indian National Congress will have to consider seriously what steps to adopt to prevent the use of Indian men and materials against Asiatic peoples fighting for their freedom."²⁶ Nehru pointed out the gap

25 *Indian National Congress, March 1940 to September 1946* (Being the resolutions passed by the Congress, the All India Congress Committee and the Working Committee), (Allahabad, General Secretary, A.I. C.C., n.d), pp. 45-46.

26 *The Hindu* (Madras), October 21, 1945. The Congress President had also joined V.K. Krishna Menon (the Secretary, India League) in dispatching a strong letter of protest to the British Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, against the Pro-Dutch British attitude towards Indonesia. Others who criticized the British attitude towards Indonesia's freedom struggle included the Birmingham India League and Pandit Hridayanath Kunzru, President of the Servants of India Society.

between professions and actions of the Western leaders in so far as the freedom struggles in Asia were concerned. In an interview with an Associated Press of India correspondent in Ajmer, Nehru said : "It is fantastic to talk of freedom, democracy and of the San Francisco Charter and at the same time to suppress by force the independence movement in Java." He also described the "far reaching consequences" of "extreme bitterness" and "large-scale racial and continental conflicts" this colonial policy might lead to, and declared: "The struggle in Java is becoming more intense and it has become the acid test of the policy of the United Nations, more especially of that of England, and the U.S.A."²⁷ Only two days before, Nehru had demanded withdrawal of "the British troops that are in effective occupation of Java." He had also openly supported "Sukarno's Government" and felt that the Republic should be accorded immediate international recognition.²⁸ In December 1945 the Working Committee of the Indian National Congress pledged its support to the struggle for freedom in Indonesia and declared that any support given to the designs of the imperialist powers in those countries caused resentment throughout Asia. It also showed special distress and anger at the British use of Indian soldiers in support of colonialism in these countries.²

Side by side, the Congress members of the New Legislative Assembly, which met for the first time in January 1946, started building pressures to compel the British Indian Government to withdraw Indian soldiers from Indonesia and to stop further aid of any sort to the Dutch. Various participants in the debate on an adjournment motion relating to the Government permitting the use of Indian troops in Indonesia strongly denounced the British policy.³⁰ Another such debate took place on February 12, 1946. The Government was censured for its "failure to instruct its delegate to the U.N.O. to convey to the Security Council.....the strong

27 Ibid., October 25, 1945.

28 Ibid., October 23, 1945. Nehru made this observation in response to a query about the Indonesian Vice-President Mohammad Hatta's demand for withdrawal of the Dutch troops and for the British troops to concern themselves with the preservation of law and order. He was talking to the Associated Press of India correspondent in Jaipur.

29 Bimla Prasad, n. 21, p. 228.

30 The strong critics of the British policy included Professor N.G. Ranga, Dewan Chaman Lal, Abdur Rahman Siddiqi and Sarat Chandra Bose. See Government of India, *Legislative Assembly Debates*, vol. 1, no. 1, 21 January 1946, pp. 68-82.

views of the elected members of the Assembly on the subject of Anglo-Dutch operations against the Nationalist Forces of Indonesia.”³¹

The sympathy and support, the Indian National Congress and its leaders offered to the cause of Indonesian independence was reminiscent of the centuries' old fellow feeling between the Indians and Indonesians. This process continued with time. India's moral and diplomatic support increased to suit the change in conditions in Indonesia. Towards the second half of August 1946, the Indonesian leaders wanted a breathing time to consolidate their political-military position against the combined Anglo-Dutch action. If the Indian National Congress could force the Indian Government to withdraw Indian soldiers from Indonesia, it would be a great service to the cause of Indonesian freedom. The Indian leaders thus directed their energies to this noble end. With the establishment of an Interim Government in India in the first week of September 1946, the position changed considerably. The Interim Government led by Jawaharlal Nehru could now take steps unfettered by the directions from London. In a radio broadcast on September 7, 1946, Nehru said, among other things : “India has followed with anxious interest the struggle of the Indonesians for freedom and to them we send our good wishes.”³² On September 26, he made a major policy statement clarifying India's attitude towards issues of regional and international importance. In this statement, Nehru emphasized four essential tenets of free India's foreign policy, viz., non-involvement in other people's quarrels, opposition to policing other countries, to the use of any Indian resources, men or money, against the freedom struggle in any country, elimination of colonialism from all over Asia and Africa, and, finally, establishment of racial equality.³³

31 *The Hindu*, February 14, 1946. An adjournment motion to this effect was passed by the Central Assembly without a division. The type of assurances the Indian National Congress gave to the “sister Asiatic nations” at this stage could be seen from a statement in the debate by one of its members, Sekhar Sanyal. He said : “We want it to be known to our sister Asiatic nations that we are of them and with them and whatever has been done by irresponsible Government has been done without our knowledge and consent.”

32 Jawaharlal Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy* (Selected Speeches, September 1946-April 1961, (Delhi, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting of the Government of India, 1961), p. 3.

33 See Bimla Prasad, n. 21, p. 249.

By November 1946, all the Indian troops had been ordered out of Indonesia.³⁴ This was the first major and practical step India took to strengthen Indonesian freedom before it was herself fully independent. This also served to convince all the countries, east and west of India, of India's genuine desire to strengthen freedom movements against colonialism.

Asian Relations Conference

The Asian Relations Conference, which took place in New Delhi from March 23 to April 2, 1947, was an important landmark in the history of India and all other countries in Asia. Of all the countries, however, it had special significance for Indonesia. For the first time after over three hundred years of Dutch rule, a large number of Indonesians had found their way out of their country into a gathering of representatives from all over Asia. There was a great jubilation among the Indonesians on the prospect of going to New Delhi and meeting their fellow Indians and Asians after a long spell of Dutch rule.³⁵

From Indian point of view, the Conference provided Nehru with an important occasion to set down in clearer terms the basic objectives of free India's foreign policy. The "answering echo" and the "magnificent response" that India's invitation evoked from all over Asia enabled him to hark back to the past when all the Asian nations enjoyed mutually beneficial contacts. Forging links broken during the colonial period appeared to be top-most in Nehru's mind.³⁶ The major objectives were to be political freedom to be followed by social and economic regeneration.

In his inaugural address to the Conference, Nehru called for reassertion of Asia's role in the world politics and economy. "...Asia

34 *Asian Relations, Being Report of the Proceedings and Documentation of the First Asian Relations Conference, New Delhi, March-April 1947* (New Delhi, Asian Relations Organization, 1948), p. 77. This information was given by Nehru, while clarifying the Indian position regarding several points raised during the discussions on the topic "National Movements for Freedom". It related to the use of Indian soldiers and arms in certain countries of South-East Asia.

35 Personal impressions gathered during an interview with Mrs. Sutan Sjahrir, Djakarta, October 6, 1969. She was among the large Indonesian contingent participating in the Conference.

36 *Asian Relations, being Report*, n. 34, p. 23. As Nehru himself put it in his inaugural address, "one of the notable consequences of the European domination of Asia has been the isolation of the countries of Asia from one another." And this "isolation" needed to be removed.

is again finding herself", he declared. In this role of Asia, India occupied a pivotal position. Although Nehru declared that "there are no leaders and no followers", he stressed the strategic importance of India's role. He viewed a free India as "the natural centre and focal point of the many forces at work in Asia." In this connection he invited the attention of the distinguished gathering to the streams of culture that have flowed into India from Central, West and South-East Asia and the Far East and *vice versa* in the centuries past.³⁷

In this framework of Nehru's Asia policy, Indonesia came to be the first serious case. Centuries of relations with the Indonesians obliged the Indian leaders to do everything possible to prevent the Dutch from reimposing their colonial rule over Indonesia. Besides, while fighting for its own freedom, India could not compromise with European colonialism anywhere. With the strengthening of Indonesian independence was linked the question of India's own freedom. Dutch control over Indonesia, lying at a sea distance of about a hundred miles, could always pose a threat to the security and territorial integrity of India.³⁸ Moreover, it would also imperil India's seaborne trade across the Bay of Bengal. All considerations pointed in the direction of blocking the Dutch from re-establishing their colonial rule. Many steps were thus taken to consolidate Indonesia's freedom. One of the major contributions was to enable the Indonesian delegation, including former Prime Minister Sutan Sjahrir, to participate in the First Asian Relations Conference. This, coupled with Nehru's espousal of Indonesia's case, made the Indonesian problem an Asian problem. Thus the entire Asia came to have a stake in Indonesia's independence.

With other participating delegates to the Conference, Nehru welcomed the representatives from Indonesia, "whose history", he recalled, "is intertwined with India's culture."³⁹ Later while wel-

37 Ibid., pp. 23-24.

38 Two years later, in the course of his speech at the Indian Council of World Affairs in New Delhi on March 22, 1949, Nehru said that "the problem of Indonesia is more important to us than many European problems. Geography, perhaps, is responsible, if you like. Whatever the reason may be, the real reason ultimately is not merely geography, but a feeling deep down in our minds that if some kind of colonial domination continues in Indonesia, and is permitted to continue, it will be a danger to the whole of Asia, to us in India as well as to other countries". See Nehru, n. 32, p. 262.

39 *Asian Relations, being Report*, n. 34, p. 22. The Indonesian delegation comprising 25 members and six observers was led by Dr. Abu Hanifa ; Sutan Sjahrir, then Adviser to the President of Indonesia, joined the Conference at a later stage. See pp. 271-2.

coming Sutan Sjahrir to the Conference on April 1, 1947, the Indian leader commended the "important part" Indonesia had been playing "in Asian and world events in recent years" and said that the participation of the Indonesian leader was "of considerable significance for our Conference and for us in India."⁴⁰ On their part the Indonesian leaders expressed their gratitude for all that India had been doing for their country. Dr. Abu Hanifa, leader of the Indonesian delegation, recalled how in contrast to the "Dutch imperialists" and the "Japanese fascists", the Indians in the centuries past visited Indonesia "with good intentions".⁴¹ Addressing the closing Plenary (Public) Session of the Conference on April 2, 1947, Sutan Sjahrir described his visit to India as "brief but memorable" and concluded his speech by extending "warm thanks" to "India in particular" for the "great moral and material support you have given us in our struggle." "Many as our faults are", he continued, "we Indonesians have never been and never will be guilty of ingratitude."⁴²

India and the First Dutch "Police Action"

In the meantime, some serious developments took place in Indonesia. Unreconciled to the prospect of losing their colonial empire, the Dutch threw the Linggadjati Agreement of March 25, 1947⁴³ to the winds and resorted to armed repression of the Indonesian Republic. This so-called Dutch "police action" put their sincerity in doubt. Not surprisingly, it aroused strong emotions in India. India could not view with equanimity the Dutch efforts at reimposing their rule.

Reacting sharply to the Dutch attack on the Indonesian Republic on July 24, 1947, Nehru declared that "no European country, whatever it might be, has any business to use its army in Asia. Foreign armies functioning on Asian soil are themselves an outrage to Asian sentiment. The fact that they are bombing defenceless people is a scandalous thing. If other members of the United Nations tolerate this or remain inactive, then the United Nations Organisation ceases to be." The Indian leader (then Nehru was Vice-President of the Interim Government and Member of Foreign

40 Ibid., p. 79.

41 Ibid., p. 48.

42 Ibid., pp. 241-2.

43 The Linggadjati Agreement was the outcome of the Dutch-Republic of Indonesia negotiations initiated under the combined Indian and Soviet pressure since October 1946.

Affairs) described the Dutch action as an "astounding thing" which "the new spirit of Asia will not tolerate". Expressing India's attitude on the issue, he declared : "We will give every possible help."⁴⁴ Four days later, on July 28, 1947, he repeated his warning against the use of foreign troops in Asia in these words : "The mere presence of a colonial regime or of foreign troops in any Asian country is an insult and challenge to Asia".⁴⁵ The same day the Government of India announced its decision to terminate Dutch air services flying over India.⁴⁶

By now the Government of India had decided to raise the issue of Indonesia's freedom at the United Nations. In a letter addressed to the UN Secretary-General and delivered on July 30, 1947 Nehru charged the Dutch with bad faith. He expressed his Government's opinion that "this situation endangers the maintenance of international peace" and requested the Security Council "to take the necessary measures" in the framework of the UN Charter, to ease the present situation.⁴⁷

India took up cudgels on behalf of Indonesia in the UN Security Council as well. B.R. Sen, India's representative, raised the Indonesian question and called upon the Security Council to ask both the Dutch and the Republic of Indonesia "to revert to the original positions which they held when hostilities broke out." He also asked for a hearing of the case from an Indonesian delegate himself. He warned that "the dispute with which we are dealing today threatens the peace and security of the whole of South-East Asia."⁴⁸ The joint efforts of India and Australia bore fruit when, on August 1, 1947, the Security Council adopted a resolution, calling on both parties (a) to cease hostilities forthwith, (b) to settle their disputes by arbitration or by other peaceful means and keep the Security Council informed about the progress of settlement⁴⁹. Participating in the Security Council debate on August 22, 1947, the Indian representative, Pillai, rebutted the Dutch attempt to raise the question of Security Council's compe-

44 *The Hindu*, July 26, 1947. He made this statement to Pressmen when they were emerging from his house after meeting Sutan Sjahrir.

45 *Ibid.*, July 30, 1947.

46 *Ibid.*

47 United Nations, *Security Council, Official Documents, 1947, Supplement no. 16*, Annexure 41, p. 50.

48 United Nations, *Security Council, Official Documents 1947, Supplement no. 17*, Annexure 41, p. 50.

49 United Nations, *Year Book, 1947-1948*, pp.362-87.

tence to deal with the Indonesian question and described the Dutch tactics "as a prelude for a renewed offensive" against the Republic.⁵⁰ Pillai also expressed the anxiety prevalent among all the Asians and said : "Events in Indonesia, which is in the heart of South-East Asia, are being scrutinized with anxious eyes by the rest of Asia and one of the surest ways of defeating the objectives of the United Nations.....would be the refusal of justice to Indonesia."⁵¹

The Indonesian leaders were, in the meantime, becoming increasingly worried due to two factors—refusal of the Dutch forces to go back to their previous positions, and the prospects of a Dutch-sponsored Federal Government of Indonesia. In view of large areas of the Republic of Indonesia having fallen to the Dutch troops since the beginning of armed hostilities, the prospects of negotiated settlement with an adversary talking from a position of strength could not be very encouraging. The Dutch decision to establish, by the end of 1948, a Federal Government of Indonesia was also causing a lot of anxiety. The Indian representative at the United Nations gave unreserved support to the Republic on both these points. It was clear from the statements made by Pillai at the United Nations Security Council.⁵²

India and the Second Dutch "Police Action"

In fact the Dutch resolve to set up a Federal Government of Indonesia by January 1, 1949 led to further deterioration of the political situation in Indonesia. The Dutch re-started armed action on December 18, 1948, when the Republican leaders ignored their one-day ultimatum. The next day, all the Indonesian leaders were detained by the Dutch Army. There was resentment and shock in India. Chances for negotiated settlement were thrown overboard. Prime Minister Nehru gave vent to his feeling just after the Dutch resumed their second "police action". Speaking at the closing session of the Indian National Congress at Gandhinagar (Jaipur) on December 19, 1948, he said : "The action has been started by the Dutch, but I may warn them that they

50 United Nations, *Security Council Official Records (SCOR)*, yr. 2, mtg. 192, August 22, 1947, p. 2153.

51 Ibid., p. 2157.

52 Ibid., mtg. 208, October 7, 1947, p. 2507, mtg. 214, October 27, 1947, p. 2626 and United Nations, *Year Book, 1948-1949*, p. 213.

will not be able to achieve their objective. The day of Imperialism is over, because no Imperialist power can stay in Asia." He continued : "The police action of the Dutch will have serious repercussions in India, in Asia and perhaps in some other countries too. Though we cannot give the Indonesian Republic effective aid now, we cannot remain idle spectators.....The reaction to the Dutch action will be heard soon all over the Asiatic countries and we will have to consider what we will have to do under the circumstances."⁵³

The convening of the 18-nation Conference on Indonesia in New Delhi on January 20, 1949 was a sequel to the serious developments in Indonesia.⁵⁴ Through this Conference Nehru successfully sought to turn the Indonesian issue into an all-Asian issue. The inaugural speech that he made on the first day of the Conference as its President will ever be remembered for its feelings of sympathy for the Indonesian people.⁵⁵ He took the Dutch action as a "challenge to a newly awakened Asia." Describing the history of the past three years in Indonesia, he said : "It is a long story of broken pledges and continuous attempts to undermine and break the Republic of Indonesia". Commenting on the rough treatment meted out to the Indonesian leaders, Nehru said : "Even the dulled and jaded conscience of the world reacted to this with shock and amazement." He pointed out the urgency of the matter and stressed : "The situation in Indonesia is full of dangerous possibilities and requires urgent action."⁵⁶

Developments in the Security Council, on the other hand, appeared to be promising. There was, for the first time, a perceptible change in the U.S. attitude towards the fate of the Republic. This had resulted from their appreciation of the stern action taken by the Indonesian nationalist leadership against the Communist (Madiun) rebellion between September and December 1948. On American Government request an urgent Security Council meeting was held on December 22, 1948. Taking the floor, the Indian delegate, M.J. Desai,

53 *The Hindu*, December 21, 1948.

54 This was the first official Asian Governments' Conference, hence its importance. The first Asian Relations Conference in March-April 1947 was unofficial in character, although it had the inspiration and guidance of Nehru.

55 Nehru, n. 32. Full text of Nehru's Presidential speech appears at pp. 407-11.

56 Ibid.

expressed his Government's concern at the developments in Indonesia and stressed "that a just, honourable and peaceful settlement of the Indonesian question was necessary for the maintenance of peace and tranquility not only in Indonesia but in the whole of South-East Asia." He charged that the attack launched by the Dutch was "entirely unprovoked and uncalled for", and was "a flagrant breach of the truce agreement." He commended the conciliatory attitude adopted in the negotiations by the Indonesian leaders. He urged the Security Council to act "immediately, decisively and effectively", called for an immediate cease-fire, withdrawal of Dutch forces to the positions as fixed by the truce agreement, and the release of the leaders of the Indonesian Republic.

Deprived of diplomatic support from and subjected to strong economic pressures by her allies—the United Kingdom and the United States of America—and under heavy moral and diplomatic pressures exerted by the New Delhi Conference on Indonesia, the Dutch yielded ground, ceased military action and resumed negotiations with the Indonesian leaders in April 1949. The Round Table Conference at the Hague in August 1949 resulted in the conclusion of the Dutch-Indonesian Agreement on November 1, 1949 and to the subsequent transfer of sovereignty to the Government of Indonesia on December 29, 1949.

The Government of India's and especially Nehru's support to the cause of Indonesian independence thus became a major source of inspiration for continued mutual understanding and friendly relations between the two countries.

Developments During 1950-1961

Developments during these years should be viewed in the background of this old and recent past relationship. Whatever the Indian leaders had said and done in support of the Indonesian cause for freedom had definite imprint of the ancient past.⁵⁷ Co-operation during the freedom struggle had laid the foundations for future relations. These were strengthened by exchange of visits by the top

57 SCOR, yr 3, mtg. 388, December 22, 1948, pp. 24-29.

58 Speaking at a banquet given in honour of Indonesia's Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo, during his visit to New Delhi on September 23, 1954, Nehru had commented thus: While "thinking of Indonesia our minds go back to ages past, to times which are celebrated in epics, in traditions, and in stories when we lived together, the people of Indonesia and our people, in many ways, and they were always the ways of peace." *The Hindu*, September 24, 1954.

leaders in 1950 itself. President Sukarno paid a visit to India in January 1950 to take part in the first Republic Day celebrations in New Delhi. This was reciprocated by Prime Minister Nehru in June that year. These visits brought the two peoples still nearer to each other. Speaking in Parliament on March 17, 1950, Nehru alluded to this growing intimacy and said that this was due not to "formal treaties and alliances and pacts but by bonds which are much more secure, much more binding—the bonds of mutual understanding and interest and, if I may say so, even of mutual affection."⁵⁹ The treaty⁶⁰ of "Perpetual peace and unalterable friendship" as signed by the two Governments in Djakarta on March 3, 1951, was a logical result of the reservoir of mutual goodwill created during the freedom struggle. A survey of the various provisions of the Treaty shows that after having done away with the colonial barriers, the two countries had embarked on, as President Sukarno put it, the policy of intensifying "the cordial relations of the past for the benefit of both India and Indonesia."⁶¹ As such, the Treaty represented a major landmark in the two countries' relations. Being a confirmation of the expectations aroused during the struggle for freedom, it provided a framework in which these expectations could be fulfilled.

In certain fields growth of bilateral relations between the two countries was quite healthy and in accord with the hopes thus generated. These included co-operation between the armed forces of the two countries. A survey of co-operation between the various services follows.

Co-operation Between the Indian Air Force (IAF) and the Indonesian Air Force (AURI—Angkatan Udara Republic Indonesia)

India's interest in the growth and development of the AURI became evident during 1954-1955, when an Indian Air Force goodwill mission led by the then Deputy Chief of staff, Air Marshal A.M. Engineer, visited Indonesia. This visit resulted in the establishment of a bi-monthly courier service between the two countries.⁶²

⁵⁹ Nehru, n. 32, pp. 411-2.

⁶⁰ For full text of the Friendship Treaty, see Government of India, *Foreign Policy of India : Text of Documents 1947-1964*, (New Delhi, Lok Sabha Secretariat, 1966), pp. 40-41.

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 41.

⁶² Government of India, Ministry of Defence, *Brief Statement of Activities of the Ministry during 1954-1955*, pp. 11-12.

The two countries' desire for mutual co-operation in this field led in 1955 to the forging of certain links between the two Air Forces. Some measure of co-operation and mutual assistance in the form of exchange of officers, equipment and courier service, had thus been instituted a year before the two Governments entered into an Agreement on mutual Aid between the IAF and AURI.

The Agreement was signed in Djakarta on February 28, 1956. It was valid for five years and provided for the exchange of pilots and officers, the training of Indonesian Air Force Officers in India, the sale, loan or exchange of equipment by the two Governments and the maintenance of courier air communications.⁶³ Under the terms of this Agreement, an IAF mission under Wing Commander H.S. Bakshi was sent to Indonesia to assist the AURI in various ways. He stayed there for a period of five years. Before his departure from Indonesia on January 5, 1961, the Indian Wing Commander had completed several assignments entrusted to him in connection with administrative reforms and reorganization schemes undertaken by the AURI during 1959 and 1960.⁶⁴ Another Wing Commander T. Basu, who was in the Indian Advisory Group attached to the AURI, had already completed three years of service in Indonesia and left for home on June 23, 1960.⁶⁵

With the expansion in training facilities in the Air Force establishments in India, there was an increase in the number of Indonesians receiving training in various courses. By the end of 1960 their number rose to eight hundred.⁶⁶ Usefulness of the Air Forces' Agreement was well recognized in Indonesia. This is evident from the interview with *Antara News Agency* given by the Indonesian Air Chief shortly before his departure for India on February 15, 1961. He told the Indonesian News Agency that the existing Agreement with India would be prolonged after some minor administrative changes. Acknowledging its usefulness he added that the Air Forces' Agreement had substantially contributed to the strengthening of relations between the two Air Forces. The benefit to Indonesia was clearly evident in the results achieved thus far

63 Ibid., 1956-57, p. 18.

64 *Antara*, June 3, 1961.

65 Ibid, June 26, 1960.

66 Ibid., March 6, 1960. This was revealed by the Indonesian Air Force Chief of Staff, Air Vice Marshal S. Suryadarma, in Djakarta on March 4, 1961. He had just been back after a ten-day visit to India, undertaken in reciprocation of the one to Indonesia in 1959 by the Indian Chief of Air Staff, late Air Marshal Subroto Mukerjee.

by the Indonesian Air Force in the field of training.⁶⁷ Air Marshal S. Suryadarma's visit in 1961 provided the opportunity to extend the existing Agreement due to expire on February 28, 1961. India raised no objection. On his arrival back to Djakarta on March 4, 1961, the Indonesian Air Chief told newsmen that both the Air Forces had agreed in principle to extend the existing co-operation agreement between them. He added that he and his party had been accorded a warm welcome by the President and Prime Minister of India. Referring to the training of Indonesian Air Force personnel, the Indonesian Air Marshall expressed his satisfaction at the AURI's achievements. He also revealed that in addition to about 800 Indonesian airmen pursuing various courses in India at present, around 360 more would be sent during 1961. During his visit, the Indonesian Air Force Chief had, on behalf of President Sukarno, presented to Mrs. Subroto Mukerjee the Indonesian "Bintang Darma" (Order of Darma).⁶⁸ It was a fitting tribute to the contribution made by her late husband, Air Marshal Subroto Mukerjee, to the development of the AURI.

The year 1961 also saw attempts by the two countries for bilateral negotiations on an air agreement regarding commercial aviation traffic between them. An Indonesian Government mission led by Engineer Soetomo Adisasmito, Civil Aviation Chief of Indonesia, visited New Delhi in the last week of March. The objective was to resume negotiations, already started in Djakarta, regarding the opening of a regular Garuda Indonesian Airways (GIA) service between Djakarta and New Delhi.⁶⁹ A few days before the Belgrade Conference in September 1961, Karno Barkah, Head of the Air Traffic Control Service of the Civil Aviation Sub-Department, paid a visit to India. He came with a scheme to seek technical assistance from the Hindustan Aircraft Factory (Bangalore) in modifying the Dakota Aircraft into a flying classroom plane for training the Indonesian navigators at the Indonesian Aviation Academy at Tjurug to the West of Djakarta.⁷⁰

During September 1961, a batch of 328 non-commissioned officers of the AURI completed training courses in various Air Force engineering subjects and left for home. An impressive parade was held by the whole batch at Halim Pardanakusuma Air Base on their arrival in Djakarta. After taking the salute, Air Force Com-

67 Ibid., February 15, 1961.

68 Ibid., March 6, 1961.

69 Ibid., March 25, 1961.

70 Ibid., August 30, 1961.

modore S. Hardjolukito, Deputy II to the Minister/Air Force Chief of Staff, complimented the Indian-trained officers for their smart turnout which, according to him, reflected an aspect of their training. He also expressed his thanks to India and in particular to the IAF for the assistance it had rendered for the development and expansion of the AURI.⁷¹

Obviously, co-operation in various activities between the two Air Forces had been, since 1954-1955, growing satisfactorily. By 1961 it had brought the two closer to each other and created a fund of goodwill and understanding between the officers and cadres. In spite of its limited resources, the degree of co-operation India had offered to Indonesia in this field was adequate to promote a sense of fellow feeling. Exchange of goodwill missions and reciprocation of official visits by the Air Chiefs of the two countries cemented the bonds of friendship between them. Stationing of special IAF missions in Indonesia for the purpose of improving and reorganizing the AURI, had still further strengthened it. It was a manifestation of fellow feeling and could well be counted upon as an element in the continuing friendship between the two countries.

Co-operation between the Indian Navy and the Indonesian Navy (ALRI-Angkatan Laut Republic Indonesia)

A similar pattern of friendly co-operation between the two countries existed in the naval field. Even before the two Governments signed a naval agreement on December 3, 1958, their naval ships had exchanged goodwill visits. During the summer of 1952, several Indian naval ships had visited Indonesia, Thailand and Malaya, which "not only conveyed India's goodwill to her neighbouring countries but also formed an integral part of her sea training."⁷² This was reciprocated by a four-day goodwill visit to Cochin (India) of two Indonesian naval ships in the first half of October 1958.⁷³ An Indonesian Naval Mission led by Rear Admiral R. Subijakto, Chief of Staff and Commander-in-Chief of the Indonesian Navy, had already visited India in October 1955. This was the first Indonesian Naval Mission to India. It had visited various Indian Naval establishments.⁷⁴ By 1956-1957, with the expansion in the

71 Ibid. September 30, 1961.

72 Government of India, Ministry of Defence, *Brief Statement of the Ministry During 1951-1953*, p. 21.

73 Ibid., *Report for 1958-1959*.

74 Ibid., *Brief Statement of Activities of the Ministry During, 1955-1956*, p. 11.

opportunities for naval training, the Indian Navy found itself in a position to offer a limited number of training seats to cadets from Indonesia, Egypt and Ethiopia. Naval officers from Indonesia were also being offered a few seats at the Defence Services Staff College, Wellington.⁷⁵ The number of trainees from abroad increased with growth in the Indian Navy during 1958-1959. At the request of the Indonesian Government a short attachment was arranged for a team of Indonesian officers to Indian Naval establishments with a view to enabling them to reorganize their own Naval establishments.⁷⁶

Thus when the Navies of the two countries signed an agreement on December 3, 1958, the process of co-operation in this field had already been initiated. The agreement as such provided for three types of co-operation—attachment of officers and training of selected naval personnel of the Navy of one country with the Navy of the other, combined naval training exercises, and, finally, visits to one country by the ships of the other. It however, excluded activities in the operational field. The agreement was to remain in force for a period of five years in the first instance.⁷⁷

As regards training facilities provided to Indonesian Naval officers and other ranks in the Indian Naval establishments, the year 1959 saw the training of eight Indonesian sailors. Besides a few Indonesian officers, twenty-three Indonesian sailors were said to be under training.⁷⁸ This number continued to grow with growth in the training opportunities. In 1961 a total of twenty-eight Indonesian Naval officers and seventy-nine other ranks came to India to receive training in different courses at different centres. Out of twenty-eight Naval officers, fifteen came after the Belgrade Conference in September 1961.⁷⁹

An exchange of visit by Naval Chiefs of Staff of the two countries during 1960 and 1961 further strengthened the ties between the Indian Navy and the ALRI and proved useful in bringing about better understanding between them. The Indian Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral R.D. Katari's goodwill visit to Indonesia in July 1960 coincided with the programme of carrying out joint naval exercises with the Indonesian Naval fleet. The Indonesian Naval Chief of Staff, Rear Admiral Martadinata, paid a return visit to India in March 1961.

75 Ibid., 1956-1957, p. 12.

76 Ibid., *Report for 1958-1959*, p. 12.

77 Ibid., p. 17.

78 Ibid., *Report 1959-1960*, p. 13.

79 *Antara*, August 3, 1961, August 22, 1961, September 12, 1961, October 13 1961 and November 16, 1961.

In terms of the exchange of visits by ships of the two countries, the years 1959 and 1960 saw further consolidation of relationship between the two Navies. Six Indonesian Patrol Boats and one ship visited Bombay between April 12 and 14, 1959. Next year three Indonesian ships visited Bombay and Cochin during the last week of April and the first week of May.⁸⁰

Within two years of its becoming operational, the Agreement had shown quite encouraging prospects for future co-operation in this field. The agreement which was to last up to December 1963 was found to be mutually advantageous and had created a friendly understanding between the officers and men of the two Navies which augured well for future relations between the two countries.

Co-operation in the Army Field

Satisfactory implementation of the agreements between the Air Forces and Navies of the two countries prompted the two governments to conclude a similar type of agreement between their Armies. Major General Gatot Soebroto, Deputy Chief of Staff, Indonesian Army (Angkatan Darat Republic Indonesia—ADRI) paid an eight-day official visit to India from April 29 to May 6, 1960. He was accompanied by five Indonesian Army Officers.⁸¹ He entered into consultations with the Chief of Staff of the Indian Army and other officers on the subject of an agreement between the two Armies. Major-General Gatot Soebroto seemed to be satisfied with the outcome of his talks. While giving his impressions about his visit to India, the Indonesian Army leader said in Djakarta on May 17, 1960 that his mission had gained satisfactory results particularly in the field of fostering relations of friendship with India.⁸² Consultations in New Delhi eventually led to the signing in Djakarta on June 3, 1960 of a bilateral co-operation agreement between the two countries' Armies.⁸³ Seven months later, in January 1961, General A.H. Nasution, Minister for National Security and Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Army, paid a four-day visit to India. He was on way back home from a visit to Moscow, where he had signed an arms-purchase agreement with the Soviet Government. When asked whether he had discussed the possibility of purchasing small

80 Government of India, Ministry of Defence, *Report 1959-1960*, p. 17 and *Report 1960-1961*, p. 16.

81 Ibid., *Report 1960-1961*.

82 *Antara*, May 18, 1960.

83 Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, *Report 1960-1961*, p. 26. See also *The Statesman*, (New Delhi), June 4, 1960.

arms from India, General Nasution said : "I did not discuss it specifically, but that is within the scope of our technical cooperation agreement."⁸⁴ The statement showed that besides the offer of training places and services, the Agreement covered supply of small arms from one country to the other as well.

Unlike in the field of Armed Forces, bilateral relations in trade and cultural fields did not develop as satisfactorily as expected. A survey of developments in these fields follows.

Bilateral Trade Relations

The basis for trade relations was laid as early as 1946. Sutan Sjahrir, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Indonesia, made on April 12, 1946 what Nehru described as a "generous offer" of half-a-million tons of rice in order to alleviate the sufferings of the famine-stricken people of India. In his telegraphic message to Nehru the Indonesian leader wrote: "We assure you that our people have given enthusiastic adhesion to the plan (of sending rice to India in exchange for requisite goods if available), mainly because we want to show our sympathy with your country."⁸⁵ Nehru expressed India's deep sense of gratitude to the Indonesian leader's gesture of goodwill in these words : "The terms of the offer and language that Dr. Shariar (Sjahrir) has used will go to the heart of the Indian people...It is the language of a friend and comrade, not out to bargain, but to help in the time of need, even though he has to face a mountain of troubles in his own land. It is by such acts that nations and peoples are bound together...I hope and trust that it will be the precursor of a closer friendship between the two nations advantageous to both."⁸⁶

Besides being a help to India, Sutan Sjahrir's offer of rice served a useful purpose. It enabled the Indonesian leaders to break the blockade imposed by the Dutch. Since it was the first trade deal entered into by the Indonesian Republic with a foreign country, the Dutch could not keep silent. Successful implementation of the rice deal with India would go a long way in qualifying the Republic for staking its claim to international recognition. In order, therefore, to prevent this eventuality, the Dutch shelled, among other places, the rice stores at Banjuwangi (East Java) and destroyed the greater part of the rice stocks there. In spite of all obstructions, however, the

84 *Antara*, January 11, 1961.

85 J.S. Bright, *Important Speeches of Jawaharlal Nehru*, vol. 1, 1922-1946 (Lahore, 1961), Edn. 3, p. 378. Nehru read out Sutan Sjahrir's telegram in a statement in New Delhi on May 23, 1946.

86 *Ibid.*

Government of Indonesia succeeded in sending in August 1946 at least one steamship "Empire Favour", carrying a rice load of 6,000 tons. The "Empire Favour" successfully broke the Dutch blockade and reached Cochin port (India) to deliver its cargo, thus initiating the process of trade relations between Indonesia and India.⁸⁷

As a follow-up action the two countries signed a Trade Agreement on January 20, 1951. It came into effect from November 1, 1950 and was valid until June 30, 1951. It was the first agreement signed by the two Governments for mutual advantage after independence. It was, in a way, designed to revive the ancient trade and commercial contacts between the two countries.

Dealing comprehensively with the needed items of export and import and their corresponding values in two schedules, the Agreement envisaged a three-fold increase in trade. It also aimed at balancing the bilateral trade at a fixed level of Rs. 4.62 crores per annum on either side.⁸⁸ The items included in Schedule 'A' (India's Exports) and Schedule 'B' (India's Imports) indicated a wider basis of trade than one in the past.⁸⁹ It also provided for India a direct access to the Indonesian market for sale of textiles. Finally, it served the useful purpose of introducing many of the Indian goods which, during the colonial period, were unknown to Indonesia and other countries in the region.⁹⁰

It would be interesting to examine the actual implementation of the bilateral trade Agreement. The first two years were quite encouraging; though three-fold increase in the total value of trade was yet to be realized, about two-fold increase actually registered was a good achievement. Total trade value of Rs. 4.2 crores during 1949-50 climbed to an impressive figure of Rs. 7.58 crores in 1951-52. The balance of trade also showed a shifting trend. From an adverse balance of Rs. 1.6 crores during 1949-50, India achieved a favourable balance of Rs. 44 lakhs during 1951-52.⁹¹ This trend continued apace in the following years. India's trade with Indonesia had a surplus balance of Rs. 471,14,000 during 1953-54,⁹²

87 See Government of the Republic of Indonesia, *Illustrations of the Revolution, 1945-1950*. (1946), (Djakarta, Ministry of Information, 1954).

88 10 lakh=1 million; 1 crore=10 million.

89 B.N. Ganguli, *India's Economic Relations with the Far Eastern and Pacific Countries in the Present Century* (Bombay etc., 1956), pp. 123-4.

90 Ibid., p. 125.

91 Ibid., p. 126.

92 *Statistics of Foreign Trade of India by Countries and Currency Areas for February 1954* (Delhi, 1954), p. 8. These figures are for eleven months from April 1953 to February 1954.

Rs. 472,77,000 during 1954-55,⁹³ and Rs. 10,14,16,000 during 1955-56,⁹⁴ The Indian exports to Indonesia in 1955 registered an almost 100 per cent increase over the level of 1953. The reason was obvious. This year the Indian 'cambrics' had found an entirely new and potentially large market in Indonesia.⁹⁵

Indonesia's increasingly adverse balance of trade could be attributed to two factors. Firstly, certain traditional Indian imports like copra, rubber and palm oil being competitive in nature, could be had at cheaper rates and lesser costs in other markets like Ceylon and Singapore. Secondly, the economic and trade relations of both the countries continued to be heavily dependent on areas outside the region. None of them showed readiness to seek out new markets or sources of imports for fear that these might prove to be less dependable. Consequences of such caution could be anything but encouraging. Whereas Indonesian imports from India during the three years starting from 1953 constituted only 2·5, 2·2 and 4·7 per cent of its total world imports, its exports to India represented even less than one per cent of its total world exports, viz., 0·7, 0·1 and 0·3 per cent.⁹⁶ Almost similar was the case with India. Both her imports from and exports to Indonesia were far below even 1 per cent vis-a-vis its total world imports and exports.

India, no doubt, could boast of its seventh position in the list of suppliers of Indonesia's import needs, the other six being the United States, Japan, the Netherlands, West Germany, the United Kingdom and Hongkong.⁹⁷ But the actual position was not very satisfactory to the two countries. India participated in the Djakarta Third International Fair in August-September 1955, and the various types of traditional and non-traditional goods exhibited by the Indian delegation attracted large crowds; but no follow-up action seemed to have been taken to utilize its results to boost bilateral trade. The absence of high-powered publicity for Indian goods and of properly-managed, prompt and regular salesmanship were important factors that kept India's trade with Indonesia at a level lower than the other competitors. Moreover, since the Bandung Conference in April 1955, there had emerged another rival

93 Ibid., March 1955, p. 7.

94 Ibid., Oct. 1955 to March 1956, p. 6.

95 "Indo-Indonesian Trade Trends : Good Prospects for Engineering Goods" *Journal of Industry and Trade*, vol. 7, no. 3, March 1957, p. 422.

96 Ibid.

97 "Commercial Information for Indian Exporters to Indonesia and Hints to Business Visitors", *Supplement to the Journal of Industry and Trade*, vol. 6, no. 7, July 1956, pp. 1-20.

in this field. The People's Republic of China was entering the South-East Asian markets in a big way.

The performance during the succeeding years upto 1961-62 can be assessed from the following figures :⁹⁸

India's Trade with Indonesia, 1955-56 to 1961-62

(Rupees in Lakhs)

	1955- 56	1956- 57	1957- 58	1958- 59	1959- 60	1960- 61	1961- 62
Imports	1,46	2,08	4,13	3,65	3,97	3,57	1,77
Exports	11,66	7,70	4,18	2,98	4,84	3,11	7,00
Balance of Trade	(+)10,20	(+)5,62	(+)5	(-)67	(+)87	(-)46	(+)5,23

It would be clear from the above figures that taking 1949-50 as the base year, three-fold increase in total bilateral trade as envisaged in the Trade Agreement of January 1951 had been registered only in one year, viz., 1955-56.⁹⁹ It also showed that India's highest favourable trade balance of Rs. 10,20 lakhs in 1955-56 had declined to Rs. 5 lakhs in 1957-58, though from an adverse balance of Rs. 67 lakhs in 1958-59, it had registered an appreciable increase in its favourable balance in 1961-62, which stood at Rs. 5,23 lakhs. But one glaring fact remained. India's exports to and imports from Indonesia reached only once or twice the level of one per cent of its total world trade. Its exports to Indonesia during the period from 1957-58 to 1961-62 constituted merely .74, .52, .7, .48, and 1.05 per cent respectively of its total world exports. Similarly its imports from Indonesia during the same period represented .4, .4, .4, .25 and .17 per cent of its total world imports.¹⁰⁰

This was the state of affairs until and including the year of the Belgrade Conference, that is, 1961. By 1960, both the countries had started feeling the necessity of revising the decade old Trade

98 These figures have been taken from *The Journal of Industry and Trade* (New Delhi, Ministry of Commerce and Industry of the Government of India) vol. 12, no. 11, November 1962, p. 1967. The import figures during 1960-61 are 3,57 and not 2,57 as given here. For this, see p. 1259 and p. 1453.

99 Total bilateral trade value which stood at Rs. 4.02 crores during 1949-50, reached the level of Rs. 13.12 crores during 1955-56.

100 *The Journal of Industry and Trade*, n. 98. These percentages have been calculated on the basis of data given at p. 1963 and p. 1967.

Agreement. In this year an Indian trade delegation visited Indonesia to explore the possibilities of expansion in trade relations. During November of the following year, a five-man Indonesian fact-finding mission came to India with a similar objective. They fully realized that despite the Trade Agreement of 1951, the volume of transactions between the two countries so far had not reached a high mark.¹⁰¹ Speaking to newsmen at Madras Airport, the leader of the Indonesian delegation, Haroon al Rashid Saleh, emphasized that the time had come for redrafting the old trade agreement which was being extended year after year. He asserted that this could be done on a mutually advantageous basis. There was vast scope for Indonesian import of non-traditional consumer goods like electric fans, sewing machines, and bicycles, he said, while his country could export crude oil and various other items of Indian imports.¹⁰²

The Indonesian delegation's visit almost coincided with the launching of Indonesia's ambitious eight-year plan for economic development. It had fixed substantial outlays on various non-traditional goods like several types of machine tools for capital and other industries. For India, which had by then almost completed its first two Five-Year Plans and made good progress in industrial output, Indonesia's Plan provided a fairly large scope for expansion in its trade. Inviting a reference to this fact and to the necessity of venturing into joint collaboration in certain industrial projects, K.C. Sehgal, India's First Secretary (Commercial) in Djakarta, exhorted India's "private entrepreneurs (to) seize this opportunity and seriously consider coming into this market." "In this scheme", he assured, "there appears to be no danger to their capital investment."¹⁰³ But this exhortation did not produce any results. The Indian capital was as shy as any other in the world owing to the absence of political stability in Indonesia and the growing political influence of the Indonesian Communist Party.

Cultural Relations

Even before the two countries signed the Treaty of Friendship in March 1951, the Government of India had initiated the process of co-operation in various fields. Cultural co-operation was, at least in the initial stages, very much pronounced. After gaining

101 Antara, November 12, 1961.

102 Ibid., November 18, 1961.

103 K.C. Sehgal, "Trade with Indonesia : Demand for Machine Tools", *The Journal of Industry and Trade*, vol. 13, no. 4, April 1963, p. 618.

independence, both the nations were eager to renew the centuries' old cultural ties.

The first move by the Indian Government in this direction was to offer a limited number of scholarships to Indonesian students. Under an *ad hoc* scheme commencing in 1948, seven scholarships were offered to the Indonesian students. The total budget provision made for the prosecution of their studies was Rs. 60,000. All the scholars were likely to complete their studies by 1951-52; hence no provision was made for expenses during 1952-53.¹⁰⁴

In the meantime the two Governments had signed a Treaty of Friendship on March 3, 1951. The Treaty expressed the desire of both parties to consolidate "the bonds of peace and friendship, which have ever existed between the two States and of developing peaceful and friendly relations between them"¹⁰⁵ President Sukarno referred to the centuries' old "relations of commerce and common culture" and said: "...now that both peoples have regained their freedom and independence, our peoples are free again to intensify the cordial relations of the past for the benefit of both India and Indonesia."¹⁰⁶

The *ad hoc* scheme of scholarships to Indonesian students was conceived to be a part of the overall objective of promoting cultural relations with all the neighbouring countries. A comprehensive scheme for the award of 70 scholarships every year to students of Indian origin domiciled abroad and to indigenous students of certain Asian, African and other Commonwealth countries had already been initiated in 1949-50. With the increase in the number of opportunities and the encouraging response shown by the recipient nations, the number of scholarships was increased. The total number of scholarships rose from 70 to 100 in 1952-53 and to 140 in 1956-57. The number of foreigners holding Indian scholarships rose from 260 in 1954-55 to 301 in 1955-56 to 431 in 1960-61 and to an impressive figure of 484 in 1961-62.¹⁰⁷ The total number of Indonesian students holding these scholarships is not known.

Besides, efforts were being made to conclude bilateral cultural agreements with certain neighbouring states. One such cultural.

104 Government of India, Ministry of Education, *Report of Activities During 1949-50 and Programme for 1950-51*, Pamphlet no. 71, pp. 30-31 and *Report for 1951-52 and Programme for 1952-53*, p. 22.

105 *Foreign Policy of India*, n. 60, p. 40.

106 *Ibid.*, p. 41.

107 Govt. of India, Ministry of Education, *Reports for 1954-55, 1955-56, 1956-57, 1960-61 and 1961-62*.

agreement was signed by the Indian and Indonesian Governments on December 29, 1955. The agreement aimed at encouraging and facilitating "co-operation in all fields of science, literature and art". Specifically, it provided for the exchange of University teachers and members of scientific and cultural institutions ; the institution of scholarship schemes for students of one country studying in the other ; and the training of nationals of one country in scientific, technical and industrial institutions maintained by the Government of the other. The Agreement was to "remain in force for a period of ten years."¹⁰⁸ It was a comprehensive agreement consisting of twelve articles and covering a wide range of activities in the cultural and educational fields. Representing the desire of the two countries to intensify co-operation in this field, the Agreement aimed at bringing the two peoples closer in the sphere of art, literature and science.

But since friendly relations depend more on implementation than on mere profession, it would be worthwhile to examine the results it produced in the succeeding years. On the basis of information available from the Indian side in the Ministry of Education Reports, the annual reports of the Indian Council of Cultural Relations, the Ministry of External Affairs Reports and the *Foreign Affairs Record* of the Government of India, it could be contended that many of the provisions of the Agreement remained unimplemented. Neither any educational centre nor any art or cultural society was established.¹⁰⁹ Both the Governments, for reasons of their own, failed to establish Chairs in Universities or other Institutions of higher learning. The Government of India, however, had on certain occasions sent a number of books on various subjects as gifts to certain Universities in Indonesia.¹¹⁰

Finally, Article X of the Agreement called upon the two Governments to set up a special commission for "supervising the

108 The Agreement was ratified on February 8, 1958. For text of the Cultural Agreement, see Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, *Foreign Affairs Record*, vol. 1, no. 12, December 1955, pp. 246-7.

109 The Tagore Society existed in Indonesia prior to the conclusion of the Cultural Agreement.

110 For instance, an assortment of 74 books on literature, philosophy and religion, politics, arts, culture, economics and education, was presented on April 15, 1961 by the Indian Ambassador, Dr. J. N. Khosla, to the Indonesian Religious Affairs Minister, Wahib Wahab, as a gift from the Government of India to the Government of Indonesia. This was stated to be the second gift ; the first included 38 books on History and interpretation of Islam. See *Antara*, April 15 1961.

work of the Agreement", for "advising the Governments concerned on details of implementing the Agreement" and for suggesting "possible improvements". The two Governments were also to hold joint consultations not less than once in three years "to co-ordinate the working of the Agreement". On the basis of available records, it could be contended that neither any such machinery was brought into being nor were any triennial consultations held.

Besides the various scholarship schemes, the Government of India also offered to the foreigners a large number of training places within the country and services of Indian experts abroad under the Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic Development in South and South-East Asia. During the decade following the inception of the Colombo Plan in 1950, India's contribution both in offering training places and in sending experts was quite impressive. With 1,545 training places, India had the fifth place among all the donor countries and first place among the Asians. The other four countries were United States with 7,112, United Kingdom with 3,880, Australia with 3,530, and Canada with 1,617, all outside Asia. In the matter of providing services of experts, India with 169 was the sixth among the donor nations, others being the United States with 1,333, United Kingdom with 446, Australia with 441, Japan with 347, and Canada with 259¹¹¹. By the time of the publication of the Colombo Plan Report in 1961, the total number of training seats offered and experts provided by India had risen to 1,694 and over 200 respectively.¹¹² The break-up of these impressive figures may now be examined. Out of the total of 1,694 training places, Nepal received the largest number of 1,444, while Indonesia got only 51. As to the number of experts, against 200 sent to Nepal, only 3 were sent to Indonesia.¹¹³ Indonesia, during the same period, contributed a total number of 124 training places and 1 expert.¹¹⁴ It also offered 17 scholarships to Colombo Plan countries. Of these, India received two Indonesian scholarships for its students.¹¹⁵

Another officially-sponsored Indian agency which was entrusted with the task of promoting and strengthening cultural relations with

111 *The Tenth Annual Report of the Consultative Committee of the Colombo Plan*: (Kuala Lumpur, November 1961) pp. 269-70.

112 *Ibid.*, pp. 221-2.

113 *Ibid.*

114 *Ibid.*, pp. 269-70.

115 *Antara*, January 13, 1961.

the neighbouring countries, was the Indian Council of Cultural Relations. During five years preceding the conclusion of the Cultural Agreement, deputing in 1953 of Dr. S.M.H. Nainar to Indonesia for a period of two years was an outstanding activity performed by the ICCR.¹¹⁶ Besides, the ICCR also held reception in honour of Mohammad Hatta, the then Vice-President of Indonesia, during his visit to India in September 1955. A survey of the ICCR Reports for 1951-56 also reveals that for promoting cultural relations with Indonesia the Council had presented some books on various subjects and Indian classics to certain libraries and educational institutions in Indonesia.¹¹⁷

During five years after the Cultural Agreement had been in operation, the only other activities of the ICCR concerned presentation, on June 19, 1960, to the President of the University of Airlangga in Surabaya, Professor A.G. Pringgodigdo, of a typewriter with Devanagari letters.¹¹⁸ The ICCR also awarded scholarship to an Indonesian student during 1958-59 in order to enable him to complete his studies at an Indian University.¹¹⁹

It has been stated that certain factors impeded the growth of healthy relations between India and Indonesia since 1950 itself. An examination of the most pronounced among them follows.

I. Distinct Personalities : Nehru and Sukarno

Both Nehru and Sukarno led their countries to freedom and became top leaders. The two had a long tradition of suffering at the hands of the British and the Dutch colonial governments. Their views on European colonialism and imperialism in Asia and Africa and on the necessity of eliminating it and gaining freedom, were similar.

But there were differences in the circumstances in which they had been bred up. Unlike Nehru, who was born to a very rich lawyer, Sukarno came to the world as the son of a teacher. In their early age, whereas Nehru had never experienced the fear of want, Sukarno had to undergo severe hardships. Affluence enabled the former to have his primary and higher education at Harrow and Cambridge in London. This had provided him with an opportunity to see and comprehend the liberal tradition of the Western democratic

116 The Indian Council of Cultural Relations (I.C.C.R.), Report for 1951-56.

117 Ibid.

118 Antara, June 22, 1960.

119 "ICCR Secretary's Report to the Annual Session of the General Assembly, February 21-22, 1959", *Report for 1958-59*, p. 10.

political system. The latter, on his part, had never had an occasion to see the outside world.¹²⁰ Even in their own countries when the two leaders joined the freedom struggle, the practical opportunities of participation in the democratic system as provided by the British in India were almost lacking in the case of Dutch East Indies.

In view of these and other reasons, both Nehru and Sukarno came to have dissimilar attributes in their personalities. During Nehru's visit to Indonesia in June 1950 when the two leaders met, an impression grew among the high political circles in Indonesia that friendship between the two would not last long.¹²¹ In course of time, the two leaders came to have dislike for each other. Sukarno's prides and prejudices did not get due respect from Nehru. Even India's receptions to Sukarno grew less warm. Sukarno began to nourish a feeling that Nehru was a road-block in the way of his assumption of big leader's role in South-East Asia, nay, in the whole of Asia and Africa. By the time of the first Conference of Non-Aligned countries in Belgrade in September 1961, lack of personal rapport between the two leaders proved to be one of the decisive factors in determining their attitude towards national and international issues. The Belgrade Conference thus provided the two leaders with an opportunity to openly manifest their strong opposition to each other's views. Some of the former Indonesian diplomats have a feeling that personal element was as prominent a factor, if not more, as difference in the world view the two leaders exhibited.¹²²

II. Difference in the Nature of Struggle for Freedom

The national struggle for freedom which the two leaders had led in their respective countries had also run along different lines.

120 The first occasion when Sukarno went out of Indonesia was when he visited India in January 1950. This was immediately after the recognition by the Dutch and the world community of the independence of the Republic of Indonesia in December 1949.

121 Interview with Moekarto Notowidigdo (Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Wilopo Cabinet, April 29, 1952 to August 1, 1953 and Ambassador to India between October 1960 and February 1964) Djakarta, October 11, 1969. Moekarto Notowidigdo told the author that Nehru, according to his temperament, neither liked addressing vast public gatherings which Sukarno considered necessary for projecting his popular image before his guests nor Sukarno's love stories. In this connection he referred to President Sukarno's remarks made to him immediately after Nehru's departure for India. Sukarno had said, recalled Moekarto Notowidigdo, that "Nehru's is not a happy company."

122 Ibid.

Under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, India had fought its way to independence through non-violence. The Indians had waged civil disobedience movement and the "quit India" movement. They had used the non-violent technique of "Satyagraha" and had thronged the British prisons in thousands and suffered long sentences, but there had been no mass military training in arms and armed clashes with the British Army. In Indonesia the independence struggle had run a different course. Three and a half years of the Japanese occupation had given a violent twist to it. To execute their own imperialist policies, the Japanese had given to the Indonesians training in the use of arms. On the Japanese surrender, the so-called "police actions" undertaken by the Dutch had compelled the Indonesians to meet force with force in order to resist the reimposition of colonial rule over the Republic. This fact became a source of pride to them that unlike the Indians they had won their country's freedom by fighting and that it was not a grant to them by the Dutch colonialism. This feeling was expressed by the Indonesian leaders on many an occasion. During her visit to Indonesia in September 1954, Mrs. Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit referred to Indonesians' reactions to her counsels for peaceful solution of the West Irian problem and said that on this question the Indonesians were apt to get excited. While giving her impressions, she said : "When I laughingly suggested sometimes to them that non-violence was always a good technique to solve the problem, there were serious faces around me and the answer generally came back : "We are not a non-violent race. We find it exceedingly difficult to apply the non-violent technique."'¹²³ So the Indonesian leaders and people had, since the achievement of independence, built up a tradition of violent revolutionary struggle. As it coloured their attitude towards various issues, a stage came when they found themselves comfortable in the company of those who subscribed to their view of opposition to colonialism and imperialism and cool in the company of India whose enthusiasm for freedom struggles in Asia and Africa seemed to be diminishing in their eyes. It was certain to mark a point of serious divergence in the two countries' reciprocal attitudes and relations.

III. Geo-Politics as a Factor

Geo-politics of the two countries, to which, at least for the major part, twenty centuries of Indian-Indonesian commercial and

123 *The Hindu*, September 13, 1954.

cultural relations could be safely attributed, had also since independence not been a factor conducive to strengthening of mutual relations. They are two out of the four potentially great powers of Asia, the other two being the People's Republic of China and Japan. There could be no competition with China, which, on the basis of increasing political influence and growing industrial and atomic and nuclear power, was seeking the status of the third major world power after the United States and the USSR. The tremendous economic and industrial might of Japan also inhibited Indonesia's claims of a major Asian or at least South-Asian power and excluded the possibility of competition in any field. The only other country thus left out was India. With its teeming millions, its growing unemployment, its social and regional tensions, its linguistic dissensions and communal riots, etc., India appeared to be the only country with whose performance in certain fields of activity and on more or less equal footing, Indonesia could establish some sort of competition or rivalry. In this sense geo-political situation accentuated rather than diminished the sense of rivalry growing as a result of many other factors.

IV. "Big-Brother" Attitude

Another factor that made it difficult for the two countries' relations to run smoothly was the so-called "big-brother" attitude. Indian writers, political leaders and diplomats are alleged to have taken the stand in their writings and attitudes that Indonesia had no separate identity of its own and was merely an extension of India, at least, in religious and cultural sense. The term "Greater India" so widely used in the Indian writings on pre-colonial history of Indonesia is cited as an instance. The Indian scholars often used in their writings terms like "ancient Indian colonies", the words implying some kind of political domination as well. Prominent among the Indian scholars who have followed this line of argument are Professors R.C. Majumdar and Neelakanta Sastri. In one of his writings on India's ancient relations with South-East Asian countries, for instance, R.C. Majumdar observes : "The art of Java and Kamboja was no doubt derived from India and fostered by the Indian rulers of these colonies."¹²⁴ Following a similar line of historical argument, Professor Kalidas Nag of the Greater India Society has

124 R.C. Majumdar, H.C. Raychaudhuri and Kalikinkar Datta, *An Advanced History of India* (London, etc., 1950), edn. 2, p. 221.

attempted to show that Indonesia, since the beginning of its history, has been at the receiving end of India's civilization and culture.¹²⁵

In fact the Indonesians are proud of their past cultural heritage. Their art and architecture, their ancient monuments, their religions, languages and culture, their dance, drama and music, all are testimony to this fact. The source of irritation is some Indians' repeated assertion that when the Indians for the first time landed in Sumatra and Java, they found "savages" beyond the pale of civilization and then carried a civilizing mission. The facts established by the Dutch and other Western historians of Indonesia and South-East Asia, the Indonesians assert, do not support this "Indian" thesis.¹²⁶

Some prominent Indonesian political leaders also hold the view that India's culture was not the only one that came to Indonesia. Since the first century A.D., Indonesia, owing to its geographical location, has been recipient of diverse cultures and civilizations. It has been the meeting ground of the Hindu-Buddhist, Chinese, Arab, and European influences. Moreover, the Indian writers have tended to ignore the impact of the spread of Islam on Indonesian culture and civilization.

Like the Indian historians of Indonesia and South-East Asia, the Indonesians allege, the attitude of the Indian leaders and diplomats towards their Indonesian counterparts has also been one of below equality. Some of the earlier Indian diplomats posted in Indonesia are stated to have been laying stress on the fact that but for India's moral, material and diplomatic help, Indonesia's proclaimed independence would have been thwarted by the Dutch and the British, or, at least, delayed. M.R.A. Baig, the author of *In Different Saddles* (Bombay, 1967), believes that this kind of attitude was a projection of the attitude at New Delhi. He is of the view that "personal, subjective factors were very prominent" in the attitude of the Indian leaders and diplomats towards the leaders of

125 Kalidas Nag, "Greater India-III" in *Greater India* (Calcutta, 1960), p. 144. "In Sumatra", he writes, for instance, "The Malayan races were moulded by Indian influences into a relatively civilized condition before they crossed over to the Archipelago."

126 Interview with Professor Soenarjo, former Foreign Minister and diplomat of Indonesia, Djakarta, September 24 and October 1, 1969. A leader of the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI), Professor Soenarjo gave the impression of being a strong critic of Indian writers, leaders and diplomats for this type of attitude.

Indonesia and other countries and smacked of a politician's approach rather than a diplomat's.¹²⁷

This tendency on the part of the Indian leaders and diplomats manifested itself in their day-to-day contacts in Indonesia, at the United Nations, during official visits, and at various conferences. An outstanding instance is Prime Minister Nehru's personal attitude towards Indonesian leaders.¹²⁸ This came to have, in due course, a very damaging impact on personal relations. A sensitive nation, in the process of establishing its national identity, could hardly be expected to put up with this type of attitude. The fact that it had a highly ambitious and egoistic leadership at the top, rendered it all the more difficult to separate personal dis-respect from national honour. It was bound to have serious effect on overall relations.

Sometimes the "big-brother" attitude is explained in psychological terms. Unlike the Indians, (the Javanese leaders are generally prone to include Pakistanis among the Indians) the polite and well-behaved Javanese are characteristically not given to much talking. So when they meet the former, conversation creates an adverse feeling that they are being lectured about.

At least up to the first Asian-African Conference in Bandung, this type of relationship continued without much irritation. This is evident from the fact that Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo of Indonesia came all the way to New Delhi in September 1954 to seek Prime Minister Nehru's approval to the holding of the 'Bandung' Conference. This position underwent a transformation, however, during the interregnum between the Bandung Conference in 1955 and the Belgrade Conference in 1961. Nehru's invitation to Sukarno

127 Interview with M.R.A. Baig (India's First Secretary and head of the Chancery in Indonesia between January and November 1950) New Delhi, August 19, 1971.

128 Interview with H.A. Subardjo Djoyoadisuryo (Minister of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia in the Sukiman Cabinet, April 27, 1951—April 3, 1952), Djakarta, September 23, 1969. Subardjo referred to the first Colombo Prime Ministers' Conference in April 1954. On hearing Ali Sastroamidjojo's suggestion and arguments for convening an Asian-African conference, Nehru passed a loud remark that the Indonesian Premier did not know the fundamentals of international law. This, said Subardjo, was "in bad taste" and irritating to Ali Sastroamidjojo. Later, he said, others present intervened and patched up and restored understanding between the two leaders.

Ali Sastroamidjojo, however, refused to confirm the correctness of Subardjo's contention. He asserted that he was never on bad terms with Prime Minister Nehru. *Interview* with former Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo, Djakarta, September 24, 1969.

to halt at New Delhi en route to Belgrade was ignored by the Indonesian Government.¹²⁹ Obviously, the Indonesians were in no mood to tolerate this kind of attitude any longer. They had, at least once, officially expressed themselves against it. Writing in 1960, the Counsellor for Press and Public Relations, Information Service of Indonesia, had expressed the Indonesians' feelings in these words : "Indonesians in general do not appreciate very much an older brother attitude as is sometimes adopted by people who think of themselves as belonging to a bigger or more advanced country."¹³⁰

V. Indians in Indonesia

Indians in Indonesia, running into several thousands, have been another factor in Indian-Indonesian relations. Having gone there, most of them in the nineteen-twenties and nineteen-thirties, as miners and labourers, they have, by dint of hard labour and business skills, established themselves fairly well. A large number of Indians in Java are the Hindus from the Sindh Province (now in Pakistan) and deal in textiles. Fewer in number are the Sikhs from Punjab and most of them deal in sports business. There are many Indians in Sumatra also and they originally belonged to Punjab, Sindh, Gujarat, Madras and Malabar. Unlike those in Java, a substantial number of those in Sumatra are milkmen or daily wage-earners. All the Indians in Indonesia, whose literacy standards are quite poor, have a split personality ; their bodies are in Indonesia but their hearts are in India. Only a few have snapped their family ties in India altogether, the rest continuing their familial links with the mother country. The Gujarati, Tamil and Malabari Muslims have found little difficulty in mixing with the local Indonesians through marriages. This is not the case with the Sindhis and the Punjabi Sikhs who have tended to maintain their exclusive existence, and have thus invited the charge of being non-assimilative.

In response to a set of questions concerning Indians submitted to Indonesian leaders in Press, Parliament and political parties, in government and university campuses, the author elicited mixed type of responses which can be easily put into two groups. Some among the elite group were of the view that being fewer in number and less rich than the overseas Chinese, the Indians have never constituted a factor in relations between the two countries. Always busy

129 *Antara*, August 14, 1961. Talking to newsmen in Djakarta, Foreign Minister Subandrio revealed that President Sukarno would not call on any country on way to Belgrade.

130 *The Statesman* (New Delhi), June 6, 1960.

with their professions, they are left with little time, less energy and least inclination to meddle into local politics. They have maintained relations with the Indonesian masses better than the Chinese have done, and hence have never been a source of irritation. Others hold the opinion that the Indians have tended to live in an exclusive circle of their own. Some charge them, as they charge the Chinese, with indulging in illegal activities like smuggling and tax evasion and some even in money-printing.¹³¹ It is said that they have refused to adapt themselves to the new environment in the country and to identify themselves with the urges and aspirations of the Indonesian masses. In some respects, particularly in making money from the Indonesian people, they have proved, as the allegation goes, no better than the Chinese.¹³² Some in high political circles in Indonesia put the blame squarely on the Government of India for this state of affairs and consider it a negligence or a failure on India's part in doing its duty *vis-a-vis* the Indians in Indonesia.¹³³

Government of India's attitude, however, towards the Indians abroad has always been one of prompting them to readily assimilate themselves with the masses of their country of adoption. The Indians in Indonesia are no exception. Perhaps the Indian Government cannot do much in the matter, except to continue with its policy of persuasion. There is some truth in the view that the Indians are not inclined towards assimilation in the mainstream of national life. This is evident from the fact that they have established their own places of worship and their own educational institutions. Besides, very few Indians allow their children to mix with the Indonesian boys and girls. Inter-marriages are very rare.

Gandhi Memorial School in Djakarta and a couple of other Indian schools in Bandung (West Java) and in Medan (North Sumatra) are the only educational institutions catering to the educational needs of the Indian community. With these schools in

131 Interview with Jamaluddin Malik, Vice-Chairman of the Nahdatul Ulama (NU) Party and member of the Supreme Advisory Council (DPA) of Indonesia, Djakarta, December 30, 1969. Jamaluddin Malik told the author about the case of an Indian who was caught red-handed while producing fake money and was imprisoned for a number of years.

132 This view is held, among others, by Osep, Secretary General of the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI). Impressions gathered during interviews with the PNI leader in Djakarta on October 22 and 29, 1969. Another Indonesian leader who shares this opinion is Soebadio Sastrosatomo of the banned Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI). Interview with Soebadio Sastrosatomo, Djakarta, December 25, 1969.

133 *Ibdi.*

existence, very few Indians allow their boys and girls to seek education in the Indonesian schools. Higher education in Indonesian Universities is totally discouraged by the Indians. They are afraid of losing a helping hand in business which their children are expected to be. Nevertheless, these Indian schools serve a useful and noble purpose of instilling a sense of discipline, of devotion to duty and of their place and role *vis a-vis* their country of adoption as well as their country of origin.

Whatever Indonesians' views about Indians in their country, historically speaking, however, the Indonesians continue to have a liking for the Indians living in their midst. Certain factors account for this. First, the impact of India's religions and culture on the Indonesians in the pre-colonial era has left an abiding sense of common identity. Secondly, distinguished Indians like Rabindra Nath Tagore, Mahatma Gandhi and Bal Gangadhar Tilak have, through their writings and actions, left favourable impressions on their minds. Thirdly, India's unreserved support during the freedom struggle coupled with India's co-operation in the field of Armed Forces, has created and strengthened a sense of fellow feeling between the two communities. Fourthly, the Indian traders' control over the Indonesian economy is minimal. Fifthly, inter-marriages between the Indian Muslim merchants and Indonesians have led to the emergence of a fairly large group of Peranakans (off-springs of mixed marriages). These types of matrimonial relations, mostly in Sumatra, commented Dr. S.M.H. Nainar in 1957, "contribute to great friendship and cordiality between the two peoples."¹³⁴

But how long can these factors of goodwill continue on their own? This requires certain positive steps which could enable the Indian community to identify their interests with those of the Indonesians. What they are expected to do is to march in step with the social, economic and political urges and aspirations of the people of Indonesia. By and large, the Indians seem to find it difficult to do so.

It is the Indian traders who come into contact with the Indonesians in day-to-day life. It is from their attitude that the Indonesians are prone to form their image of India. The Indian community could project a better image of the country of their birth by being fair in their dealings with the Indonesians.¹³⁵ They forget that

134 S.M.H. Nainar, "Indians in Indonesia", *Indo-Asian Culture* (New Delhi), vol. 6, no. 2, October 1957, p. 167.

135 Responding to a questionnaire submitted by Dr. R.K. Vasil in 1955 to nearly 300 senior students of the University of Indonesia, one of the

whenever anyone of them is apprehended for any action against the law of the land, it is not his name that is publicized in the Press. "Orang India" (Indian) is the invariable term used.

Demands are rising in the higher political circles that the Indians in Indonesia, for their own sake, must do something tangible in order to earn the continued goodwill of the Indonesian masses. This may be done by opening a charitable dispensary, and/or by establishing a foundation for awarding scholarships to Indonesian students for higher studies in India, etc. The two Governments and those genuinely interested in promoting better relations between the two countries (and their number is not small) would be glad to encourage and even help such mutually beneficial schemes. Moreover, this would ensure continued flow of Indonesian goodwill for them as also for India.

The Indians could also play a useful role in strengthening Indian-Indonesian relations in the field of trade and economy. Besides competing with the Chinese in earning Indonesian goodwill, they could popularize and push through Indian-made goods in the vast Indonesian market.

Developments in the Domestic Field

On achieving independence the two countries came to adopt a democratic parliamentary system of government. Whereas India under Prime Minister Nehru continued to pursue this system, the working of the Provisional Constitution of 1950 of the Republic of Indonesia by the various Indonesian political parties underwent severe strains. In the absence of a single political party commanding majority, as in the case of Indian National Congress, a number of unstable coalition governments composed of individuals, groups and parties, professing diametrically opposed ideologies and programmes, came to rule the country. In a country where the parliamentary system of government had yet to take roots, the results could very well be anticipated. In due course, the parliamentary system was discredited and later replaced by a system which President Sukarno chose to call "Guided Democracy".¹³⁶

students complained that the Indian businessmen resident in Indonesia were exploiting their country and, therefore, should be thrown out of Indonesia. See letter to the Editor by R.K. Vasil, *The Statesman* (New Delhi), December 9, 1961.

136 For a detailed analysis of the reasons, factors and forces which led to the fall of parliamentary system of government in Indonesia, See Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia* (Ithaca, N. Y., 1968), Third Printing, 618. pp.

One of the two forces which emerged stronger and came to exercise a decisive bearing on Indian-Indonesian relations was President Sukarno himself. As an ambitious, power-seeking man, the Indonesian President had never reconciled himself to the ambiguous position of a mere figure-head as provided in the provisional Constitution of 1950. The failure of the politicians and political parties in working out the constitutional democracy provided him with a scapegoat for the ills of the country. The Western liberal democracy had, in fact, not been to his liking. So he put the blame on the system itself and started a campaign against it. His visits to the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China during 1956 prompted him to do away with this system altogether and replace it with a new political system which according to him suited the traditions and genius of the Indonesian people. On February 21, 1957, Sukarno announced his "Concept". He alluded to eleven years of instability in the Republic due to the adoption of what he called "a wrong system, a wrong style of government, that is, the style which we call Western democracy."¹³⁷ The regional rebellions during 1957-1958, which were aided and abetted by two of the prominent Indonesian political parties, viz., the Masjumi and the P.S.I., gave him a further cause to discredit the system. Ultimately, on July 5, 1959, President Sukarno abrogated the 1950 Constitution and decreed a return to the 1945 Constitution. Under this Constitution, Sukarno became both President and Prime Minister of the Republic. And thus the process of "Guided Democracy" was initiated in all earnestness.

The second force that emerged strong during the nineteen fifties and came to have a major say in Indonesia's foreign policy attitudes, especially towards India, was the Indonesian Communist Party (P.K.I.). For at least three years after the Madiun Revolt of September-December 1948, it led a precarious existence. Thereafter it organised its mass base in Central and East Java under the youthful leadership of D.N. Aidit. In the General Elections in September-December 1955 it had emerged as one of the four largest political parties in Indonesia.¹³⁸ The Constituent Assembly elections held in

137 Government of the Republic of Indonesia, *To Preserve The Republic We Have Proclaimed* (Sukarno's Message of February 21, 1957, outlining his Concept of Guided Democracy), (Djakarta, Ministry of Information, 1957), pp. 6-10.

138 The other three largest political parties were PNI (Indonesian Nationalist Party), Masjumi (Consultative Council of Indonesian Moslems), and NU (Nahdatul Ulama—Ulama Association). See Herbert Feith, *The Indonesian Elections 1955*, (Ithaca, N.Y., 1957), pp. 58-62.

December 1955, Djakarta Municipal Council elections held in June 1957 and Provincial Legislative Assembly elections held in Central and East Java in August 1957 increased still further the PKI's strength and political influence.¹³⁹ Apart from the economic causes, one of the most important factors in augmenting the PKI's strength was its identification with President Sukarno and the causes he espoused, even if it meant a little deviation from the philosophy of Marxism Leninism.¹⁴⁰ The political stakes involved in this policy were too high to be easily ignored. Besides securing the President's patronage, it would enable the PKI to establish its nationalist bona fides as well as isolate the Moslem and the Socialist liberal forces by dubbing them as anti-nationalist. The PKI's major attack was on the Masjumi and PSI. By 1961, the PKI had managed to establish itself as a strong, organised political force. Other political parties were just managing to survive against heavy pressures being exerted by the PKI. The only force the Communists entertained apprehensions from was the Indonesian Army and its leadership. It was quite natural to expect that with the lapse of time PKI would have a larger say in the formulation of the foreign policy of the Republic. And India was to become a target of the P.K.I's attack on account of its border dispute with the People's Republic of China.

Foreign Policy Attitudes

In the diplomatic field the two Governments managed to establish a basis of close and informal consultations between their leaders and diplomats. This was designed to iron out differences, if any, and to adopt similar postures on various issues concerning world peace, international co-operation, colonialism and apartheid.

In the beginning India's non-alignment and Indonesia's "independent and active" foreign policy, adopted in response to the Cold War tensions arising out of bipolar policies of the United States and the USSR, grew to be similar in essence. Refusing to align with either of the two military blocs, reserving the right to judge every issue of global importance on merit, and keeping an independent position in order to throw their full weight on the side of peace when

¹³⁹ See D.N. Aidit "Indonesian People are Shifting to the Left" (a statement on local elections on June 27, 1957), *Review of Indonesia*, vol. 4, no. 7, July 1957, p. 7.

¹⁴⁰ For instance, see the PKI's full-throated support to Sukarno's Concept of February 1957, in "D.N. Aidit Interviewed by 'P.I.A.' News Agency Correspondent", *Review of Indonesia*, vol 4, no. 3, March 1957, p.3.

the cold war threatened to be hot, were the basic principles commonly shared by the two countries.

There were some major planks of this policy. Preservation of world peace appeared to be top-most in the minds of the leaders of the two countries. In the absence of peace all schemes of socio-economic reconstruction programmes would be put to nought. Political independence unaccompanied by social and economic progress would be of little use. For doing so peace in the world was an absolute necessity. Only in a peaceful atmosphere could the basis of international co-operation be established. This could be ensured through strengthening the United Nations and other allied organizations. The second was a common belief that peace and freedom were indivisible. Hence it was essential to oppose colonialism and to support national independence movements in Asia and Africa. The third was common opposition to racist policies pursued by some white minority regimes in Africa. There could be no truck with the policies of racial discrimination as these lowered human dignity and also contravened the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

As to the necessity of promoting world peace, Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo told the Indian Parliament on September 23, 1954: "We are not seeking peace for ourselves. Humanity the world over is crying for peace." He added: "Peace is no luxury for us ... Peace is for us an absolute value and therefore a necessity."¹⁴¹ Speaking at the State Banquet in honour of the Indonesian leader the same day, Prime Minister Nehru said: "We have reached a stage when we are anxious to have something to build our countries and to do away with poverty and misery; and it is obvious we cannot do so except in peace and through peace."¹⁴² Echoing similar thoughts, Ali Sastroamidjojo observed: "It is in peace and peace only that the countries of Asia will be able to develop themselves into welfare states."¹⁴³

In view of this basically common approach to issues of national and international importance, the leaders of the two countries displayed their opposition to the United States' sponsored military pacts in Asia in general and in South and South-East Asia in particular. While addressing the Indian Parliament, Ali Sastroamidjojo gave a categorical reaction to the SEATO pact in these words: "In

141 *The Hindu*, September 24, 1954.

142 *Ibid.*

143 *Ibid.*

our way of thinking, and keeping in mind the principles of Pantja Sila, peace in our part of the world cannot be assured by military pacts such as recently concluded in Manila.” He added : “There is a better way to the preservation of peace—I mean co-operation and co-existence.”¹⁴⁴ Similarly, Nehru’s attitude towards SEATO was one of forthright criticism. According to him, it neither relieved tension in South-East Asia nor enhanced the chances for peace. He told the Lok Sabha on September 29, 1954 : “I confess, I see neither any lessening of tension nor any advance towards peace, but in fact, a reverse.” He believed “that the whole approach of this Manila Treaty is not only a wrong approach but a dangerous one from the point of view of any Asian country.” He further said : “It talks about that area of peace, and converts it into an area of potential war. So all these facts I find disturbing.”¹⁴⁵

The similarity of approach in the regional and international field was commensurate with the growing degree of mutual understanding. It enabled Ali Sastroamidjojo to say that “in the pursuance of peace and peaceful co-existence of all countries of Asia, India and Indonesia are standing firmly together.”¹⁴⁶ Recalling with emotion India’s support to Indonesia during its struggle for freedom, the Indonesian Prime Minister observed that “the assistance which India has given so fully and whole-heartedly to my people in the struggle for independence will be written in letters of shining gold in the pages of the history of Indonesia.” He also alluded to the two Conferences in New Delhi in 1947 and 1949 and said : “It was these two Conferences which gave us such valuable support at a time when we needed it so badly.”¹⁴⁷

Prime Minister Nehru reciprocated these sentiments with an equal warmth. Welcoming the Indonesian leader, he said : “I doubt that any one has come from Asia so welcome as you are, Sir, and Madame Ali.” He added : “There was commonness in struggle and in our objectives, but it is true to say that nothing aroused the emotions of our people here so much as the struggle for the independence of Indonesia.” Perceiving “a certain emotional element in our meeting and in our task” and feeling “a sense of happiness with an immemorial past”, the Indian Prime Minister recalled the

144 Government of India, *Indonesian Prime Minister’s Visit to India* (New Delhi, Information Service of India, n.d.), p. 6. See also *The Hindu*, September 24, 1954.

145 *The Hindu*, September 30, 1954.

146 Ibid., September 25, 1954.

147 Ibid., September 24, 1954.

ancient Indian-Indonesian contacts in these words : "Thinking of Indonesia, our minds go back to ages past, to times which are celebrated in epics, in traditions and in stories, when we lived together, the people of Indonesia and our people in many ways, and they were always ways of peace...So when you come here, immediately a thousand memories burried in our conscious and sub-conscious cells, come up and we think of hundred and even thousands of years of contacts."¹⁴⁸

The Joint Statement issued in New Delhi on September 25, 1954, on the conclusion of the Indonesian leader's visit to India, only confirmed the two countries' common approach to various issues of regional and international importance. The two Prime Ministers expressed their anxiety for furthering "the cause of peace in the world and more especially in South-East Asia" and displayed a "general agreement about the approach to these problems."¹⁴⁹ They also agreed on the desirability of holding early "a Conference of representatives of Asian and African countries", and on the advisability of "the Prime Ministers of the Colombo Conference countries to meet together, preferably at Jakarta."¹⁵⁰

Seen in this perspective, both the countries could be expected to pursue similar policies as regards various specific issues of national, regional and international significance in so far as these affected their foreign policy attitudes and mutual relations. The United Nations provided the forum for both India and Indonesia, together with Burma, to show a remarkable degree of mutual understanding and identity of views. Out of 56 non-official issues taken up in the General Assembly up to 1955, the three countries displayed unanimity on 44 issues. The record on colonial issues was far more impressive. Out of 30 such issues they registered a unanimous

148 Ibid.

149 For "Text of India-Indonesia Joint Statement", see *Foreign Policy of India*, n. 60, p. 314.

150 In an interview in Djakarta on September 24, 1969, Ali Sastroamidjojo told the author that Prime Minister Nehru was hesitant on this issue. It was only after a lot of discussion about the South-East Asian situation and about Afro-Asian role in seeking solution of international issues through peaceful means, that Nehru agreed. In a jubilant mood Ali Sastroamidjojo observed that by meeting Press, people and members of Parliament he had created such a favourable situation that Nehru could not say no to his proposal of holding an Asian-African conference. See also George M. Kahin, *The Asian-African Conference, Bandung, Indoncsia*, April 1955 (Ithaca, New York, 1956), p. 2.

approach on 28.¹⁵¹ Thus according to the voting pattern, India and Indonesia expressed their opposition to Western colonialism in Asia and Africa and to the South African Government's policy of racial discrimination and showed a common approach to the issues of war and peace. But on certain issues having direct bearing on their national interests they followed different courses. The survey of various issues and the two countries' responses to them follows.

In view of the broad similarity of ideals and outlook in the framework of their foreign policies, the Governments of India and Indonesia followed similar policies regarding the war in Indo-China¹⁵² and towards the tripartite (British, French, and Israeli) aggression on Egypt and the Soviet armed action in Hungary.¹⁵³ But there were certain issues on which the two Governments exhibited divergent attitudes. Their approach to the Korean issue showed a marked difference. India voted against the UN General Assembly resolution branding China as an Aggressor whereas Indonesia voted in favour of it.¹⁵⁴ Another issue that revealed dissimilar attitude was the Japanese Peace Treaty signed in San Francisco in September 1951. India declined the invitation to attend the Conference and signed a separate Peace Treaty with Japan later. But Indonesia attended the Conference and, after its demands were duly met, signed the Peace Treaty also. Indonesia's eagerness to create goodwill with the Japanese as also with other participants, especially the United States, prompted it to do so. "If Indonesia had followed in the steps of India", wrote the *Indonesian Review* (an official quarterly journal), "that is, decided to conclude a separate peace treaty, the sphere of goodwill would certainly be absent and Indonesia would certainly not be able to count on any support from

151 G.H. Jansen, *Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment*, (London, 1966), p. 113.

152 The five Prime Ministers' Conference which was held in Colombo in April 1954 to review the situation arising from the war in Indo-China and to discuss ways and means to stop it, revealed a substantial community of outlook among the participants. See Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, *Report 1954-55*, p. 16.

153 For text of Joint Statement issued by the Prime Ministers of Burma, Ceylon, India, and Indonesia, New Delhi, November 14, 1956, see *Foreign Policy of India*, n. 60, pp. 275-9.

154 D.N. Sharma, *Afro-Asian Group in the UN* (Allahabad, 1959), p. 19. On February 1, 1951, the UN General Assembly passed this resolution by a roll vote of 44 to 7 with 9 abstentions. India along with Burma and the Soviet bloc countries voted against whereas Indonesia joined 43 other countries voting in favour of it.

the United States.”¹⁵⁵ It would be clear from the above that on issues directly relevant to Indonesian interests, the Indonesian leaders followed a separate course from that of India. On issues having no direct bearing on their interests, such as the Indo-China War, and the tripartite aggression on Egypt and the Soviet action in Hungary, however, they adopted a course similar to that of India.

West Irian Issue

Then there were certain issues which had direct relationship with their vital interests. One such issue related to restoration of West Irian still under Dutch control.

From the very beginning, India gave full moral and diplomatic support to Indonesia on this question. But India's support was also always accompanied with a counsel of moderation and peaceful, non-violent solution through negotiations with the Dutch. As early as June 1950, Nehru had exhorted the Indonesians to discard violent approach and solve the issues facing them in a peaceful way.¹⁵⁶ Since September 1954, the West Irian issue was brought before the United Nations General Assembly four times, and each time the Indian delegates to the world body lent their diplomatic and moral support to the Indonesian cause. While speaking in the Rajya Sabha on December 12, 1957, Nehru considered the Indonesian claim to West Irian as “right” and “legitimate one.” He regretted the United Nations' failure in carrying the “moderate” Afro-Asian resolution which called upon the Dutch and the Indonesians to resume negotiations for a settlement; but he was also sorry for the use of mob violence against the Dutch and their property in Indonesia. He suggested the use of “our own approach”, that is, peaceful approach and stressed that “it is little difficult for us to understand or to appreciate” the anti-Dutch developments in Indonesia.¹⁵⁷

Certainly, Indonesian leaders had not been satisfied with the nature and degree of India's support on the issue. A feeling was

155 *Indonesian Review* (Djakarta, Indonesia Publishing Institute, “Prapanca”, vol. 1, no. 5, October-December 1951, p. 375.

156 *The Hindu*, June 9, 1950.

157 Government of India, Rajya Sabha, *Debates* (New Delhi, Rajya Sabha Secretariat, 1957), vol. 19, no. 19, part 2, December 12, 1957, col. 2347. While speaking in the Lok Sabha on December 17, 1957, Nehru “viewed with concern” the anti-Dutch happenings in Indonesia and suggested “that it is always better, it is always desirable to settle these matters peacefully by negotiations, even though that might take some considerable time.” See Government of India, Lok Sabha, *Debates*, series 2, vol. 10 December 17, 1957, cols. 5880-1.

growing among them that India had lost its earlier enthusiasm against Western colonialism in Asia and Africa. Nehru's lack of approval for anti-Dutch activities in Indonesia was already evident from his speeches in Parliament. When Sukarno visited India in January 1958 and met the Indian leaders, he failed to convince them about the desirability of creating forceful pressures in order to see that the Dutch resiled from their intransigence on the West Irian question. Commenting on his impressions of his tour of India and Pakistan on way back from Moscow in January 1961, General Abdul Haris Nasution, the Indonesian Minister of Defence and Security, told the author that "frankly speaking...President Ayub Khan's support to our struggle (for West Irian) was more spontaneous than Jawaharlal Nehru's". He appreciated the diplomatic support given by the non-aligned countries including India and the UAR, but he stressed that the Soviet support was stronger.¹⁵⁸ Even at the United Nations, India's attitude towards the problem of West Irian had shown a little disinterestedness.¹⁵⁹

India's insistent stress on a non-violent approach to colonial issues in general and to the West Irian issue in particular became, in course of time, highly embarrassing to the Indonesian leaders.

158 Written replies by Gen. Abdul Haris Nasution, Chairman of the MPRS (Madjelas Parmusjawaratan Rakjat Sementara—Provisional People's Congress of Indonesia), Djakarta, November 15, 1969, in response to a questionnaire submitted by the author during his field study in Indonesia.

159 Interview with Ali Sastroamidjojo, for some time Indonesia's Permanent Representative at the United Nations, Djakarta, September 24, 1969. Ali Sastroamidjojo told the author about an incident involving V.K. Krishna Menon, India's Defence Minister and leader of the Indian delegation to the United Nations General Assembly in its Fourteenth Session in September-October 1959. The Indonesian representative had asked Arthur Lall, India's Permanent Representative, to request Krishna Menon to mention the West Irian issue in the course of his speech. Arthur Lall informed him that he had conveyed his request. Finding that his request had been ignored, Ali Sastroamidjojo once again approached the Indian Representative to remind Krishna Menon. Arthur Lall, consequently, sent a small chit to the Indian Defence Minister in the course of his speech. Ali Sastroamidjojo told the author that Krishna Menon's attitude revealed that India had lost zeal on the West Irian issue.

Krishna Menon, in fact, made a brief mention of the West Irian issue and reiterated India's position in these words: "The Government of India considers West Irian as unfinished business, that is, that part of Indonesia which, as is the case of Portuguese Goa, still remains under alien rule." See United Nations, *General Assembly Official Records* (GAOR), session 14, plen. mtg. 823, October 6, 1959, p. 422.

The Government of India's action in Goa against the Portuguese in December 1961 added sharpness to criticism against India. It also confirmed the Indonesian thesis that colonialism understood only the language of force.

Indonesian Demand for a Second Asian-African Conference

Another issue that had its bearing on the two countries' relations was the Indonesian leaders' demand for convening a second Asian-African conference. The Indian-Indonesian attitudes towards this issue have been examined in a separate chapter.¹⁶⁰ Since the first Asian and African Conference in Bandung (West Java) in April 1955, Indonesia had been approaching India and other Asian and African countries for a second such conference. At a Press conference in New Delhi on November 14, 1956, Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo of Indonesia revealed that his Government had even succeeded in seeking concurrence, in principle, of the Prime Ministers of Burma, Ceylon and India, to the holding of the second Asian-African conference. He thought that it would be "held in the second half of next year."¹⁶¹ Nehru, however, had been showing hesitation to agree to the Indonesian overtures in this connection. Rather than bringing unity in the Afro-Asian ranks, he believed, another conference would create and promote differences to the advantage of the Big Powers.

The Indian-Indonesian differences on these issues got strengthened during the period under study. Two countries, China and Pakistan, played an important role in promoting anti-Indian sentiment in Indonesia. Sharing an avowed sense of hostility towards India, they adopted certain policies and utilized certain occasions in order to damage India's relations with Indonesia. The role of of these two countries in Indian-Indonesian relations has been examined separately.¹⁶²

160 See Chapter on India, Indonesia and the Second Asian-African Conference.

161 *The Hindu*, November 15, 1956.

162 See Chapters on China's Role and Pakistan's Role.

India and Indonesia at the Belgrade Conference

Importance of the Belgrade Conference

The importance of the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned countries in Belgrade (Yugoslavia) in September 1961, as far as Indian-Indonesian relations are concerned, has been variously assessed. Some former Indonesian leaders describe it as “a turning point”, others term it as “a starting point”, still others “an important development”.¹ Most of them representing a cross-section of political opinion in Indonesia, however, are agreed that the Belgrade Conference was a major landmark in the post-independence history of the two countries’ relations. According to Anak Agung Gde Agung, the famous author of *Twenty Years’ Indonesian Foreign Policy, 1945-1965*, published in 1973, the process of “alienation” that started since the first Asian-African Conference in Bandung (West Java, Indonesia) in April 1955 came to mark a full circle at the Belgrade Conference². The major significance of the Conference lay in the fact that it provided the leaders of the two countries with the first ever opportunity to express in open their different approaches to the issues of colonialism and world peace. This divergence of the world view as registered at the Belgrade Conference got reinforced in the period under study and proved crucial in the lessening of Indian-Indonesian interaction.

- 1 These were the impressions gathered by the author during interviews with Indonesian political leaders belonging to different political parties in Djakarta between September 1969 and February 1970.
- 2 Interview with Anak Agung Gde Agung, Djakarta, 17 October 1969. He was Minister of Internal Affairs in Mohammad Hatta’s Cabinet (December 20, 1949—September 6, 1950) and Minister of Foreign Affairs in Burhanuddin Harahap’s Cabinet (August 12, 1955—March 26, 1956).

Early Attitudes

The idea of the Conference is said to have emanated from President Joseph Broz Tito of Yugoslavia in 1959.³ It got an impetus during the fifteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly. At a long "summit meeting" on September 30, 1960, the five leaders of India, Indonesia, the United Arab Republic, Yugoslavia and Ghana, exchanged views on the role of the non-aligned members of the United Nations in relation to the deteriorating international situation.⁴ The meeting passed a Resolution calling upon the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union "to renew contacts interrupted recently, so that their declared willingness to find solutions of the outstanding problems by negotiations may be progressively implemented."⁵ This was the first practical step taken by the non-aligned leaders to co-ordinate their approach and demonstrate their eagerness to form and exert combined moral pressure on the Great Powers to seek peace through mutual negotiations.

By virtue of their being the representatives of the two most populous and potentially rich non-aligned nations, and also because of their widely acknowledged role as great personalities among the non-aligned leaders, both Nehru and Sukarno played a significant role in the "summit meeting". This was clear from the fact that the Indonesian leader was authorized to introduce the resolution to the General Assembly on behalf of the five non-aligned states and the Indian leader was chosen to second it. The resolution, no doubt, signified a similar approach on the part of both the leaders. Nevertheless, beneath this similarity lay obvious differences that manifested later at the Belgrade Conference. In the course of his address at the General Assembly of the United Nations on September 30, 1960, Sukarno attributed the cold war "conflict" to "inequalities" whether within a nation or between nations. And these "inequalities", according to him, resulted from "imperialism and colonialism" which should be eliminated in order to remove exploitation

3 K.P. Karunakaran. "Background to the 'Neutral Nations' Summit", *The Journal of United Service Institute of India* (New Delhi), vol. 91, no. 384, July-September 1961, pp. 171-5.

4 The leaders respectively were Prime Minister Nehru and Presidents Sukarno, Nasser, Tito and Kwame Nkrumah.

5 For text of the Resolution, see Government of Indonesia, *Handbook on the Political Manifesto* (Two Executive Directions of the Manipol), (Djakarta, Department of Information, 1961), Special Issue 33, p. 159. See also *The Hindu* (Madras), October 2, 1960.

of man by man and nation by nation. Although, while submitting the non-aligned countries' resolution to the General Assembly he considered it "a practical step" in the direction of easing international tension arising out of the cold war postures of the two Super Powers, his entire argument revolved round the question of colonialism and imperialism which have to be eliminated in order to "build a world sane and secure".⁶

In contrast, Nehru's address to the U.N. General Assembly was over-weighted in favour of resumption of negotiations between the American and the Soviet leaders. For him "the basic problem of all" was the "necessity to preserve peace" in the world. "Without peace," he said, "all our dreams vanish and are reduced to ashes." He believed that the danger to peace arose from the "deadlock" between the two Super Powers on various issues, like disarmament, Germany, West Berlin and the Congo. If the American and the Soviet leaders could be brought round to soften their rigid postures and to enter into negotiations, chances for world peace might be brightened. It was in this field that the non-aligned countries could play a meaningful role. The five powers' draft resolution was significant because it focussed on the urgency of this fact. Nehru was fully aware of the continued existence of colonialism in Asia and Africa. But unlike Sukarno, he attached a lesser degree of importance to it than to the question of promoting a climate congenial for world peace.⁷ Thus the emergence of a difference in the perception of the international system by the two leaders was quite apparent.

Initial Moves

The prospects of a conference of the non-aligned countries remained in abeyance until President Tito of Yugoslavia and President Nasser of the United Arab Republic broached the idea in April 1961. In the joint communique issued on the conclusion of President Tito's visit to the U.A.R. on April 22, 1961, the two leaders "expressed their deep concern over the unfavourable development of international relations and over the dangerous aggravation of the situation caused by recent developments." They "held the view that consultations between the non-aligned countries

6 Government of Indonesia, "To Build the World Anew" (Text of Sukarno's address to the U.N. General Assembly on September 30, 1960), in *Handbook on the Political Manifesto*, n. 5, pp. 147-8.

7 For text of Prime Minister Nehru's speech, see United Nations *General Assembly Official Records* (GAOR), session 15, plen. mtg. 882, October 3, 1960, pp. 324-9.

are indispensable for the purpose of consolidating world peace, safeguarding the independence of all nations and eliminating the danger of intervention in their affairs.”⁸ In pursuance of their common desire both the Presidents issued joint letters addressed to the leaders of the non-aligned countries, proposing the idea of a summit conference and suggesting that it be convened some time before the next session of the U.N. General Assembly.⁹ With President Sukarno having given his concurrence, an announcement was made in the name of the three leaders on May 16 that a preparatory meeting would be held in Cairo on June 5, 1961.¹⁰ The announcement was accompanied with an invitation to attend the preparatory meeting in which following six issues would be discussed and decided upon :

1. desirability of holding a neutral summit as proposed, and in case of agreement, to
2. decide on the countries to be invited to the main conference;
3. the date on which the conference to be held;
4. the duration of the conference;
5. the agenda, functioning and procedure; and
6. the venue of the conference.¹¹

The underlying idea stated was to hold high-level consultations in order to arrive at a common understanding on the major issues that were due to come up before the sixteenth session of the U.N. General Assembly.

India's Reactions

India's interest in the Asian-African gatherings had been declining since the Bandung Conference in April 1955.¹² Prime Minister Nehru's lukewarm response to President Sukarno's demand for second conference of that type could be attributed to his awareness of disunity existing among the Afro-Asian countries.

8 *Arab Observer* (Cairo), vol. 2, no. 20, May 14, 1961, p. 15.

9 Ibid., p. 14. The letters jointly signed by Presidents Tito and Nasser were delivered in various Asian, African and Latin American countries by the Chiefs of the Yugoslav and the U.A.R. diplomatic missions shortly after the signing of the joint communique on April 22, 1961.

10 "The Neutral Summit", *Link* (New Delhi), vol. 3, no. 41, May 21, 1961, p. 21.

11 Ibid.

12 Sisir Gupta, *India and Regional Integration in Asia* (Bombay, etc., 1964) p. 70.

These gatherings in his opinion would only display the divisions in their ranks and invite Big Powers to exploit the same to their own advantage.

Keeping this in view, Nehru made a brief halt at Cairo on March 19, 1961, enroute to New Delhi and discussed with President Nasser the advantages and disadvantages of holding a second Asian-African meet.¹³ At least he was not, as he made known later, well disposed towards it.¹⁴ Quite possibly the two leaders also discussed the prospects of a non-aligned gathering as proposed by President Tito. Nehru's talks with Nasser were quite significant in point of time as these took place just about a month before the Nasser-Tito joint communique was issued in April 1961. Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether Nehru readily agreed to attend a non-aligned conference. The way India accepted the invitation to attend the preparatory meeting created an impression that India was not that willing to attend it. On May 18, 1961, Nehru told newsmen in New Delhi: "We are attending the preliminary conference and that may lead the way to the other. But there is no question of anticipating the results of the first conference."¹⁵ Obviously, the Indian Prime Minister entertained certain reservations about the preparatory meeting. Nehru's Press conference indicated that India would be willing to join the summit meeting only if certain conditions were fulfilled. These related to the membership of the proposed conference and to the nature of issues to be discussed there. India desired, as it was made known later by R.K. Nehru, leader of the Indian delegation, that the summit conference should be broad-based to include all the countries that were not committed to either of the two blocs. It also desired that the agenda of the conference should include only those issues having direct or indirect bearing on Big Power conflicts such as disarmament, banning of nuclear tests, Laos and the Congo. "Bilateral disputes" or regional issues of limited significance should be excluded.¹⁶ It was believed in India that fulfilment of these two conditions would checkmate efforts at building a third bloc, and enable the non-aligned con-

13 "Nehru in Cairo," *Arab Observer*, vol. 2, no. 13, March 26, 1961, p. 11.

14 While back in New Delhi, Nehru revealed at a Press conference that prospects of a second Asian-African conference had figured in his talks with President Nasser. But he categorically stated that "it did not mean that such a meeting was going to be held." See *Mideast Mirror*, vol. 13, no. 12, March 25, 1961, p. 10.

15 *The Statesman* (New Delhi), May 19, 1961.

16 *Ibid.*, June 2, 1961.

ference to make a positive contribution towards promoting world peace. The Indian Prime Minister entertained fears that the summit meeting "may encourage the idea of a Third Bloc". These fears continued to delay Government of India's decision to attend the summit conference even after the two original sponsors, Presidents Tito and Nasser, gave assurances to Prime Minister Nehru in this connection.¹⁷ But the words of the invitation, viz., "to convene in the greatest possible numbers"¹⁸ were in accord with the Indian emphasis on broad-basing the conference and, in this sense, might have encouraged India to decide in favour of participating in the preparatory meeting. In fact these conditions became the two major planks of India's policy there.

Indonesia's Responses

During his visit to Yugoslavia in late May 1960, President Sukarno was reported to have discussed with President Tito the prospects of a meeting of the uncommitted nations. This could be inferred from Foreign Minister Subandrio's statement at a Press conference on June 1, 1960.¹⁹ Subandrio favoured the idea of such a conference. Linking it with the abortive Paris Summit Meeting of the leaders of the Big Four—Britain, France, the United States and the Soviet Union—he observed that by holding such a conference "we will be able to assist the two world giants to find another way out to breakthrough the deadlock in Paris."²⁰ This showed Indonesia's growing interest in the convening of a non-aligned conference.

But Government of Indonesia's favourable attitude produced a controversy in the domestic politics. Since the first Asian-African Conference in April 1955, the Indonesian leaders had been making efforts to convene a second such conference.²¹ Under the dominant influence of President Sukarno Indonesia made anti-nekolim (anti-neo-colonialism, colonialism and imperialism) as the main compo-

17 *Link*, vol. 4, no. 1, August 15, 1961, p. 22.

18 G.H. Jansen, *Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment* (London, 1966), p. 281.

19 *Antara*, June 6, 1960.

20 *Ibid.*, June 2 and 17, 1960. The Big Four Summit Meeting which was scheduled to be held in Paris on May 16, 1960, proved abortive. The deadlock arose from strong Soviet reactions to American espionage activities against her. Only a fortnight before the Summit Meeting was scheduled to be held, that is, on May 1, 1960, the Soviet Union shot down an American U-2 spy air-craft over its territory.

21 See Chapter I, p. 51 and Chapter IV, pp. 151-3.

ment of its world view. In fact Indonesia from the beginning had a hostile view of the world trying to circumscribe its independence.”²² Certain developments in the post-independence period only reinforced the anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist tendency born during the struggle against the Dutch. The most important were, (a) Dutch intransigence on the West Irian question, (b) the American sympathy and support for the regional rebellions in Indonesia during 1957-1958, (c) the eclipse of parliamentary democracy and replacement thereof by a new political system called “Demokrasi Terpimpin” (guided democracy) and (d) the phenomenal growth in the political influence of the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) since the general elections of 1955-1956. Simultaneously, an important external factor that lent radical support to Sukarno’s world view and contributed to reinforcement of his antipathy towards the *nekolim* was the People’s Republic of China. All these developments had combined to give an impetus to the demand for convening a second Asian-African conference. In this sense Indonesian Government’s readiness to attend the preparatory meeting of the proposed non-aligned conference seemed to be paradoxical.

The PKI and the PNI (Indonesian Nationalist Party), the two important adjuncts of *Nasakom* (an acronym for a combination of nationalist, religious and Communist elements) politics openly expressed their opposition to the Government’s attitude. The PKI had expressed its opposition to the idea of a non-aligned conference as early as July 1960. It had noted contradictions between the Yugoslav and Indonesian foreign policies, criticized Foreign Minister Subandrio for his quick agreement to President Tito’s proposal and interpreted it as deviation from the “independent and active” principles and those laid down in the Political Manifesto. Stressing that Indonesia’s foreign policy was one of active opposition to imperialism and not a neutral posture towards it (like that of Yugoslavia), it had said, “it must mean actively striving for world peace and not convene a Little Summit conference of non-bloc countries.”²³

22 For a highly perceptive study of the world view held by the Indonesian elite groups from the 1928-generation to 1945-generation to 1966-generation, see Franklin B. Weinstein, *Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence, From Sukarno to Soeharto* (Ithaca and London, 1976), 384 pp.

23 “Between Yugoslavia and Indonesia”, *Review of Indonesia* (a PKI monthly journal), vol. 7, no. 80, August 1960, pp. 39-41. This article originally appeared in the PKI daily *Harian Rakjat* (Djakarta), July 12, 1960.

The PNI also expressed its opposition to joining the proposed non-aligned meeting. The party leaders considered the Government's favourable attitude towards President Tito's proposal in this regard as against President Sukarno's idea of struggle between the forces of colonialism and imperialism and the forces of freedom and independence as outlined in his address at the General Assembly of the United Nations in September 1960. Ali Sastraamidjojo, General Chairman of the PNI, explained that the basis of President Sukarno's concept was aligning with all the international forces working actively against colonialism and imperialism anywhere in the world. And, according to him, the way was to make incessant efforts towards a second Bandung-type conference. The PNI leader met President Sukarno, explained the PNI's stand and expressed his anxiety that the Government's decision to attend the non-aligned preparatory meeting might slacken its efforts towards convening the second Asian-African Conference.²⁴

In order to allay these anxieties the Government issued a special statement on May 16, 1961. It described the non-aligned summit conference plan as "a concrete implementation of Indonesia's active and independent foreign policy" and added that the uncommitted countries "together could make important constructive contribution to the cause of world peace without forming a new bloc." Simultaneously, it assured: "With the holding of this high level meeting we need not worry that our effort to call a second conference of A-A (Afro-Asian) nations will be in any way depreciated." The Government, it added, would use the non-aligned preparatory meeting as a "medium" to better the prospects of the second Asian-African conference and, in this way, continue its endeavours to hold a preparatory meeting thereto "at the end of this year."²⁵

These assurances from the Government appeared to satisfy both the PKI and the PNI. This was evident from their readiness to be represented later in the official Indonesian delegation to the main non-aligned gathering, which came to be known as *Nasakom* delegation.²⁶

24 Interview with Ali Sastroamidjojo, former Prime Minister and General Chairman of the PNI, Djakarta, September 24, 1969.

25 *Antara*, May 27, 1961. See also "Prelude to Summit", *Arab Observer*, vol. 2, no. 23, June 4, 1961, p. 25.

26 *Harian Rakjat* (a PKI Bahasa Indonesia daily-Djakarta), August 21, 1961. The *Nasakom* delegation as such included among others PNI leader Ali Sastroamidjojo, PKI leader D.N. Aidit and NU (Nahdatul Ulama) Party Leader Sjaifudin Zuhri.

Attitudes at the Preparatory Meeting

The preparatory meeting representing twenty non-aligned countries took place in Cairo between June 5 and 12, 1961. The Indian and Indonesian delegations were led by R.K. Nehru, Secretary General of the Ministry of External Affairs and Foreign Minister Subandrio respectively. India's representation below the level of its Foreign Minister showed India did not attach as much importance to the preparatory meeting as Indonesia did.

The first issue that revealed difference of opinion between India and Indonesia related to the seating at the preparatory meeting of the delegates from the Provisional Revolutionary Government of Algeria (PRGA) and the Antoine Gizenga-led Government of the Congo based in Stanleyville. The Ghanaian delegate's proposal for invitations to these two governments brought differences to the fore. India was opposed to the Ghanaian proposal because neither of these two governments was a member of the United Nations nor had India accorded recognition to either of them so far. Besides, the Antoine Gizenga Government lacked mandate from the Congolese Parliament. India had in the recent past been withholding recognition to any Government in the Congo on these grounds. The leader of the Indian delegation was of the view that an invitation to the Stanleyville-based Government would be prejudicial to the U.N. resolution seeking for the convening of the Congolese Parliament.²⁷ Another related reason for India's objection was the fact that the United Nations recognized only the Leopoldville-based Government as the Central Government of the Congo.²⁸

In contrast, the Indonesian delegate expressed itself strongly in support of the Ghanaian proposal to send invitations to these two Governments. The Indonesian Government had already accorded recognition to them. Only three weeks before the preparatory meeting, in a joint communique issued in Accra on May 15, 1961, President Sukarno had joined President Kwame Nkrumah in reaffirming the two countries' recognition of the Antoine Gizenga's Government as the only legitimate government in the Congo.²⁹

The Indo-Indonesian differences on the issue of invitations to PRGA and the Antoine Gizenga Government had deeper implications. The Indonesian delegation had found itself in agreement

27 *Suluh Indonesia* (A Bahasa Indonesia daily—Djakarta), June 12, 1961.

28 *Ibid.*, June 16, 1961.

29 *Antara*, May 18, 1961.

with the views of majority of the participants. If "Casablanca" group of the states insisted on invitation to the Antoine Gizenga Government, the Moroccan delegate went to the extent of threatening to boycott the meeting if the PRGA was not invited.³⁰ Other countries like Cuba, Yugoslavia and even Ceylon rallied round to their view.³¹ Whereas the question of participation of the Stanleyville government was deferred due to the reservation of the UAR, the Sudan and some other countries on the issue, under pressure of the majority opinion India had to yield on the issue of participation by the PRGA.³² By implication, whereas India found itself isolated, Indonesia demonstrated its identification with the African-Arab sentiment against colonialism. India's refusal to recognize these two governments gave the impression of its "lack of fervour" for the African cause of liberation from colonialism.³³

One of the two other issues on which India and Indonesia expressed difference of opinion at the preparatory meeting related to the composition of the non-aligned conference. At a Press interview in Cairo, R.K. Nehru stressed that membership of the conference should be comprehensive rather than restrictive. The idea as he put it was to win over "wavering" countries to the side of the non-aligned group and, thereby, to strengthen the front working for world peace.³⁴ In this connection the Indian delegate had already submitted a list of eighteen countries belonging to Asia, Africa and Latin America for consideration as possible invitees.³⁵

As stated earlier, India's endeavour to broad-base the non-aligned conference was related to its fears that the conference might not degenerate into a bloc-making effort. According to Prime Minister Nehru, non-aligned states should not only be non-aligned with the two power blocs but also be non-aligned among themselves.³⁶ The Government of India believed that inclusion of coun-

30 *Duta Masjarakat* (a Bahasa Indonesia daily—Djakarta), June 9, 1961.

31 Ceylonese delegate had seconded the Ghanian proposal to send invitations to these two governments. See *Arab Observer*, vol. 2, no. 24, June 11, 1961, pp. 9-10.

32 *Duta Masjarakat*, June 9, 1961. According to this daily, the Sudan, the UAR and India were opposed to the representation of the Stanleyville Government: As a result it guessed that it might not be invited. See also *Arab Observer*, vol. 2, no. 24, June 11, 1961, pp. 9-10.

33 "Neutralists to Meet" (editorial), *The Statesman* (New Delhi), June 17, 1961.

34 *Arab Observer*, vol. 2, no. 24, June 11, 1961, p. 9.

35 *Suluh Indonesia*, June 7, 1961.

36 *The Hindu*, July 1, 1961.

tries belonging to the four continents and adhering to a policy of non-alignment of various shades would checkmate efforts at bloc-making and also keep radical anti-colonialist tendencies in reasonable proportions.

But the leader of the Indian delegation had to face stiff opposition from various sides. Only Afghanistan, Burma, Ethiopia, Nepal and the Sudan supported India's stand.³⁷ The rest of the participants found India's policy against their interests and hence joined to restrict rather than to expand the scope of non-alignment. On the basis of its radical anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist posture, Indonesia found a common cause with those wanting to oppose new admissions.

Outnumbered, the group led by India suggested the formation of a sub-committee to evolve a criterion to be applied for selection of the invitees to the non-aligned conference. It was during discussion in this sub-committee that the Indian and Indonesian delegates came to have a sharp difference of opinion. The Indonesian delegate put forward the formula that only those be considered non-aligned that agreed to "having no foreign military bases on their territories and joining no military blocs."³⁸ The Indonesian posture was based on a proper assessment of the strength of opposition to the stand taken by the Indian delegate. Cuban opposition to participation by the pro-American states, like Argentina, Chile, and Mexico, and the "Casablanca" group of African and Arab States' opposition to participation by the "Monrovia" group of African states clearly indicated that India would be isolated.³⁹ And this is what happened. Most of the participants favoured the Indonesian thesis about criteria for invitations to the non-aligned conference.⁴⁰

Certain considerations prompted the Indonesian delegation to adopt a stiff attitude on this issue. Its identification with the strongly anti-colonialist stance of the "Casablanca" group of states, the Arabs, the Yugoslavs and the Cubans would enhance Indo-

37 Jansen, n. 18, p. 285.

38 *Arab Observer*, vol. 2, no. 24, June 11, 1961, p. 10.

39 The "Casablanca" group comprised of only six radically anti-colonialist states as against the "Monrovia" group comprising about twenty odd African states. Differences in the two groups on the Congo issue prevented participation of the states belonging to the latter group.

Heads of twenty African states participated in a conference held at Monrovia (Liberia) in May 1961. These states later came to be known as "Monrovia" group. See Jansen, n. 18, p. 287 and p. 289.

40 *Arab Observer*, vol. 2, no. 24, June 11, 1961, p. 10.

nesia's image as a champion of their cause. It would also better the prospects of the second Asian-African conference.

Thus Foreign Minister Subandrio, leader of the Indonesian delegation to the preparatory meeting, took the position that the urgent need of the time was to consolidate and not to expand the scope of non-alignment. Addressing the preparatory meeting on June 6, 1961, he said: "Now we are engaged in the work of consolidating the ranks of the non-aligned countries, so as to build a compact moral force of compelling magnitude in the world." He also warned against "trying to compromise on basic principles of non-alignment or by diluting these principles beyond recognition."⁴¹ However, in order to placate the sentiments of those left outside the conference, Subandrio was quick to assure "that this convention of non-aligned countries should not be construed as antagonizing our other brothers of Asia and Africa."⁴²

This showed the degree of importance the Indonesian leaders attached to the prospects of the second Asian-African conference, an objective of their foreign policy which they always kept in view. In the course of his speech at the preparatory meeting the Indonesian Foreign Minister had stated that "this conference will pave the way to a second Asian and African Conference in the not too distant future." He had added that this "will also encourage people to find ways and means to implement the Bandung resolutions...and (will) strengthen the force of struggle against colonialism and imperialism."⁴³

The second major issue which focussed Indian-Indonesian differences related to the agenda of the proposed summit conference. The Government of India was of the opinion that only general issues of international character should be included in the agenda. India sought to exclude bilateral disputes because it believed it would be difficult to achieve unanimity on them. This might lead to the conference getting bogged down on issues on which certain states might adopt rigid positions. This way the very purpose of creating and promoting conditions for world peace and international co-operation, which the non-aligned conference was thought to serve, would be defeated. India was certainly not opposed to discussing the problem of colonialism in general. But it apprehended that discussion on specific bilateral issues might lead

41 *Antara*, June 20, 1961. This issue gives full text of Subandrio's speech at the preparatory meeting in Cairo on June 6, 1961.

42 *Ibid.*

43 *Ibid.*, June 20, 1961.

to stiffening of attitudes and prejudicing the efforts of the non-aligned countries to end colonialism through the United Nations.

In this regard Indonesia's attitude was sharply opposed to that of India. Indonesia had, of late, been losing faith in the efficacy of the United Nations as a forum for peaceful solution of colonial disputes. The United Nations had failed to do justice to Indonesia on the West Irian issue, a territory which still continued to be under the control of the Dutch. The Dutch persistence in declining negotiations on this issue on the one hand and the UN failure in inducing the Dutch to enter into negotiations with Indonesia on the other, had been having serious impact on Indonesian domestic and foreign policies. One of the important consequences of the Dutch policy on the West Irian question had been the growing commitment of Indonesia's ruling elite to anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism. In this sense West Irian was a very live issue which Indonesian leaders would have liked to be included in the agenda of the summit conference. Likewise, Indonesia would also have liked to include all other issues of national liberation struggles still being waged in Asia and Africa. This fitted well into Indonesia's Asian-African policy of seeking to consolidate all the anti-colonialist forces in the world.

To other issues before the preparatory meeting, such as the venue, timing and duration of the summit conference, neither India nor Indonesia appeared to attach much importance. The Indian delegate suggested Lebanon, but later fell in line with many others who opted for Yugoslavia as the venue of the main conference.⁴⁴ The Indonesian delegate also took a favourable position on Yugoslavia as the choice of the venue. As regards the timing of the conference, both delegations agreed to the general trend of fixing the date close to the next session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Finally, at its meeting on June 9, 1961, the preparatory meeting decided about Yugoslavia as the venue and September 1, 1961 as the date for the non-aligned conference⁴⁵.

India was not happy with the results of the preparatory meeting. Certain reservations entertained by Prime Minister Nehru before sending an Indian delegation to the preparatory meeting had not been met satisfactorily. This explains why the Government of India was still hesitant to attend the summit meeting. In a statement issued in Cairo, R.K. Nehru, leader of the Indian delega-

44 Jansen, n. 18, p. 289.

45 *Egyptian Gazette* (Cairo), June 10, 1961.

tion, said that India was not committed to attend the proposed conference. He clarified his remarks by suggesting that India had associated itself with the states sponsoring the conference and was not among those sending invitations.⁴⁶

India was in fact not as much bothered about the nature of the criteria of non-alignment as with its application to individual cases. In an interview to *Link* correspondents in August 1961 Nehru said : "I do not think there are any differences of views in regard to broad principles. But in regard to the application of these principles there might be some differences."⁴⁷

In fact, the difficulties arose in the selection of participants in the main conference. The preparatory meeting had failed to resolve the deadlock on this issue and had left the question to be settled later by an Ambassadors' committee comprising of representatives of twenty participating countries. The Indian delegation which had been pressing for sending invitations to various Asian, African, Latin American and European countries did not find the communique of the preparatory meeting altogether discouraging. The communique had expressed the "opinion" of the participants "that the area of non-alignment had been widened, and could be further widened, in scope and influence, and thus become a fundamental factor in the preservation of international peace and security". Thus it left an opening for India in this direction.

Encouraged by the communique of the preparatory meeting, India continued to make efforts through the Ambassadors' committee to seek inclusion of a number of states. While explaining India's stand at the first meeting of the Ambassadors' committee, the Indian Ambassador in Cairo, M.A. Husain, said :

India is not trying to push any country against the wish of any other. We are interested only in proper application of the criteria adopted by the preliminary meeting. We want our philosophy of non-alignment to expand to allow more nations to come in. Why be afraid of inviting more countries ? Only those countries which like us and follow our line of policy will respond to our invitation.⁴⁸

46 *The Hindu*, July 1, 1961. See also K. P. Karunakaran, "India and the Neutral Summit", *The Economic Weekly*, vol. 13, no. 34, August 26, 1961, pp. 1367-8.

47 *Link* (New Delhi), vol. 4, no. 1, August 15, 1961, p. 22.

48 *Egyptian Gazette*, June 14, 1961.

49 "More Countries May be Invited to Non-Aligned Summit Conference", *Arab Observer*, vol. 2, no. 26, June 25, 1961, p. 16.

The Indian representative also hinted that he would suggest a list of new countries to be invited, provided they fulfilled the five-point criteria laid down by the preparatory meeting. As it happened, he suggested nineteen new members and succeeded in seeking invitations only for six.⁵⁰

Obviously, India's efforts in broad-basing the summit conference had met with stiff opposition. The degree of India's achievement in this direction was variously interpreted as "partial success" and "meagre".⁵¹ On the whole India's experience at the preparatory meeting had not been "wholly happy".⁵² India's emphasis on exclusion of bilateral disputes from the agenda of the summit conference had also failed to carry conviction with a majority of the participants. Issues of national liberation struggles in Asia and Africa were too important for Indonesia, Yugoslavia, Cuba and Arab and African states to be excluded from the agenda. As a result, to India's embarrassment, the first item on the proposed agenda related to "Respect of the right of peoples and nations to self-determination; the struggle against imperialism, liquidation of colonialism and neo-colonialism".⁵³

Unlike India, Indonesia was satisfied with the results of the preparatory meeting. As regards the criteria of non-alignment, the Indonesian thesis on considering those non-aligned who agreed to "having no foreign military bases on their territories and joining no military blocs" had found favour with a majority of the participants. By offering ready support to Ghana's proposal to admit the Congo (Stanleyville) Government of Antoine Gizenga and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of Algeria, Indonesia had quite succeeded in establishing its anti-colonialist image among the African and Arab circles. The Indonesian contention of consolidat-

50 Ibid. See also *The Hindu*, July 8, 1961. These states were Nigeria, Togoland, Upper Volta, Equador, Bolivia and Lebanon. Of them Lebanon alone became a full-fledged participant. Nigeria, Togoland and Upper Volta declined to attend the conference of the non-aligned countries. Equador and Bolivia accepted 'observers' status. See *The Statesman* (New Delhi), July 15, 1961.

51 *The Hindu*, July 8, 1961. See also *Link*, vol. 3, no. 52, August 6, 1961, p. 7.

52 *Link*, vol. 3, no. 45, June 18, 1961, p. 11.

53 Yugoslavia, *The Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, Belgrade, September 1-6, 1961* (a collection of Conference Documents) (Beograd, 1961), p. 16. (Hereinafter cited as *The Conference of Heads of State or Government*). See also *Egyptian Gazette*, June 12, 1961.

ing non-alignment at this stage also complemented the efforts of those who sought to restrict the non-aligned group. A co-relation of policy with these states on the composition issue had enabled the Indonesian delegate to block Indian effort to seek expansion of the non-aligned group.

India's sense of disappointment at the outcome of the preparatory meeting was very acute. This explains why India was still reluctant to attend the main conference. The final decision about India's participation and representation through the Prime Minister came on August 9, 1961, barely three weeks before the conference was scheduled to begin.⁵⁴

For Nehru, the decision to attend the conference was not an easy one. He had to weigh the likely outcome of the conference in case India joined as also in case it did not, and its bearing on the national and international objectives of India's foreign policy. Participation would bring India into conflict with a majority of those attending it on most of the issues. Nevertheless, if India participated, the non-aligned meeting might prove to be a substitute to a second Asian-African conference and Indonesia's persistent demand for it might lose much of its appeal, a calculation that the later events proved to be wrong. But in case of India's non-participation, non-alignment might be twisted to serve as an instrument of the cold war. Moreover, it would not be in the best interests of India to displease the Afro-Asian countries as such. It was felt that there would be more advantages than disadvantages in attending the Belgrade conference; hence the decision to participate.

India's Preparations

Nehru's decision to participate in the main conference was in awareness of the enormity of difficulties ahead. A majority opposition to expand the area of non-alignment had limited the scope of India's manoeuvrability against those whose feelings against Western colonialism and imperialism were still very high. In view of this development it was rather necessary for the Indian diplomats to prepare the ground properly. Obviously, not much was done to popularize India's views in this connection. In the absence of clear directions from New Delhi on the issues of importance to India at Belgrade, the Indian diplomats had been puzzled. Confusion grew from the Government's belated decision to attend. Through continued reluctance, an impression had been allowed to grow that in

54 *The Hindu*, August 10, 1961.

spite of all sorts of compulsions India might not attend the conference. A period of three weeks was certainly not enough to counter the anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist propaganda carried on insistently by Indonesia and China. One of the major lessons of the Cairo preparatory meeting and subsequent Ambassadors' committee meetings had been ignored through a belated decision. It could be said that India attended the Belgrade conference without having adequately prepared the ground for it.

Indonesia's Preparations

After having decided to participate in the non-aligned conference, Indonesia had intensified its efforts to strengthen its position *vis-a-vis* India's. The Indonesian diplomacy was geared to identify Indonesia fully with the Asian-African aspirations for freedom from European colonialism. The objectives of Afro-Asian solidarity and of convening the second Asian-African conference could be realized only by sharing and intensifying Afro-Asian feelings against colonialism and imperialism. President Sukarno's frequent world tours had been of enormous diplomatic use. His regular visits had enabled him to strengthen personal contacts with the Asian and African leaders.

The most recent of President Sukarno's world tours was well through when the preparatory meeting was being held in Cairo in June 1961. Only eighteen days before the preparatory meeting, the Indonesian leader was in Cairo discussing with Presidents Nasser and Sekou Toure of Guinea the problems of national movements for freedom in Africa and thinking about concrete ways on how to help those fighting against colonialism.⁵⁵ The joint communique issued at the end of his 3-day visit to the UAR put major stress on the problems of anti-colonial movements and on rendering all-out assistance necessary for achieving independence.⁵⁶ Almost similar had been the communique issued at Accra at the end of Sukarno's visit to Ghana on May 15, 1961.⁵⁷

In June 1961 the President of Indonesia paid visits (among other countries) to the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China and Yugoslavia. A review of his speeches and those made in his welcome as also of joint communiques issued at the end of his visits shows a close similarity between Indonesian objectives and those of the Soviet Union and China. Besides getting unreserved

55 *Antara*, May 18, 1961.

56 *Ibid.*, May 20, 1961.

57 *Ibid.*, May 18, 1961.

support on the West Irian issue, Sukarno received wild applause, wherever he went, as a consistent fighter for freedom in Asia and Africa. While speaking at a reception given in honour of the Indonesian leader in Kremlin on June 10, 1961, Khrushchev observed that the USSR and Indonesia "have identical views on many international problems, notably general and total disarmament, the liquidation of colonialism, and the struggle against imperialism." He praised Sukarno for his "struggle for his people and for peace against colonialism and imperialism".⁵⁸

Similar was the approach of the Chinese leaders. The *People's Daily* described growing friendship between China and Indonesia as "a powerful force in defence of peace in Asia." It quoted President Sukarno as having said that "the friendship between the peoples of our two countries should be increasingly strengthened and consolidated with each passing day till we attain our common objects, and we will continue to be friends after we attain the common objects." It also quoted Chairman Liu Shao-chi as having asserted that the basic interests of the two peoples "are identical. Our friendship has a bright future."⁵⁹

After his visit to China, President Sukarno went to Yugoslavia. In a joint communique issued at Belgrade he joined Presidents Tito and Keita of Mali (already in Belgrade) in expressing the hope that the forthcoming "neutral" summit meeting would result in "strong and unanimous" declarations against colonialism and imperialism.⁶⁰

In view of Sukarno's efforts abroad for about three months before the non-aligned conference, it would be fairly correct to say that Indonesia was fully preparing the ground in its favour before the conference began at Belgrade on September 1, 1961.

International Situation on the Eve of the Belgrade Conference

The Soviet Union announced resumption of nuclear tests on August 30, 1961, just a day before the opening of the conference of non-aligned states. The Soviet decision, in a sense, represented a new high in the international tension which had been building up over the Berlin issue since the beginning of 1961. By August, the tension had risen to enormous proportions and there was every possibility of an open clash of arms between the two superpowers,

58 Ibid., June 12, 1961. The reception had been arranged by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

59 Ibid., June 17, 1961.

60 Ibid., June 19, 1961.

the United States and the Soviet Union. This was the situation when the latter carried out the first nuclear test of a series on August 30, 1961. Thus the moratorium on nuclear tests operative since December 1958 was broken with serious repercussions on the prospects of world peace.

Parallel to the aggravation of international tension, some serious developments were taking place in Africa. The French action in Tunisia over the Bizerta issue⁶¹ and the Dutch action in Angola and Mozambique created an impression that European colonial powers had no intention to withdraw from their colonies.

These developments came to have different impact on Nehru and Sukarno, who were leading their countries' delegations to the Belgrade Conference. If the imminent threat to world peace as resulting from the Soviet action enabled Nehru to put major stress on the question of world peace, the repressive action of the French and Dutch colonial forces enabled Sukarno to focus major attention on the issue of colonialism and imperialism.

Introducing Belgrade Conference

In all delegates from twenty-five non-aligned countries and observers from three countries attended the conference of the Heads of State and/or Government that opened in Belgrade (Yugoslavia) on September 1, 1961. There were thirteen Asian and ten African states besides Yugoslavia from Europe and Cuba from Latin America.⁶²

Among all the participants in the Conference, India and Indonesia were the most populous states. India with its 438 million people and Indonesia with its 90 million people constituted over 58 per cent and 12 per cent respectively of the total number of people represented at the Conference.⁶³ The Indian delegation consisted

(1) In July 1961 President Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia had challenged the French claim to their base at Bizerta. This had resulted in armed clash between the French paratroopers and the Tunisian soldiers, leading to a large number of Tunisian casualties and damage to property.

62 Alphabetically, the countries were Afghanistan, Algeria, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Lebanon, Mali, Morocco, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, the Sudan, Tunisia, the UAR, Yemen and Yugoslavia. The three Latin American countries which sent observers were Bolivia, Brazil and Ecuador.

63 The Conference of Heads of State or Government, n. 53. These percentages have been worked out on the basis of information given at pp. 273-322. The people represented by the three observers from Latin America are excluded from these figures.

of only six members including Prime Minister Nehru and Defence Minister Krishna Menon (leader and deputy leader respectively), and was among the smallest.⁶⁴ By way of contrast, the Indonesian delegation led by President Sukarno, had eighteen members and was the largest with the sole exception of the Ethiopian delegation having nineteen members.⁶⁵ Besides Sukarno, it included Foreign Minister Subandrio, six other ministers, Acting Chairman and two Vice-Chairmen of the Provisional People's Congress (MPRS), and many other top officials and diplomats.⁶⁶ In political terms the Indonesian delegation fairly represented the "Nasakom" concept as it included Ali Sastroamidjojo, Sjaifudin Zuhri and D.N. Aidit, the leaders of the PNI, NU and PKI respectively.⁶⁷

In his opening statement President Tito set the tone by suggesting various issues to be discussed. These covered both the Indian and Indonesian viewpoints. He corroborated Nehru's opposition to the formation of a third bloc and to the use of the conference forum for attacking one country or other. He agreed with Nehru that the major source of threat to peace was the cold war resulting from the division of the world into two military blocs. Hence the significance of the role of the non-aligned countries in the preservation and promotion of world peace. In this connection he asserted the right of the non-aligned countries "to participate in the solving of problems particularly of those which endanger peace and the fate of the world at the present moment." This was opposed to Nehru's stand in the matter and was in line with Sukarno's oft-repeated opinion since the abortive summit meeting in Vienna in May 1961. President Tito's suggestion that the major purpose of the Conference was to pave the way "towards a relaxation of world tensions and to the freedom, equality and peaceful co-operation of all nations", appeared to lend more weight to Nehru's contention. But his approach to the problems relating to

64 Ibid., pp. 295, 287, 307 and 309. Only three other countries, namely, Cyprus, Nepal and Saudi Arabia had five members.

65 Ibid., pp. 297 and 289.

66 The Indonesian contingent for the Belgrade Conference, in fact, had 46 members including, among others, Special Assistants to the President and his ministers, a cameraman and also an assistant of the President's daughter. See *Suluh Indonesia*, August 26, 1961.

67 *Harian Rakjat*, August 21, 1961. The PNI, NU and PKI represented the three strands of nationalism, religion (agama) and Communism in the "Nasakom" concept of President Sukarno.

the issue of colonialism seemed to be more pro-Sukarno.⁶⁸ In short the opening statement of the Yugoslav President was a well-balanced exposition of the divergent stands taken by Nehru and Sukarno.

President Sukarno's Views

After Tito's inaugural statement, President Sukarno was, in alphabetical order, the first non-aligned leader to address the Conference. His speech covered a wide range of subjects of national and international importance. According to him, the basis of all the present difficulties besetting the world was the continuance of colonialism and imperialism in Asia and Africa. It conflicted with the growing Asian-African demand for freedom and hence produced tension. The Indonesian leader refused to "believe that the real source of international tension and strife is ideological conflict between the great powers." He did not deny the existence of the "ideological conflict". He was, however, convinced that, except when thrust upon other nations, it "must not lead to tension." According to him, "different social systems can co-exist, but there can be no co-existence between independence and justice on one side and imperialism-colonialism on the other side."⁶⁹

Feeling convinced of the correctness of his stand on this issue, to which he returned repeatedly and forcefully, the Indonesian leader called for imposition of a time-limit, not exceeding "two years" in each individual case, "for the complete removal of all forms of colonial subjugation of one nation by another."⁷⁰

Besides, in the course of his address Sukarno made specific references to Germany and Berlin issue, to restructuring of the United Nations, to disarmament, and finally, to his plea for convening a second Asian-African conference. He favoured the idea of a "temporary de facto" recognition of the two German states as well as the Soviet Union entering into a separate peace treaty with East Germany. Although he acceded to the demand of the West Berliners to have "free access to the other parts of the world" and vice versa, he linked it with the question of *de facto* recognition of both East and West Germany. By implication, thus, he supported the East German view that access should be subject to

68 *The Conference of Heads of State or Government*, n. 53, pp. 18-21.

69 *Ibid.*, pp. 27-32.

70 *Ibid.*, p. 33. See also *The Statesman* (New Delhi), September 2, 1961.

check by the "sovereign East German Government."⁷¹ As regards the United Nations, President Sukarno pleaded for the restructuring of its various organs to suit the present-day realities. He also urged for "adequate" representation of the "new, emergent forces" in the world body in order that they could "exert a rightful influence in the world councils where major world problems are considered." For the solution of the "complicated" problem of disarmament also, he demanded the recognition of an "active role" by the non-aligned countries.⁷² Finally, the Indonesian leader attempted to show that the present conference was "complementary to" and "a joining brother" of the second Asian-African conference; and hence the "necessity" for holding it "in the near future".⁷³

Sukarno's speech as a whole revolved round a single argument that colonialism and imperialism must be eradicated early as these were the only impediments in the way of realizing a new world of peace and social justice. The rest were only side issues not as important and as relevant to the realities of the present international situation as that.

There was a serious omission in Sukarno's speech. This related to the Soviet resumption of nuclear test. Deliberate as it seemed, it had its own justification. By saying anything against the Soviet action, the Indonesian leader did not desire to lose his prestige that his radical views on colonialism and imperialism and Afro-Asian solidarity had gained him. If the West came to criticize him, as it happened later, it would be all the more better, because in that case he would be able to enhance his prestige in Afro-Asia as well as in the Communist world.

Prime Minister Nehru's Views

Sukarno's speech had serious implications for the general stand Nehru was expected to take at the Conference. Before his turn came on September 2, 1961, he had heard eight speeches which tended to put the major blame on Western colonialism and imperialism, laid greater emphasis on issues of local and regional importance and ignored the urgency of world peace which lay threatened by the prospect of nuclear confrontation. It prompted him to make a speech which shifted the emphasis from the issue of colonialism and imperialism to the problem of war and peace in the world.

71 Ibid., p. 36. See also *The Hindu*, September 4, 1961.

72 Ibid., pp. 37-38. See also *The Hindu*, September 5, 1961.

73 Ibid., p. 38.

In the course of his speech⁷⁴ Nehru attempted to bring home to all the urgency of the present international crisis which overshadowed all other issues. He urged all to recognize that "if war comes all else for the moment goes. Therefore it becomes inevitable for us...not only to pay attention to but to make sure that the dominant note of our thinking and action...is this crisis that confronts humanity." He pleaded for keeping in view "first things first" and demanded "priority" for the issue of world peace over everything else, "however vital" it might be. Also viewed from a "historical perspective", Nehru believed that "the era of classical colonialism is gone and is dead, though of course it survives and gives a lot of trouble yet, but essentially it is over." This meant his countering Sukarno's argument which sought priority for the issue of colonialism and imperialism over all other issues. Like Sukarno, in order to make his point more convincing, he repeated his argument several times. He also expressed his fear that issues of lesser importance might get priority and a war, more disastrous than the Second World War, might result.

Nehru's stress on the issue of war and peace did not mean to suggest that he had lost sympathy with national liberation struggles still being waged in Asia and Africa. He was fully aware of the difficulties that the colonial powers were creating in the way of national independence in Algeria, Tunisia, the Congo and Angola.⁷⁵ He was simply asking for more pointed attention to the issue that deserved it. In the face of the imminent threat to the whole world, the Indian Prime Minister was averse to discussing any other issue except that of war and peace. "What is the use of discussing Bizerta, Algeria, Angola, etc., if neither the colonies nor the imperialists would any longer exist", he had pointedly asked.⁷⁶

Besides seeking priority for the issue of war and peace over all other issues including colonialism and imperialism, Prime Minister Nehru also dealt with the problems of Germany and West Berlin, of restructuring the United Nations and of disarmament. His views on the issue of Germany and West Berlin were, to an extent, different from those held by Sukarno. He agreed with the Indonesian leader on considering the existence of two German states as "facts of life", which have "to be recognized."⁷⁷ But he

74 For text of Prime Minister Nehru's speech, see *Ibid.*, pp. 107-17.

75 *Ibid.*, pp. 114-15.

76 Cited in "Nehru's Role at Belgrade", *Indian Foreign Affairs*, vol. 4, no. 9, September 1961, p. 25.

77 *The Conference of Heads of State or Government*, n. 53, p. 36.

did not approve of Sukarno's suggestion for signing a peace treaty or exchanging diplomats with East Germany at present.⁷⁸ India's views in this regard were shared by a majority of delegations in the Drafting Committee who were later reported to have rejected *de facto* recognition of the existence of the two German states.⁷⁹ As regards access to West Berlin, Nehru wanted guarantees "by all concerned", which meant that, unlike Sukarno, he was not ready to leave it to the discretion of the East German Government.⁸⁰

As regards the United Nations, Nehru shared Sukarno's emphasis on "a change in the structure" of the world organization. But he was not prepared to concede Sukarno's thesis for "adequate recognition" to the "new emerging forces" in all the UN bodies including the Security Council,⁸¹ and thus ignore the "balance of power" on which the world body was based.⁸² As to the question of disarmament, Prime Minister Nehru considered it "a vital matter" and "an absolute necessity" for world peace. However, keeping in view President Sukarno's demand for "active" participation by the non aligned countries in the disarmament negotiations, he reminded the participants of their limitations. He took the stand that because the issue of war and peace could be settled only by those who had the arms to wage the destructive war and power to ensure peace, it would be better to leave this issue to them. The non-aligned states could only direct their efforts towards creating a peaceful atmosphere congenial for big Powers' negotiations.

Prime Minister Nehru made no reference whatsoever to President Sukarno's call for convening a second Asian-African conference. This in a way showed India's "coolness" towards Indonesia's long-standing demand.⁸³ It was fully in keeping with Nehru's earlier attitude of considering the idea of such a conference as "premature".⁸⁴

78 *The Hindu*, September 4, 1961.

79 *New York Times*, September 5, 1961.

80 *The Conference of Heads of State or Government*, n. 53, p. 112. See also *The Hindu*, September 4, 1961.

81 *Ibid.*, p. 37.

82 *Ibid.*, p. 113.

83 *The Times* (London), September 2, 1961.

84 Talking to newsmen in New Delhi on June 30, 1961, Nehru had said : "We have not been convinced yet of its necessity. Anyhow when a conference not, exactly that but rather similar in essence, is being held in Belgrade, to talk of yet another conference seems at least premature." Nehru was giving his reactions to a special message received from Indonesia personally through Mrs. Supeni, the roving Indonesian Ambassador. The message related to Indonesia's proposal for holding a second Asian-African conference. See *The Hindu*, July 1, 1961.

With all the persuasive power at his command, Nehru had endeavoured to counter Sukarno's arguments. With increase in the number of new states coming up in the process of decolonization, colonialism for him was withdrawing. With only a few colonial pockets left here and there in Asia and Africa, he considered it just a spent force. Hence there was no use condemning those who still refused to see the march of historical forces. Rather it would be better to remove the factors which enabled the French, the Portuguese and the Dutch to cling to their colonies. And the factors, as he understood, were different from the ones suggested by the Indonesian leader. By arguing that it "is war or the fear of war that had led to the cold war", and that it is "the cold war which has resulted and is resulting in the old imperialism and the old colonialism hanging on wherever they exist because they deem it advantageous",⁸⁵ the Indian Prime Minister simply put President Sukarno's argument upside down. If the latter contended that colonialism and imperialism were the root of all world tension and hence they should first be eliminated to make the world safe for peace and socio-economic progress, the former countered it by suggesting that once war or the fear of war which was "advantageous" to colonialism was removed, colonialism and imperialism would not be able to survive for long. Lest his moderate tone should create an impression that he or India had lost interest and enthusiasm for freedom in Asia and Africa, Nehru stressed that "we stand for anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism, anti-racialism, and all that."⁸⁶

But by putting the argument straight, Nehru more than annoyed Sukarno. The former's refusal to agree with the latter on the question of priority for the issue of colonialism and imperialism became a major source of irritation between the two countries. The omission of a reference on West Irian in Nehru's speech was equally matched by Sukarno's omission of a reference on Goa. The latter's ire was provoked also because of the former's divergent approach to other issues. Nothing could be more displeasing to President Sukarno to see Prime Minister Nehru omitting any reference to his plea for the convening of a second Asian-African conference "in the near future".

Behind-the-Scenes Developments

Divergence of views expressed by Nehru and Sukarno in the open plenary session of the Conference came to be crystallized at

85 *The Conference of Heads of State or Government*, n. 53, p. 109.

86 *Ibid.*, p. 108.

the Drafting Committee stage. The Drafting Committee had started its work on the communique since September 2, 1961. Two sub-groups had been formed, one to deal with the threat of nuclear war arising out of conflict between two super powers and other with various other issues on the Conference agenda.⁸⁷ In actual terms the first was to concern itself with Nehru's three-para draft urging negotiations for peace between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Khrushchev, and the second with the issues of colonialism in Asia and Africa. The first controversy that arose was whether conclusions of the two Drafting Committees should be presented separately or embodied in a single document.⁸⁸ Nehru had suggested that such an appeal "should be put foremost and topmost, and perhaps be isolated to show that it is the main thing, that other things may be very important but they are secondary."⁸⁹ Hence the Indian delegation led by Krishna Menon put emphasis on keeping the appeal for peace separate from the main body of the Conference communique. But this was opposed by the Indonesian delegation led by Subandrio along with many other delegations including that of Yugoslavia.⁹⁰ Three reasons may be suggested for their opposition to the stand taken by the Indian delegate. First, Prime Minister Nehru being the initiator of the peace proposal, India would get the entire credit. Secondly, there was a fear that this special procedure would attract all attention to itself. Thirdly, giving importance to the peace appeal would imply that other subjects like colonialism and imperialism were not as important as this was.⁹¹ They demanded, therefore, that the projected appeal should be included in the final document of the Conference.⁹²

After a long session the Drafting Committee accepted the idea of issuing a separate appeal. But it had witnessed a lively argument between India and Indonesia, the latter having been satisfied that a majority of the participants shared its opposition to the former's stand.⁹³ At a meeting with the Press reporters on September 3, 1961, Krishna Menon indicated that there had been a sharp clash in the Committee over separating the war threat from colonialism in the

87 *The Hindu*, September 5, 1961.

88 *Ibid.*

89 *The Conference of Heads of State or Government*, n. 53, p. 109.

90 *The Hindu*, September 5, 1961.

91 *The Statesman* (New Delhi), September 5, 1961.

92 "Belgrade Conference" (editorial), *The Hindu*, September 5, 1961.

93 *The Hindu*, September 5, 1961.

Conference communique.⁹⁴ In the Plenary Session on September 3, 1961, the heads of delegations ratified the decision of the Drafting Committee to issue a separate appeal after a heated debate. The non-aligned countries were divided along lines of the Cairo meeting in June and July 1961, with India finding itself in a minority. President Nasser's suggestion in a public speech earlier that "a mere appeal" would not do and that it would be better to evolve "a plan which can drive the negotiations between the two blocs into the domain of practical application", ultimately resulted in an agreement to issue two identical letters addressed and to be delivered personally to President Kennedy and Prime Minister Khrushchev.⁹⁵

Bitterness generated at the Drafting Committee meeting on September 2, 1961, was further strengthened at its next meeting on September 4, 1961. The Indian delegation stressed priority for world peace through conciliatory approach to the two super powers and the Indonesian delegation sought prominence for the issue of colonialism and imperialism over and above the threat of world war arising from big-power conflict.

The differences related to the type of issues to be included in the Conference Declaration, to the nature of the language used and to the length of the Declaration. India was opposed to the inclusion of bilateral disputes and colonial issues in the Declaration. This was in accord with Nehru's attitude of considering colonial issues as secondary to the issue of world peace which had at this stage assumed overriding importance in his mind. If at all these were to be included in the Conference Declaration, these should be couched in brief and non-condemnatory language. In his address to the Conference Prime Minister Nehru had emphasized the importance of avoiding condemnations of one side or the other in order to promote an atmosphere conducive to peaceful negotiations between great Powers.⁹⁶ In short India desired that in order to be effective in its influence the Declaration of the Conference should be brief and conciliatory. Besides, the Indian delegation stressed that the non-aligned countries should avoid making specific proposals on issues of

94 *Hindustan Times*, and *The Statesman* (New Delhi), September 5, 1961. The latter English daily from New Delhi reported that Nehru's appeal for peace had not been accepted without some sharp exchanges in the Drafting Committee.

95 Jansen, n. 18, p. 300.

96 *The Conference of Heads of State or Government*, n. 53, p. 115. See also *The Statesman* (New Delhi), September 3, 1961.

global importance like Germany, West Berlin and disarmament.⁹⁷ This was in accord with Nehru's plea to the non-aligned leaders to understand that "our capacity is limited."⁹⁸

But the Indonesian delegation was not prepared to agree to the Indian contention on all these points. It insisted that the Conference Declaration should condemn Western colonialism and imperialism in forthright terms, that it should include all the issues relating to the struggle for freedom from colonialism in Asia and Africa. Indonesia was worried that acceptance of India's position would exclude West Irian from the Conference Declaration, an eventuality it endeavoured to avert. The Indonesian delegation was encouraged by the fact that the African and Arab states, Yugoslavia and Cuba shared its emphasis on condemnation of colonialism and on inclusion of these issues in the Conference Communique.

In a situation of deadlock both the groups supporting India and Indonesia resorted to bargaining. The majority which had acquiesced in India's demand for issuing a separate peace appeal earlier adopted a stiffer attitude in demanding inclusion of strongly-worded anti-colonial resolutions into the final communique.⁹⁹ India's insistence led to tense atmosphere and the Indian delegation was reported to be "obstructive" in the deliberations of the Drafting Committee.¹⁰⁰ Indonesia, West African states, Yugoslavia and Cuba were determined to go ahead with their idea to condemn Western colonialism and imperialism. They were opposed to exclusion of issues directly related to their national interests from the final document. What face would, for instance, President Sukarno show to his people if Indonesia did not receive a direct reference of Conference support on the West Irian issue?

97 *The Statesman* (New Delhi) September 6, 1961.

98 *The Conference of Heads of State or Government*, n. 53, p. 116. Nehru was aware of the difference of outlook on this point between India and other participants. This is revealed in the course of an informal talk he had with the Indian correspondents in Belgrade. India, he said, had broad suggestions whereas other countries wanted to make special proposals on questions like Germany, Berlin and disarmament. See *The Statesman* (New Delhi), September 4, 1961.

99 *The Statesman* (New Delhi) September 7, 1961. In an article in *The Statesman* of September 8, 1961, "Nehru's Independence Among the Non-Aligned Countries", Mahesh Chandra described the situation as follows: "Much manoeuvring went on behind the scenes and there was considerable display of cross purposes."

100 *Ibid.*, September 7, 1961.

Apart from this controversy, one of the particular issues that figured prominently at the Drafting Committee meeting related to the fixation of the time limit for the elimination of colonialism. In the course of his address President Sukarno urged for fixing a period not exceeding "two years" in each individual case.¹⁰¹ The Indonesian stand was, as expected, backed by a majority of the participants. The Indonesian delegation thus made a determined bid to see that the final communique embodied a provision to that end. But India was opposed to such a move. Ultimately, Krishna Menon suggested a way out of the impasse. He proposed a small change in the UN "Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples" of December, 14, 1960,¹⁰² and this went to satisfy the majority of participants.¹⁰³ When the Drafting Committee ended its long session on the morning of September 5, 1961, this was the only important point on which it had registered agreement.

Other specific issues which brought Indian-Indonesian differences to the fore at the Drafting Committee meeting were related to Germany, West Berlin and disarmament. The position taken by the delegations of the two countries was in line with the suggestions made by their Heads earlier.

The issue of Palestine also registered divergence between the two countries. Conforming to its stand of unequivocal support to the Arabs on this issue, the Indonesian delegation supported them and the West Africans in their square condemnation of Israel. But the Indian delegation opposed this move for two reasons. First, using condemnatory language would be against the general stand taken by Prime Minister Nehru. Secondly, it would be displeasing to the Burmese delegation which was opposed to a strong condemnation of Israel.¹⁰⁴ Consequently, Krishna Menon urged for a moderate approach which was not acceptable to the majority.

Anticipating difficulties at the Drafting Committee meeting, the Heads of the delegations had, in the meanwhile, met in a closed

101 *The Conference of Heads of State or Government*, n. 53, p. 33.

102 The United Nations Declaration made a solemn proclamation about "the necessity of bringing to a speedy and unconditional end of colonialism in all its forms and manifestations." See *GAOR*, session 15, Supplements 7-16A, *UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV)*, p. 66.

103 Krishna Menon suggested replacement of the word "speedy" in the Declaration by the word "immediate" and his suggestion was later accepted.

104 Burma was one of the few countries which supported India's overall position at the Conference. India could thus ill-afford to lose Burmese support.

session on September 4, 1961. Both Krishna Menon and Subandrio accompanied their leaders as advisers. The session being secret, it provided the participants with an opportunity to have an open and frank discussion on various issues referred to in the open plenary speeches. The discussions were reported to be "fairly lively though not polemical". It was at this meeting that Nehru and Sukarno, for the first time, exchanged divergent views on all general and specific issues in the presence of other Heads of delegations in the Conference. Both Krishna Menon and Subandrio later attended the Drafting Committee meeting and found themselves opposed to each other on all the issues. The net result of the night-long session of the Drafting Committee was thus an increased bitterness between the Indian and Indonesian delegations. Subandrio was among many others who had been "irked" and "angered" by Krishna Menon's lessons on English Grammar.¹⁰⁵

Differences in the Open

It was expected that the participants in the closed session and the Drafting Committee meeting would restrain themselves from giving out details of their deliberations. But the secrets leaked out to the Press. The initiative for doing so came from a member of the Indonesian delegation, Ruslan Abdulgani, a minister and Vice-Chairman of the Supreme Advisory Council of Indonesia. Commenting in a statement, he said :

Here lies the difference...We...believe that actually at this very moment there is no nuclear war as yet. However, in a colonial war, like in Angola, Algeria, Tunisia. etc, ordinary bombs alone can kill numerous Asians and Africans. Obviously, we cannot wait until settlement is attained over a nuclear war that has not come yet, while actually we ourselves are already under the threat of a blazing war. For us to be killed by an ordinary bomb or by an atom bomb, there is no difference. As from the start, Indonesia holds that security and freedom are inseparable. If we want to talk about security, there must first be freedom. Of course, we do not close our eyes to the danger of a nuclear war, but neither could it be accepted that colonialism is not a major issue. I can understand the Indian frame of mind. India has developed within her relations with Britain and the Commonwealth, in a different way from the

105 *The Statesmen* (New Delhi), September 7, 1961. See also Jansen, n. 18, p. 302.

experiences Indonesia, Indo-China, Tunisia, Algeria, Angola, etc., have experienced or are experiencing in a struggle against Dutch, French and Portuguese colonialism.¹⁰⁶

This statement by Ruslan Abdulgani became the basis of wild speculations among journalists gathered in Belgrade about the differences between Prime Minister Nehru and President Sukarno. The official Yugoslav news agency *Tanjug* in Djakarta picked it up and reported back home. A bulletin based on *Tanjug* reports was distributed among newsmen in Belgrade and different stories started circulating. Rumours were afloat that Nehru had come to sabotage the Conference, that he was threatening to walk out if he did not get his way, that he was leaving for Moscow a day earlier, and that he was obstructive.¹⁰⁷

It was with all the embarrassments arising out of such rumours that Prime Minister Nehru attended the second and the last closed session of the Heads of delegations.¹⁰⁸ As many of the chief delegates had their programmes already set, there was no possibility of extending the Conference beyond the limit already fixed; hence their impatience to finish the work in time led to a longer session. It was at this session that the final communique of the Conference was drawn up and approved.

India's Achievements

In the light of differences arising from the previous meetings, it was quite expected that there would be a lot of give and take in order to remove the deadlock on most of the issues. And this was what happened. In order to have his say in the face of the opposing majority, the Indian Prime Minister had to yield on certain matters of importance. The inclusion of direct reference to three colonial issues—Bizerta, Angola and Algeria—was certainly against the Indian stand. But a survey of the Conference documents would show that India had succeeded on most of the points. The persistent efforts of the Indian delegation had led to the issuance of a separate “Statement on the Danger of War and an Appeal for Peace”. Nehru had successfully led the Conference to focus its attention on the urgent need for international peace. He had also

106 *Antara*, September 4, 1961. See also *Harian Rakjat*, September 5, 1961.

107 G. H. Jansen, “Another Look at India at the Belgrade ‘Summit’: A Degree of Isolation was Inevitable”, *The Statesman* (New Delhi), September 16, 1961.

108 It started on September 5, 1961, and continued for eight hours and fifteen minutes until late at 1.15 a.m.

succeeded in toning down the condemnatory language of the Conference Declaration. A remark in the British weekly *The Economist* that Nehru had come to assume "the thankless role of the regulator of the Belgrade Conference's harsher impulses", was quite appropriate.¹⁰⁹ On the issue of colonialism the Conference was content to provide encouragement and support to all peoples fighting for their independence and equality. Instead of fixing any time-limit as insisted upon by the Indonesians and others, it considered adequate to "solemnly reaffirm their support to the 'Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples', as adopted at the 15th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations". So the recommendation of the Conference for "the immediate unconditional, total and final abolition of colonialism" and its resolve "to make a concerted effort to put an end to all types of new colonialism and imperialist domination in all its forms and manifestations", was not materially different from the Final Communique of the First Asian-African Conference in April 1955.¹¹⁰ All colonial issues except Algeria, Angola and Tunisia had been omitted and lumped together under Article 5 of the Declaration, demanding "the immediate termination of all colonial occupation and the restoration of the territorial integrity to the rightful people in countries in which it has been violated in Asia, Africa and Latin America as well as the withdrawal of foreign forces from their national soil."¹¹¹

As regards Germany and West Berlin, the Conference Declaration simply made a call "upon all parties concerned not to resort to or threaten the use of force...in accordance with the appeal made by the Heads of State or Government on 5th September 1961."¹¹² All the proposals submitted on these issues had cancelled each other out and ultimately led the Conference to a position quite similar to Nehru's view of avoiding to make any specific proposal to the super powers. Even on the problem of disarmament the Conference was led to take up a similar position. Although India had

109 "India, Embarrassed Giant" (Notes of the Week), *The Economist* (London), September 2, 1961, p. 855.

110 The Final Communique of the First Asian-African Conference had declared "that colonialism in all its manifestations is an evil which should speedily be brought to an end." For the text of the Final Communique, see *Documents for the Meeting of Ministers in Preparation of the Second Asian-African Conference* (Djakarta, Organizing Committee, 1964), p. 9.

111 *The Conference of Heads of State or Government*, n. 53, p. 257.

112 *Ibid.*, p. 261.

to compromise on this issue in-as-much as it had allowed the Indonesian demand for non-aligned nations' representation to prevail,¹¹³ there was no specific proposal for its solution.

There is no doubt that India achieved success on most of the points, but it had to pay a price for it. Nehru's appeal for moderation, his emphasis on granting priority to East-West negotiations for mitigating cold war tensions and his attempt to relegate the issue of colonialism into the background did not carry conviction with the Indonesian and West African leaders. His refusal to agree to strong condemnation of the West earned him more criticism than approbation. He "conspicuously failed to persuade the majority" that colonialism was "a dead issue" and that "attention should be given to first things first".¹¹⁴

Finding itself in a position of minority, India adopted at Belgrade a posture similar to that at the Cairo preparatory meeting. There were two factors which contributed to its success—Nehru's individual personality and his position as the Prime Minister of India and representative of its over four hundred million people. But out of these two the latter came to have more significant impact than the former. The population of India exceeded the total population of all the other non-aligned countries assembled at Belgrade. As Nehru was not prepared to concede the demands of the radical majority, he simply refused to budge from his position.

Indonesian Reactions to the Outcome of the Conference

With the results of the Conference, Indonesia was not satisfied either. The Indonesian leaders had failed to seek direct support on the West Irian issue. Giving a combined interview to *Antara*, *Suluh Indonesia* and *Warta Bhakti* and commenting on the outcome of the Conference, Ali Sastroamidjojo said :

Whether I am satisfied or not, depends from which angle you envisage the question. If you envisage it from the point of view of (Indonesian) national interest, we cannot be satisfied, because in its decision there was no clear-cut support of the

113 Ibid., p. 259. The Conference Declaration provided that the non-aligned countries should be given representation "at all further wor'd conferences on disarmament."

114 "Under Neither Flag", *The Times* (London), September 7, 1961, and "From Neutralism to Non-Alignment" (Hella Peck), *The Spectator*, no. 6950, September 8, 1961, p. 310.

conference in regard to Indonesia's national claim to West Irian unlike the case with the 1955 Bandung Conference.¹¹⁵

Expressing his disappointment at the omission of specific Conference support to Indonesia on this issue, Ruslan Abdulgani, another member of the delegation, declared in a Press statement: "The most important lesson we drew from experiences in the Belgrade Conference was that Indonesia should always base its struggle on its own strength with the aid of real progressive countries as had been repeatedly stressed by President Sukarno."¹¹⁶ The term "real progressive countries" was a hint towards countries of the Communist bloc which had condemned colonialism and imperialism in unambiguous terms, aided national liberation movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and supported the 'Bandung spirit' and its concomitant, the concept of Afro-Asian solidarity. At Belgrade India had shown reluctance to openly condemn Western imperialism.¹¹⁷ Its non-alignment, the Indonesian leaders believed, had sought only compromises between the two super powers in order to preserve world peace. Its attitude at the Conference had displayed its declining interest in and enthusiasm for national liberation movements in Asia and Africa. In a bitter comment on India's present posture of moderation, Chaerul Saleh, then Indonesian Minister for Basic Industry and Mining and a member of the delegation, had said: "The revolutionary spirit of the nations who (sic) won their independence without bloodshed has vaporized."¹¹⁸ India had only contented itself with offering diplomatic support on the issue of West Irian and some Indonesian leaders had considered it inadequate.¹¹⁹ Neither had Nehru supported Sukarno's suggestion for the convening of a second Asian-African Conference. Hence India could no longer be considered one of the "real progressive countries". According to the understanding of the Indonesian leaders, India had lost its revolutionary temper which had characterized its non-alignment until the first Asian-African Conference and the Suez crisis.

115 *Antara*, September 7, 1961. See also *Harian Rakjat*, September 8, 1961. Ali Sastroamidjojo, former Prime Minister of Indonesia, was a member of the Indonesian delegation to the Belgrade Conference.

116 *Antara* and *Harian Rakjat*, September 8, 1961.

117 Mahesh Chandra, "Policy Reappraisals in New Delhi", *The Statesman* (New Delhi) January 5, 1962.

118 *Antara*, September 7, 1961, and *Harian Rakjat*, September 8, 1961.

119 See Chapter on The Background, pp. 49-50.

But how to satisfy the Indonesian masses ? They had come to presume that the Belgrade Conference would give direct support to Indonesia on the West Irian issue. The Indonesians were disappointed by the fact that the Declaration of the Conference did not include any specific reference on West Irian. In an explanation Ali Sastroamidjojo had to quote the operative part of Article 5 of the Declaration, under which all the colonial issues had been grouped together.¹²⁰ Another member of the Indonesian delegation, Kusumowidagdo, had to attribute it to the limitation of time appropriated for the Conference.¹²¹ But such explanations had little to satisfy the masses who had for long been fed on the politics of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism. The alternative for the leaders was to find the scapegoat on which the entire blame could be put and to step up propaganda against it. Although it was President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana who had prevented President Sukarno from seeking West Irian's inclusion into the Declaration,¹²² it was India that was chosen as the whipping boy. It was suggested that it was the Indian Prime Minister who had refused to agree with President Sukarno on the latter's thesis that colonialism was the basic issue and that it was he who had blocked Indonesian attempts at making specific proposals on certain issues of global importance.

As regards intensifying the struggle against colonialism and imperialism, President Sukarno himself set the tone. While addressing the workers of the Belgrade Shipyard "Tito" on September 7, 1961, the Indonesian leader said : "There are two things the Conference have decided upon. These are the struggle against colonialism and the struggle against imperialism.....This is the most important struggle imposing itself now, and therefore we work on doing away with colonialism and imperialism immediately."¹²³ His tone became sharper on return to Djakarta after he had completed his mission to Washington. While addressing thousands of Indonesians on September 21, 1961, Sukarno asserted that the threat of extinction to humanity by a nuclear confrontation "is only a possibility...wh ch we are trying hard to prevent from breaking out. Another question is the oppression being practised in

120 *Antara*. September 7, 1961.

121 *Ibid.*, September 18, 1961.

122 Andrew Boyd, "Fall-Out From Belgrade", *The Eastern Economist* (New Delhi), vol. 37, no. 12, September 22, 1961, p. 542.

123 *Antara*, September 8, 1961.

Algeria, Angola, West Irian. These instances are not just a possibility but facts, facts of life and death.”¹²⁴

Ali Sastroamidjojo was more forthright in criticizing Nchru's approach. In an interview to *Hsinhua* (*New China*) News Agency he stated that “the question of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism is of first importance today.” He stressed that a mere statement on the danger of war and an appeal for peace, taken out of context, “is floating in the air. It has no meaning unless you give an analysis of the source of war, that is, colonialism-imperialism.”¹²⁵ Expressing his dissatisfaction, D.N. Aidit, General Chairman of the PKI, said that the Declaration of the Conference was less firm in both content and spirit as compared to President Sukarno's speech. “This is not surprising”, he remarked, “because the Declaration is the outcome of negotiation where a rather sufficient number of non-bloc powers are not as firm as Indonesia in opposing imperialism and colonialism.”¹²⁶

The other Indonesian objective was to convene the second Asian-African conference. The Indonesian leaders had created an impression that the Conference of Non-aligned countries would pave the way for such a conference. The parleys at the Conference had demonstrated Indonesia as a consistent advocate of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism and India as out of step with this general trend. But a follow-up action was necessary in order to consolidate this focus of Asian-African unity. Ali Sastroamidjojo had already emphasized at Belgrade that to promote the anti-*neocolim* struggle “we must now concentrate our efforts on convening a second Afro-Asian Conference, and sooner the better.”¹²⁷ In view of Sukarno's failure in his bid to seek concurrence of the Non-aligned Conference to the convening of such a conference, this line of propaganda had become all the more necessary.

Impact on Indian-Indonesian Relations

When the Indonesian leaders decided to intensify their propaganda campaign against colonialism and to direct their efforts towards materializing the second Asian-African conference, India was in a mood of serious reappraisal of its relations with the non-aligned group of states. In view of the developments at

124 Ibid., September 22, 1961.

125 Ibid., September 9, 1961.

126 Ibid. see also *Harian Rakjat*, September 8, 1961,

127 Ibid., September 9, 1961.

Belgrade it had become "real and urgent" for India to start "a quest for reality" in its relations with these countries generally and with Indonesia particularly. It was realized that sentiment which had so far characterized Indian-Indonesian relations would have to be replaced by a policy of pragmatism.

The reasons that had impelled India to adopt a moderate posture at the Conference were quite obvious. Its bigness in size and population and continuing stress on economic development contrasted sharply with the Indonesian emphasis on political slogans and symbols. With a stake in stability and world peace, India could not afford to be as sentimental as Indonesia was on the issue of colonialism. The differences had widened because Indonesia, having given prominence to politics over economics at home, had its emotional attitude fixed up. For ensuring success of its objectives, India had to pursue certain "policies and attitudes which earned her unpopularity, hostility and a degree of isolation."¹²⁸

India's stance at the Belgrade Conference had cast reflections on Indian-Indonesian relations. Exchange of divergent world views at a gathering of the leaders of twenty-five countries was not conducive to maintaining cordial relations between the two states. One of the major consequences was the cooling off of relations at personal level. Nehru's opposition to Sukarno's views on various issues was interpreted in Indonesia as personal insult to the latter. This tended to bring personal rapport between the two leaders under strains.

A section of the Indian Press tended to play down India's differences with Indonesia and other participants in the Belgrade Conference. Commenting editorially on these differences, *The Hindu* wrote : "The two points of view are not necessarily contradictory. It seems to be a difference of approach and emphasis rather than a fundamental disagreement."¹²⁹ In course of time, however, it was this "difference of approach and emphasis" which changed into "a fundamental disagreement" and tended to affect Indian-Indonesian relations adversely. The two conceivable factors which had added to India's embarrassment at Belgrade were India's weakness in the diplomatic field and the smallness of India's delegation. The weakness in the diplomatic field told heavily on India's role in the non-aligned Conference. The Indian diplomats had

128 Ibid.

129 "Belgrade Talks : Differences in Approach" (editorial), *The Hindu*, September 6, 1961.

been confused by the vacillating attitude of the Government. In order to ensure the Indian viewpoint to prevail a vigorous diplomatic drive with clear-cut directions of policy was essential. In a dispatch from Belgrade an Indian correspondent pointed to this deficiency and urged upon the need to tone it up. He said : "...the fact that it can be suggested that India was not fully understood at a gathering like the one at Belgrade points to the need of more vigorous Indian diplomacy in Africa where the Chinese, for example, are active."¹³⁰ The smallness of the Indian delegation also accounted for much of India's predicament. Nehru's views on all the major issues remained for the most part confined to the exclusive Indian circle. Although he was able to have fairly frequent contacts with the chiefs of the Afro-Asian delegations, other members never got the opportunity to hear him or know his mind. As for Press correspondents, no arrangements were made for him to meet those from Africa and West Asia, although some Western newsmen accidentally met him. As a result, there was a general lack of appreciation of Nehru's relative stress on the crisis of war and peace. To those not adequately informed, his attitude was at best "obstructive".

Loss of personal rapport at the top leadership level and clearly pronounced divergence of the world view as held by Nehru and Sukarno did not augur well for Indian-Indonesian relations. Following the Belgrade Conference, certain internal and external forces and factors found the emerging not-so-happy India-Indonesia equation quite advantageous to their objectives and did everything to damage their relations.

130 "India's Views Not Properly Publicised" V. R. Bhatt's dispatch, *Hindustan Times*, September 5, 1961.

Bilateral Relations and the Malaysia Question

In the period of four years following the Belgrade Conference in September 1961, relations between India and Indonesia came to sustain further strains. With the passage of time, divergence of approach to various issues developed between Prime Minister Nehru and President Sukarno. Nehru's refusal to agree to Sukarno's emphasis on priority for the problem of colonialism tended to be interpreted in Indonesia as a personal affront to the Indonesian leader. In this sense it marked an end to personal rapport between the two leaders established since the days of the Indonesian struggle for freedom from the Dutch. It was bound to have serious repercussions on the two countries' relations.

Goa Issue

On December 18, 1961, three and a half months after the Belgrade Conference, the Indian Government took military action against the Portuguese colonialism in Goa, and within 24 hours put an end to the last vestiges of Western colonialism in India.¹ India's Goa action had certain profound implications as far as Indonesia was concerned. At Belgrade, Nehru had heard the Indonesian charges of India's earlier "revolutionary spirit" getting "vaporized".² India needed to refurbish its image among the ruling Indonesian elite group. The Government of India's action against the Portuguese colonialism demonstrated that despite the fact of India's non-violent struggle against British colonialism, and despite its continued membership of the British Commonwealth, the Indian leadership was anti-colonialist by action. It also established that India, if so required, could use force against colonialism and that its dependence on Western countries for economic aid did not compromise its independence of action.

1 *The Hindu* (Madras), December 20, 1961.

2 See Chapter on India and Indonesia at the Belgrade Conference, p. 86.

Not surprisingly, Indonesia's reactions to India's action against the Portuguese in Goa were quite favourable. In conformity with their commitment to anti-colonialism, the Indonesian Government and Press hailed India's action. An Indonesian Foreign Office spokesman, in a statement in Djakarta, extended his Government's "every sympathy" to the Indian people and Government. "We are fully aware", he said, "that India is compelled to use force in spite of the fact that India is peace-loving nation." He added: "There can be no compromise with colonialism."³ In a statement in the Indonesian Parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat-Gotong Rojong DPR-GR), Foreign Minister Subandrio fully supported India's Goa action and said that "apparently India has now become aware that only force can be understood by the colonialists."⁴ Colonel Latief Hendraningrat, Chairman of the Indonesian Parliament, criticized the American attitude on Goa issue as one showing "lack of understanding towards the problem of colonialism and the liberation movements related to it." He also described it as "a liberation movement and not as aggression as propagated by the colonialists and their allies."⁵ The *Indonesian Herald* (an English daily from Djakarta, close to the Indonesian Foreign Office), editorially asked the Western nations not to be shocked by India's action. "They should fully understand that this is only a matter of course, although long overdue", it observed.⁶

West Irian Question

India's anti-Portuguese operation in Goa understandably had an impact on Indonesia's policy on the West Irian question, in spite of Prime Minister Nehru's protestations to the contrary.⁷ It brought an additional element of militancy and urgency in the tone of

3 *Antara*, December 19, 1961 and *The Statesman* (New Delhi), December 19, 1961.

4 *The Statesman* (New Delhi), December 22, 1961.

5 *Antara*, December 22, 1961.

6 *Indonesian Herald*, December 18, 1961 and *The Statesman* (New Delhi), December 19, 1961.

7 At a Press conference in New Delhi, while replying to the charge that Sukarno was on "the verge of doing Goa", Nehru refuted any such link-up between India's action in Goa and Indonesia's stepped up campaign for West Irian, and observed: "...so far Indonesia is concerned, I do not think anything was necessary for incitement by other sources. The Indonesians have been talking of this for months and years past. I do not think that Indian action in Goa had made any difference."

Indonesian attitude towards the Dutch. The fact that on December 19, 1961, only a day after the Indian forces entered Goa, President Sukarno announced to the nation "Tri-Command"⁸ for the liberation of West Irian, reinforces this contention.

Sukarno's "Tri-Command" was as a reaction to the Dutch policies towards Indonesia's demand for restoration of West Irian. Since 1960, the Dutch had been creating additional complications in the dispute. The Dutch decision to send aircraft carrier "Karel Doorman" to the West Irian waters was one of the major causes of growing tension in the area. The Indonesian Government interpreted it as a Dutch move to perpetuate their colonial rule in West Irian and as a threat to the security of the Republic.⁹ At a Press conference in Havana (Cuba) in May 1960, Subandrio observed: "If Holland is reinforcing the frontiers of the territory with warships and planes, we cannot remain quiet nor keep our arms crossed in the face of that." He also gave a warning: "If Holland continues to send reinforcements, we will meet force with force."¹⁰ The growing tension on Dutch reinforcements ultimately led President Sukarno to order severance of diplomatic relations with the Netherlands in August 1960.¹¹

The second element in the Dutch Government policy which complicated the West Irian question was its declaration in April 1960 to establish a central representative council in West Irian.

8 Sukarno's "Tri-Command" was as follows :

1. Defeat the formation of the puppet state of Papua of Dutch colonial rule.
2. Unfurl the Honoured Red and White Flag in West Irian, Indonesian Native Land.
3. Be ready for general mobilization to defend the independence and unity of the country and nation.

See Government of the Republic of Indonesia, *The People's Command for the Liberation of West Irian*, Special Issue 82 (Djakarta, Department of Information, 1961), p. 16. See also *Indonesian Observer* (Djakarta), December 19, 1961 and *Antara*, December 20, 1961.

9 See *Indonesian Observer*, April 27, 1960.

10 *Indonesian Observer*, May 16, 1960 and *The Hindu* (Madras), June 18, 1960.

11 To this effect, President Sukarno issued instructions to the Foreign Affairs Department on August 16, 1960. While explaining the immediate cause, he attributed his decision to the Dutch reinforcements to West Irian, including the aircraft carrier "Karel Doorman". See Government of the Republic of Indonesia, "Like An Angel that Strikes From the Skies—The March of Our Revolution" (Independence Day Address by President Sukarno on August 17, 1960), *Handbook on the Political Manifesto*, (Djakarta, Department of Information, 1961), pp. 70-71.

The declared intention was to prepare the Papuans (West Irianese people) in the art of self-determination and virtual self-government within a period of ten years. The Dutch plan, in short, implied the creation of a new independent Papuan state in West Irian the viability of which, apart from the understandable Indonesian hostility it would provoke, was very much in doubt. It represented a Dutch effort to ensure "that Indonesia shall be denied Western New Guinea (West Irian)".¹²

In 1961, side by side with their programme of constitutional reform in West Irian, the Dutch declared their readiness to hand over the territory to UN administration, promising continuance of an annual subsidy for the development purposes at the present level of about US \$ 30 million.¹³ This meant internationalizing the issue.

The Dutch scheme on the West Irian was bound to attract strong Indonesian reactions. For twelve years, since 1950, Indonesia had been demanding restoration of this territory to the Republic. Neither bilateral negotiations nor efforts at the United Nations had produced any concrete results. And now the Dutch had proposed to internationalize the issue. In a statement in Tokyo on June 25, 1961, President Sukarno hinted at a continued policy of confrontation against the Dutch, in all fields, political, economic, and military.¹⁴ In his Independence Day Address on August 17, 1961, he expressed his apprehensions about the Dutch reinforcements to West Irian, reiterated his Government's continued "policy of confrontation, in every field", and warned the Dutch that "the people of Indonesia, probably cannot be patient very much longer." As regards the prospects of a negotiated settlement, although the Indonesian President continued to keep the door open for it, he conditioned it to Dutch acquiescence in Indonesia's position on West Irian, that is, negotiations to take place only if "based on the transfer of West Irian to the territory under the authority of the Republic".¹⁵ Relating to the new complications introduced by the

12 Leslie H. Palmier, *Indonesia and the Dutch* (London, 1962), pp. 127-29.

13 On September 26, 1961 the Dutch Foreign Minister, Joseph Luns, submitted proposals to this effect to the United Nations General Assembly. See *General Assembly Official Records* (GAOR), session 16, plen. mtg. 1016, September 26, 1961, pp. 90-91.

14 *Antara*, June 26, 1961. President Sukarno made this statement in the course of his address to the Indonesians resident in Tokyo.

15 Government of the Republic of Indonesia, *Re-So-Pim Revolution-Indonesian Socialism-National Leadership*, 17 Times 17th August (Sukarno's Address on August 17, 1961), (Djakarta, Department of Information, 1961). pp. 42-47.

Dutch, Foreign Minister Subandrio said: "If the Dutch preparation for cutting West Irian loose are continued by force of arms as at present, there will of course come a time when the Government of Indonesia will liberate our brothers in West Irian by force also."¹⁶

In this atmosphere of growing tension President Sukarno announced his "Tri-Command" on December 19, 1961. India's action in Goa, at this stage, only added militancy to Indonesia's attitude against the Dutch colonialism in West Irian. The announcement was followed by general mobilization, air dropping of Indonesian volunteers in the West Irian territory and clashes with the Dutch.

Sukarno's policy of threats to use force was designed to exert maximum pressure on the Dutch to resile from their position on the West Irian question. It finally led to a change in the American attitude on this question in favour of Indonesia. It became evident by March 1962. On March 20, 1962, the Indonesian and Dutch representatives met in Washington in the presence of a "third party", an American diplomat, Ellsworth Bunker. The meeting resulted in a compromise solution based on Bunker's proposals.¹⁷ Indonesia announced acceptance of these proposals "in principle" on April 9, 1962. The Dutch expressed their readiness to resume negotiations on the same basis on May 26, 1962. On July 12, 1962, the representatives of the two countries resumed their talks with Bunker present among them. At a meeting in Washington on July 30, 1962, the two sides reached an agreement on "all essential points".¹⁸

India's Attitude

India's attitude towards the West Irian question until 1961 has already been surveyed elsewhere.¹⁹ It is worth noticing that even after

16 *Antara*, October 24, 1961.

17 Justus M. van der Kroef, "The West New Guinea Settlement : Its Origins and Implications", *Orbis*, vol. 7, no. 1, Spring 1963, p. 139. The Bunker Plan contained six proposals. The major implications of these proposals were : Netherlands' agreement to transfer administrative authority over West Irian to the United Nations ; the United Nations to administer the territory for one year ; to arrange replacement of UN officials with the Indonesian officials in the second year ; and to revert the administration to Indonesia by the end of the second year ; and finally, Indonesia's agreement to give the people of the territory, after a number of years to be decided upon, the opportunity to exercise freedom of choice between remaining with Indonesia or separating from it. See *Link* (New Delhi), vol. 4, no. 45, June 17, 1962, p. 22.

18 *The Statesman* (New Delhi), August 1, 1962. A formal agreement was, however, signed in New York on August 15, 1962.

19 See Chapter on The Background, pp. 49-51.

India employed force to remove Portuguese colonialism from Goa, it continued to counsel peaceful solution of the West Irian problem. This was evident from Prime Minister Nehru's statement at a Press conference in New Delhi about ten days after India's action in Goa. When asked whether he had suggested to the Indonesian Government that the latter might take military action in case bilateral negotiations did not succeed, Nehru refused "to express any opinion" for other Government's actions and only said : "I very much hope that this question of West Irian is solved peacefully by negotiations between the two governments concerned." He also refused to agree that India's "action in Goa had made any difference" in Indonesia's attitude towards the West Irian question.²⁰

India, however, continued to offer moral and diplomatic support to Indonesia on this issue, both in and out of the United Nations. At a Press conference in New Delhi just about ten days after the freedom of Goa, Nehru reiterated India's position thus : "We have always felt and we have been of the opinion that the claim of Indonesia to West Irian was justified."²¹ At the United Nations India put up a strong fight against the Dutch proposals and the Dutch Resolution of October 9, 1961.²² While speaking in the General Assembly on November 20, 1961, the Indian Defence Minister, Krishna Menon, refused to "agree" to the Dutch resolution, urging the United Nations to appoint a Commission for West Irian, because "this means that the question of sovereignty...is in dispute." As to Government of India's attitude towards the question of sovereignty over West Irian, he categorically stated thus : "The position of the Government of India is that West Irian is a colonial territory, having been administered by the Netherlands, and whose sovereignty has been transferred under the terms of the Charter of

20 *The Hindu*, December 29, 1961.

21 *Ibid.*

22 United Nations, *General Assembly Official Records* (GAOR), session 16, 1961-62, Agenda items 88 and 22(a), Document A/4954, p. 12. A summary of the Dutch proposals of October 9, 1961, is as follows : 1. Self-determination in accordance with the Charter ; 2. Internationalization under the United Nations ; 3. Transfer of sovereignty to the Papuan people ; 4. Continuation of financial assistance to the amount of \$30 million a year without any strings attached ; 5. United Nations fact-finding and enquiry without any restrictions.

The Dutch Resolution of October 9, 1961, in its operative part, suggested the establishment of "a United Nations Commission" for West Irian, in order to investigate and report about the general conditions and opinions of West Irianese. For text of the Resolution, see Document A/L354, Netherlands : draft resolution, p. 24.

Transfer of Sovereignty.” It was fully in accord with the Indonesian view that the question of sovereignty over West Irian had been settled since the Hague Agreements of 1949. Reiterating India’s position as regards Indonesia’s claim on this territory, Krishna Menon stated that “West Irian, so far as the Government of India is concerned, is an integral part of Indonesia.”²³ He also submitted a draft resolution, calling upon the Dutch and the Indonesians to “co-operate” and to resume negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the dispute “under the aegis of the President of the General Assembly”.²⁴

On November 27, 1961, a week after Krishna Menon’s statement in the General Assembly, India’s Permanent Representative at the United Nations, C.S. Jha, spoke at some length in support of Indonesia’s claim over West Irian, criticized the Dutch Resolution and the one submitted by thirteen African states and urged for the adoption of the Indian draft resolution, to the terms of which the Indonesian Foreign Minister had agreed.²⁵ Despite all efforts, however, the Indian draft resolution failed to muster two-thirds majority and was rejected.²⁶

A few months later, in May 1962, when following Dutch delay²⁷ in accepting Ellsworth Bunker’s proposals the situation became more tense, India, on request, agreed to give small arms aid to Indonesia. According to reports in the Press, Prime Minister Nehru once again reiterated his Government’s full support to Indonesia’s claim and rejected the Dutch request not to sell military equipment to Indonesia. Assurances to this effect were given by Nehru at a meeting with Subandrio, in New Delhi, on his way back home from Moscow.²⁸

The Indian Press came out in categorical support of the Indonesian stand and against the Dutch. An influential daily from Madras sharply criticized the “Dutch reluctance to accept Bunker’s

23 *GAOR*, session 16, plen. mtg. 1058, vol. 2, November 20, 1961, p. 716.

24 *Ibid.*, p. 717.

25 For text of the statement by C.S. Jha, see *GAOR*, session 16, plen. mtg. 1065, vol. 2, November 27, 1961, pp. 841-6. Speaking after Krishna Menon, Subandrio agreed to the former’s proposal for entering into negotiations with the Dutch. See n. 23, p. 725.

26 In a roll call on the Indian draft resolution, 41 voted in favour, 40 against and 21 abstained. See *GAOR*, session 16, plen. mtg. 1066, November 27, 1961, pp. 876-7.

27 The Dutch Government took one and a half months to announce its readiness to enter into negotiations with Indonesia on the basis of Bunker’s proposals.

28 *The Statesman* (New Delhi), May 15, 1962.

proposals", charged the Dutch with "bad faith" and "intransigence" and warned them against the consequences of "further dilly-dalliance".²⁹ Another national daily editorially asked the Dutch Government "to realize that so long as it refuses to negotiate with the Indonesian Government on the future of West Irian it cannot expect Indonesia or the UN to halt the liberation moves."³⁰ Whereas the *National Herald* described the Dutch position as "in every respect untenable"³¹, the *Times of India* gave a terse warning to the Dutch, which read : "Unless the Dutch wish to be removed as unceremoniously from West Irian as the Portuguese were from Goa, they should resume their talks with the Indonesians before Jakarta is compelled to launch a fullscale liberation campaign."³²

On conclusion of the Indonesian-Dutch Agreement in New York on August 15, 1962, there was a sense of relief and happiness in India. Both the Government and the Press hailed the Agreement and offered congratulations to the two governments, the Indonesian and the Dutch, for reaching an agreement over what Nehru described as "a very difficult and delicate problem". He considered it "a matter of good augury for the peace of South-East Asia", and expressed the hope "that there will be peace" in the region of which, "in a sense", India is a "part."³³ Speaking at the UN General Assembly on August 21, 1962, the Indian Defence Minister, Krishna Menon, offered his "good wishes" to the two governments and people and recalled the last phase of the Indonesian struggle for Independence and said : "Since then, our position has been that Indonesia is one and sovereign, and we have repeated that year after year in this Assembly." While commenting on the provisions of the New York Agreement, he asked the United Nations not to treat West Irian as "a trust territory" and itself "as a kind of super authority" during the seven months period of its administration. "There is no question therefore", he observed, "of creating independence in this area. Indonesia is one and independent." He also urged the world body to ensure that "the period of its stewardship" in West Irian be "as short as possible."³⁴

29 "War Clouds in the East" (editorial), *The Hindu*, May 23, 1962.

30 "Double Dutch" (editorial), *Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), May 24, 1962.

31. "West Irian" (editorial). *National Herald* (New Delhi), May 23, 1962.

32 "West Irian" (editorial), *Times of India* (New Delhi), May 28, 1962.

33 Government of India, Rajya Sabha, *Debates*, vol. 40, no. 12, pt. 1, August 22, 1962, cols. 2876-7. See also *Indonesian Herald*, August 24, 1962.

34 GAOR, session 17, plen. mtg. 1127, vol. 1, September 21, 1962, pp. 57-58.

The Indian Press viewed with jubilation the encouraging trends emerging from the Indonesian-Dutch negotiations in Washington. Commenting editorially the *Times of India* wrote : "Everyone will be happy that Mr. Thant's mediation in the West Irian dispute has borne fruit."³⁵ *The Statesman* commented : "The West Irian drama seems to be approaching a happy ending; one which should have come months, if not years, ago."³⁶ The *Hindustan Times* and the *Indian Express* were the two Indian dailies which attracted favourable comments from the Indonesians. The *Indonesian Herald* editorially described both these Indian papers as "independent" and quoted excerpts from their editorials.³⁷

Although India had all through given moral and diplomatic support to Indonesia on the West Irian question, the latter had not found enough reason to be as much beholden to the former as, for instance, to the Soviet Union and Pakistan, whose support in various fields it considered more valuable and forthright.³⁸ This had inevitable impact on political relations between the two countries, which had been cooling off especially since the Belgrade Conference in September 1961. Two incidents in the following year put additional strains on India's overall relations with Indonesia and revealed that cordiality existing since the days of the freedom struggle had been replaced by a sense of jealousy and rivalry at personal levels, and consequent indifference to each other's national interests. It provided opportunity to certain domestic and external forces to play an active role in damaging the two countries' relations.

Sondhi Episode

The first incident which brought to surface the deterioration in the two countries' relations was the so-called "Sondhi Affair" during the Fourth Asian Games in Djakarta in September 1962. On September 3, 1962, a mob of 20,000 Indonesians demonstrated at the Indian Embassy, threw stones, broke the furniture, tore down the shutters and even tried to haul down the Indian Flag.³⁹ On September 4, 1962, the closing day of the Games, thousands of

35 *Times of India*, August 2, 1962.

36 *The Statesman* (New Delhi), August 10, 1962.

37 *Indonesian Herald*, August 20, 1962.

38 See Chapter on The Background, p. 50.

39 *Hindustan Times*, September 4, 1962 and *The Hindu*, September 5, 1962. See also *Indonesian Herald* and *Antara*, September 4, 1962. The *Indonesian Herald* put the number of demonstrators at 5,000.

Indonesians booed the Indian athletes and continued their hootings even during the singing of India's National Anthem.⁴⁰ The immediate provocation for this anti-India demonstration arose from a statement issued earlier by G.D. Sondhi, Senior Vice-President of the Asian Games Federation. At a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Fourth Asian Games, called by Sondhi in his capacity as a Senior Vice President, it was decided that the Asian Games be stripped off its official name.⁴¹ In a statement issued on August 27, 1962, in pursuance of this decision, Sondhi suggested : "Another name must be used for the 4th Asian Games now being held in Djakarta."⁴² He attributed this to non-participation in Games by the athletes from Israel and Taiwan.

G.D. Sondhi's statement came three days after President Sukarno had inaugurated the Games on August 24, 1962. After settlement of the West Irian question, the Indonesians tended to look upon the Games as constituting "the climax of the challenging task" and a "difficult and delicate challenge" to the entire nation. In an editorial the *Indonesian Herald* exhorted the Indonesians to "pledge to ourselves to make these Games a resounding success."⁴³ Success in the Games was thus an important national issue, "a national obsession with the Indonesians...next only to the West Irian issue."⁴⁴

G.D. Sondhi's statement of August 27, 1962, thus became a subject of bitter criticism. It was immediately linked with the honour of the President and people of Indonesia.⁴⁵ Incidentally, because Sondhi was an Indian, the Indonesian reactions came to have a significant bearing on the two countries' relations. The fact that Sondhi was in no way representing Government of India and its views, was simply ignored. A high-ranking Indonesian Asian Games Official, on August 28, 1962, accused some members of the Asian Games Federation of "blatant interference and political pressure" on the sovereignty of Indonesia, and of an attempt "to discredit"

40 *The Statesman* (New Delhi), September 5, 1962.

41 *Indonesian Herald*, August 29, 1962.

42 *Antara*, September 4, 1962.

43 "Now, the Asian Games" (editorial), *Indonesian Herald*, August 21, 1962.

44 *The Statesman* (New Delhi), September 2, 1962.

45 At a meeting on September 1, 1962, a delegation of the Indonesian National Front told the Indian Ambassador, Apa B. Pant, that G.D. Sondhi's activities, in fact, constituted an "insult to the Head of State and the people of Indonesia as a whole." See *Indonesian Herald* and *Hindustan Times*, September 3, 1962 and *Guardian* (Rangoon), September 4, 1962.

it. In his statement he avoided making any direct reference to any person or country except Israel and Taiwan. He charged "some officials representing some international sports organisations (of having) come here deliberately determined to see that these games are not held."⁴⁶ Obviously, it was "Sondhi of India,"⁴⁷ the Vice-President of the Asian Games Federation, who was alleged to have been making efforts to seek participation by Israel and Taiwan and, if otherwise, to seek a change in the name of the Games.

The first official reaction came from Dr. Suharto, the Indonesian Trade Minister. In a statement on August 31, 1962, he said that Sondhi's attitude "is deeply hurting our feelings and will immensely affect our stand towards the Indian Government and the people in the future." He also disclosed that he had issued the following instructions to all key Government Officials: "Pending further developments around Mr. Sondhi's activities, you are all instructed to refrain from entering into new trade relations with India because such relations will become an object of criticism by society."⁴⁸

The Indonesian Press took the cue from this official statement and brought out editorials and comments linking up Sondhi and India in the same breath. The language daily *Merdeka*, representing the views of the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI), editorially wrote thus: "Mr. Sondhi wants to discredit President Sukarno and the Indonesian people. He is playing with fire and (wants to) endanger friendship between India and Indonesia." "What is more important for Indian Government", it asked, "Indonesia-India friendship or freedom of Mr. Sondhi to destroy the friendly relation."⁴⁹ Sharply bracketing Sondhi with India, Mohammad Nahar of the *Indonesian Herald* wrote thus: "...the person who attempted to strip the name 'Asian Games' from the current competitions is Mr. Sondhi of India."⁵⁰ *Harian Rakjat*, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) daily, covered the Indonesian Press comments criticizing G.D. Sondhi. Prominent among the language papers it quoted

46 Indonesian Herald, August 30, 1962. The official, who held a high post in the Indonesian Government, refused to be quoted by name.

47 These words appeared in an editorial in a Djakarta language daily, *Berita Indonesia*, the English version of which was published in the *Indonesian Herald* of September 3, 1962. The cue was taken from an article by Mohammad Nahar, "If Asian Games IV is Frustrated", in the *Indonesian Herald* of September 1, 1962.

48 *Indonesian Herald*, September 1, 1962. See also *Indonesian Observer* and *Harian Rakjat* (Djakarta), September 1, 1962, and *The Hindn*, September 1, 1962.

49 *Merdeka* (Djakarta), September 1, 1962.

50 *Indonesian Herald*, September 1, 1962.

from were *Merdeka*, *Bintang Timur* and *Berita Indonesia*. A correspondent of *Harian Rakjat* wrote : "Sondhi's attitude not only shows lack of friendship toward Indonesia, but also is a stab in Indonesia's back."⁵¹ Commenting editorially on Sondhi's attitude, this daily wrote : "His attitude is not only in contravention with the decisions of the Bandung Conference but also with the *Panch Sheel* signed by Premiers Nehru and Chou En-lai."⁵² *Bintang Timur*, a pro-Communist daily, doubted "India's friendliness" in that, despite *its* "such a nice historical record with Indonesia", it had "now suddenly (allowed) one of her nationals to do everything to defend imperialism, thus destroying good relations between India and Indonesia." It also charged that Sondhi had come to the "Asian Games festival as the faithful defender of an imperialist stooge as (sic) Taiwan."⁵³

The Indonesian Government and Press attitude towards Sondhi as well as towards relations with India caused shock and surprise in the Indian diplomatic and Government circles. The Indian Ambassador in Djakarta, Apa B. Pant, described the statement by the Indonesian Minister of Trade as "really surprising and shocking". "It will be most surprising and agonizing", he said, "if the activities of sports associations which have nothing to do with the Government of India and are not getting any financial subsidies from the Government should stand in the way of normal friendly relations between India and Indonesia."⁵⁴ In a statement on August 30, 1962, only a day before Trade Minister Suharto's statement, the Indian Embassy in Djakarta had clarified the Government of India's position *vis-a-vis* the Indian Olympic Association or any other sports associations and categorically declared that these were neither run nor subsidized by the Government. It had also expressed the fervent hope of the Indian contingent that "these Games would be successful."⁵⁵ At a meeting with a National Front delegation on September 1, 1962, the Indian Ambassador had clarified the Government of India's position as regards the "Sondhi Affair" and assured the delegation that if their charges against Sondhi were proved correct, the Government of India would take due action against him.⁵⁶

The Government of India also felt surprised. In order to pacify the growing anti-Indian sentiment over Sondhi's statement, a

51 *Harian Rakjat*, September 1, 1962.

52 *Ibid.*, September 2, 1962.

53 *Bintang Timur* (Djakarta), September 2, 1962.

54 *Indonesian Herald*, September 1, 1962.

55 *Ibid.*, August 31, 1962.

56 *Ibid.*, September 3, 1962.

spokesman of the Ministry of External Affairs in New Delhi, in a statement, dissociated his Government from the "Sondhi Affair" and said: "India's friendship with Indonesia is not a restricted affair. India and Indonesia have marched and faced difficulties together in the past and will continue to do so in future."⁵⁷

But India's attempt to avert any untoward incident failed to produce results. This is evident from the anti-Indian demonstrations and sacking of the Indian Embassy in Djakarta on September 3, 1962. Many factors operating since independence added to Sukarno's sense of personal grouse against Nehru, particularly since the Non-Aligned Conference in Belgrade, and worked to reduce the warmth in the two countries' relations. Although workers of all the major political parties had participated in the anti-Indian demonstrations, it was the PKI which played the major role.⁵⁸ Some prominent Government leaders including Foreign Minister Subandrio and Trade Minister Suharto, and the Indonesian Press helped in rousing anti-India sentiment among the masses.⁵⁹ The main plea they took was Sondhi's "insult" to the President and the people of Indonesia, a plea fully suited to the anti-Indian propaganda as carried on by China and Pakistan.

The Indian Government was sorry over the Djakarta incidents of September 3, 1962.⁶⁰ In a statement in the Lok Sabha on September 4, 1962, Prime Minister Nehru, narrated the background of developments culminating in the attack on the Indian Embassy in Djakarta on September 3, 1962 and said: "It is highly deplorable that this kind of thing should happen." Indirectly charging the Indonesian authorities with their complicity in rousing mass resentment against India, he said: "...to encourage the attack on the Indian Embassy in this way in extremely distressing and deplorable as also the statement made by the Trade Minister."⁶¹ Nehru's was a well-balanced statement, fully in keeping with the long-term pro-

57 Ibid., September 1, 1962.

58 Interview with Ali Sastroamidjojo, Djakarta, September 24, 1969.

59 *The Hindu*, September 5, 1962. In an editorial it referred to Foreign Minister Subandrio and Trade Minister Suharto carrying on anti-Indian campaign for days on.

60 *Hindustan Times*, September 4, 1962. The Indian Ambassador had said: "I am profoundly sad...More than the damage the affair has saddened my heart." In a statement in the Lok Sabha on September 4, 1962, Nehru said: "I feel very sad about this". See Government of India, *Lok Sabha, Debates*, series 3, vol. 8, session 2, September 3-8, 1962, col. 5807.

61 Government of India, *Lok Sabha, Debates*, n. 60.

spects of the Indian-Indonesian relations.⁶² He described the incident in Djakarta as “shocking” and “peculiarly surprising and distressing”.⁶³ He also thought “that the Indonesian authorities were actively associated with criticizing Sondhi’s stand and its culmination in the incidents”⁶⁴ in Djakarta; but he was not ready to concede that it was the outcome of anti-Indian sentiment among the Indonesians. While speaking before the Congress Party’s External Affairs Standing Committee on September 4, 1962, he reportedly commended the Indian Ambassador’s reports full of praise for Indonesia, refused to approve the manner in which Sondhi had said certain things and spoke of the friendly feelings of the Indonesian people towards India.⁶⁵

In his reply to a question by a member of the Lok Sabha, Nehru confirmed the apprehension about China’s keen interest in exaggerating and possibly instigating the anti-Indian outburst over the “Sondhi Affair.”⁶⁶ While replying to another question, he expressed his fears that some people had instigated the Indonesians against India, although he refused to identify them, saying: “These are behind-the-scenes things.”⁶⁷

While the Government of India only contented itself with sending a protest note⁶⁸, and thought it better not to press for pay-

62 The *Indonesian Herald* praised Nehru for his open-mindedness and understanding and assured “that whatever may be the case, the Indonesian people would certainly think twice before they harbour any hard feelings against the Indian people.” See *Indonesian Herald*, September 7, 1962.

63 Government of India, Lok Sabha, *Debates*, n. 60, cols. 5807-8.

64 *Ibid.*, col. 5805.

65 *The Hindu*, September 5, 1962 and *Indonesian Herald*, September 7, 1962.

66 Government of India, Lok Sabha, *Debates*, n. 60, col. 5808. See also *The Hindu* and *Hindustan Times*, September 5, 1962.

67 *Ibid.*, n. 60, col. 5809. See also *Hindustan Times*, September 5, 1962. since it was an indirect reference to Chinese involvement in rousing Indonesians’ feelings against India, members of Parliament belonging to the Communist Party of India refused to take it lying down. This became thus a matter of keen debate in the Rajya Sabha. While referring to the Prime Minister’s remarks about China’s suspected involvement in the Djakarta incidents, the CPI leader, Bhupesh Gupta, criticized Nehru for having committed “an unwise thing”, a “kind of indiscretion”. He also wanted the Government to clarify the matter with the Indonesian authorities as it might be interpreted to mean that Indonesia was a tool of China. See Government of India, *Parliamentary Debates, Rajya Sabha Official Report*, vol. 40, part 2, August 24–September 7, 1962; cols. 5190-1.

68 *Hindustan Times*, September 6, 1962. The Indian Ambassador in Djakarta handed over a formal protest note to Foreign Minister Subandrio on September 5, 1962.

ment of damages⁶⁹ caused in the wake of mob attack on the Indian Embassy, the Indian Press came out with bitter criticism against the Indonesians and their Government. *The Statesman*, in an editorial, asked "thousands of Indonesians to feel ashamed of their anti-India activities", considered the attack on the Indian Embassy as "deplorable" and charged the Indonesian Government with inability "to ensure civilized behaviour in their people."⁷⁰ *The Hindu* described it as "A Shameful Episode" and wrote editorially (under this caption) that it was obvious from the start that "it was a stage-managed affair under official auspices."⁷¹ *The Times of India* termed it as a "disgraceful attack" and "a serious affront to the people of this country."⁷²

The Indian Press also brought out a number of editorials and articles analysing the various causes, forces, and factors operating since the days of the freedom struggle, which had adversely affected relations between the two countries and finally led to the anti-Indian demonstrations. *The Statesman* described the Djakarta incident as "a shocking climax" to those who had witnessed both the present episode and the 1947 and 1949 Asian Conferences in New Delhi.⁷³

President Sukarno did not say a word about the anti-Indian incident. His silence rather lent some credibility to Nehru's charge of Indonesian Government's complicity in the anti-India happenings in Djakarta. In a talk with the reporters on the day following the demonstrations, Foreign Minister Subandrio regretted the attack on the "Embassy of our close friend India" and stressed that "Our friendship with India is very important."⁷⁴ However, he hastened to add: "I can understand the reaction of the Indonesian people towards Sondhi's statement, which actually hurt the Indonesian President and people." Giving his personal reactions, he said: "Personally, however, I am also offended by Mr. Sondhi's statement and I can understand that the reaction given by the people was to

69 The total damages, according to Prime Minister Nehru, came to between Rs. 10,000 and Rs. 20,000. In his statement to the Lok Sabha on September 3, 1962, Nehru said: "It is a small matter. We are not going to press it." See Government of India, Lok Sabha, *Debates*, n. 60, col. 5811.

70 *The Statesman* (New Delhi), September 4, 1962.

71 *The Hindu*, September 5, 1962.

72 *Times of India*, September 4, 1962.

73 *The Statesman* (New Delhi), September 7, 1962.

74 *Indonesian Observer*, September 5, 1962. See also *The Statesman* (New Delhi), September 5, 1962. It quoted Subandrio as having said: "Our friendship with Afro-Asian countries and particularly with India is of the greatest importance." See also *Hindustan Times*, September 4, 1962.

defend the honour of the President as the Great Leader of the Revolution whom we all love." Commenting on Indonesia's pioneering efforts towards Afro-Asian solidarity, Subandrio pleaded thus : "If sometimes we are made to face difficulties among ourselves, don't ever forget the main objective, namely, by solidarity fighting colonialism and imperialism which are still at large in Asia and Africa."⁷⁵ After a meeting with the Indian Ambassador, eight days later, Indonesia's First Minister, Djuanda Kartawidjaja, observed that the Sondhi incident should be a lesson for both the countries. He added, however, that "it is all over now and our relations will develop. Both countries will become closer neighbours."⁷⁶

The Indonesian reactions carried two implications. First, although the Government of Indonesia regretted the anti-Indian incidents, it did not consider mob action as unjustified. Secondly, it tended to condition Indonesia's continued friendship with India on the latter's readiness to actively join the former in "the struggle against imperialism and colonialism...in Africa and Asia" in the framework of Afro-Asian solidarity, and also to agree to the convening of a second Asian-African Conference.⁷⁷ Notwithstanding these implications, the Indonesian Government and Press showed eagerness to straighten relations with India. Probably what prompted them to do so was their awareness of the importance of India's concurrence to the holding of a second Asian and African Conference. While speaking to newsmen in Djakarta on September 10, 1962, Subandrio once again regretted the incidents of September 3 and 4, 1962, disclosed that he had instructed the Indonesian Ambassador in New Delhi to the effect that bilateral relations in the fields of politics, economy and culture, remained as usual, and declared that "we have closed this incident and issue."⁷⁸ This was subsequent to India's reported willingness to attend the preparatory meeting of the second Asian-African Conference.⁷⁹ There is a possibility that the Indian Ambassador, Apa Pant, conveyed Government of India's decision to this effect during his half-hour meeting

75 *Indonesian Observer*, September 4 and 5, 1962.

76 *Straits Times* (Kuala Lumpur and Singapore), September 14, 1962. See also *Indonesian Herald*, September 13, 1962.

77 S. Nihal Singh, "Indonesia Desires India's Friendship, But She Wants It on Her Own Terms", *The Statesman* (New Delhi), September 17, 1962.

78 *Indonesian Herald*, September 11, 1962.

79 *The Statesman* (New Delhi), September 11, 1962.

with President Sukarno on September 7, 1962.⁸⁰ This is clear from the increasing sense of urgency shown in the subsequent official statements in Indonesia about preserving and strengthening Indian-Indonesian relations.⁸¹ Obviously, prospects of the two countries' relations were hinged on India's preparedness to join Indonesia in convening the second Asian-African conference.⁸²

In the days following the "Sondhi Affair", both India and Indonesia showed eagerness to bring normalcy in their relations. Nevertheless, the basis on which they desired to do so was distinctly divergent. Whereas India wanted to give priority to relations in the trade, economic and cultural fields, Indonesia preferred bilateral co-operation in the political and foreign policy field. The major condition that found mention in various official statements emanating from Djakarta was Indonesia's emphasis on India's concurrence to the former's demand for the second 'Bandung' conference. In view of Prime Minister Nehru's lukewarm attitude towards this Indonesian demand, and in the light of coolness in personal relations between him and President Sukarno developing since the Belgrade Conference in September 1961, there was little, if any, possibility of bringing Indian-Indonesian relations to a satisfactory level.

China's Attack on India

It was in this atmosphere of diminishing goodwill between the two countries that China launched an attack on India's northern borders on October 20, 1962. Coming as it did, only less than seven weeks after the attack on the Indian Embassy in Djakarta, the event

80 *Indonesian Herald*, September 8, 1962. Apa Pant did not disclose anything to the gathered journalists about his meeting with the Indonesian President except saying : "We talked about Mahabharata."

81 For instance, following Apa Pant's meeting with Subandrio on 10 October 1962, the latter declared to the newsmen that for him "the most important thing is to preserve the relations between Indonesia and India which in this region is an essential requirement of high importance for the two parties." See *Indonesian Herald*, October 11, 1962. Speaking about the developments in the two countries' relations, the Indonesian Ambassador to India, Moekarto Notowidigdo, told Pressmen in Djakarta on October 21, 1962, that "the things were returning to normal. This affair between Indonesia and India was like a quarrel between husband and wife. The two countries are approaching each other again and expect there will even be a strengthening of good relations." See *The Hindu*, October 22, 1962 and *Asian Recorder* (New Delhi), November 19-25, 1962, p. 4900.

82 S. Nihal Singh, n. 77.

proved to be of significant, although indirect, bearing on relations between India and Indonesia.

India viewed China's invasion with a sense of shock and bewilderment. Prime Minister Nehru had expected that anti-imperialist states would not commit aggression against other states. He was disappointed to find China, an avowedly anti-imperialist state, invading the borders of a non-aligned state.⁸³ His sense of disillusionment with China was all the more bitter because it was he who had proposed to invite China to attend the first Asian-African Conference in April 1955, and, thereby, helped China to develop its contacts with the Afro-Asian states.⁸⁴ Since then India had been pursuing a policy of peace and friendship towards China. China's attack on India's borders showed its disregard of the *Panchsheel* Agreement, of the ten Bandung principles and of the policy of non-alignment and peaceful co-existence.

Indonesia's Reactions

Whereas India became a victim of Chinese aggression and hence undertook a serious appraisal of its earlier view of China, Indonesia, at this very stage, found itself in the process of consolidating its friendship with that country. Indonesia's growing contacts with China have been surveyed elsewhere in this study. Suffice it to say here that, in spite of building of cordial relations between India and Indonesia, to expect Indonesia to come out openly in support of India and against China was just out of question. And yet India had reasons to believe and hope that Indonesian leaders would show a correct understanding of the Indian position in the Sino-Indian border dispute and demonstrate impartiality of judgment. But this did not happen. Indonesia remained neutral on the question of Chinese aggression on India, chose not to go into the merit of the case and only concentrated on efforts to restore peaceful relations between China and India.⁸⁵

⁸³ For Nehru's statement in the Lok Sabha on November 8, 1962, see Government of India, *Foreign Affairs Record*, (New Delhi, Ministry of External Affairs, November 1, 1962), pp. 278-86.

⁸⁴ Nehru made this proposal at the five Colombo States' Conference at Bogor (West Java) in December 1954. The proposal was accepted by the leaders of the five countries. See George M. Kahin, *The Asian-African Conference, Bandung, Indonesia, April 1955* (Ithaca, New York, 1956), p. 2.

⁸⁵ Vishal Singh, 'The Reactions of South-East Asian Countries', *International Studies* (New Delhi), vol. 5 (1/2), July 1963 - October 1963, pp. 82-83.

Immediately after the Chinese invasion, the Government of India approached the Indonesian Government. Along with his letters addressed to Heads of Government of other states, Prime Minister Nehru wrote a letter to President Sukarno.⁸⁶ Following the Ceylonese Premier Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike's proposal to hold a 6 power⁸⁷ summit conference to find ways of solving the Sino-Indian border dispute, the Indian Government decided to send special emissaries to participating countries.⁸⁸ According to Nehru, the purpose of these missions was "to explain more thoroughly our position and what we think about the situation."⁸⁹

Mrs. Lakshmi N. Menon, leader of the Indian delegation to South-East Asian countries, reached Indonesia on November 30, 1962 and had a 20-minute meeting with President Sukarno and 3-hour meeting with Foreign Minister Subandrio, in Jogjakarta, the next day. In a statement to the Press, after these meetings, she expressed her satisfaction "with the discussions". "We are pleased", she said, "that the Indonesian Government had studied the situation with great care and concern."⁹⁰ Obviously, the Indonesian leaders had only displayed keen interest in discussing the pros and cons of the dispute with the Indian emissary and shown reluctance to pass any judgment on the rightness or wrongness of India's cause. This was confirmed later by the leader of the Indian mission. On arrival in Djakarta, back from Jogjakarta, she told newsmen: "I am neither optimistic nor pessimistic."⁹¹ While commenting on Indonesia's and other South-East Asian countries' reactions, in Singapore, en route to Ceylon, Mrs. Menon shed all hopes of their sympathy and support for India and merely contented herself by saying: "They all appreciate our stand. We do not urge any of the leaders

86 *Indonesian Herald*, November 6, 1962.

87 The six countries invited to the Conference in Colombo were Ghana and the United Arab Republic, Ceylon and Burma, Cambodia and Indonesia. The Conference was scheduled for December 10, 1962. See *Indonesian Observer*, December 8, 1962.

88 Two separate missions were decided upon. One of them was headed by Mrs. Lakshmi Menon, Minister of State for External Affairs, and was to visit Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon and Indonesia. Mrs. Lakshmi Menon was accompanied by Dr. S. Gopal, Director of Historical Division of the Ministry of External Affairs.

89 Government of India, Lok Sabha, *Debates*, series 3, vol. 10, session 3, November 26, 1962, col. 3332.

90 *Indonesian Herald*, December 3, 1962.

91 *Ibid.*, December 4, 1962.

to take sides in our fight with Communist China. We are interested to explain and convince the leaders of our views and the correctness and righteousness of our stand.”⁹²

This statement of Lakshmi Menon was nothing short of an admission of failure of her mission to elicit the Indonesians’ and other countries’ support. But in order to ensure that her statements did not allow an impression to grow that her mission was returning empty-handed, she told newsmen at Madras airport on December 3, 1962 that she had found “a great deal of understanding in Rangoon, Djakarta and Phnom Penh about India’s case in the Sino-Indian conflict.” She also said that there was confusion among the Indonesians and other South-East Asians about the Indian and Chinese position. They, she said, appear to think that the 1959 line to which the Chinese had said they would withdraw was more advantageous to India than the line of September 1962, on which India had insisted.⁹³

In fact, from the very beginning, the Indonesian Government showed lack of enthusiasm towards India’s fate. Foreign Minister Subandrio gave his reactions after his meeting with the Indian Ambassador in Djakarta on November 5, 1962. He told the Press that Indonesia “stands firm” on the principle that Sino-Indian border dispute should be settled through peaceful negotiations. He declared that Indonesia had no desire to become mediator in the border dispute between India and China. “Of course we will have to see first whether there is any concurrence of views between India and People’s China before trying to find basic points for a meeting”, he said.⁹⁴ It was a clear indication that Indonesia wished to avoid taking sides, lest its growing relations with China should cool off. It also implied Indonesia’s readiness to offer its services as a mediator, provided there was “any concurrence of views” between the two parties. President Sukarno made his first comments on November 21, 1962, thirty-two days after the Chinese launched their attack, the day when Peking declared its unilateral ceasefire. In a statement to newsmen in Manila the Indonesian President remarked: “I am working hard to bring peace” in the Chinese-Indian border war. When pressed further, he only said: “wait and see, wait and see.”⁹⁵ Although it is known that President Sukarno made

92 Ibid.

93 *Indonesian Observer*, December 4, 1962.

94 *Indonesian Herald*, November 6, 1962.

95 Ibid., November 23, 1962 and *Harian Rakjat*, November 23, 1961.

personal approaches to the Chinese leaders in this connection⁹⁶, it is difficult to believe it had much impact on the Chinese who were acting according to set calculations. And yet it is worth-noticing that both the Chinese unilateral ceasefire declaration and Sukarno's statement came on the same day, that is, November 21, 1962.

When China declared unilateral ceasefire on November 21, 1962, there was a sense of relief in Indonesia. "Now", Foreign Minister Subandrio observed, "a basis acceptable to both sides must be sought in order that negotiations could be started immediately on the dispute."⁹⁷ Ali Sastroamidjojo, Chairman of the PNI, considered it an inspiring news. "It goes without saying", he observed, that "in every conflict like the one under discussion, there are always two parties directly involved and it would therefore become all the more cheerful when the unilateral gesture of People's China would be a basis for India to likewise call out a ceasefire."⁹⁸

Indonesia maintained its attitude of treating both India and China at par, or refusing to pass judgement on the rightness or wrongness of China's armed action on Indian borders. It also continued to seek points of concurrence between the two parties in order to arrange a peaceful settlement of the dispute.⁹⁹ This was evident from the three-day deliberations of the six-power Conference

96 Interview with Sukarni Kartodiwirjo (former Indonesian Ambassador to China and leader of the Murba Party), Djakarta, January 26 and 30, 1970. The author is tempted to co-relate this brief statement by Sukarno to an observation made by Sukarni in the course of the interview. Sukarni disclosed that he carried a verbal message from President Sukarno to Prime Minister Chou En-lai, asking the latter to order a ceasefire in order to help arrange a negotiated settlement between China and India. In this connection Sukarni met Chen Yi on November 17, 1962. See *Indonesian Herald*, November 20, 1962.

97 *Indonesian Herald*, November 26, 1962. Later, in the Sino-Indonesian Joint Communique issued at the end of Subandrio's visit to China on January 7, 1963, the Government of Indonesia "appreciated" the unilateral declaration of ceasefire by the Chinese and considered it as "indicative of China's sincerity for a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary dispute." See *Ibid.*, January 9, 1962.

98 *Ibid.*, November 24, 1962. See also *Peking Review*, vol. 5, nos. 47 and 48, November 30, 1962, p. 30.

99 On more than one occasion the Indonesian Government and leaders issued statements purporting to treat both China and India as two friendly Asian nations and urging to seek ways for a peaceful settlement of the dispute. See, for instance, Subandrio's talk in Bangkok with a reporter of Radio Republic Indonesia, revealing that Indonesia was actively trying, behind the scenes, to find a way out of deadlock on the border issue between the two countries friendly to Indonesia. *Indonesian Herald*, November 24, 1962.

in Colombo on December 10-12, 1962. The leader of the Indonesian delegation, Foreign Minister Subandrio, set himself against the stand taken by Ali Sabry of the UAR. In his speech at the Colombo Conference, the UAR representative had said: "There must not be any territorial gain on account of military operations. This principle is in conformity with the spirit of Bandung Conference."¹⁰⁰ It was, no doubt, a shrewd move by Ali Sabry to prompt Subandrio to come out openly on the aggression issue and show sympathy towards India, which had lost territory as a result of Chinese "military operations". But Subandrio opposed this clear-cut attitude and suggested a face-saving formula for the Colombo Conference, which meant making proposals for settlement "without touching on the substance of the conflict, who is the aggressor and who is the expansionist."¹⁰¹ This way he lent strength to the views of the other participants and, thereby, isolated the UAR representative who had to yield in view of the consensus against him, and caused disappointment to India.¹⁰²

India's official reaction to the Indonesian attitude towards the Chinese attack on the former's territorial integrity was that of a friend let down. Expressing his sense of disappointment at Indonesia's neutral posture, the Indian Ambassador, Apa Pant, said, in the course of his Republic Day Address on January 27, 1963, that "if a friend does not help you when you are in danger what is the worth of such a friendship."^{1 3} Apart from reminding the Indo-

In the Joint Communique issued in Djakarta on December 5, 1962, President Sukarno joined Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia in expressing the "hope that India and China as two sister nations of Asia will solve peacefully their present differences at the conference table to achieve a negotiated settlement of their borders, satisfactory and honourable for both." Ibid., December 6, 1962. In a statement on December 14, 1962, two days after the six-power Colombo Conference came out with its proposals for a peaceful settlement, the Government of Indonesia appealed to both India and China to settle their outstanding disputes peacefully in compliance with the proposals of the Colombo Conference. Ibid., December 17, 1962.

100 Government of India, *China Disregards Colombo Proposals* (pamphlet), (New Delhi, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1963), p. 11. See also *The Statesman* (New Delhi), December 11, 1962.

101 *Hindustan Times*, December 11, 1962.

102 *The Statesman* (New Delhi), December 14, 1962. See also G.H. Jansen, "The Neutralist Six at Colombo: Why India got Much Less Than She Expected", Ibid., January 3, 1963.

103 *Indonesian Herald*, January 28 and 29, 1963. See also *Indonesian Observer*, January 28, 1963.

nesians of their obligations towards India, it was an attempt to arouse in their minds latent feelings of friendship for India, by suggesting to them the worth of a friend in need. Whatever other implications of Indonesia's attitude, there is reason to believe that every step that took Indonesia nearer to China was taking it away from India.¹⁰⁴

After the Chinese invasion of India in October 1962, the Malaysia question and Indonesia's demand for the convening of a second Asian-African conference proved to be factors of major significance in India's relations with Indonesia. For various reasons, the two countries came to have divergent attitude on both these issues. During the period of three years following the "Sondhi Affair" in September 1962, these two questions dominated Indonesia's domestic politics and determined its foreign policy attitudes. Their major importance, however, lay in the fact that they revealed the basic motivations of Indonesian policy towards South-East Asia as well as Afro-Asia. Since both the problems represented Indonesia's aspirations of a regional and Afro-Asian role, the broad domestic support the Government policy on these two issues came to receive, made them into a test case for Indonesia's friendship with India. Various internal and external forces and factors, often working at cross-purposes, contributed to the strengthening of Indonesia's commitment in this regard and, ultimately, led to realignments in Asia, with Indonesia, China and Pakistan on one side and India on the other.

Indonesia's Initial Reactions to Malaysia Proposal

In the beginning Indonesia did not react unfavourably to the Prime Minister of Malaya, Tunku Abdul Rahman's proposal for the formation of new federation of Malaysia.¹⁰⁵ In this connection Foreign Minister Subandrio made his views known as early as August 2, 1961.¹⁰⁶ Later, in the course of his speech at the General Assembly of the United Nations on November 20, 1961, he stated that Indonesia had told Malaya "that we had no objection to such a

104 Interview with Moechtar Lubis, Editor of *Indonesia Raya*, Djakarta, January 23, 1970. Moechtar Lubis confirmed this view in the course of the interview with the author.

105 The Tunku made this proposal on May 27, 1961. The new federation was proposed to include Malaya, the British South-East Asian colonies of Singapore, Sarawak and Sabah (North Borneo territories) and the British Protected State of Brunei.

106 *Antara*, August 3, 1961. He reiterated his views in a letter to *New York Times*, November 13, 1961.

merger based upon the will for freedom of the peoples concerned.”¹⁰⁷ On this basis, Indonesia’s stand towards the Malaysia proposal, at least at the early stages, tended to be interpreted as “benevolently indifferent”, even “not unfriendly.”¹⁰⁸

It is interesting to note that although Indonesia’s initial reaction to Malaysia proposal was one of “no objection”, it was not without caution. This was clear from Subandrio’s words “will for freedom of the peoples concerned”. It was just this caution which, at the time of the Brunei revolt in December 1962, provided a justification for the Indonesian policy of confrontation with Malaysia. The Government of Indonesia perhaps wanted to watch the developments carefully for some time before taking a definite stand on the question of Malaysia.

Indonesia’s cautious approach at this stage could be attributed to three reasons. First, it was pre-occupied with the West Irian issue.¹⁰⁹ Secondly, it feared that any adverse reaction in Djakarta against Malaysia would prejudice the efforts that were being made to secure Western (particularly United States) support in negotiating a favourable settlement of the West Irian question.¹¹⁰ Thirdly, it desired to keep up with the general expectation in the United States that after the West Irian issue was resolved to Indonesia’s satisfaction, it would give priority to economic development.¹¹¹

107 GAOR, session 16, plen. mtg. 1058, vol. 1, November 20, 1961, pp. 718-19. Also quoted in Vishal Singh, “The Struggle for Malaysia”. *International Studies*, vol. 5, July 1963-April 1964, p. 236.

108 See Justus M. Van der Kroef, “The Sino-Indonesian Partnership”, *Orbis*, vol. 8, no. 2, Summer 1964, p. 334 and Ghazali Bin Shafie, “Malaysia and Indonesian Confrontation”, *United Asia* (Bombay vol. 17, no. 3, May-June 1965, p. 221, respectively.

109 Indonesia had been engaged in an all-out confrontation with the Dutch. President Sukarno’s “Triple Command” on December 19, 1961 for national mobilization in the struggle for West Irian added further militancy in Indonesia’s attitude towards the Dutch and entailed more financial burdens. See Government of the Republic of Indonesia, *A Year of Triumph* (Address by Sukarno on August 17, 1962), Special Issue 225, (Djakarta, Department of Information, 1962), p. 37.

110 George M. Kahin, “Malaysia and Indonesia”, *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 37, no. 3, Fall 1964, pp. 260-1.

111 Justus M. Van der Kroef, “The West New Guinea Settlement : Its origins and Implications”, *Orbis*, vol. 7, no. 1, Spring 1963, p. 139, and the same author’s “Indonesian Communism and the Changing Balance of Power”, *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 37, no. 4, Winter 1964-65, p. 363. In view of the “unsettling political consequences” of an expected shift in Indonesian Government’s emphasis from politics to economic development, Van der Kroef considered this expectation as “quite unrealistic”.

However, as soon as Indonesian-Dutch Agreement on West Irian was signed in New York on August 15, 1962, Indonesia's attitude towards Malaysia proposal showed definite signs of change. On September 26, 1962, Subandrio declared, in an exclusive interview to the *Straits Times* in Singapore, that Indonesia could not remain "indifferent" to the situation as the proposed federation was going to have "common borders" with it. He held out the threat of a "counter action" in the event of Malaysia permitting a military base to be established" on its territory. He also warned that "if things go wrong then we must take notice to protect our own interests."¹¹²

Among the political parties at this stage, only the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) manifested its clear opposition to the scheme of Malaysia.¹¹³ Indeed the PKI criticized the concept of Malaysia as early as August 1961 and said that it was "neo-colonialist".¹¹⁴ In a formal resolution passed at the Third Plenum of its Central Committee on December 30 and 31, 1961, it described the the Malaysia plan as an "instrument to safeguard Britain's position" in South-East Asia and as "an unacceptable colonial intrigue."¹¹⁵ It kept up its hostility to the Malaysia plan in the years that followed and contributed considerably to the eventual switch-over by the Government of the Republic of Indonesia from an indifferent to a hostile posture.

India's Initial Responses

While there was thus a shift in Indonesia's attitude from one of acquiescence in the project of Malaysia to one of hostility

112 *Antara*, September 28, 1962. Subandrio's statement came just five days after the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a joint Indonesian-Dutch Resolution, authorizing Secretary-General U Thant to implement the West Irian Agreement of August 1962.

113 Among the major non-Communist parties, the Nationalist Party of Indonesia (PNI) expressed its fears about the proposed federation of Malaysia. While addressing the open session of the Party Congress Executive Body in Semarang (Capital of Central Java) on September 12, 1962, Chairman of the PNI, Ali Sastroamidjojo, said: "We may not remain indifferent towards this problem. On the contrary, we must follow developments closely in order to determine whether Malaysia is an advantage or disadvantage to us." See *Indonesian Herald*, September 15, 1962. See also *The Statesman* (New Delhi), September 27, 1962.

114 "Apa Itu Malaysia Raya"? ("What is Greater Malaysia?"), *Harian Rakjat*, August 31, 1961.

115 *Strengthen National Unity and Communist Unity* (Djakarta, Pembaruan 1962), pp. 60-61. This was a manifesto of the Third Plenum of the Central Committee of the PKI. See also *Straits Times*, January 2, 1962.

towards it, India looked upon the formation of Malaysia as a welcome development in South-East Asia. India's favourable attitude towards the proposed federation became manifest as early as December 1961. During a visit by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong of Malaya to India, Vice-President Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan reportedly gave his blessings for the Malaysia plan.¹¹⁶ India's attitude got further clarified during the three-day visit of Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew to India in April 1962. Since Tunku Abdul Rahman's proposal was yet to get under way and it needed a policy decision with regard to the region, at least for the time being, the Government of India chose to maintain near silence on the issue. The only public occasion when it made its attitude known was the dinner given by Mrs. Lakshmi N. Menon, Minister of State for External Affairs, to Prime Minister and Madame Lee Kuan Yew. In her speech, Lakshmi Menon observed that Malaysia was a good idea and expressed the hope that the efforts being made to establish Malaysia would be crowned with success.¹¹⁷

In his talks with Lee Kuan Yew on April 23, 1962, Prime Minister Nehru showed keen interest in the Malaysia plan.¹¹⁸ Being inconclusive the talks were resumed on the next day and covered various aspects of the scheme and its regional implications.¹¹⁹ Nehru seems to have indicated that India would support the establishment of Malaysia. At his Press conference in New Delhi on April 25, 1962, Lee Kuan Yew observed that Nehru was "remarkably well-informed on all matters connected with South-East Asia" and that he "understood my point of view very well and expressed sympathy with my view that this (Malaysia) is a logical way of liquidating the British Empire in South-East Asia."¹²⁰ The Malaysia scheme, in fact, evoked appreciation in official circles in New Delhi.

Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew's visit to India was important inasmuch as it enabled Prime Minister Nehru to exchange views on the Malaysia plan with the leader of one of the prospective constituents of the proposed federation. In view of the racial dimension of the Malaysia scheme, the fact that Lee Kuan Yew represented

116 *Straits Times*, May 21, 1962. This was disclosed by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew in the course of his talk recorded by BBC and broadcast over Radio Singapore on May 20, 1962.

117 *Times of India* (New Delhi), April 25, 1962.

118 *Straits Times*, April 26, 1962.

119 *Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), April 24, 1962.

120 *Straits Times*, April 25, 1962. The talks on April 24, 1962 were reported to be on Prime Minister Nehru's initiative.

the predominantly Chinese Singapore and had come to India to canvass support for the scheme, made the occasion all the more important. Since it represented the willingness of the Singapore Chinese to join the new federation, discussions with Lee Kuan Yew led Nehru to believe in the viability of the Malaysia plan.

The major significance of Lee Kuan Yew's visit, however, lay in the fact that it clarified certain grounds on which India's pro-Malaysia attitude would be based. India welcomed Malaysia for a variety of reasons. First, the emergence of Malaysia would mark the end of the remnants of British colonialism in the region. Secondly, Malaysia offered a sound and politically and economically viable alternative to instability in insular South-East Asia. In fact in India it was believed that Malaysia "will be a factor for political stability" in the region.¹²¹ Thirdly, during his talks in New Delhi, Lee Kuan Yew is reported to have placed much emphasis on the anti-Communist content of the Malaysia plan and to have suggested that viewed from that angle, the proposed federation would be in India's interest.¹²² The fact that Nehru reportedly agreed with Lee Kuan Yew on the various implications of the Malaysia plan meant the Government of India's acceptance of the emergence of Malaysia as a stabilizing factor in the region.

Following Lee Kuan Yew's visit, the Government of India came out openly in support of the formation of the new federation. In September 1962 it joined the other countries of the Commonwealth in expressing its satisfaction with the "great progress made towards the establishment of the Federation of Malaysia by August 31, 1963."¹²³ However, since Indonesia was as yet not actively hostile in its attitude to the Malaysia plan, it was not yet an issue between India and Indonesia.

Indonesia Changes its Attitude

The revolt in Brunei¹²⁴ in December 1962 occasioned a marked change in Indonesia's attitude to the Malaysia question. The Government of Indonesia expressed its support for the Brunei rebels led by A.M. Azahari, leader of Party Ra'ayat, soon after the news

121 "Malaysia" (editorial), *Times of India*, April 27, 1962.

122 *The Statesman* (New Delhi), April 22, 1962 and *Straits Times*, April 26, 1962.

123 *Hindustan Times*, and *The Statesman* (New Delhi), September 20, 1962.

124 Brunei, the British-Protected State in the north-west of Indonesian Borneo, was one of the prospective constituents of the proposed federation of Malaysia.

of the uprising became known on December 10, 1962. President Sukarno linked the revolt with the 'new emerging forces', and declared that it would triumph.¹²⁵ Five days later, Foreign Minister Subandrio criticized Tunku Abdul Rahman for bracketing Indonesia with the Brunei rebellion and charged him with a persistently "hostile" attitude to Indonesia.¹²⁶ On December 21, 1962 President, Sukarno declared that the Indonesians' sympathy for the freedom struggle of the North Borneo people was "a matter of principle".¹²⁷ On January 20, 1963, Subandrio announced that his Government now "cannot but adopt a policy of confrontation against Malaya because at present they represent themselves as accomplices of the neo-colonialists and the neo-imperialists pursuing a hostile policy towards Indonesia."¹²⁸ And thus the ground was prepared for launching a policy of confrontation with the proposed Malaysian Federation a good eight months before it was formally inaugurated on September 16, 1963.

The Indonesian leaders attributed their policy of supporting the Brunei revolt and opposing the scheme of Malaysia to two ideological and strategic reasons. Ideologically, Indonesia saw the revolt in Brunei as a people's struggle against colonialism. The British suppression of the revolt by force strengthened the Indonesian view that the Malaysia plan was being imposed upon the people of its prospective constituent territories without due ascertainment of their wishes. They, therefore, regarded it as a "moral duty" and "a matter of principle" to give all kinds of support to "the independence struggle of the Kalimantan Utara (North Borneo) people" against British colonialism.¹²⁹

Strategically, the Indonesian leaders viewed the merger of Brunei, Sarawak and Sabah in Malaya as a threat to the security of their country. Indonesia's fears arose from the fact that according to the British-Malayan Defence Agreement of 9 July 1963 (Agree-

125 *Antara*, December 11, 1962 and *Indonesian Herald*, December 12, 1962.

126 *Indonesian Herald*, December 17, 1962.

127 *Ibid.*, December 28, 1962.

128 *Ibid.*, January 22, 1963. This was for the first time that the Indonesian leaders used the term 'confrontation' against Malaya. The fact that Subandrio made this announcement about three months and ten days before the U.N. Temporary Executive Authority handed over its mandate over West Irian administration to Indonesia, showed growing impatience in Indonesia about developments regarding the proposed federation of Malaysia.

129 Government of the Republic of Indonesia, *Why Indonesia Opposes British Made "Malaysia"* (Djakarta, 1964), pp. 57-58.

ment Relating to Malaysia), Britain was entitled to maintain bases in Singapore and discharge defence and peace responsibilities in South-East Asia as ever before.¹³⁰ The Indonesians felt that it would be suicidal for them to ignore any development that would oblige them to share a long border with a state which allowed British colonialism to maintain military bases on its territory and thereby pose a threat to the security and peace of their country and region.¹³¹ The primary reason that they gave for their anti-Malaysia policy was, therefore, their opposition to the continued existence of British political, military and economic interests in South-East Asia. It was not directed against the people of these territories whom Indonesia considered as "racial brothers" and "cultural cousins".¹³² The leaders of Malaya became subject of severe criticism in Indonesia because Indonesia felt they were politically, economically and militarily "subservient" to British colonialism.¹³³

Besides, the Indonesians were apprehensive lest Malaya, once formed, should promote Chinese influence rather than stem it."¹³⁴ Understandably, however, no Indonesian Government leader is on record having expressed publicly his apprehension of possible Chinese influence.¹³⁵ The Indonesians presented this aspect of the Malaysia plan only in their behind-the-scenes briefings in world capitals.¹³⁶ Commenting on Indonesia's anti-Malaysia policy, Professor Kahin traces it to the Indonesian "fear of the political

130 Ibid., pp. 58-59.

131 See Sukarno's comments on the continued threat of British Colonialism on Indonesia's borders in Cindy Adams, *Sukarno: An Autobiography* (New York, 1965), p. 302.

132 See "British-Made 'Malaysia'—Barrier to International Peace and Progress", *Indonesia* (Djakarta, Department of Foreign Affairs, 1964), vol. 4, p. 66. This is an annual publication of the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Government of Indonesia. This 27-page article in *Indonesia* gives a clear exposition of the reasons for Indonesia's official anti-Malaysia policy.

133 Ibid.

134 S. Nihal Singh, *Malaysia: A Commentary* (New Delhi, 1971), p. 69.

135 Outside the Government, an authentic view emphasizing anti-Chinese and anti-China basis of the Indonesian policy of opposition to Malaysia is given by Mohammad Hatta, former Vice-President of Indonesia. He observed thus: "The creation of a 'Malaysia' is nothing but the creation of a second China using the mask of 'Malay', a new colony dominated by Chinese capitalists, oppressing the Malay nation." See Mohammad Hatta, "One Indonesian View of the Malaysia Issue", *Asian Survey*, vol. 5, no. 3, March 1965, p. 143.

136 S. Nihal Singh, n. 134.

potential of what is by far the world's largest concentration of overseas Chinese." Indeed he describes it as a "major concern to Indonesia's top civilian and military leaders and a factor of outstanding importance in their attitude towards Malaysia." In this connection, Kahin mentions Subandrio among the top civilian leaders having a sense of ill-will towards the Chinese. According to him, it was the rough treatment meted out by the Chinese leaders to Subandrio during his visit to Peking in 1959 that led to the exodus of over 100,000 Chinese from Indonesia. Besides, Kahin is convinced that the Indonesians would not forget the reported threat by Foreign Minister Chen Yi to Subandrio that if Indonesia did not rescind its anti-Chinese measures, Peking would call on the Singapore Chinese to launch a trade boycott in order to bring Indonesia to its knees.¹³⁷

This view of Kahin's is endorsed by an Indian journalist. He contrasts Indonesia's hostility to Malaysia with its simultaneous friendliness towards the Philippines, and says that the growing intimacy between Indonesia and the Philippines was attributable to the common conviction of the two countries that the federation of Malaysia would, when formed, be dominated by the Chinese and pose a threat to their security. According to him, while Sukarno could afford to be friendly with China and the Chinese Communist leaders because of the large sea-distances separating the two countries, he could not ignore the prospect of a Chinese-dominated Malaysia sharing a border with Indonesia.¹³⁸

During the period between the Brunei revolt in December 1962 and the inauguration of the Federation of Malaysia in September 1963, Indonesia's commitment to anti-Malaysia policy got strengthened. Various domestic political forces and factors, though working very often at cross-purposes with one another, contributed to it. These forces included the PKI, the President and the leaders of the Armed Forces. Among these, the PKI made a major contribution to Indonesia's policy of confrontation with Malaysia. When the Brunei revolt occurred, the PKI immediately declared its support to the rebels. It was in accord with the anti-Malaysia postures that the Party had adopted since August 1961. On December 13, 1962, Chairman D.N. Aidit of the PKI exhorted the Indonesians to offer

137 Kahin, n. 110, p. 254 and pp. 264-5.

138 G.M. Telang, "Indonesia : Changing Attitude", *Foreign Affairs Reports*, vol. 12, no. 7, July 1963, pp. 48-51. This is a monthly publication of the Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.

every assistance to the "revolutionary struggle of the people of North Borneo" and to oppose any effort that might be made to break the struggle of the people of North Borneo. All organizations led by the PKI—such as its organizations for labour (SOBSI), the peasantry (BTI), women (GERWANI) and the youth (PEMUDA RAKJAT)—also voiced support for the cause of the rebels.¹³⁹

Finding the Government and the PKI coming out openly against the proposal for Malaysia, other major political parties and groups such as the Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI), the Nahdatul Ulama (NU) and the Partindo (Indonesian Party—an off-shoot of the PNI and closer to the PKI) followed suit. Representing a wide range of public opinion, the "National Committee for Solidarity with the North Kalimantan people" as established by various political parties and groups, urged the Government to recognize A.M. Azahari's Unitary State of North Borneo and called for demonstrations at the British and Malayan embassies in Djakarta and for the raising of an expeditionary force and "volunteers" for the "liberation" of North Borneo.¹⁴⁰

Attitude of Army Leadership

The leaders of the army also interpreted the Brunei revolt as a struggle for freedom from British colonialism and gave prompt support to the rebels. In an obvious reference to the British Gurkha troops quelling the Brunei rebellion, General Nasution, Indonesia's Defence and Security Minister, observed that far from being dead, colonialism was encircling and threatening Indonesia. In a message to a gathering in Djakarta on December 11, 1962, he denied that his Government harboured any territorial ambitions outside Indonesia. He declared: "We shall oppose colonialism wherever it is. And we shall assist independence wherever it is being fought for."¹⁴¹ Making his attitude still clearer, he declared a week later: "We do not claim the North Kalimantan (North Borneo territories) but we do give

139 *Artara*, December 19, 1962.

140 *Ibid.*, and *Djakarta Mail*, December 20, 1962. The members of the National Committee included among others, important leaders such as Chaerul Saleh, Ali Sastroamidjojo (PNI) and D.N. Aidit (PKI).

Demand for recognition was based, among others, on grounds of A.M. Azahari's statement in Manila on December 8, 1962, proclaiming "the absolute and complete independence of Negara Kesatuan Kalimantan Utara (The Unitary State of North Borneo). See Arnold C. Brackman, *South-East Asia's Second Front* (London, 1966), p. 142.

141 *Indonesian Herald*, December 13, 1962.

our support and endorsement to the struggle of the people of North Kalimantan." According to Nasution, this was "also the voice of the Indonesian people." He also invited a reference to "Portuguese colonialism" and asserted that "Indonesia is still surrounded by colonialism and neo-colonialism."¹⁴²

It is clear from the above that the Government, political parties and the Army leaders, had, by the time of Subandrio's announcement of a policy of confrontation on 20 January 1963, adopted a similar posture of opposition to Malaysia. The broad consensus as it emerged on the question of Malaysia represented very often conflicting motivations of various factors in Indonesian politics, such as the President, the PKI and the leadership of the Army.¹⁴³ One common feature in their attitudes, however, was their agreement on the "neo-colonialist" nature of the proposed Malaysia federation. Being in line with President Sukarno's concept of "New Emerging Forces" versus "Old Established Order Forces", the Malaysia question provided a framework for the working out of a broad national consensus.

Indonesia's Aspirations for a Regional Role

The leaders of Indonesia also saw in the Malaysia issue a possibility of realizing their dream of a Greater Indonesia.¹⁴⁴ Restoration of West Irian encouraged them in that direction. President Sukarno viewed it as fulfilling his concept of Indonesian unity "from Sabang to Merauke". Some came to believe that Indonesia had achieved great power status, and was therefore entitled to a sphere of influence in the region. Professor Mohammad Yamin, whom Brackman describes as "an architect of Sukarno's present day expansionist policies", went to the extent of asserting that "when

142 Ibid., December 26, 1962,

143 For an examination of the motivations behind the anti-Malaysia policy, see Alex Josey, "Aidit and Malaysia", *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hongkong), vol. 43, no. 8, February 20, 1964, pp. 421-2, 427; Justus M. van der Kroef, "The Sino-Indonesian Partnership", *Oriens*, vol. 8, no. 2, Summer 1964, pp. 332-56; George M. Kahin, "Malaysia and Indonesia", *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 37, no. 3, Fall 1964, pp. 253-70; Robert Curtis, "Malaysia and Indonesia", *New Left Review* (London), no. 28, November-December 1964, pp. 5-32; and Jan M. Pluvier, *Confrontation: A Study in Indonesian Politics* (Kuala Lumpur, 1965), 85 pp.

144 Curtis, Ibid, p. 26. Curtis mentions (p. 23) the "historical memory and Legend of a Java-based Greater Malay Empire in South-East Asia" as one of the seven "key elements" determining Indonesia's anti-Malaysia policy,

the national flag flies over Kotabaru, Indonesia will be the chief guardian of the Pacific Ocean.”¹⁴⁵

It is difficult to tell whether the Indonesian leaders harboured any expansionist designs at this juncture on Malaysia and the Philippines. Prior to independence, of course, both Mohammad Yamin and Sukarno had referred to the necessity of incorporating these two states into Indonesia.¹⁴⁶ Mohammad Hatta, later the Vice-President of the Indonesian Republic, was opposed to the “imperialist” content of Yamin’s thesis and described it as “a most dangerous view”. He observed: “Let us live within our own country. Let us not encourage our youth towards imperialism.”¹⁴⁷

It is interesting to note that in the process of evolution of Guided Democracy, the Indonesian elite group which shared Mohammad Hatta’s views was gradually eliminated from politics.¹⁴⁸ Thus the leadership which succeeded in restoring West Irian to the Republic in August 1962, was the same as shared Yamin’s conception of Indonesia’s place in the Malay world.

Following the transfer of sovereignty in December 1949, however, the Indonesian leaders started emphasizing that the Republic of Indonesia was heir only to the territories previously under Dutch colonialism. It was obviously in view of the exigencies of the struggle for restoration of West Irian. Once the question of West Irian was resolved to the satisfaction of the Indonesians, the elite with Sukarno at the top tended to switch over to Yamin’s concept of a Greater Indonesia. Indonesia’s reactions to Brunei rebellion in December 1962, its full moral and political support for A.M. Azahari’s Government of North Kalimantan, and its subsequent anti-Malaysia policy should be seen against this background.

Apart from the enormous political prestige flowing from the return of West Irian to the Republic, what sharpened Indonesia’s

145 Quoted in Brackman, n. 140, p. 114, Kotabaru was the Indonesian name for Hollandia, the capital of Dutch New Guinea (West Irian). After the restoration of West Irian to Indonesia, the Government of the Republic of Indonesia renamed it Sukarnapura. Djaya Pura is the latest name of this city.

146 See the Government of Malaysia publication, *Indonesian Intentions Towards Malaysia* (Kuala Lumpur, 1964), pp. 1-2.

147 Ibid. p. 3.

148 The process started with Mohammad Hatta’s exit from the Government in December 1956. He resigned from Vice-Presidency due to differences with President Sukarno’s policy and especially because of Sukarno’s tendency to disregard democratic methods and constitutional procedures. Interview with Mohammad Hatta, Djakarta, October 15, 1969.

tendency to establish its role as a major Power in the region was its massive arms build-up with the help of the Soviet Union. By the end of 1960, Indonesia had received from the Soviet Union two modern destroyers, several torpedo boats, and two submarines, as well as 60 MIG fighters and 20 Ilyushin twin-jet bombers. In addition, it concluded an agreement with that country in January 1961 for the supply of mostly high-calibre arms worth (US) \$400 million. According to General Nasution, Indonesia's Minister of Defence and Security, who concluded the agreement on behalf of his Government during his visit to the Soviet Union in January 1961, this would double the size of Indonesia's armoury¹⁴⁹. The restoration of West Irian and this massive arms build-up prompted the Indonesian leaders to assert their ambition for a sphere of influence in the Malay world in South-East Asia. This meant pursuance of a policy of limited hostilities against Malaysia, a policy of confrontation short of war, and to keep open various options which satisfied Indonesia's regional ambitions.

Reactions in India

It is not certain how far the Government of India realized these domestic pulls and pressures tilting Indonesia towards a policy of confrontation with the proposed Malaysian federation. In fact, in October 1962, when a broad consensus against the Malaysian scheme was emerging in Indonesia, India was preoccupied with the problems arising from the Chinese invasion on its northern borders. This restricted its initiatives concerning developments in South-East Asia to a certain extent.

Besides, India sensed Indonesia's growing hostility towards the proposed federation of Malaysia at this stage. It, therefore, did not deem it desirable to make any comment on the question. Any open and direct support for the scheme of Malaysia on its part would have only strengthened the anti-Indian feeling which had erupted in Indonesia during the Fourth Asian Games held in Djakarta in September 1962. Moreover, China which was anxious to woo Indonesia into an anti-India combination (in this part of Asia) had already declared its vocal moral support for the Indonesian policy of confrontation with Malaysia. It would have found in India's open support for Malaysia a convenient handle for tarnishing India's image further in Indonesia.

¹⁴⁹ Leslie H. Palmier, n. 12, p. 130.

This did not, however, mean that India totally ignored the issue. A month after Subandrio's announcement of a policy of confrontation with Malaysia, Prime Minister Nehru explained why India had welcomed the Malaysia proposal. In line with India's record of opposition to colonialism, he said, India regarded the freedom of the British colonies as "the first thing". In a statement in the Lok Sabha on February 22, 1963, Nehru observed: "The major thing it seemed to us, was that the colonies should cease to be colonies; the rest, it was for them to decide."¹⁵⁰ This was in accord with India's policy towards the region both before and since independence. The major components of this policy were elimination of colonialism, strengthening of nationalism and independence, and promotion of bilateral and/or multilateral co-operation and of friendship, peace and stability.

No doubt India's efforts to promote trade and economic relations with the countries of the region had only been marginal. This is evident from India's volume of trade with South-East Asia. Between 1950-51 and 1962-63, India's trade with the region ranged between 3 per cent and 9 per cent of its total world trade, 9.7 per cent being the highest registered in 1956-57.¹⁵¹ This reflected India's own limitations and lack of capacity to compete with the technologically and industrially advanced countries, which proved better

150 Government of India, Lok Sabha, *Debates*, series 3, vol. 13, session 4 of 1963, February 22, 1963, col. 738.

151 For the fourteen years since 1950-51, India's trade with South-East Asia constituted 9.3, 6.5, 7.1, 7.5, 9.2, 5.3, 9.7, 4.6, 6.7, 5.3, 3.9, 3.9, 3.2, and 3.6 per cent of its total world trade. These percentages have been worked out on the basis of figures taken from several Indian official sources such as Government of India *The Journal of Industry and Trade* (New Delhi, Ministry of Commerce and Industry) vol. 7, no. 7, July 1957, and vol. 13, no. 6, June 1963, pp. 1192-3, and vol. 13, no. 6, June 1963, pp. 1112-3; Government of India *Accounts Relating to the Foreign Sea and Air-borne Trade and Navigation of India* (Calcutta, Department of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics), March 1952, March 1953, March 1954, March 1955 and March 1956; Government of India, *India: A Reference Annual* (New Delhi, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting), issues for the years 1960, 1961, and 1963, p. 334, 333 and 291 respectively; and Government of India, *Brochure of Foreign Trade Statistics of India: Third Five Year Plan* (New Delhi, Directorate of Research and Statistics, Office of the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, 1967). Figures for the first seven years represent the import and export trade of Indonesia, Burma, Malaya and Singapore and Thailand. Figures for the remaining seven years include the import and export trade between the Philippines and India as well.

sources of aid and trade to the states of South-East Asia. India wanted to gain time to reach the stage of self-sustained growth in economy and industry, thus increasing its capacity to compete with those at a higher stage of development. In fact, Nehru's policy of non-alignment and of a "peace area" in South-East Asia was suited to serve, among other things, these ends. In the meantime, India desired to go ahead with its policy of friendship, peace and stability in the region.

In pursuance of this policy India welcomed the Indonesian-Dutch Agreement on West Irian in August 1962. In a statement in the Rajya Sabha on August 22, 1962, Prime Minister Nehru expressed his satisfaction over the removal of "one source of conflict in South-East Asia". He also referred to the recent settlement in Laos, said that it augured well "for the peace of South-East Asia", and declared that "we are particularly happy not only because of our intimate contacts with the countries concerned but also because, in a sense, we are part of South-East Asia, and we earnestly hope that there will be peace there."¹⁵²

Again, in May 1963, after Indonesia started a policy of confrontation with Malaysia, Nehru spoke on India's approach to the region. In his address to the members of the Executive Board of the Organization of Asian News Agencies in New Delhi on May 15, 1963, he underlined India's objectives in the region thus: "We want peace and progress in South-East Asia. We are friends of Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines and we hope that they will come to an agreement among themselves." He also emphasized that India was not prepared to get "entangled" in this issue because "we have enough problems of our own."¹⁵³

Indonesia, the "Maphilindo" Scheme and the Attitude of India

In the following weeks certain developments encouraged the belief that Indonesia might agree to end its confrontation policy with Malaysia. In a joint statement issued in Tokyo on June 1, 1963, President Sukarno and Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman agreed to end "acrimonious attacks and disparaging references to each other" and "reaffirmed their faith in the Treaty of Friendship

152 Government of India, *Foreign Affairs Record* (New Delhi, Ministry of External Affairs), vol. 8, no. 8, August 1962, p. 163.

153 *The Statesman* (New Delhi), May 16, 1963. Those present included the Filipinos, the Indonesians and the Japanese.

between Indonesia and Malaya in 1959.”¹⁵⁴ Subsequently, this led to a Foreign Ministers’ meeting and a summit-level meeting of the leaders of the three Malay states—viz., Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines—in Manila. These meetings produced three documents—the Manila Accord, the Manila Declaration, and the Joint Statement.

Some of the stipulations contained in these documents showed a willingness on the part of the three countries to “share a primary responsibility for the maintenance of the stability and security of the area from subversion in any form or manifestation”. They agreed to take “initial steps towards the establishment of Maphilindo by holding frequent and regular consultations at all levels to be known as *Musjawarah* (Consultation) Maphilindo.”¹⁵⁵ The Manila Accord also contained assurances from Indonesia and the Philippines that “they would welcome the formation of Malaysia provided the support of the people of the Borneo territories is ascertained by an independent and impartial authority, the Secretary-General of the United Nations or his representative.”¹⁵⁶

The Maphilindo proposal as initiated by President Macapagal of the Philippines and agreed to at the meeting of the three Foreign Ministers concerned in Manila in June 1963 was based on the principle of common “ties of race and culture”. It envisaged “the grouping of the three nations of Malay origin (Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines) working together in closest harmony but without surrendering any portion of their sovereignty.”¹⁵⁷ Agreement on this proposal had certain important implications. The Maphilindo scheme provided for a regional framework in which Indonesia, the largest and biggest of the three partners, would be able to play a dominant role. At any rate that was how President Sukarno interpreted it.¹⁵⁸ Besides, the Maphilindo scheme was conceived to be both anti-Chinese and anti-Communist. It is quite interesting that in signing the Manila documents President Sukarno ignored the domestic pressures opposed to the idea of Maphilindo. This showed his willingness to resist Communist

154 *Hindustan Times*, June 2, 1963.

155 For texts of the Manila Accord and the Manila Declaration see *Why Indonesia Opposes British Made “Malaysia”*, n. 129, pp. 121-24 and 128-9 respectively.

156 *Ibid.*, p. 123.

157 *Ibid.*, p. 122.

158 See Sukarno’s views as cited in Brackman, n. 140, p. 187.

pressures if a suitable framework for Indonesia's role in the region was provided for.

As a country interested in the promotion of friendship, peace and stability in the region, India was expected to welcome the Manila agreements. It, however, chose to maintain silence. This was perhaps due to Indonesia's growing relations with China, increasing pressures of the PKI on the Government and President Sukarno's unpredictability. It was difficult to tell how long Sukarno would be able, even if willing, to stand up to the continuing anti-Malaysia and anti-Maphilindo stance of China and the PKI.

A section of the Indian Press, however, perceived a lot of "romanticism" in the Philippine President's proposal for Maphilindo. Following the Manila Accord signed in June 1963, S. Nihal Singh of *The Statesman* analysed motivations of the three countries in coming closer to one another. He interpreted it as a new mood of co-operation in South-East Asia. According to him, Indonesia viewed the Maphilindo scheme as an instrument for checkmating Chinese aggressive expansionism.¹⁵⁹ Later the same correspondent hailed the Manila agreements as marking a new era in the history of Asia, and said that the Maphilindo scheme might thwart Chinese aims in the region. He was quite sure that the "new concept of the coming together of the Malay race will work to the disadvantage of the Chinese." He was consequently convinced that it was in the interest of India to encourage this scheme. He also believed that from the Indian point of view the "most encouraging aspect of the agreement" was "the emphasis placed on the right of three countries to maintain their national identity."¹⁶⁰ This was something that India should be fully satisfied to note.

PKI's Opposition to Maphilindo

The Manila agreements, which aroused hopes of a peaceful solution of the Malaysia dispute and of peace and stability within the framework of the Maphilindo scheme, lost their appeal in a period of six weeks from the day they were signed. Major opposition to the Maphilindo scheme in Indonesia came from the PKI. Speaking at the Bandung Military Academy on June 29, 1963, Chairman

159 S. Nihal Singh, "A New Mood of Co-operation in South-East Asia : Manila Conference as Herald of Three-Nation Unity", *The Statesman* (New Delhi), July 4, 1963.

160 S. Nihal Singh, "New Era in the History of Asia : Three Nation Rap-prochement May thwart Chinese Aims" *Ibid.*, August 19, 1963.

Aidit referred to the fear in "some people in Indonesia" that "Maphilindo (Indonesia, Malaya, and the Philippines) would become a son of SEATO or a nephew of ASA (Association of South-East Asia)". He said that this fear was reasonable because, among the three partners of the Maphilindo scheme, "Malaya adheres completely to Britain's policy, and another, the Philippines, is well known as a member of SEATO."¹⁶¹

Later, in his Political Report to the Seventh Central Committee of the Party in December 1963, Aidit stressed that the Manila Conference of three Malay leaders—Sukarno, Macapagal and the Tunku—took place "without the wishes" and approval of the PKI. He also gave two reasons for his party's opposition to Maphilindo: (i) the racial overtones of the scheme, and (ii) differences in the domestic and foreign policies of the three countries concerned—Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines.¹⁶²

Besides the opposition of the PKI three things queered the pitch for the acceptance of the Maphilindo scheme in Indonesia. These were (i) difficulties over the number of Indonesian and Filipino observers to be attached to the U.N. Mission instituted to ascertain the wishes of the people of Sabah and Sarawak, (ii) the British delay in granting visas to them, and (iii) Tunku Abdul Rahman's "not very diplomatic" announcement that Malaysia would be inaugurated on September 16, 1963, well before the U.N. Investigation team had completed ascertainment of wishes of the people of the British North Borneo territories and made its report known.¹⁶³

Inauguration of Malaysia

As the date of inauguration of Malaysia drew nearer, the strong reactions of the Government of Indonesia to these developments and the PKI's continuing anti-Malaysia and anti-Maphilindo posture carried anti-Malaysia sentiments in Indonesia to new heights. On September 16, 1963, when Malaysia was inaugurated, there were huge anti-Malaysian and anti-British demonstrations everywhere in

161 *Peking Review*, vol. 6, no. 28, July 12, 1963, p. 16. See also *Harian Rakjat*, July 1, 1963.

162 D.N. Aidit, *Set Afire the Banteng Spirit: Ever Forward, No Retreat* (Political Report to the Second Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of Indonesia, Djakarta, 23-26 December, 1963 (Peking, 1964), p. 33.

163 *Why Indonesia Opposes British Made 'Malaysia'*, n. 129, p. 39. See also Pushpesh Pant, "The Making of Malaysia" (Thesis, Ph. D., Indian School of International Studies, New Delhi, 1970), p. 163.

Indonesia. The British Embassy in Djakarta was stormed, and the Malaysian and British Consulates in Medan (North Sumatra) were sacked.¹⁶⁴

A Government statement issued in Djakarta the next day said that it "greatly deplores" these happenings and assured action against "those guilty". It, however, added that the Government "appreciates the militant attitude of various groups of our society and the fact that our people have shown their indignation about the formation of Malaysia which is not in accordance with the Manila Summit Conference."¹⁶⁵ On September 21, 1963, Sukarno announced rupture of trade and economic relations with Malaysia.¹⁶⁶ It was exactly eight months earlier on January 20, 1963, that Subandrio had announced a policy of confrontation against the Malaysia project. It showed that either Sukarno was not seriously interested in the Maphilindo scheme and only wanted to use it to delay inauguration of Malaysia or he was no longer capable of resisting Communist pressures at home in favour of continuing the anti-Malaysia policy.

Government and Press Reactions in India

India no doubt shared the Indonesian view that the Federation of Malaysia should come about after the ascertainment of the wishes of the peoples of the territories concerned.¹⁶⁷ The report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant, on September 14, 1963, fulfilled this requirement. Nehru told the Lok Sabha on September 16, 1963, that "we accept the report of the U.N.", and he also wished Malaysia "a good start."¹⁶⁸

India also welcomed the inauguration of Malaysia on September 16, 1963. In an official message to H.M. The Yang Di-Pertuan Agong of Malaysia, the President of India conveyed "to the Government and people of Malaysia the most cordial congratulations of the Government and the people of India" and "sincere good wishes for the prosperity and well-being of the new state and for

164 *The Statesman* (New Delhi), September 17, 1963.

165 *Ibid.*, September 18, 1963.

166 *Ibid.*, September 22, 1963.

167 See Nehru's statement in the Lok Sabha on February 22, 1963. Nehru put emphasis on freedom of British colonies in South-East Asia and said that "the rest, it was for them to decide." Government of India, Lok Sabha, *Debates*, series 3, vol. 13, session 4 of 1963, February 22, 1963, col. 738.

168 Government of India, Lok Sabha, *Debates*, series 3, vol. 21, session 5 of 1963, September 16, 1963, col. 6280.

the welfare and advancement of the Malaysian people.” Prime Minister Nehru wrote to the Prime Minister of Malaysia, Tunku Abdul Rahman, to give him his “warm felicitations and greetings on the happy occasion of the inauguration of the Federation of Malaysia.”¹⁶⁹ Lakshmi Menon, Minister of State for External Affairs, participated in the celebrations on the occasion as India’s representative.¹⁷⁰

India expected that Indonesia too would accept the U.N. Enquiry Report and recognize the new federation.¹⁷¹ However, the reverse happened. There were anti-Malaysia and anti-British disturbances in Djakarta. The Indian Ambassador to Indonesia, Apa B. Pant, played an important role in sheltering the former Malayan Ambassador in his house for a night. He also gave moral support to the British diplomatic staff in their hour of difficulty.¹⁷²

In line with the Government attitude, the Indian Press also hailed the inauguration of Malaysia. The *Hindu* welcomed the “birth of the multiracial Federation of Malaysia” as “a landmark in the history of post-war Asia”.¹⁷³ There were numerous articles and editorials in the various national dailies in India explaining why India should welcome the new federation. In an article contributed to the *Indian Express*, a day before the inauguration ceremony, one Aruna Mukerji described “September 16” as “a red letter day in the history of Asia not only because it will witness the birth of a new nation, Malaysia, after prolonged birth-pangs but will also (sic) see the virtual end of colonialism on that continent.” According to Mukerji, the Malaysia plan was a “bold plan”. “India has from the beginning welcomed the formation of this new nation”, because it “promises to be a bulwark against communism.”¹⁷⁴

The view that India should welcome Malaysia because it promises to checkmate Communism as well as Chinese influence in

169 *The Statesman* (New Delhi), September 16, 1963.

170 Lakshmi Menon reached Kuala Lumpur on September 15, 1963. See *The Hindu*, September 21, 1963.

171 Inviting a reference to Manila Accord of August 1963, Vijayalakshmi Pandit said that India had expected both Indonesia and the Philippines to recognize Malaysia. However, contrary to that expectation, it found that both of them had gone back on their word. See *The Statesman* (New Delhi), September 20, 1963.

172 *Ibid.*, September 25, 1963.

173 “Malaysia” (editorial), *The Hindu*, September 18, 1963.

174 Aruna Mukerji, “Malaysia: Bulwark against Communism in Asia”, *Indian Express* (New Delhi), September 15, 1963.

the region was shared by all Indian dailies. The *Hindustan Times* described Malaysia as "a potential bulwark against a common threat, namely, that posed by Communist China's expansionism."¹⁷⁵ The *Indian Express* entertained the hope that Malaysia was "going to be a sound bastion against the new yellow peril that is Peking." It took note of the anti-Peking and anti-Communist posture of the Malaysian leadership and said that "we in India are happy to wish godspeed to Malaysia."¹⁷⁶

The Indian Press also took serious note of the reaction of the Indonesians to the inauguration of Malaysia. *The Statesman* criticized Indonesia for its refusal "to acknowledge Malaysia after having agreed to abide by the findings of the U.N. mission to Sarawak and North Borneo". It observed that the "Indonesian Government has done its reputation much harm, and what is perhaps more important, put a spoke in the wheel of Maphilindo, the larger confederation embracing Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia."¹⁷⁷ The *Times of India* described Indonesia's decision to withhold recognition of Malaysia as one based on "wholly specious" arguments. It pointed out how the U.N. fact-finding team had taken care to ascertain the wishes of the people of the North Borneo territories "in accordance with the Manila Agreement" and added: "There is not the slightest reason to question its conclusion that the majority of the people fully and voluntarily supported the federation scheme." At the same time the paper deplored the Tunku's action in announcing the decision to bring Malaysia into being on September 16, 1963, without waiting for the publication of the U.N. team's findings. It felt that he must have done so with the aid and abetment of the British.¹⁷⁸ Commenting on the anti-British and anti-Malaysia mob excesses in Djakarta, *The Statesman* observed: "It is difficult not to believe that in Djakarta there was official collusion with the mob."¹⁷⁹

India's welcome to Malaysia implied its agreement with the major objective behind the formation of the new federation, viz., to

175 "Welcome" (editorial), *Hindustan Times*, September 16, 1963.

176 "Birth of a Nation" (editorial), *Indian Express*, September 17, 1963.

177 "Malaysia" (editorial), *The Statesman* (New Delhi), September 17, 1963.

178 "Malaysia" (editorial), *Times of India*, September 17, 1963. Also see editorial "Malaysia", *The Hindu*, September 17, 1963; "Malaysian Clouds", *Hindustan Times*, September 19, 1963; and "Attacking Embassies", *The Statesman*, September 21, 1963.

179 "Attacking Embassies" (editorial), *The Statesman* (New Delhi), September 21, 1963.

checkmate both the Chinese and Communist influence in the region. Indonesia's initially indifferent attitude towards the Malaysia plan and its readiness to sign the Manila agreements later had encouraged the Indians to believe that it would welcome the formation of Malaysia. However, as noted earlier, the reverse happened. By welcoming Malaysia, India showed that it did not believe Indonesia's allegation that the ascertainment of the wishes of the people of Sabah and Sarawak was not proper. In fact it accepted the verdict of the U.N. Secretary-General that the elections preceding the formation of the new federation were free and indicative of the people's desire to come together in a common political structure. In the days that followed, India made its position in this regard clearer still. In her speech to the U.N. General Assembly on October 11, 1963, Vijayalakshmi Pandit referred to Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak and extended India's "warm welcome" to the three colonial territories in South-East Asia "which have emerged into independence". She congratulated U Thant for having "carried out...the task of ascertaining the wishes of the people" of the North Borneo territories and observed: "After the attainment of independence, the three territories have freely chosen to join with Malaya to establish the Federation of Malaysia." She also expressed the hope that "differences of opinion now existing on this matter will be relaxed and resolved in an amiable fashion by those directly concerned."¹⁸⁰

Attitude of the PKI

Following the formation of Malaysia in September 1963, the differences between India and Indonesia over this issue got further sharpened. All the political forces and factors were seemingly arriving at a consensus with the PKI in its continued opposition to Malaysia. The PKI, in fact, continued to be in the forefront of the Indonesian campaign against Malaysia. This was so even when the Government of Indonesia was showing encouraging response to efforts in the direction of a negotiated settlement of the problem. We have already surveyed the PKI's opposition to the Manila agreements of August 1963 and to the Maphilindo scheme. Later in January 1964, when Robert Kennedy, U.S. Attorney General and Special Representative of President Lyndon B. Johnson, visited Indonesia to

180 GAOR, session 18, plen. mtg., 1239, vol. 1, October 11, 1963, p. 10. See also H.R. Vohra's dispatch 'Indonesia's Stand Against Malaysia: Unsympathetic Response in United Nations', *Times of India* (New Delhi), October 15, 1963.

help resolve the deadlock over the question of Malaysia, Chairman Aidit of the PKI said that "we need not be afraid of U.S. imperialist threat" and that "it is our obligation to avoid efforts which have the nature of compromise." "Let us", he added, "continue to crush 'Malaysia' and to drive out the Seventh Fleet from the Indonesian Ocean." He asserted: "Our people are fully determined to crush 'Malaysia' completely".¹⁸¹

A week later when, as a result of his talks with Robert Kennedy, President Sukarno issued a ceasefire order effective from January 25, 1964, the PKI stepped up its propaganda against Malaysia.¹⁸² It also came out unsparingly against India, its leadership, and its policy of non-alignment. It charged that under Nehru's leadership India had become "the U.S. watch-dog in Asia and a fifth column within the ranks of the Asian-African countries".¹⁸³ This showed how far the PKI had fallen in line with China's posture of hostility to India. Its open anti-Indian tirades built up much ill-will in Indonesia towards India.

India's Later Reactions

India was at this stage engaged in a serious effort at various levels to promote the prospects of a second Belgrade-type conference of non-aligned states. That it should be so engaged was quite understandable; for both China and Pakistan, the two countries openly hostile to India had joined Indonesia in intense diplomatic activity at the highest level to hold a second Bandung-type Asian-African conference. As a consequence, both in official circles and in the Press in India, the issue of Malaysia attracted much less attention than the efforts that were being made by India and Indonesia in the direction of holding such conferences.

At the preparatory meeting of the second Asian and African conference in Djakarta in April 1964 India found a good opportunity

181 *Harian Rakjat*, January 17, 1964. Taking it as a green light, SOBSI, the labour wing of the PKI, took over control of 16 British-owned tea, rubber and coffee plantations. It also demanded that all British interests in Indonesia should be seized. Interestingly, all these actions were contrary to Government instructions. See Alex Josey, "Aidit and Malaysia", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, vol. 43, no. 8, February 20, 1964, pp. 421-2.

182 For Aidit's criticism of U.S. efforts in the direction of a peaceful settlement of the Malaysia question, see *Summary of World Broadcasts* (SWB), pt. 3, FE/1464/A3/8, January 28, 1964.

183 Aidit, n. 162.

to manifest its open moral and political support for Malaysia when the question of Malaysia's representation at the main conference was being debated. Swaran Singh, the leader of the Indian delegation, took the initiative to propose, among others, an invitation to Malaysia. The proposal was contained in a working paper submitted to the preparatory meeting which was entitled "Composition of the Second Asian-African Conference".¹⁸⁴ Swaran Singh justified Malaysia's participation on three grounds, viz., Malaysia's Asian situation, its membership of the United Nations, and its recognition by over a hundred countries.¹⁸⁵ He expected that, on the basis of these justifications, many Asian and African countries would support his proposal.¹⁸⁶

This proposal had serious implications for India as well as for Indonesia and Pakistan. India must have foreseen that in view of Indonesia's growing commitment to a "Ganjang (Crush) Malaysia" policy, its open support for the participation of Malaysia would exacerbate anti-Indian sentiment in Indonesia and bring upon it the charge of aiding and abetting British colonialism in the region. Nevertheless, it believed that the advantages accruing from such a policy would outweigh the disadvantages. The political situation in Indonesia indicated that even if India stopped pursuing a pro-Malaysian policy, it would make little difference.

Apart from strengthening Indian-Malaysian relations, this policy would force Pakistan to discard its ambiguous attitude towards *Indonesia's anti-Malaysia* policy and come out openly either in favour of India's proposal and incur Indonesia's displeasure, or against India's proposal and risk loss of friendship with Malaysia. Pakistan was making an all-out effort at this stage to seek Indonesia's categorical support for itself on the Kashmir question and to woo it into an anti-Indian combination on the continent. Any negative attitude on its part to the Indian proposal might lead to hard feelings against it among the elite in Malaysia, and this would be a decisive diplomatic gain for India.

184 *Proceedings of the Meeting of Ministers in Preparation of the Second African-Asian Conference held in Djakarta, Indonesia, April 10-15, 1964* (Djakarta, 1964), p. 71.

185 *Ibid.*, p. 41.

186 *Ibid.* Swaran Singh noted that none except China rejected the Indian proposal on Malaysia outright. The Indonesian delegate, as expected, expressed his reservation on account of his Government's anti-Malaysia policy. *Ibid.*, p. 34.

The Indian delegate, therefore, persistently called for sending an invitation to Malaysia. Finding it difficult to resolve the deadlock, the preparatory meeting decided by a consensus to discuss the matter at a sub-committee level. The sub-committee finally decided to postpone the problem, thus leaving an important issue unresolved. Although India did not succeed in securing an invitation for Malaysia, with the active help of Ceylon it did succeed in barring Indonesia from securing an invitation for the Government of the Unitary State of North Kalimantan even as an observer.¹⁸⁷ Lest it should put India's bona fides as regards the second Asian-African conference in doubt, Swaran Singh accepted the draft submitted by the sub-committee suggesting postponement of the question of invitation to Malaysia.¹⁸⁸ At the same time he insisted that India's acceptance of Malaysia's full entitlement to be invited to the main conference should be placed on record.¹⁸⁹

It would be worth noticing here that, at least so far as India was concerned, Swaran Singh's proposal regarding Malaysia's representation at the second Afro-Asian conference tended to link the Malaysia issue with the very prospects of the conference coming off at all. That is to say either Indonesia would agree to Malaysia's participation in the conference as proposed by India, or the conference would not be held.

In the months following the preparatory meeting, India also tended to ignore the anti-Indian sentiment growing in Indonesia as a result of its pro-Malaysia policy. This was evident from its offers of moral and diplomatic support for Malaysia on various occasions. On July 15, 1964, it joined other states of the Commonwealth in expressing "satisfaction at the establishment of Malaysia", as also in assuring "the Prime Minister of Malaysia" of its "sympathy and support in his efforts to preserve the sovereign independence and integrity of his country, and to promote a peaceful and honourable settlement of current differences between Malaysia and neighbour-

187 Ibid., pp. 41-43.

188 Ibid., p. 88. The sub-committee draft as decided upon by the preparatory meeting noted the proposal to extend an invitation to Malaysia. It also expressed the hope "that the obstacles [which prevented reaching a consensus on the invitation would be eliminated. In this case, an invitation should be extended as soon as possible. Some countries that recognized Malaysia stated their position that Malaysia was fully entitled to an invitation and should be invited."

189 Ibid., p. 47.

ing countries.”¹⁹⁰ Later it made efforts to exclude the Malaysia issue from discussions at the second Conference of Non-Aligned States in Cairo in October 1964.¹⁹¹

As expected, this open moral and political support for Malaysia and insistence on Malaysia's representation at the second Asian-African conference led to increasing bitterness in Indonesia's attitude towards India.¹⁹² Although India tended to ignore Indonesian susceptibilities on the Malaysia question, it was not unaware of the PKI's growing pressures on the Indonesian leaders against seeking a peaceful solution of the question. There were suggestions in a section of the Indian Press that the PKI was “crying for continuation of the confrontation against Malaysia”.¹⁹³ S. Nihal Singh of *The Statesman* wrote that the PKI was forcing Sukarno's hands against Malaysia and that, but for the PKI, a peaceful settlement of the Malaysia dispute should be possible.¹⁹⁴

In fact, right from the beginning India was in favour of a peaceful settlement of the dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia. It envisaged for itself a neutral role in the matter. However, in view of its “good relations with Malaysia”, it felt that it “would be unfortunate if the sovereignty of Malaysia is disturbed by use of force.”¹⁹⁵ Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri told the Lok Sabha on September 18, 1964, that India had “always supported the idea of Indonesia and Malaysia trying to settle matters between themselves.” He also agreed to the suggestion made a day earlier by former Defence Minister, Krishna Menon, that “the non-aligned nations’

190 See “Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference : Final Communique”, Appendix III, India, Ministry of External Affairs, *Annual Report 1964-65*, (New Delhi, 1965), pp. 127-8.

191 See Swaran Singh's remarks in a statement on October 11, 1964, in the *Hindustan Times* of October 12, 1964. He had disclosed that India had been successful in keeping the Malaysia question out of the Conference.

192 This is obvious from the strongly condemnatory language used against India in the *Indonesian Herald*, December 23 and 30, 1964.

193 “Reds Preparing to Seize Power in Indonesia” South-East Asia (Correspondent), *The Hindu*, November 30, 1964.

194 S. Nihal Singh, “Soekarno's Hand Being Forced by Communists : Rapprochement with Malaysia otherwise Not Impossible”, *The Statesman* (New Delhi), March 23, 1965.

195 India wanted the dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia to be “amicably settled”. It, therefore, thought it better to refrain “from taking sides”. See Government of India, Lok Sabha, *Debates*, [series 3, vol. 21, session 5 of 1963, September 16, 1963, col. 6280. Also Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, *Annual Report (1964-65)*, p. 48.

Conference should move in this matter and try to settle these differences.”¹⁹⁶

After the second Conference of Non-Aligned States, India also took the initiative in bringing about a *rapprochement* between Indonesia and Malaysia. In a statement in the Lok Sabha on November 25, 1964, External Affairs Minister, Swaran Singh, revealed India's continued efforts made in this direction, including those made by his delegation at the second Conference of Non-Aligned States. Although he was sorry to state that despite efforts by various countries the situation had “not very much improved”, he said he was still hopeful of a solution through Indian initiative. He also disclosed that he had received invitations from both Malaysia and Indonesia, and said that “it is my intention to go into that part of this world and try to do something.”¹⁹⁷

However meaningful, India's efforts in the direction of a peaceful solution of the Malaysia dispute seemed to be misplaced. Within a month and a half of Swaran Singh's statement in the Lok Sabha, there was a sudden burst of anti-Indian sentiment in the Indonesian Press. It coincided with Malaysia's success in getting a non-permanent seat in the UN Security Council. This reaction might have been caused by Indonesian ire at India's pro-Malaysia attitude towards the Malaysian candidature for the membership of the Security Council.

On December 31, 1964, President Sukarno had repeatedly asked newsmen to note that “Indonesia will definitely quit the United Nations if Malaysia becomes a Security Council member.”¹⁹⁸ Finding his warning ignored, he carried out his threat of withdrawal from the world body on January 7, 1965. Explaining his

196 Government of India, Lok Sabha, *Debates*, series 3, vol. 33, session 9 of 1964, September 18, 1964, cols. 2547-48. See also *The Hindu*, September 22, 1964. During his speech in the Lok Sabha on September 17, 1964, Krishna Menon had expressed his “hope” that “it will be possible for the Government of India to promote by their diplomatic efforts and the good offices of countries like Ethiopia, the United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia and some others, at Cairo to establish something like a good offices' committee to step in the differences between Indonesia and Malaysia.” He thought it could possibly be done through the Non-Aligned Conference “in the usual procedure of the United Nations to set up some good offices' organization to bring down the tension as between these people.” See *Ibid.*, September 17, 1964, col. 2296.

197 *Ibid.*, series 3, vol. 35, session 10 of 1964, November 25, 1964, cols. 1685-6.

198 *Guardian* (Rangoon), January 2, 1965.

action in an interview in Tokyo later, Sukarno remarked : "We cannot bear the fact that Malaysia was elected a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council. We cannot remain an idle spectator to the fact that Malaysia, which, as far as we are concerned, does not exist, sits in the UN Security Council."¹⁹⁹

In view of the strong anti-Malaysia posture of the Indonesian leaders, it was quite natural to expect that India would face stiff Indonesian hostility on account of its pro-Malaysia stance. All the same India made no secret of its unhappiness over the extreme step taken by Indonesia in quitting the United Nations. On January 10, 1965, Swaran Singh appealed to Indonesia to reconsider its decision to withdraw. He also appealed to all the countries to persuade Indonesia not to leave the United Nations. He referred to the tension already built up in South-East Asia over the dispute in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, and urged that efforts should be made for a peaceful settlement of all these disputes, including the dispute between Malaysia and Indonesia. He added that India too would do its best in the matter.²⁰⁰

The Indian Press immediately took note of Indonesia's withdrawal from the United Nations. S. Nihal Singh of *The Statesman* described Indonesia's withdrawal as a "retrograde step" which would have the effect of pulling "Djakarta closer to Peking's policies". He interpreted it as "an indication of how central the "Crush Malaysia' theme" was to Indonesia's policy towards the region. Indonesia's quitting the world body would, according to him, "remove a restraining influence on her (Indonesia's) actions *vis-a-vis* Malaysia" and "only bring further comfort" to the PKI, "which is witnessing an orientation of the country's foreign policy more in line with its own thinking." Furthermore, it would "serve to isolate it (Indonesia) from the mainstream of world opinion."²⁰¹ In an editorial, *The Hindu* described Sukarno's decision as "regrettable". It also reminded Indonesia of its debt to the United Nations Security Council. It was because of the "intervention" of the Security Council, it wrote, that Indonesia had gained independence. Again, it was due to the good offices of the Security Council that Indonesia had been able to secure West Irian. The Indian daily went on to survey Indonesia's actions of the last two years and noted how Sukarno had

199 Ibid., January 10, 1965.

200 *The Hindu*, January 11, 1965. Swaran Singh made these observations in the course of his speech at the plenary session of the Congress Party at Durgapur, West Bengal.

201 *The Statesman* (New Delhi), January 3, 1965.

“promptly gone back on his word and had started his ‘confrontation’ policy”. It also pointed out how except for some Communist countries, hardly any country in the world had responded favourably to Indonesia’s decision to walk out of the world body and also how there was general sympathy for Malaysia in the world community. Summing up, it observed that withdrawal from the United Nations could “only further isolate Indonesia from the stream of world opinion.”²⁰² Rakshat Puri of the *Hindustan Times* saw in the close consultations between Foreign Minister Subandrio and the Chinese Ambassador in Djakarta, following announcement of withdrawal, an indication that the “present informal Peking-Jakarta axis may develop into a regular military arrangement between the two Governments.”²⁰³

The Hindu attempted a few days later to correlate Indonesia’s internal political situation to its foreign policy goals. It noted how China, which had offered strong support to Indonesia in connexion with the second Afro-Asian conference had also “characterized the (Indonesian) withdrawal from the U.N. as correct revolutionary action.” It also noted how the Indonesians had seemingly “made themselves politically dependent on Peking and militarily dependent on Moscow which furnishes most of their war material.” It further observed how Sukarno was “yielding ground to the Communist Party led by Dr. Aidit, a development not likely to be welcomed by his own Nationalist Party or the Army leaders.” In the process of realizing his Asian-African objectives, Sukarno is likely to find that he will have to play second fiddle to China.”²⁰⁴

This showed an awareness in India that Indonesia’s anti-Malaysia policy, culminating in its withdrawal from the United Nations, was, at least partly, being continued under the direct pressures of the PKI and the indirect pressures of China. These two internal and external factors were egging President Sukarno on to a continuing anti-Malaysia posture. Interestingly, it was precisely these two factors which were responsible for persistently hostile propaganda against India for its attitude of open sympathy and support for Malaysia as well as its lack of enthusiasm for the second Asian-African conference. However, by supporting Malaysia, India earned the sympathies of the ruling elite in that country.

²⁰² “Sukarno’s Latest” (editorial), *The Hindu*, January 5, 1965.

²⁰³ Rakshat Puri, “Regular Peking-Jakarta Military Alliance Likely, *Hindustan Times*, January 11, 1965.

²⁰⁴ “After the Walk Out” (editorial), *The Hindu*, January 14, 1965.

Moreover, India supported Malaysia by way of reciprocation of the forthright moral and political support that Malaysia (then Malaya) had given to India during the Chinese aggression on its northern borders in 1962.²⁰⁵

Nevertheless, keeping in view long-term interest of relations with Indonesia, India attempted to make its pro-Malaysia policy as little provocative to the Indonesian leaders as possible. Although it continued to give moral and political support to Malaysia, it did not say anything against Indonesia. Instead, it only urged for a peaceful solution of the Malaysian-Indonesian dispute bilaterally or through mediation by a third party. On January 12, 1965, Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri told a Press conference in Calcutta : "...we have always said that we do not believe in any confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia. India has recognized the independence and sovereignty of Malaysia and we have always said that the differences between Indonesia and Malaysia should be settled between themselves or through the intervention of a third party." He also expressed his Government's wish "to develop good relations with Indonesia."²⁰⁶

One visible effect of the anti-India feeling manifested by the Indonesian Press about the beginning of 1965 was the postponement of a visit that Swaran Singh had planned to pay to Indonesia and some other South-East Asian countries in January 1965. Although it was reported that the postponement was the result of his pre-occupation with visits to India by a number of foreign dignitaries about this time,²⁰⁷ it might well be related to a realization on the part of India that in the political situation then obtaining in Indonesia such a visit by its External Affairs Minister might not serve the purpose of reconciling differences between Indonesia and Malaysia.

In the months following Indonesia's withdrawal from the United Nations, India continued to pursue its policy of supporting

205 Malaysia (then Malaya) was the most forthright among the Asian and African countries in offering support to India in the context of the Chinese aggression. Commenting on the Chinese attack, Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman had said in New Delhi on October 28, 1962 : "In your fight, you will have many friends and Malaya will be one of the strongest among them. No matter how grave the situation India's cause is right and India must win." *The Statesman* (New Delhi), October 29, 1962.

206 *The Hindu*, January 13, 1965. See also *Times of India* (New Delhi), January 13, 1965.

207 *The Hindu*, January 13, 1965.

Malaysia as well as keeping a posture of neutrality, however, precarious. This was necessary in order to be able to play a mediatory role between Indonesia and Malaysia as and when occasion arose. Replying to questions in the Rajya Sabha on March 9, 1965, the Deputy Minister for External Affairs, Dinesh Singh, said that his Government was aware of the "serious situation" in South-East Asia arising from the "serious dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia." He also expressed his Government's "sincere hope for a peaceful settlement" of the Indonesian-Malaysian differences and stressed the desirability of "peaceful negotiations" between the two parties. He observed : "Government of India continue to watch the situation carefully and will be glad to offer necessary assistance to bring about *rapprochement*, if necessary, at the appropriate time."²⁰⁸ Dinesh Singh also revealed that India had made many efforts to secure a peaceful settlement of this dispute and had kept in touch with both sides. Elucidating his Government's attitude, he stated that it preferred "a peaceful settlement" and that it had every hope "that it will be possible to reach a peaceful solution."²⁰⁹ In answer to a question whether India had done anything to show its identification with Malaysia, he observed : "Indonesia does not recognize Malaysia and has a policy of confrontation with Malaysia. We recognize Malaysia, and it is a friendly country."²¹⁰ About five weeks later, on April 16, 1965, C. Subramaniam, India's Minister for Food and Agriculture and leader of the Indian delegation to the tenth anniversary (*Dasa Warsa*) celebrations of the first Asian-African Conference, told reporters in Singapore that India was prepared to take part, if requested to do so, in any Asian-African Conciliation Commission to solve the Malaysia dispute.²¹¹

During the *Dasa Warsa* celebrations President Sukarno came out with open criticism of India for its pro-Malaysia attitude. This showed how misplaced India's efforts had been in the matter of seeking a peaceful settlement of the dispute between Indonesia and

208 Government of India, Rajya Sabha, *Debates*, vol. 51, no. 15, pt. 1, March 9, 1965, cols 2553-4. See also *Indonesian Herald*, March 12, 1965.

209 Ibid., col., 2554.

210 Ibid., col. 2555.

211 *The Hindu*, April 17, 1965. C. Subramaniam was on his way to Djakarta to attend the tenth anniversary celebrations. The idea of an Asian-African Conciliation Commission had been accepted in principle by Sukarno, Macapagal and Tunku Abdul Rahman during their meeting in Tokyo on June 20, 1964.

Malaysia. India's attitude to the question also allowed an impression to grow in Indonesia that India was exerting its influence on Indonesia in favour of Malaysia. Reporting an interview with the Indonesian Deputy Foreign Minister, Ganis Harsono, B.K. Tiwari, the South-East Asia correspondent of the *Indian Express*, quoted the Indonesian Minister as having commented thus : "We consider India's attitude towards Indonesia, particularly in regard to Malaysia, as unfriendly and unwise.... Why should you come out so openly in support of Malaysia ?" Warning about the consequences, Ganis Harsono observed : "You will have to face the problem with Indonesia. Do not pour oil on troubled waters (sic). Problems between Malaysia and Indonesia can be solved (and will be solved). Why should you hurriedly and prematurely throw your weight (about) ? This we do not understand." The Indonesian Deputy Foreign Minister also advised India either to keep quiet and watch the situation or at the most offer mediation if possible as was done by Thailand", or to adopt a near neutral posture like Pakistan and Ghana, which were also members of the Commonwealth.²¹²

India, it seems, ignored this advice. Between April and June 1965 it continued to insist on Malaysia's representation at the second Asian-African conference. For that purpose it used the forum provided by the meetings of the 15-nation ambassadorial Standing Committee. This provoked Sukarno to condemn India and its leaders for their pro-Malaysia policy.²¹³ It ultimately led to a repetition of anti-India demonstrations in Djakarta and elsewhere in Indonesia on June 23, 1965.²¹⁴ The immediate provocation arose from India's efforts to seek postponement of the second Asian-African conference scheduled to be held in Algiers.

Growing Tensions in Indian-Indonesian Relations

In June 1965 it looked as though the two countries were rapidly sliding towards a point of no return. India's efforts to secure postponement of the second Afro-Asian conference, and its firm adherence to the view that Malaysia (and the Soviet Union) should be invited to the conference, led to a further hardening of the anti-Indian feeling in Indonesia. The Indonesian leaders were

212 *Indian Express*, April 23, 1965.

213 Commenting on India's pro-Malaysia stance, Sukarno accused India of having befriended evil contrary to Gandhism and of having forgotten the meaning of *ahimsa* (non-violence) by wounding Indonesia in the heart. See *Indonesian Herald*, June 12, 1965.

214 *The Statesman* (New Delhi), June 24, 1965.

mortified to find that in spite of all-out support offered by China and by Pakistan, they were unable to salvage the conference. The question of Malaysia's participation in the conference, combined with some other developments such as the *coup* in Algiers, the venue of the conference, about a week before the conference was to be held, had finally led to the postponement of the conference.

It was in this atmosphere of heightened tension in Indian-Indonesian relations that in September 1965 Pakistan chose to strike at India with a view to solving the Kashmir question once for all by force. China's 72-hour ultimatum to India, its threat to open a new front, and Indonesia's open moral and even material support for Pakistan confirmed India's fear that the three countries had formed an anti-Indian combination.

Impact on Bilateral Relations in the Trade, Cultural and Other Fields

The Malaysia issue continued to be a complicating factor in India's relations with Indonesia till the abortive *coup* in Indonesia on October 1, 1965. During the period of four years from September 1963, however, strains in the two countries' political relations came to have an adverse impact on their trade and cultural relations as well. The Indian-Indonesian relations in these fields up to 1961 have already been surveyed. The unfavourable trends emerging in that year got marked in the following years.

Following the "Sondhi Affair" in September 1962, India took initiative to promote and expand trade and economic ties with Indonesia. This was necessary in view of the overall adverse impact the anti-Indian disturbances in Djakarta were expected to have on the two countries' relations in these fields. During his visit to India in connexion with the Colombo proposals regarding the Sino-Indian border dispute in January 1963, Foreign Minister Subandrio was accompanied by an Indonesian trade delegation led by Umarjadi, the Fourth Deputy Foreign Minister in charge of Foreign Economic Relations. This was at a formal invitation sent by the Indian Minister for Foreign Trade, Manubhai Shah, and showed Government of India's eagerness to restore normalcy in bilateral relations.²¹⁵ At the preliminary talks, the two sides led by Umarjadi and Manubhai Shah agreed to conclude a trade agreement for a period of three to five years. The protocol signed in this connexion

215 *The Hindu*, January 26, 1963. It quoted Subandrio to have observed : "In view of the fact that the invitation came from India, I would guess this represents an Indian initiative to re-establish goodwill with South-East Asia's largest country."

was aimed at expansion of bilateral trade and was reported to be in favour of increasing Indonesian exports to India.²¹⁶

Umarjadi revealed in Djakarta on February 7, 1963, that, under the trade expansion programme, the two countries would plan about the volume and range of commodities to be exchanged and set a framework in which they would review each year the flow of trade on a balanced basis. According to him, the two Governments had agreed to exchange technical and scientific information between the industrialists of the two countries. Besides, India had agreed to provide facilities for training Indonesian personnel, to send Indian technicians to Indonesia for this purpose, to help establish industries there and to assist in running and establishing industrial units manufacturing, among other things, diesel, motor and water pump equipment. There was also a discussion about India supplying capital goods to Indonesia on deferred payment basis. The Indonesian side expressed its desire for getting Indian machinery for cement plant, pulp industry, paper factory and other India-made capital goods. Umarjadi further disclosed that during the talks Indonesia had shown keen interest in the establishment of a nickel factory, paper mill, oil refinery and several other units on production-sharing basis. To this Indonesian offer, he added, the Indian side had felt attracted and promised to study it.²¹⁷

A fortnight later, Manubhai Shah confirmed the correctness of Umarjadi's statement, saying that at the preliminary talks in January 1963, the trade delegations of India and Indonesia had agreed on a long-term trade agreement. While replying to a question in the Lok Sabha on February 22, 1963, he stated that a delegation of technical experts and trade representatives from Indonesia was expected to come to India soon. After this delegation had explored the shopping lists in details, he said, a Government delegation led by the Indonesian Minister would be coming to New Delhi to conclude a trade agreement with India. Manubhai Shah also disclosed that during Foreign Minister Subandrio's visit in January 1963, the two sides had tried to explore other avenues of Indian exports to Indonesia and this had led to the signing of a protocol between the two countries.²¹⁸

The two countries' efforts to consolidate and expand trade and economic relations ultimately led to the signing of a three-year

216 *Guardian* (Rangoon), February 8, 1963.

217 *Ibid.*, and *Indonesian Herald*, February 8, 1963.

218 Government of India, Lok Sabha, *Debates*, series 3, vol. 13, session 4 of 1963, February 22, 1963, cols. 698-9.

Trade and Commerce Agreement on April 24, 1963.²¹⁹ According to a communique issued at the end of the talks, the total bilateral trade in the first year of the Agreement was fixed at Rs. 13 crores (1 crore=10 million).²²⁰ As it envisaged approximately 139 per cent increase in the two countries' total trade as compared to the level of trade during 1962-63,²²¹ if achieved, it could be considered a major break-through in Indian-Indonesian relations.

But the hopes created by the Trade Agreement did not materialize. Strains developing in the political relations of the two countries had their inevitable impact on trade relations as well. This was evident from the following trade figures pertaining to the period between 1961-62 and 1965-66.²²²

India's Trade with Indonesia, 1961-62 to 1965-66

(Rupees in lakhs)

	1961-62	1962-63	1963-64	1964-65	1965-66
Exports	697	406	240	180	81
Imports	178	139	169	266	222
Balance	+519	+267	+71	-86	--141

The above figures clearly show a steady decline in India's exports to Indonesia from Rs. 697 lakhs in 1961-62 to Rs. 81 lakhs in 1965-66. India's growing imports during the same period from Rs. 178 lakhs to Rs. 222 lakhs reduced its favourable balance of trade with Indonesia from Rs. 519 lakhs in 1961-62 to Rs. 71 lakhs in 1963-64. In fact, during the following years India started having an adverse balance growing from Rs. 86 lakhs in 1964-65 to Rs. 141 lakhs in 1965-66.²²³ Moreover, the total bilateral trade between India and Indonesia during these years never reached the

219 For text of the Agreement of Trade and Commerce between India and Indonesia, see Government of India, *India's Trade Agreements, As in force on January 1, 1965* (New Delhi, Directorate of Commercial Publicity, Ministry of Commerce, 1965), pp. 133-5.

220 *The Hindu*, April 26, 1963.

221 Total trade between India and Indonesia during 1962-63 stood at Rs. 545 lakhs (10 lakhs=1 million). See Government of India, *Brochure of Foreign Trade Statistics of India : Third Five Year Plan* (New Delhi, Directorate of Research and Statistics, Office of the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, 1967), p. 4.

222 Ibid.

223 Apart from decrease in Indian exports to Indonesia, India's heavier imports of Indonesian petroleum contributed to India's adverse balance of trade during these years.

figure of Rs. 13 crores as envisaged in the communique issued after the talks between the trade delegations of the two countries. It did not even regain the 1962-63 (the year preceding to the signing of the Agreement) figure of Rs. 545 lakhs and stood at the very low of Rs. 303 lakhs in 1965-66.

Similar was the case in other areas of bilateral co-operation. An important field in which India had made substantial efforts in strengthening its ties with Indonesia before 1960-61, was co-operation between the various services of the two countries' armed forces. This also declined for political reasons. A reference to Indonesia's choosing Pakistan for dispatch of armed forces contingent to West Irian in 1962 has already been made.²²⁴ The only activity worth-mentioning in the field of co-operation between their air forces during 1962-65, was a four-day visit to India by Air Vice-Marshal Omar Dhani, Commander-in-Chief of the Indonesian Air Force (AURI), in August 1963. Accompanied by his wife and six of his Staff Officers, Omar Dhani was welcomed by Indian Minister of Defence, Y.B. Chavan, and Air Vice-Marshal A.M. Engineer of the Indian Air Force (IAF). On his arrival in New Delhi on August 20, 1963, the Indonesian Air Vice-Marshal referred to the existing cordiality between the air forces of the two countries and expressed his conviction that "this visit...will further strengthen these friendly relations." He also recalled the AURI's and his own long friendly contacts with the IAF and said that his visit would give him a first-hand opportunity to convey the greetings of the Indonesian people and its Air Force to the Indian people and the IAF.²²⁵

Co-operation between the two countries' armies was also diminishing, particularly since the "Sondhi Affair" in Djakarta in September 1962. Since the signing of the Agreement between the Indian and Indonesian armies in December 1960, India had been sending officers to Indonesia to train Indonesian military officers. India had also been offering training facilities to Indonesian military personnel in its military academies. By the end of 1963, no Indian military instructors were reported to have been left in Indonesia, nor any more, it was learnt, would be invited from India. It was also reported that the Indonesian military personnel receiving military training in India would be the last batch. "India's whole-

224 See Chapter on Pakistan's Role.

225 *The Statesman* (New Delhi), August 21, 1963.

hearted support to Malaysia" was stated to be "one of the reasons for the termination of the training arrangements" by Indonesia.²²⁶

Indian-Indonesian cultural relations, which had not developed satisfactorily even before 1960-61, witnessed further loss of enthusiasm on both sides. During 1962-65 the Government of India offered two scholarships to Indonesian students for 1965-66. These were intended for students at graduate or post-graduate level in Humanities, Arts or Science at any Indian University. Each scholarship provided for maintenance allowance of Rs. 250 per mensem excluding tuition, examination and other compulsory fees to be paid by the Government of India.²²⁷

It is not known whether any Indonesian student utilized this Indian offer. One thing, however, which was known to have discouraged the Indonesians from taking advantage of these opportunities was the fact that the cost of passage to and from India had to be borne by the students themselves.²²⁸

India also offered facilities to two Indonesian officials for pursuing advanced training course on research for the production of radioisotopes and activation analysis at the Atomic Energy Establishment in Bombay (Trombay).²²⁹

Besides, the Government of India also sponsored a visit to Indonesia by Swami Ranganathananda of Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Calcutta, on the occasion of Swami Vivekananda's Birth Anniversary celebrations in December 1963.²³⁰ The only other activity noticed during this period was the offer of travel grant to one K. Yunus of Indonesia by the Indian Council for Cultural Relations.²³¹

Deterioration in the political relations of the two countries also adversely affected their cultural co-operation under the Colombo Plan. This was evident from the decreasing number of training places offered by India to Indonesia out of its total contribution to the Colombo Plan countries. From 42 training places provided by India during 1958-62, it came down to one place during 1962-63 and to two places during 1963-64.²³² It is worth noticing

226 *Times of India*, January 22, 1964.

227 *Indonesian Herald*, October 23, 1964.

228 Ibid.

229 Ibid., November 18, 1964.

230 Government of India, *Ministry of Education Report, 1963-64*, p. 93.

231 Ibid., p. 129. K. Yunus was stated to be on a study tour of India.

232 Technical Co-operation Under the Colombo Plan. *Report by the Colombo Plan Council for Technical Co-operation in South and South-East Asia for the Year 1 July 1962 to 30 June 1963*, p. 111.

that the one and the two training places that India offered to Indonesia during these two years were out of India's total contribution of 242 and 284 to the Colombo Plan countries for the respective years.²³³ Besides, the number of experts India provided to Indonesia decreased from four during 1950-58 to one during 1958-62 to nil during 1962-63.²³⁴

The situation, however, did not take long to change for the better. Following the coup in Indonesia, there was a qualitative change in the domestic politics and foreign policy of that country. This provided an opening to India to mend its own ties with Indonesia.

233 *Twelfth Annual Report: The Colombo Plan* (Bangkok, November 1963) p. 280.

234 *Technical Co-operation Under Colombo Plan, Report*, n. 232, p. 117.

India, Indonesia and the Second Asian-African Conference

An important issue which determined the Indian-Indonesian attitudes and affected their relations during 1961-1965 was Indonesia's continued insistence on holding a second Asian-African conference. For the Indonesian leadership, it was a matter of pride that it is they who had initiated the move for holding the first Asian-African Conference in Bandung in April 1955.¹ They tended to see it as marking a continuity with the International Congress against Imperialism held at Brussels in February 1927.² Attended by twenty-nine Heads of State and/or Government in Asia and Africa and representing over half of the world's population, the Bandung Conference became a legend in Indonesia. The success with which it was characterized had brought enormous prestige to the Indonesian leaders. The "Dasa Sila" (Ten Principles) of the Bandung Conference communique came to symbolize what the Indonesians chose to describe as the "Bandung Spirit".

Indonesia's Motivations and Efforts

The inspiration for holding a second Asian-African conference came from the constitutional and ideological moorings of the Indonesian foreign policy. The Indonesian leadership felt obliged to "contribute in implementing an order in the world which is based upon independence, abiding peace and social justice" and to "seek and promote friendship especially with the Asian and African

1 It was Ali Sastroamidjojo, the Indonesian Prime Minister, who had during the First Colombo Conference of the Five Prime Ministers of Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia and Pakistan, in April 1954, mooted the idea of holding an Asian-African conference. Ali Sastroamidjojo later became the Chairman of the Bandung Conference in April 1955.

2 See Roeslan Abdulgani's speeches in Djakarta on January 27, 1960 and February 11, 1963 in Government of the Republic of Indonesia *Bandung Spirit, Moving on the Tide of History* (Djakarta, 1964), pp. 79 and 99 respectively.

countries.”³ It saw colonialism and imperialism in Asia and Africa as hindering the promotion of these objectives and identified it with the “OLDEFOS” (Old Established Order Forces) resisting the “NEFOS” (New Emerging Forces). And the removal of the “OLDEFOS”, according to President Sukarno, required unity among the ranks of the “NEFOS” in the world in general and in Asia and Africa in particular.⁴

Moreover, the Indonesian leaders believed that all the disputes in Asia and Africa were either left-overs of “OLDEFOS” or the outgrowth of their constant divisive interference in the two continents. Hence the need to convene a second Asian-African conference in order to resolve mutual disputes without interference from the “OLDEFOS”. Other reasons prompting the Indonesian leaders to hold the second Asian-African conference were its idea of exerting cumulative Afro-Asian pressure on the Dutch on the West Irian question and the projection of Indonesia’s Afro-Asian role as the chief spokesman of the “NEFOS”.

Taking a cue from the Bandung Conference Communique of April 24, 1955,⁵ Indonesia had initiated the move for holding another ‘Bandung’—type conference as early as 1956. But its efforts had failed to evoke a positive response from India. As late as June 30, 1961, Prime Minister Nehru had told Pressmen in New Delhi that it was “premature” to talk of a conference “similar in essence” to a Non-Aligned Conference.⁶ At the Conference of the Non-Aligned countries in Belgrade in September 1961, Sukarno’s emphatic plea for holding a second Asian-African conference “in the near future” had met with a cool indifference from Nehru.⁷

3 Government of the Republic of Indonesia, *The 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia* (Special Issue 001/1966) (Djakarta, Department of Information, 1968), p. 5, and *Handbook on the Political Manifesto : Two Executive Directions of Manipol* (Djakarta, Department of Information, 1961), p. 88.

4 Government of the Republic of Indonesia, *The Indonesian Dawn is Approaching : It is the Dawn of the Victory of Men* (Address by President Sukarno) (Djakarta, Department of Information, 1962), p. 10.

5 “Final Communique of the Asian-African Conference”, *Asian-African Conference* (Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia, New Delhi), p. 215.

6 *The Hindu* (Madras), July 1, 1961. Nehru was giving his reactions to Sukarno’s special message delivered to him personally by Indonesia’s roving Ambassador Madame Supeni during her visit to New Delhi on June 20-21, 1961. Madame Supeni confirmed Nehru’s reluctant position in a statement in Djakarta later. See *Harian Rakjat* (Djakarta), July 7, 1961.

7 *The Times* (London), September 2, 1961. It described Nehru’s attitude to Sukarno’s demand as one of “coolness”.

The Indonesian leaders, however, did not give up and continued to make efforts towards the convening of the conference of Asian and African states. Their efforts appeared to succeed when Madame Supeni, Indonesia's roving Ambassador, stated in Djakarta on August 23, 1962 that sixteen nations including India had officially agreed to sit on the preparatory committee for the conference.⁸ Interestingly, this statement came only twelve days before the Anti-India demonstrations arising out of the "Sondhi Affair" during the Fourth Asian Games in Djakarta on September 3, 1962 and about two months before the Chinese aggression against India on October 20, 1962.

India's Responses

India, it appears, wavered between acceptance and rejection of Indonesia's persistent call for the second Asian-African conference. Anti-India demonstrations and the sacking of the Indian Embassy in Djakarta by the National Front of all the parties, especially the PKI, the NU and the PNI, and the Indonesian Government's unrepentant, though regretful, attitude had come as a surprise and a shock to the Indians. It was certain to have, and it did have, adverse effect on India's attitude towards Indonesia's foreign policy demands.

The Indian Press had called for discarding the sentimental approach and introducing pragmatism in India's relations with Indonesia. There were warnings about serious repercussions concerning India's prestige if the Indian Government attended the preparatory meeting as already reportedly decided. Writing just two days before the Chinese invasion, *The Statesman* reviewed the nature of Indian-Indonesian relations to date, pointed out "difference of tone in the basically similar policies of the two countries" and urged upon the Government of India to see that a second Bandung conference was put safely "into cold storage".⁹

Following the "Sondhi Affair", India's attitude towards Indonesia's demand for the second Asian-African conference stiffened. In the course of their talks in Cairo on September 30, 1962, Prime Minister Nehru and President Nasser reportedly felt that the time

8 *The Statesman* (New Delhi), August 25, 1962.

9 "Indonesia Now" (editorial), *The Statesman* (New Delhi), October 18, 1962.

was not opportune for such a conference.¹⁰ It would, however, be incorrect to link Nehru's remarks in Cairo or those later in Colombo¹¹ to the anti-India demonstrations in Djakarta. On the other hand, he was convinced that the then international situation, particularly, that obtaining in Asia and Africa at the time was not conducive to the holding of such a conference.

In the background of Sukarno's emphasis on uniting "NEFOS" against "OLDEFOS", Nehru feared that the Asian-African conference might lead to the emergence of a third bloc.¹² This would reduce the importance of non-alignment and peaceful co-existence. Apart from intensifying the existing tensions among the various Asian and African states, it would adversely affect the prospects of international co-operation and world peace. Besides, he was also aware of the Chinese and Pakistani machinations. By pursuing their anti-India policies, the two countries were trying to alienate the Indonesian leaders from India. Further, the anti-India demonstrations in Djakarta had also given clear indications of the strength of certain Indonesian domestic political forces working against India's interest. Nehru's stand was also reinforced by his knowledge that many Asian and African countries were not in favour of holding another Asian-African conference.¹³

The Djakarta incidents thus only went to strengthen India's desire to seek an indefinite postponement of the second 'Bandung' conference. It did not mean reversing the decision to attend the preparatory meeting nor that India would not attend the conference at all. In fact, there is no indication of the Government of India having done so.

China's attack on India's northern borders about seven weeks after the "Sondhi Affair" further cooled India's attitude towards

10 *Egyptian Gazette* (Cairo), and *The Stateman* (New Delhi), October 1, 1962. See also a despatch in *Daily Telegraph* (London), October 16, 1962. According to it, the two leaders agreed that the second "Afro-Asian Conference would be a pointless extravagance".

11 At a Press conference in Colombo on October 16, 1962, Nehru said that the present time was not ripe or feasible for holding another Bandung Conference. See *Indonesian Herald*, October 17, 1962.

12 Nehru had expressed his fears, in this connection, as early as August 1961. See quotations from Nehru's interview with the *Link* correspondent in *Link* (New Delhi), vol. 4, no. 1, August 15, 1961, p. 22. See also "Neutral Summit", *ibid.*, vol. 4, no. 4, September 3, 1961, p. 34.

13 Nehru confirmed this view while replying to a question. For Nehru's statement in the Lok Sabha on November 19, 1962, see Government of India, Lok Sabha, *Debates*, series 3, vol. 9, session 3 of 1962, November 19, 1962, col. 2165.

the idea of a second Asian-African conference. In Nehru's words, it made such a conference "all the more undesirable."¹⁴ India viewed it as China's deliberate violation of the *Panchsheel* Agreement and of the ten principles of the Bandung Conference and as an attack on its policy of non-alignment and peaceful co-existence. Yet, in spite of all this, viewed from long-term prospects of India's relations with Indonesia, the Indian Government could not reject outright the Indonesian demand in this connection.

Indonesia's Attitude After the 'Sondhi Affair'

In the days following the anti-India demonstrations in Djakarta in September 1962, the Indonesian leaders tended to link normalization of relations with India to India's concurrence to the convening of the second Bandung-type conference. Thus the Indonesian Government did not take kindly to Nehru's remarks in Cairo and Colombo. Foreign Minister Subandrio observed on October 3, 1962 : "I know that since the beginning India has been hesitating regarding the second Asian-African meet."¹⁵ A week later, after his meeting with the Indian Ambassador on October 10, 1962, he declared : "For me the most important thing is to preserve the relations between Indonesia and India, which in this region is an essential requirement of high importance for the two parties." Commenting on whether the question of the second Asian-African conference was also discussed in his meeting with the Indian Ambassador, he stated that "the topic was approached from another angle, namely from the viewpoint of how to restore the erstwhile relations between the two countries."¹⁶

Taken together, these remarks by Subandrio left no one in doubt that if India desired normalization of relations with Indonesia, it must shed its hesitation and agree to the latter's demand for the convening of the second Asian-African conference. By linking the prospects of better relations with India's willingness to concede to their demand in this regard, the Indonesian leaders wanted to exert pressure on India and its reluctant Prime Minister.

It was at this stage that China committed aggression against India. The Indonesian leaders must have realized that it would still further strengthen India's reluctance about this conference. This ex-

14 For Nehru's statement, see in *ibid.*, col. 2164.

15 *Indonesian Herald*, October 4, 1962, See also *Harian Rakjat*, October 4, 1962.

16 *Ibid.*, October 11, 1962.

explains why President Sukarno approached Prime Minister Chou En-lai, in the midst of war, for ceasing hostilities.¹⁷ In this sense, it may be contended that it was not so much for his sympathy and support for India that Sukarno approached the Chinese leaders as for his anxiety about further hardening of India's attitude towards the second conference of Asian and African states. Moreover, since China categorically supported Indonesia's demand in this connection, it explains, at least partly, why Indonesia failed to express clear support for the victim of the Chinese aggression, and merely pleaded for the application of the Bandung spirit to resolve the Sino-Indian border dispute.

Efforts for the Second Non-Aligned Conference

A reference has already been made to Nehru's negative remarks in Cairo about the second Bandung conference. These remarks suggest a possibility that Nehru and Nasser might have exchanged views on the prospects of holding second non-aligned conference. Especially Nehru might have perceived certain advantages accruing from such a conference. It would automatically exclude both China and Pakistan, as also avoid a discussion of bilateral disputes. Besides, a non-aligned conference would once again put its stamp of approval on the policies of non-alignment and peaceful co-existence. It would also serve as a substitute for the second Afro-Asian conference and make it appear superfluous. But this required the approval of the four prominent non-aligned countries, the UAR, Ceylon, Yugoslavia and Indonesia. As an initiator of the move for and as host of the first Conference of the Non-Aligned States, Yugoslavia was expected to positively welcome this move. If both the UAR and Ceylon could be got round to the idea, even if reluctantly, Indonesia was also likely to join them. Sukarno could ill-afford to ignore the value of this forum in so far as it enabled him to canvass for the second Asian-African conference. It is in the light of these considerations that Nehru's talks with President Nasser and Prime Minister Mrs. Bandaranaike become quite significant.

However, for a year after the Chinese attack, the efforts for the second non-aligned meeting remained in abeyance. These efforts were revived when, in the joint communique issued in Cairo on October 14, 1963, the Ceylonese Prime Minister and the UAR President "agreed that another conference of non-aligned countries

17 Interviews with Sukarni Kartodiwirjo, Djakarta, Jannary 26 and 30, 1970. Sukarni told the author that, in this connection, he carried a verbal message from President Sukarno to Chou En-lai.

should be held some time next year.” It was reported that their governments would soon start contacting other non-aligned countries in this connection.¹⁸ This initiated an exchange of views, both at ministerial and diplomatic level, among the governments of India, Yugoslavia, Indonesia, the UAR, Ghana and Ceylon.¹⁹

Reactions in India

The Indian Press and the Government reacted favourably to the call for another non-aligned meeting. The *Indian Express* considered it “timely” and urged the Government to “welcome” it too. It also wrote that the demand for the second Asian-African conference should be “resolutely” discouraged, because in view of “the prevailing tensions in South-East Asia and elsewhere” it could do “more harm than good to international peace and understanding.”²⁰ In an interview published in the Belgrade daily *Politika* on November 29, 1963, Prime Minister Nehru offered support for such a conference as it would enable the participants to determine “fundamental principles” of the struggle for world peace.²¹ A report in the *Hindustan Times* referred to Mrs. Bandaranaike as having stated that Nehru had requested President Nasser and herself to take up the initiative vigorously because there was an urgent need for such a meeting.²² Mrs. Bandaranaike’s remarks showed Nehru’s anxiety about the prospects of the non-aligned meeting. He was not unaware of China’s (and Pakistan’s) contemporaneous efforts, at the highest level, in support of the Indonesian demand for the convening of the second Bandung conference rather than the second non-aligned gathering. However, not fully satisfied with the progress of efforts made so far, Nehru once again approached Presidents Nasser and Tito. His messages were carried personally by Dinesh Singh, Deputy Minister for External Affairs. These intensive efforts succeeded when on February 17, 1964, invitations were reportedly issued from Cairo to twenty-six non-aligned countries to attend a prepa-

18 *Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), October 15, 1963.

19 See a dispatch from Cairo in *Times of India* (New Delhi) of November 3, 1963. See also *Patriot* (New Delhi), November 3, 1963.

20 *Indian Express* (New Delhi), October 16, 1963.

21 *The Hindu*, December 1, 1963.

22 *Hindustan Times*, December 8, 1963. Nehru’s contacts with the leaders of the UAR and Ceylon were confirmed by Mrs. Lakshmi Menon, Indian Minister of State for External Affairs, in the Lok Sabha on December 12, 1963. Government of India, Lok Sabha, *Debates*, series 3, vol. 23, session 6 of 1963, December 12, 1963, col. 4415. See also *Hindustan Times*, December 13, 1963.

ratory meeting, at ambassadorial level, in Colombo on March 23, 1964.

Indonesians' Attitudes

With Government of Indonesia maintaining silence, the major political parties, such as the PNI and the PKI, sharply criticized these moves for a second non-aligned conference. In a speech in Djakarta on December 28, 1963. Surachman, the Secretary-General of the PNI, declared that his party only supported the holding of a second Asian-African conference and "disliked" the plan for another non-aligned meeting as proposed by some countries.²³ In a resolution passed at its plenary session in Djakarta on February 7-8, 1964, the Central Board of the PNI declared that the time was ripe for convening the second conference of Afro-Asian states.²⁴ It could be interpreted as the party's effort to put pressure on the Government against attending the preparatory meeting for the second non-aligned gathering. The PNI, however, did not publicly criticize India or any other non-aligned country by name.

Unlike the PNI, however, the PKI did not mince words in criticizing India and its leaders. Chairman Aidit of the PKI supported Sukarno's plea for a "second Bandung Conference" and denounced the attempt "being inspired by the modern revisionists and Nehru" to convene a "second 'Non-Alignment' Conference". He described these efforts as "criminal" and as designed "to murder the Bandung spirit". He also used for India terms like the "US watch-dog in Asia", and "a fifth column" within Asia and Africa.²⁵ The PKI had been openly hostile towards India and Prime Minister Nehru particularly since the Chinese attack on India's northern borders. It suited the PKI to discredit non-alignment in order to bring the Indonesian foreign policy in line with that of China and thereby damage Indonesia's relations with India.

Besides these political parties, the *Indonesian Herald*, usually expressing Foreign Office views, also noted these moves for a second non-aligned meeting. In the first week of February 1964, it editorially referred to "two simultaneous efforts" being made to convene

23 *Indonesian Herald*, January 1, 1964.

24 Ibid., February 11, 1964.

25 D.N. Aidit, "Set Afire the Banteng (Wild Bull) Spirit : Ever Forward, Never Retreat !" (Political Report to the Second Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of Indonesia), Djakarta, December 23-26, 1963 (Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1964), pp. 77, 71-72.

the two conferences. It claimed "one Asian country" seeking precedence of the second non-aligned meeting over the second Bandung conference. It was an indirect reference to India. Though it considered the two conferences "mutually complementary" and "welcome", it emphasized that Indonesia preferred the second Bandung conference.²⁶ Towards the end of February, however, this daily became a little sharper in its observations. In its "Off the Record" column, and with an obvious reference to India, it asked in a sarcastic manner why "Beograd (Belgrade) had become suddenly so respectable in her eyes."²⁷

The pressures of the PNI and the PKI notwithstanding, the Government of Indonesia decided to attend the non-aligned preparatory meeting. Indonesia's positive decision seemed to have been based on three main considerations. First, its refusal to do so would lead to its isolation from the non-aligned group of states. Secondly, it would mean the loss of an international forum for projecting its image as a spokesman of the "NEFOS" and thirdly, of an opportunity to canvass for the second Asian-African conference.

Preparatory Meeting of the second Non-Aligned Conference

The preparatory meeting of the second non-aligned conference took place in Colombo from March 23 to 27, 1964. Ambassadors of twenty-three countries and observers from two attended this meeting.²⁸ The five-day deliberations showed no major differences among the participants about the choice of the venue, or the timing and composition of the main conference. With the active support of the Indian delegate, B.K. Kapur, the Indian High Commissioner to Ceylon, the preparatory meeting "agreed" about Cairo as the venue of the summit meeting. According to the communique issued on the concluding day, the participants also registered agreement about the timing of the conference—"during the first week of October 1964"—and about the "countries to be invited to participate in the second conference".²⁹

26 "Bandung and Beograd" (editorial), *Indonesian Herald*, February 3, 1964.

27 Ibid., February 29, 1964.

28 "Communique of the Preparatory Meeting of the Second Conference of Non-Aligned States, Colombo, 7 March 1964", *Supplementary Documents for the Meeting of Ministers in Preparation of the Second Asian-African Conference* (Djakarta, Organizing Committee, 1964), pp. 13-14. See also *The Hindu*, March 30, 1964.

29 Ibid., p. 13. See also *The Hindu*, March 25, 1964. The text of the communique appears in *The Hindu*, March 25, 1964, as well.

The leader of the Indonesian delegation and Deputy Foreign Minister Mrs. Supeni did not express any dissenting opinion on these issues. In her introductory statement, however, she urged upon the non-aligned countries to give constant support to movements for national independence and not to be directly or indirectly associated with any military pacts. In line with the Indonesian foreign policy she also proposed the inclusion in the agenda of the main conference of the possibility of convening a conference of the "new emerging forces".³⁰

A sub-committee of eight countries, appointed for the purpose of drawing up the agenda, held a long meeting on March 25 and 26. A majority of its members, including India, were opposed to the suggestion by the Indonesian delegation on two grounds. First, they were of the view that the non-aligned conference was neither concerned with nor competent to consider the concept of another conference unrelated to non-alignment. Secondly, they held the opinion that the non-aligned conference itself included all such emerging forces and hence there was no necessity of holding a separate conference.³¹ As there was lack of unanimity on this point, the sub-committee left it to be discussed by the preparatory committee at its meeting on the concluding day.

As expected, the Indonesian proposal promoted "a lot of discussion". Mrs. Supeni persisted in her effort to convince the non-aligned countries' representatives of the need for adoption of the Indonesian proposal. In the face of a substantial opposition, however, she failed to get included in the agenda the possibility of discussing an Asian-African conference.³²

The results of the preparatory meeting in Colombo had important bearing on Indonesia's attitude towards India. India, no doubt, had achieved a diplomatic victory over Indonesia in arranging a preparatory meeting of the non-aligned countries before Indonesia could make similar progress in respect of the second Asian-African conference. Besides, by actively participating in

30 *The Hindu*, March 25, 1964, and *Indonesian Herald*, March 26, 1964.

31 *The Hindu*, March 27 and 28, 1964.

32 *Ibid.*, March 29, 1964. According to reports, only one or two delegations supported the Indonesian proposal. The preparatory meeting, nevertheless, agreed to insert in the conference agenda a modified form of the Indonesian proposal. The second item of the agenda explained it as "the safeguarding and strengthening of world peace and security and the promotion of positive trends and new emerging nationalist forces in international affairs".

the important sub-committees, such as those appointed for drawing up the agenda and the communique, India had ensured the success of the preparatory meeting in deciding about the venue, timing, composition and agenda of the main conference.³³ This, in a way, reduced the possibility of holding the second conference of Asian and African countries in the near future.

However, therein lay Indonesia's growing sense of disappointment with India. Indonesia was not unaware of the active role India had played in arranging the preparatory meeting in Colombo and in drawing up its agenda and the communique. The preparatory meeting in Colombo thus gave further edge to Indonesia's disillusionment with India. It increased Indonesia's sense of rivalry towards the second non-aligned conference and made the holding of the second Asian-African conference more urgent for it.

Indonesian Domestic Pressures Against Participation in the Non-Aligned Conference

This coincided with the growing domestic pressures building up against participation in the second non-aligned meeting. Just three weeks before the preparatory meeting of the second Asian-African conference, scheduled to be held on April 10, 1964, the HSI (Himpunan Sardjana Indonesia—the Political Science and Law Society of the Indonesian Scholars Association) arranged a seminar in Djakarta from March 20 to 24, 1964.³⁴ Its importance lay in formulating five principles on which the Indonesian foreign policy should be based. Put together, these principles were explained to mean Indonesia's adherence to the concept of "NEFOS" versus "OLDEFOS", its unity and close consultation only with the former and continued opposition to the latter, its conviction "that the real source of international tension...is not...conflict between ideologies, but imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism", its refusal to permit a compromise with its dependence, and finally, its belief in the Indian *Panchsheel*, Ten Principles (Dasa Sila) of the First Bandung Conference and the Sukarno-Macapagal doctrine of resolution of disputes between the Asian, African and Latin American countries by these peoples themselves.³⁵ The seminar was also significant in drawing certain conclusions which focussed

33 Ibid., March 27 and 28, 1964.

34 *Report and Conclusions of the Seminar on the Second Asian-African Conference* (Djakarta, The Indonesian Association of Scientists, 1964), 20 pp.

35 Ibid., pp. 7-9.

on the difference between the non-alignment policy and the Indonesian foreign policy and in subjecting the former to a scathing attack. It described non-alignment as an outdated "Europe-centrist outlook", "neither scientific nor correct", and "a political tool of neo-colonialism on an international scale", and on these and other bases, called for its rejection by the Indonesian people.³⁶

It cannot be said for certain how much influence the PKI exerted in formulating these conclusions in the seminar. It is, however, known that the HSI under whose auspices the seminar took place was largely influenced by the PKI.³⁷ Moreover, it was M.H. Lukman, First Deputy Chairman of the Central Committee of the PKI, who went the farthest in criticizing those who were endeavouring to hold a second non-aligned meeting. He described India's emphasis on non-alignment as a mere propaganda to convince the world of its genuineness and levelled charges of India's military alliance with the United States.³⁸

During the five-day deliberations the seminar made non-alignment the subject of its unambiguous criticism and left no one in doubt as to the real target of its attack. In an appeal issued "To the Peoples of Asia-Africa on March 24, 1964, the concluding day, the Presidium of the seminar charged that "some individuals in Asia and Africa and elsewhere are busily engaging in splitting activities in order to weaken the feeling of solidarity and the revolutionary spirit of the Asian-African people." It termed these "individuals" as "nothing but puppets and assistants of the imperialist(s)".³⁹ It was not so veiled a reference to the leaders of the non-aligned countries, who were trying to stage a second non-aligned summit meeting.

The HSI seminar was as much important for its conclusions as for its timing.⁴⁰ It served the purpose of high-lighting the differences, visible since the first non-aligned gathering in 1961, between India's non-alignment and Indonesia "independent and

36 Ibid., pp. 10-11.

37 The HSI, established in 1962, was the Scholars' League of the Indonesian Communist Party. See Herbert Feith, "Soekarno, the Army and the Communists: The Triangle Changes Shape", *Asian Survey*, vol. 4, no. 8, August 1964, p. 976.

38 *Harian Rakjat*, March 23, 1964, p. 1.

39 *Report and Conclusions of the Seminar*, n. 34, p. 14.

40 In point of time, the five-day seminar coincided with the preliminary meeting of the second non-aligned conference and preceded the preparatory meeting of the second Afro-Asian conference, scheduled to be held in Djakarta on April 5, 1964, just by a fortnight.

active" foreign policy. Prime Minister Nehru's efforts to seek the convening of another conference of the non-aligned countries at this stage enabled the PKI to use the intellectual forums, such as the HSI, to exert strong pressures on the Government to reject non-alignment outright and to adopt a Peking-oriented policy of total opposition to colonialism. This stance of the PKI had strong appeal to the Indonesian elite because of its congruence with President Sukarno's concept of "NEFOS" versus "OLDEFOS".

Preparatory Meeting of the second Asian-African Conference

It is in the light of these growing foreign policy differences between India and Indonesia that developments at the preparatory meeting of the second Asian-African conference in Djakarta in April 1964 should be seen. The meeting of Ministers took place in Djakarta from April 10 to 15, 1964. Representatives from twenty-two Asian and African countries attended the meeting. Interestingly, thirteen countries out of twenty-two were the same as had been represented at the preparatory meeting of the non-aligned countries held in Colombo in March 1964.⁴¹ Their agreement to participate in the second non-aligned summit meeting in Cairo in October 1964 was enough indication of their unwillingness to attend another Afro-Asian conference during this year.

The Indonesian leaders had, however, reason to be happy that four of the five sponsors of the first Asian-African Conference had agreed to attend this meeting.⁴² But in doing so, Indonesia had to make a compromise with its current foreign policy stance of growing intimacy with China. According to reports in a section of the Indian Press, the Indonesian Government initially invited twenty countries to participate in the preparatory meeting. And those invited did not include China.⁴³ In view of China's categorical and active moral and diplomatic support to Indonesia in the latter's efforts to convene the second Asian-African conference it could only be considered surprising. The official sources reportedly

41 These were Afghanistan, Algeria, Cambodia, Ceylon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Morocco, Nepal and the UAR.

42 The five sponsors of the first 'Bandung' Conference were Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia and Pakistan. Burma reportedly declined the invitation to attend the preparatory meeting.

43 *The Hindu*, April 7, 1964.

admitted that Indonesia ignored sending invitation to China in order to placate both India and the Philippines.⁴⁴

Although there is no evidence to prove that India made its participation conditional on China's exclusion from the preparatory meeting, there is reason to believe that, at this stage, the Government of India was not willing to face China at an international gathering of this type. Probably Indonesia had to make a compromise because it realized that India was one of the five sponsors of the first Asian-African Conference, and that without its participation the prospects of the second such conference might not be very encouraging. Anyway, on insistence from Algeria and Guinea that all those who participated in the first Conference be invited, China was included in the list of invitees.⁴⁵

Although the Indonesian Government was happy with its success in holding the preparatory meeting, it was not oblivious of the difficulties in the way of convening the main conference. For one thing, the Asian and African response to its invitation had not been very encouraging. Only twenty-two countries had agreed to attend the preparatory meeting.⁴⁶ Moreover, attending the preliminary meeting did not mean a commitment to attend the main conference. A majority of the sponsors of the first Bandung meeting,

44 "Confrontation at Bandung" (By a Special Correspondent), *Far Eastern Economic Review*, vol. 44, no. 6, May 7, 1964, p. 293. The author of this article, who wants to remain unidentified, has told this author that by keeping China out of the list of invitees to the preparatory meeting, Indonesia wanted to skirt India's objections with regard to China's participation. He believes that it was a shrewd Indonesian move to seek India's concurrence to participate on this basis. In his opinion, although India never publicly conditioned its participation in the preparatory meeting on China's exclusion, yet it might have suggested so to Indonesia secretly.

45 *The Hindu*, April 7, 1964.

46 It was rather a reflection on Indonesia that whereas preliminary meeting of the second non-aligned conference was attended by twenty-three countries, the preparatory meeting of the second Asian-African conference was attended by twenty-two countries.

Out of the thirty-seven countries approached for the preparatory meeting, ten countries which were represented at the first Asian-African Conference reportedly rejected the feelers. Of the remaining twenty-seven countries which actually received invitations, Burma and Japan definitely declined and four other invitees failed to attend. So only twenty-two countries, including Indonesia, participated in the preparatory meeting. See Franklin B. Weinstein, "The Second Asian-African Conference: Preliminary Bouts", *Asian Survey*, vol. 5, no. 7, July 7, 1965, p. 361.

such as India, Burma and Ceylon, had been consistently non-committal until that time. Besides, the Government of Indonesia was fully aware of the efforts being made by these and some other countries, such as the UAR, to put off the second Asian-African conference, at least for the time being, by convening the second summit meeting of the non-aligned countries. It believed that failure to hold a second Asian-African conference before the non-aligned meeting would be prejudicial to its prestige. Hence it was necessary to seek concurrence of the participants in the preparatory meeting to a timing earlier than that of the second non-aligned meeting, that is, October 1964.

Keeping this in view, in his inaugural address to the preparatory meeting President Sukarno argued about the need for Afro-Asian solidarity against the "OLDEFOS". He also underlined the aim of holding the main Asian-African conference in these words :

Let us convene a Second Asian-African Conference to decide ourselves what our new world is to be. Let us pool our ideas, let us outline our thoughts and in harmony build up our concepts for the good of all mankind.⁴⁷

This exhortation by President Sukarno showed the degree of importance he attached to the development of concepts over and above the development of national economy and industry. In fact he believed that there was no other way than "Asian-African solidarity", not even economic development, to effectively deal with the "OLDEFOS". At this stage, he considered economic development both ineffective and unnecessary. This was, in a way, Sukarno's veiled criticism of Nehru and other non-aligned leaders who put emphasis on foreign policy conducive to the development of economy and industry at home.

In his welcome speech, following Sukarno's inaugural address, Foreign Minister Subandrio traced the efforts, made to-date by Indonesia, to arrange the second conference of Asian and African countries. He invited reference to approaches at governmental level made as early as 1957, and said : "At that time we were advised by friends that we should wait a while, for some practical reasons." Since then, he disclosed, "many countries, including Indonesia" had been "consistently" proposing such a conference "in order to safeguard and consolidate our achievements". In this connection he stressed that his country's consistent support had been for the

47 *Meeting of Ministers in Preparation for the Second African-Asian Conference, Djakarta, April 10-15, 1964* (Djakarta, Conference Secretariat, 1964), p. 44.

“immediate” holding of it. Subandrio also listed several reasons for holding the conference immediately, namely, safeguarding and consolidation of national independence, heightening of vigilance against foreign interference, solution of disputes among the Afro-Asian nations and pooling of wisdom to create new political, economic and social concepts. Considering Afro-Asian disputes as “realities”, he described them as “the negative sides of the achievement of national independence” and stressed that “the second Asian-African Conference and the revitalization of the Bandung spirit is a *conditio sine qua non* of their solution. He expressed his conviction that ‘through coming together we can localize the areas of difference between us.’”⁴⁸

In his general statement at the preparatory meeting Ali Sastroamidjojo, leader of the Indonesian delegation and Chairman of the first Bandung Conference, called for “the early convening of the Second Asian-African Conference”, which, according to him, was “actually already long overdue.”⁴⁹ Major emphasis of the Indonesian delegation, as underlined in the working paper submitted by it, was to discuss and to “even emphasise problems which are nearer to our heart, practical in our countries in Africa and Asia, which need our direct and common attention, to seek the possibility of their solution by way of our co-operation and solidarity.” It did not favour discussion on “merely subjects of general international concern”.⁵⁰

Indian Proposals at the Preparatory Meeting

Obviously, Indonesia’s justification for holding the conference early could hardly be acceptable to India. To the Indian leadership, the Indonesian emphasis on development of ideas and concepts, even at the expense of development in the economic field, had little meaning. Neither could India agree to the Indonesian priority for discussing Afro-Asian disputes at the conference. India’s objection to discussing bilateral disputes in the Asian-African gatherings had been well-known. In fact one of the reasons prompting India to actively support the idea of a second non-aligned summit meeting was to avoid this eventuality. The situation in the world as well as in Asia, where both China and Pakistan were attempting to woo Indonesia into an anti-India combination, could hardly be con-

48 Ibid., pp. 48-52.

49 Ibid., pp. 112-15

50 Ibid., p. 115.

sidered congenial for such a conference. It was with these developments in view that India had decided to attend the meeting of Afro-Asian Ministers.

Nevertheless, on reaching Djakarta on April 8, 1964, Swaran Singh, Minister for Food and Agriculture and leader of the Indian delegation, told newsmen that his instructions were to "endeavour in this preparatory conference to make it a success in every way so that the second Afro-Asian conference may take place and may carry forward the work initiated at the first Conference (held in Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955)". This was stated explicitly in order to dispel the impression in Djakarta that India was not interested in holding this conference.⁵¹

In his General Statement at the preparatory meeting on April 11, 1964, however, Swaran Singh made a set of three proposals regarding the composition, timing and venue of the main conference. In short, these were proposing an invitation to Malaysia and the Soviet Union for participation in the conference, and suggesting that the conference be held on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the first 'Bandung' Conference, in April 1965, and at a place in Africa.⁵² These Indian proposals were designed to wrest diplomatic initiative from the three countries, Indonesia, China and Pakistan and thereby, to neutralize their combined hostility towards India.

Swaran Singh's proposal regarding invitation to Malaysia was contained in a Working Paper submitted to the preparatory meeting. It was entitled "Composition of the Second Asian-African Conference". The leader of the Indian delegation justified Malaysia's participation on three grounds, namely, Malaysia's Asian situation, its membership of the United Nations and its recognition by over a hundred countries. He expected that, on the basis of these justifications, many Asian and African countries would support his proposal.⁵³

This proposal had serious implications for India as well as for Indonesia and Pakistan. India, no doubt, must have anticipated that, in view of Indonesia's growing commitment to a "Ganjang" (Crush) Malaysia policy, it would exacerbate anti-Indian sentiment in Indonesia and bring to it the charge of aiding and abetting

51 *The Hindu*, April 11, 1964. See also *Indonesian Herald*, April 10, 1964.

52 *Proceedings of the Meeting of Ministers in Preparation of the Second African-Asian Conference held in Djakarta, Indonesia, April 10-15, 1964* (Djakarta, Organizing Committee, 1964), p. 12.

53 *Ibid.*, p. 41.

British colonialism in the region. Nevertheless, it believed that the advantages accruing from such a policy would be more than the disadvantages. The political situation in Indonesia indicated that even if India stopped pursuing a pro-Malaysia policy, it would make little difference.

Apart from strengthening Indian-Malaysian relations, this policy would force Pakistan to discard its ambiguous attitude towards Indonesia's anti-Malaysia policy and to come out openly either in favour of India's proposal and incur Indonesia's displeasure or against it and incur loss of friendship with Malaysia. In view of Pakistan's all-out effort at this stage to seek Indonesia's categorical support on the Kashmir issue and to woo her into an anti-Indian combination on the continent, Pakistan's negative attitude to the Indian proposal might lead to hard feelings against Pakistan in the ruling circles in Malaysia—a decisive diplomatic gain for India.

With these calculations in mind, it seems, the Indian delegate insistently called for sending an invitation, among others, to Malaysia. Finding it difficult to resolve the deadlock, the preparatory meeting decided, by consensus, to discuss it at a sub-committee level. The sub-committee finally decided to postpone the problem, thus leaving an important issue unresolved. Lest it should put India's *bona fides* as regards the second Asian-African conference in doubt, Swaran Singh accepted the draft submitted by the sub-committee, suggesting postponement of the question of invitation to Malaysia.⁵⁴ He, however, wished to have placed on record India's feeling that Malaysia was fully entitled to be invited to the main conference.⁵⁵

India's proposal for Soviet participation in the second Asian-African conference was made with full awareness of the growing Sino-Soviet schism and their rivalry as manifested at the meetings of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization. It was designed to embarrass, besides China, Indonesia as well. It was known in India then that under growing pressures from the PKI and for some other

54 Ibid., p. 88. The sub-committee draft as decided upon by the preparatory meeting noted the proposal for extending an invitation to Malaysia. It also expressed the hope "that the obstacles which prevented reaching a consensus on the invitation would be eliminated. In this case, an invitation should be extended as soon as possible. Some countries that recognised Malaysia stated their position that Malaysia was fully entitled to an invitation and should be invited."

55 Ibid., p. 47.

reasons, the Indonesian leadership was toeing the Peking line in the Sino-Soviet dispute.⁵⁶ The proposal as such would force upon Indonesia a clear-cut choice between the USSR and People's China. It would also show the degree of success the PKI had achieved in its effort to bring the Indonesian foreign policy in line with that of China and hence its growing political influence on Sukarno's Government. Besides, it implied a difficulty of choice for various Afro-Asian nations between the Soviet Union and China, which might ultimately tend to delay the convening of the main conference, something suitable to India's interests at this stage. In case India succeeded in getting the Soviet Union into the main conference, it would ensure Soviet support to India on its disputes with China and Pakistan as also against the combined hostility of China, Indonesia and Pakistan.

The Indian proposal about the timing of the main conference also had serious implications for these three countries. At least, since the end of 1963, they had been making co-ordinated diplomatic efforts to convene the second Asian-African conference as early as possible. The Chinese Prime Minister, Chou En-lai, had made a long, two-and-a-half-month tour of Africa and Asia between December 1963 and February 1964, in order, among other things, to canvass for the early convening of the second Asian-African conference. Responses to the Chinese and Indonesian overtures in this connection had not been very encouraging. The Africans were generally in favour of holding a second conference of the non-aligned states before a second Asian-African conference was convened. This was confirmed by the outcome of the preparatory meeting of the second conference of the non-aligned countries held in Colombo in March 1964.

56 India knew how at the preliminary meeting of the Afro-Asian journalists' Association (AAJA) in Djakarta on February 15, 1963, Indonesia had opposed the UAR delegation's move to seek Soviet Union's full participation in the main AAJA Conference. The Indian delegation, along with those from Ghana and Lebanon, had then given full support to the UAR move. See *The Statesman* (New Delhi), February 17, 1963. Later, during the first five days of the AAJA Conference in Djakarta from April 24 to 30, 1963, the Indian delegation had taken the initiative to insist on full-fledged participation by the Soviet Union rather than as an observer as agreed to earlier. Although the Presidium of the AAJA, dominated by China and Indonesia, had finally rejected the Indian move on April 28, 1963, it had seriously embarrassed Indonesia whose delegate had continued to support China in its opposition to full participation by the Soviet Union.

Swaran Singh's proposal about the timing was hence an additional source of embarrassment to Indonesia, China and Pakistan. None of these three countries was prepared to take the things lying down. To accept the Indian proposal would be tantamount to accepting diplomatic defeat at the hands of India and the non-aligned group of Asian and African countries. Both Indonesia and Pakistan desired to hold the second Asian-African conference in August 1964. Although they justified it on the ground that it should be held before the UN General Assembly Session, their aim was to take the wind out of the sails of the second non-aligned summit meeting scheduled to take place in Cairo in the first week of October 1964. The Indian proposal, however, was well-conceived for the psychological and historical appeal to Afro-Asian sentiments. The occasion of the tenth anniversary of the first Asian-African Conference was acceptable to a majority of the participants in the preparatory meeting. Even though Indonesia, China and Pakistan desired otherwise, in the face of a majority favouring the Indian proposal, they were left with no choice but to accept it.

The Indian delegate's suggestion about shifting the venue from Asia to Africa was also equally significant in so far as its appeal to the African countries was concerned. Neither China nor Indonesia was disposed to holding the conference in Africa.⁵⁷ It was particularly irritating to Indonesia because it amounted to India's objection to another 'Bandung' conference being held in Indonesia. Such a conference could be useful to Indonesia only if it was held in Indonesia itself. This alone would perpetuate the memory of the "Bandung Dasa Sila" (Ten Principles of the Bandung Conference) and the "Bandung Spirit". But Swaran Singh's proposal to hold the conference in Africa had a justification and appeal which could be resisted only at the expense of African sympathies, which neither Indonesia nor China could afford.

India had reason to be satisfied with the results of the preparatory meeting. By seeking acceptance of his proposal about holding the conference on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the 'Bandung' Conference, in April 1965, Swaran Singh had succeeded in blocking it at least until after the second non-aligned summit. With the general support of a majority of the participants, India had also succeeded in seeking a shift in the venue of the main conference from Asia to Africa.⁵⁸ The only Indian proposal

57 *The Hindu*, April 12, 1964.

58 *Ibid.*

which had not been accepted was about sending invitations to the Soviet Union and Malaysia. But non-acceptance of it could not be interpreted as total rejection. The issue of participation by both the Soviet Union and Malaysia had been left to be settled by a meeting of Foreign ministers immediately preceding the main conference. Although India did not tie its own participation with the question of sending invitations to these two countries, its delegation left no one in doubt about India's strong feelings in this regard. China's and Indonesia's continued opposition to the Soviet and Malaysian participation, as India must have anticipated, would only tend to delay the convening of the conference. By its persistent attitude on this issue, India wanted to use this question as a trump card to achieve the aim of putting off the second Asian-African conference.

Reactions in Indonesia

The Government of Indonesia maintained near silence. Without mentioning India by name, Foreign Minister Subandrio only observed that the preparatory meeting had succeeded in the face of opposition and challenges by certain forces which tried to torpedo the meeting.⁵⁹ Nevertheless, it must have been embarrassed by Swaran Singh's proposals. Despite the Chinese and Pakistani support, it had failed both on the question of timing and venue of the second Afro-Asian conference. Its only success was in seeking postponement of the question of Malaysia's participation. The Indonesian leaders were disappointed to find that it was the Indian delegation which had created all sorts of complications in the way of their foreign policy objectives. In India's effort to link Malaysia issue with the prospects of the second Afro-Asian conference, Indonesia saw an attempt to obstruct its role in the region as well as in Afro-Asia.

The Indonesian Press, however, did not take kindly to India's role at the preparatory meeting. The *Indonesian Herald* editorially charged that India's move to invite the Soviet Union to the main conference was intended only "to embarrass another delegation with which it has a violent conflict at the moment", and held that it would not be "really wise" on the part of India to produce "an unnecessary confrontation" between the Afro-Asian countries and the Soviet Union.⁶⁰ The *Indonesian Observer* referred to Swaran

59 *Summary of World Broadcasts* (SWB), FE/1541/A 3/7-8, April 30, 1964.

60 *Indonesian Herald*, April 14, 1964. See also *Dawn* (Karachi), April 15, 1964.

Singh's proposal to invite Malaysia to the conference and castigated it as "a deliberate attempt by India to wreck Afro-Asian (AA) solidarity, and the solidarity of those countries with the Indonesian people."⁶¹ In its news coverage later, the *Indonesian Herald* described Swaran Singh as "Malaysia Singh".⁶²

The Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) sharply criticized India for its attitude at the preparatory meeting. At a Press conference on April 15, 1964, Chairman Aidit of the Party commented that the success of the preparatory meeting demonstrated the failure of the hopes of the "imperialists, colonialists, the Indian monopoly capitalists and the revisionists" that the meeting would end in failure. He called for vigilance, because, he believed, "they will continue to make mischief."⁶³ While addressing a mass rally in Djakarta six days later, the PKI leader observed: "There is indeed nothing that can hold back the course of history. Even though at the non-bloc conference held in Belgrade in 1961 the revisionists and the Right-wing nationalists like Nehru tried to divert the struggle of the Asian-African people against imperialism from its course, their efforts came to nought".⁶⁴

In the period of five and a half months between the preparatory meeting in Djakarta in April 1964 and the second conference of non-aligned countries in Cairo in October 1964, the tension in India's relations with Indonesia continued to grow. The reason, of course, remained India's pro-Malaysia policy. In the light of Indonesia's continued anti-Malaysia stance and its intensive efforts towards the convening of the second conference of the Asian and African countries, the Indian policies only added to Indonesia's embarrassment. In ideological terms the Indonesian leaders tended to interpret India's attitude as one of aiding and abetting the British colonialist policies in South-East Asia and hindering unity among the Afro-Asian ranks in their struggle against the forces of colonialism and imperialism. Cast in the framework of Sukarno's concept of "NEFOS" versus "OLDEFOS", it amounted to India's giving up its earlier policy of non-alignment and of active opposition to colonialism and imperialism.

Indonesia and India at the Second Non-Aligned Conference

It was against this immediate background that the two countries attended the second Conference of the Non-Aligned States held in

61 *Indonesian Observer*, April 15, 1964.

62 *Indonesian Herald*, April 20, 1964.

63 *SWB*, FE/1532/C/5, April 20, 1964.

64 *Ibid.*, FE/1549/C/3, May 9, 1964.

Cairo from October 5 to 10, 1964. After the first such Conference in Belgrade three years ago, it provided another occasion to their leaders to express their differences openly at a large gathering attended by Heads of State or Government of forty-seven countries.⁶⁵

In the course of his address⁶⁶ to the Conference on October 6, 1964, President Sukarno took up two major themes, namely, the increasing need for Afro-Asian solidarity and the growing irrelevance of the policy of peaceful co-existence in the context of the present international situation. Taking up the first theme, he stated that, although since the first Conference of the Non-Aligned countries many Asian and African peoples had achieved independence, the power of the "OLDEFOS" had "not yet been broken in the substance of their domination. Their power is still felt everywhere." The "OLDEFOS", he asserted, continued to interfere in the affairs of the newly-free countries and, thereby, hindered the process of their social, economic and political regeneration. They also posed a constant danger to the freedom and security of these nations. He was convinced that because of a sharp conflict of interests between the Afro-Asian countries and those highly developed and industrialized in the West, the former could not easily and speedily catch up with the standards of the latter. Hence they continued to be victims of both political and economic exploitation. Therefore, the only alternative open to the "NEFOS", according to President Sukarno, was to "build the huge political power of solidarity among states that face a common foe." This the Indonesian leader described as the sole "end" of all their conferences including the present one.

In this connection the Indonesian President criticized certain countries which put priority on economic development through co-operation with the "OLDEFOS" instead of uniting to oppose them, and, as a result, allow their independence to be compromised. He

65 Only twenty-five countries and three observers participated in the Conference. The forty-seven countries which attended the second Conference belonged to Asia, Africa, Europe and Latin America. For the names of the countries which attended, see United Arab Republic, *Conference of Heads of State and Governments of Non-Aligned Countries, Cairo, October 5-10, 1964* (Cairo, Ministry of National Guidance, Information Administration, n. d.), p. 334.

66 Sukarno, "Address to the Second Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, Cairo, October 6, 1964 (full text), *The Era of Confrontation* (Djakarta, Department of Foreign Affairs of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia, n. d.), pp. 7-23.

was "well aware" of the need for economic and industrial development in order to alleviate the miseries of the people; but he asserted, "our attention to economic development and social welfare" alone "will not work." He declared thus : "We cannot develop economically, nor socially, nor culturally, until we have removed those forces of domination which seek to divide us."

The Indonesian President thus strongly criticized the policy of non-alignment and international co-operation for socio-economic development. Ideologically, it meant Sukarno's taking up a foreign policy line more or less similar to China's view of the world in which "third road" did not exist. More than that, it was a bitter though indirect charge against India for preferring economic and industrial development through co-operation with the West to laying "even the foundations of their own social, economic, political and cultural consolidation, based upon their own national identities", and thus allowing its freedom to be compromised.

The second major theme of Sukarno's speech at the Cairo Conference was concerned with an appraisal of the policy of peaceful co-existence. While analysing the then international situation, he expressed his belief that the two super-powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, had "reached a condition of some balance" of power which would deter them from unleashing of war. So he argued, the threat to security and international peace at present arose not as much from the mutual antagonisms of the two super-powers as from the efforts of the "OLDEFOS" at subversion and interference of all kinds, meant to undermine the independence of the newly independent countries. In this connection he referred to "outside imperialist forces" disturbing the security of Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Malaysia and the surrounding areas, and asked the Non-aligned gathering : "How can peaceful co-existence be applied in cases such as these ?"

It was a subtle move on the part of Sukarno to deflect non-alignment and peaceful co-existence from its original course and bring it in line with his concept of struggle between the "NEFOS" and the "OLDEFOS", a concept which grew more and more congruent to China's foreign policy objectives in the region as well as in Afro-Asia. Viewed from a historical angle, his arguments for Afro-Asian solidarity against the "OLDEFOS" were not different from those he had used at the Belgrade Conference three years earlier. However, what made his argument look more credible than it was at that time was a degree of relaxation perceptible in the international tension since then.

Sukarno's attack on non-alignment and peaceful co-existence did not go unchallenged. In the course of his address⁶⁷ on October 7, 1964, Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri, leader of the Indian delegation to the Conference, stressed priority for "peace" above everything else. Explaining India's stand in this regard, he observed: "First and foremost we believe in peace, in the settlement of all disputes through peaceful means, in the abolition of war and more particularly nuclear war. Secondly, we believe in freedom for the people of each country to follow their destiny without external interference." It was, in fact, a restatement of the position Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had taken at the Belgrade Conference in September 1961. Even in the five-point programme,⁶⁸ which he suggested for adoption by the Conference, the Indian Prime Minister gave top priority to world peace through nuclear disarmament.

While explaining the first three points of his five-point programme, Lal Bahadur Shastri urged upon the Conference to "consider the recent disturbing indications which suggest that China is about to explode a nuclear device." In this connection he outlined the urgent need for "total nuclear disarmament" and proposed the dispatch of "a special mission to persuade China to desist from developing nuclear weapons."⁶⁹

Suggesting solution of border disputes through peaceful means, the Prime Minister of India called for an acceptance of the "customary or traditional boundaries" as the "basis" of these negotiations. He pleaded: "The non-aligned nations should declare their strong opposition to any changes brought about by the open use of force as well as by quiet penetration of borders or subversion of one kind or another." To strengthen his point, he cited

67 For the text of Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri's speech, see *Conference of Heads of State and Governments of Non-Aligned Countries*, n. 65, pp. 103-9.

68 Ibid., p. 104. The order of priority of the five-point programme as suggested by Lal Bahadur Shastri was as under:

1. Nuclear Disarmament.
2. Peaceful settlement of border disputes.
3. Freedom from foreign domination, aggression, subversion and racial discrimination.
4. Acceleration of economic development through international co-operation.
5. Full support for the United Nations and its programmes for peace and development.

69 Ibid., p. 105.

Nehru's remarks made during the second Dutch action against the Indonesian Republic in December 1948, which read :

Where freedom is menaced or justice is threatened or where aggression takes place, we cannot be and shall not be neutral.⁷⁰

This had the advantage of reminding Sukarno of the extent of India's moral and diplomatic support to Indonesia during the Dutch aggression against it. It was meant to highlight both the Chinese' and the Indonesians' approach of changing the borders by the aggressive use of force against India and Malaysia respectively. It was also designed to secure the non-aligned countries' support against such activities.

As regards colonialism, he voiced India's categorical support for the peoples still struggling for freedom. In this connection he expressed his anxiety over the continued existence of colonial oppression in colonies such as Angola, Mozambique and the so-called Portuguese Guinea. He also condemned both the white minority governments of Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, the former for "imposing its will on the majority" and the latter for "illegal and alien rule" over South-West Africa as well as for its racial policies.⁷¹

Besides, while defining his last two points about accelerating "economic development through international co-operation" and about seeking full "support for the United Nations and its programmes for peace and development", Lal Bahadur Shastri came out with a strong defence of the policy of non-alignment and peaceful co-existence.

In the address by the Indian leader the Indonesian delegation came to perceive three major points of difference, namely, India's emphasis on priority for "peace" and "peaceful co-existence" over all other issues including freedom from colonialism, its position on border disputes and its call for approach to China to desist from manufacturing nuclear weapons.

The differences aired by the leaders of the two countries' delegations were carried into the discussions of the Political Committee. On October 7, 1964, at a meeting of the Political Committee formed to draft the Conference Communiqué, Indonesia, with the support of Algeria, Guinea, Mali and Tanganyika, resisted India's effort to seek priority for the word "peace" and "peaceful co-exis-

70 Ibid., p. 106.

71 Ibid., pp. 106-7.

tence". The Indonesian delegation insisted on the insertion of a sentence declaring that peaceful co-existence was impossible until colonialism was liquidated. Finding itself in minority, however, it put up another fight to relegate the word "peace" to the end of the sentence on peaceful co-existence. K. Rangaswami, a correspondent of *The Hindu*, reported in a dispatch from Cairo that there was a sharp conflict of opinion and repeated exchanges between the two delegations. The Political Committee continued its discussions for six long hours when it broke up after a complete stalemate was reached. India was reported to have won the point when the Political Committee agreed to the formula that "the Conference reaffirms its deep conviction that in the present circumstances mankind must recognise peaceful co-existence as the only way to strengthen universal peace based on national freedom, equality and justice."⁷²

India also proposed that "the States shall refrain in their international relations from threat or use of force inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations; and any situation brought about by such threat or use of force shall not be recognised." Indonesia saw in it an implied reference to the Chinese occupation of vast Indian territories following the Chinese invasion of India in October 1962. In line with its pro-China policy, thus, the Indonesian delegation opposed the inclusion of the latter half of the sentence. With the two countries insistent on holding conflicting positions, the Political Committee could not come to any decision and left the issue to be resolved by the Foreign Ministers.

Still another proposal by the Indian delegation called for the inclusion in the Conference Communique of a paragraph suggesting the deputation of a mission to Peking to persuade China to refrain from producing nuclear weapons. This was supported by the delegations of Ceylon, Yugoslavia and the UAR. Perceiving in it an Indian attempt to seek the non-aligned countries' support to keep China out of the nuclear club, the Indonesian delegation, with the help of the delegations from Algeria and Cuba, opposed the Indian proposal. Indonesia was not ready to see the Non-Aligned Conference naming "China as the only bad guy" in this connection and desired instead a resolution in general terms.⁷³ As the Political Committee failed to iron out the differences, it left this question also to be decided by the Foreign Ministers.

72 *The Hindu*, October 9, 1964.

73 *Ibid.* See also *Indonesian Herald*, October 12, 1964.

Indonesia, no doubt, succeeded in blocking the Indian move to seek inclusion in the Conference Communique of a paragraph suggesting the deputation of a non-aligned mission to China in order to dissuade that country from producing nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, it failed to dilute the Indian emphasis on recognition by the Conference of the primary need of maintaining world peace through nuclear disarmament and on the relevance of the policy of non-alignment and peaceful co-existence to the present international situation. To Indonesia's dismay, a substantial majority of the non-aligned countries favoured India's position on various issues before the Conference.⁷⁴ This left Indonesia with some measure of disappointment. President Sukarno did not attend the final session and left it for Foreign Minister Subandrio to sign the Conference Communique. In India it was interpreted as indicative of his dissatisfaction with the final outcome of the Conference.⁷⁵

Fall in Indonesia's Image of India

By the end of 1964, it led to a sharp fall in Indonesia's image of India. Although Government leaders still maintained restraint in their direct references towards India, the Press came to level open charges of "revisionism", of India going out of step with the Afro-Asian struggle against Western colonialism and imperialism and of its siding with the latter. The major reason, of course, was India's continued insistence on seeking Malaysia's participation in the second Afro-Asian conference.

The *Indonesian Herald*, usually expressing Foreign Ministry views, played an important role in the anti-Indian campaign. It editorially analysed both India's political situation and the nature of leadership after the death of Prime Minister Nehru. It noticed "a tendency (in India) to move further from the established Nehru's line of active neutrality into a policy of neo-alignment; from a policy of co-operation with the Afro-Asian countries to a policy of reliance on *necolim* (neocolonial, colonial and imperialist) powers."⁷⁶

74 This is obvious from the Conference Communique. See "Programme For Peace and International Cooperation", in *Conference of Heads of States and Government of Non-Aligned Countries*, n. 65, pp. 334-57.

75 *Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), October 12, 1964.

76 "India's Revisionism" (editorial), *Indonesian Herald*, December 23, 1964. The editorial was a sharp rejoinder to an article which appeared in an issue of *The Stateman* from New Delhi. Referring to this Indian daily's charge of Indonesia joining hands with China in "endangering India's security", the *Indonesian Herald* saw indications of an "openly declared hostility towards Indonesia."

(Contd, on page 179)

It was, if anything, a clear indication of the growing receptivity in Indonesia of the anti-Indian propaganda line emanating from Peking. A week later, the *Indonsian Herald* commented on the "increasing indications of neo-alignment" in India's foreign policy. It criticized India for giving up its traditional "neutral posture and policy of opposition to colonialism and imperialism" and for practically supporting and identifying "herself with certain manifestations of Western policy in Asia and Africa."⁷⁷

In the ensuing days India's prestige continued to decline in Indonesia. Commenting sharply on a news report emanating from New Delhi about India's alleged acquiescence in the United States' scheme to station submarines armed with nuclear missiles in the Asian waters, the *Indonesian Herald* editorially charged that "India had indeed switched from non-alignment to neo-alignment." It observed in conclusion: "India seems to be moving further and further away from the general trend of Afro-Asian aspirations. At a time when the entire Afro-Asians are clamouring for the withdrawal of foreign bases and to solution of regional problems among the countries of the region concerned, India has invited foreign powers to saturate Asian areas with military bases."⁷⁸

Fall in Indonesia's image of India coincided with the growing strength and influence of the PKI at the expense of other Indonesian political parties. Simultaneously, there was an increase in Indonesia's intimacy with China and Pakistan and its active coordination of effort with them on the issue of the second Afro-Asian conference. A few days after Foreign Minister Subandrio's visit to China in January 1965, the *Indonesian Herald* commented on the "possibilities" of the struggle against colonialism and imperialism in India going "in the reverse direction". It saw the danger of India transforming itself "into a gigantic 'Malaysia' complete with *necolim* nuclear umbrella and submarine fleet" and posing "a serious threat to the peace and security as well as independence of the entire Afro-Asian continents."⁷⁹

The anti-Indian trends as evident in the Indonesian Press continued to grow in following months. The major provocation, of

As the term "Revisionism" has an ideological implication and could not appropriately be used for India, the *Indonesian Herald*, by choosing this word for the Indian policy in its editorial, showed the growing degree of influence the PKI had come to enjoy in its editorial board.

77 "The Year 1964 in Review", *Indonesian Herald*, December 30, 1964.

78 Ibid., January 11, 1965.

79 Ibid., February 10, 1965.

course, came from India's persistence in seeking Malaysia's representation at the second African-Asian Conference. The meetings of the Standing Committee of Fifteen Countries (at ambassadorial level) appointed by the Meeting of Ministers in April 1964, provided India with important occasions to reiterate its demand. At the five meetings of the Standing Committee, which took place in Algiers between October 1964 and March 1965,⁸⁰ the Indian Ambassador to Algeria, R. Goburdhun, persistently supported Malaysia's participation in the second Afro-Asian conference. Two of these meetings in December 1964 and March 1965 proved to be quite significant. The representatives of the two countries openly clashed on this issue. In the course of the meeting in December 1964 the Indian delegate forcefully pleaded that the Foreign Ministers and Heads of Government and or State had the right to add to the list of invitees as decided upon by the preparatory meeting in April 1964. He also asserted that as a participant India had the right to propose an invitation to Malaysia, and urged that a decision on this question should be taken by the Foreign Ministers' meeting scheduled to be held just before the main conference. This was to counter the argument of the Indonesian delegate that as no new developments had taken place since the preparatory meeting in Djakarta, there was no need to take up the issue of Malaysian participation. Hopefully for India, except for the Indonesian objections, the Standing Committee as a whole supported the contention of the Indian delegate in this matter.⁸¹

Similarly, during the Standing Committee meeting in March 1965 the Indian delegate once again pleaded for Malaysia's representation in the Afro-Asian conference. He also took up his earlier demand that the Foreign Ministers and Heads of State and or Government had the right to increase the number of participants in the main conference. As earlier, the Indonesian delegate, this time actively helped by the Chinese delegate, tried to block the discussion on the issue. Both the Indonesian and the Chinese representatives claimed that the list of invitees to the conference had already

80 The five meetings of the Standing Committee took place in Algiers on October, 21-22, November 12-13 and December 17-19, 1964, and February 8-9, and March 29, 1965. Indonesia, China, Pakistan and India were among the fifteen Afro-Asian countries represented on the Standing Committee. India was represented by its Ambassador in Algiers, R. Goburdhun.

81 "India Wins First Round Against Djakarta : Inviting Malaysia to Algiers Meet" (Dispatch by Sudhakar Bhat), *Times of India*, January 6, 1965.

been settled at the preliminary talks in Djakarta last year. However, as reported in an Indian daily, the Indian delegate's suggestion that the question of participation by Malaysia be left to be decided by the Foreign Ministers' meeting, was, finally, agreed to by most of the members of the Standing Committee.⁸²

It was highly embarrassing to the Indonesian Government to find that a majority of the members of the Standing Committee of fifteen countries supported India's viewpoint on this issue. The Indonesian leaders feared that India's success in seeking Malaysia's representation at the Afro-Asian conference would be highly prejudicial to its prestige. In order, therefore, to avoid this predicament the Indonesian Press and Government sought to build up pressures on India to stop its pro-Malaysia policy.

Suluh Indonesia, a language daily close to the PNI, saw in India and in its foreign policy indications of moving towards the right. It editorially invited reference to an announcement, emanating from the Indian Information Service in Djakarta, that the Malaysian army and naval staff were preparing for training in the Indian army and naval establishments. Reacting sharply, it wrote that this attitude of the Indian Government had "obviously hurt the feelings of the Indonesian people who are waging a struggle to crush the neo-colonialist project of 'Malaysia'." It regretted that India which once "belonged to the progressive front, the front of fighters against imperialism and colonialism, has now definitely degraded its own prestige by supporting the neo-colonialist project."⁸³

These serious condemnations by the Indonesian Press echoed the Chinese and Pakistani image of India. The Indonesian leaders' growing disenchantment with India became evident during the Dasa Warsa (Tenth Anniversary) celebrations of the first Asian-African Conference held in Djakarta on April 18 and 19, 1965. India's lack of enthusiasm displayed in sending a representative enjoying a status lower than that of Foreign Minister was matched by Indonesia's cool reception accorded to the Indian delegation. Indian Embassy's request to arrange a meeting between C. Subramaniam, the Indian Food Minister and leader of the Indian delegation to the Tenth Anniversary celebrations, and President Sukarno

82 *The Hindu*, April 15, 1965.

83 "India's Attitude" (editorial), *Suluh Indonesia* (Djakarta), April 7, 1965.

was simply ignored.⁸⁴ The mysterious absence of the Indian flag from the Flag Parade⁸⁵ and the unceremonious way in which the Indian delegation was treated was in sharp contrast to the warm reception accorded to the Chinese and Pakistani delegations. It showed the degree of coolness which had developed between the two countries since the signing of the Friendship Treaty in March 1951.

In the course of his inaugural speech on April 18, 1965, President Sukarno also chose to discard his earlier restraint in criticizing India publicly. Before a gathering of representatives of thirty-five Asian and African states, he bracketed India with Formosa, South Korea, South Vietnam and the Arabian Federation and called it a "non-Asian country in Asia".⁸⁶ A month after the Tenth Anniversary celebrations, at a mammoth PKI rally in Djakarta on May 23, 1965, Sukarno claimed that a majority of the Afro-Asian countries opposed Malaysia's participation. To those who still "remain stubborn in supporting the case", he warned: "We will go on without them." He rejected India's plea that it sought Malaysia's participation on grounds of geography and explained that the "principal reason" for his rejection of Malaysia's entry into the forthcoming Algiers Conference was that it had been established against the principles agreed upon in the Manila Agreement and with the express aim of preserving the life-line of imperialism.⁸⁷ Less than three weeks later, on June 11, 1965, Sukarno made a direct attack on India. He commented on India's pro-Malaysia stance and levelled serious accusations against it of having befriended evil contrary to Gandhism and of having forgotten the meaning of "ahimsa" (non-violence) by wounding Indonesia in its heart.⁸⁸ Repeating these charges, Subandrio told newsmen that some countries sometimes ignored Indonesia's fight for ideals and suspected motives of self-interest.⁸⁹

84 *Indian Express* (New Delhi), April 21, 1965. The only reply the Indian Embassy had elicited from the Indonesian Government was that its request had been registered.

85 *Ibid.* It came to light when the Indian Embassy issued a statement that "it appears that the Indian flag was missing from the flag parade." The Indian Ambassador in Djakarta, Perala Ratnam, "immediately brought this to the notice of the Indonesian Foreign Minister, who has sent a reply which is under study", the statement noted.

86 *The Hindu*, April 20, 1965. There were thirty-five full delegates and three non-full delegates. See *Indonesian Herald*, April 19, 1965.

87 *Indonesian Herald*, May 23, 1965.

88 *Ibid.*, June 12, 1965.

89 *Ibid.*

This encouraged the Indonesian Press in its anti-Indian writings. All the papers took up Sukarno's theme of "Gandhism" and "non-violence" and made strong attacks on India and its Government. The *Indonesian Herald* came out with an editorial entitled "Assassination of Gandhism". It severely criticized Lal Bahadur Shastri's Government for its pro-Malaysia policy and declared: "If India forces a rupture, let the anti-*necolim* (anti-colonialism, neo-colonialism and imperialism) forces part with those which work in the service of *necolim* forces."⁹⁰ *Berita Yudha*, a language daily, editorially charged India with having "disgraced" the "Bandung Spirit".⁹¹ "India's role", wrote another language daily, *Suluh Indonesia*, "as a stock-broker of tickets is a challenge to a friend."⁹² Still another language daily, *Warta Bhakti*, expressing pro-Communist views, editorially charged that India had now clearly come forward as the leader of the countries defending 'Malaysia'.⁹³ *Duta Masjarakat* (a language daily of the NU Party) also commented adversely on India's stand on Malaysia and observed that Algeria was a good place for India to show whether it still respected Gandhi's teachings.⁹⁴

It was a clever move by the Indonesian leaders and Press to create pressures on India in order to dissuade it from canvassing for Malaysia's participation in the Algiers conference. But as these pressures led to a sharpening of anti-Indian feeling in Indonesia, it did not augur well for the two countries' relations. In case India continued to pursue its pro-Malaysia policy, it was clear, it might expect certain untoward incidents happening against it in Indonesia.

As the fixed date of the Algiers conference, viz., June 24, 1965, came nearer, Indonesia's criticism of India grew more direct and sharp. Making an indirect reference to India, Foreign Minister Subandrio told newsmen in Djakarta on June 14, 1965: "We are cognizant of the fact that we have enemies who have been working all this time to obstruct the proceedings of the forthcoming Conference."⁹⁵ Five days later, Roeslan Abdulgani, Minister Coordina-

90 Ibid., June 14, 1965.

91 *Berita Yudha* (Djakarta), June 14, 1965.

92 In an editorial on June 14, 1965, *Suluh Indonesia* categorically asserted "that with or without India the Indonesian revolution will march onwards towards its end." See English translation of this editorial in *Indonesian Herald*, June 15, 1965.

93 *Warta Bhakti* (Djakarta), June 12, 1965.

94 "Gandhi Or No Gandhi" (leading article), *Duta Masjarakat* (Djakarta), June 16, 1965.

95 *Indonesian Herald*, June 15, 1965.

tor for Public Relations, charged India with making efforts to smuggle Malaysia into the conference.⁹⁶

The Press did not lag behind. The Foreign Affairs Correspondent of *Berita Yudha* evaluated Indian friendship towards Indonesia and compared it with that of Pakistan, Burma and the Philippines, since the signing of the Friendship Treaty with all these countries in early 1951. Feeling satisfied over the performance on the part of Pakistan, Burma and the Philippines, this Correspondent wrote that, according to Sukarno, India was the one country which was neither true to its own ideals nor to the ten principles of the Bandung Conference. It established India's "untruthfulness" on the basis of India's recognition of Malaysia and India's effort to help Malaysia get into the Second Asian-African conference.⁹⁷ Still more bitter editorial comments came from *Bintang Timur*, a language daily close to the PKI. It refused to believe that India belonged to the Afro-Asian family of nations which were struggling for freedom. Commenting sharply on India's effort to seek Malaysian entry into the conference, it said: "India's subversive action not only betrays the main interests of the people of Indonesia, it has also made India the most humiliating servant of the Imperialists."⁹⁸

Indian Efforts to seek Postponement of the Algiers Conference and Indonesians' Reactions

As the anti-Indian campaign mounted in Indonesia, an event of major importance occurred in Algiers, the capital of Algeria and the venue of the second Afro-Asian conference, just five days before the Foreign Ministers' meeting was scheduled to take place there. On June 19, 1965, a successful coup led to the overthrow of the government of President Ben Bella and the emergence of a new government headed by Colonel Boumedienne. Political uncertainties and personal security risks arising from events in Algiers were bound to have an adverse impact on the prospects of the Algiers conference.

India's aversion to, and its efforts to delay, the second Afro-Asian conference have already been examined. The political developments in Algeria made it easier for India to effectively mobilize the Afro-Asian opinion in favour of its view. Within two days of

96 Ibid., June 21, 1965.

97 "The Way of Indian Friendship" (Foreign Affairs Correspondent of "Yudha"), *Berita Yudha*, June 16, 1965.

98 See English translation of this editorial in *Indonesian Herald*, June 21, 1965.

the coup, thirteen Heads of State or Government, including the Indian Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri, who were attending the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' meeting in London and were expected to participate in the Algiers conference, met to assess the situation arising from the political disturbances in Algeria. After deliberations, they issued an appeal saying : "In view of the importance of the Conference and its objectives they are of the opinion that it would be preferable to postpone the Afro-Asian Conference for the present."⁹⁹ This appeal for postponement which was renewed two days later, was significant in that it had been signed by delegates of nine African and four Asian countries including Pakistan.

In the meantime, however, the Indian official delegation left for Algiers on June 21, 1965, to participate in the Foreign Ministers' meeting scheduled for June 24, 1965. On reaching Algiers the Indian delegation engaged itself in consultations with the other delegations and impressed upon them the need for postponing the conference to some other date. Having thus been assured of support from various Asian and African countries, the Indian delegation decided to sponsor a resolution in the Foreign Minister' meeting asking for postponement of the summit conference as well as the Foreign Ministers' meeting.¹⁰⁰

Naturally, the Indonesians' feelings against India were bitter. The Government of Indonesia was anxious that India and other Commonwealth countries should not take advantage of the coup in Algiers in seeking postponement of the conference. In order to forestall that possibility it accorded recognition to the new government of Colonel Boumedienna immediately the day following the coup and reaffirmed its decision to attend the Algiers conference.¹⁰¹ The Indonesian Government also intensified its diplomatic efforts to ensure that the Afro-Asian conference took place as scheduled. President Sukarno, at the head of the Indonesian delegation, left Djakarta for Algiers on June 26, 1965. In Cairo, enroute to Algiers, he entered into long parleys with President Nasser and Prime Minister Chou En-lai who was already there. The three leaders

99 Government of India, *Foreign Affairs Record* (Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi), vol. 11, no. 9, September 1965, p. 260.

100 Ibid.

101 *Indonesian Herald*, June 21, 1965. All the prominent language dailies like *Berita Yudha*, *Duta Masjarakat*, *Suluh Indonesia*, *Bintang Timur*, *Angkatan Bersendjata* and *Harian Rakjat*, in their issues of June 21, 1965, hailed the Government decision

assessed the prospects of the conference in the light of recent political developments in Algiers on the one hand and the efforts of India and other Commonwealth countries seeking postponement of the conference on the other. On June 27, 1965, the three leaders approved the decision of the Standing Committee to postpone the Foreign Ministers' meeting to October 28, 1965 and the summit conference to November 5, 1965.¹⁰² The following day President Ayub Khan also joined them.¹⁰³ On June 30, 1965, a joint communique issued in Cairo by the Heads of Governments of Indonesia, China, Pakistan and the UAR confirmed the decision for postponement.¹⁰⁴

India had, no doubt, succeeded in mustering enough Afro-Asian support to block the Algiers conference. Its success, however, could be attributed not so much to its own diplomatic efforts as to the two other mutually complementary reasons : the coup in Algeria on the eve of the conference and the African States' growing unwillingness to attend it. On June 26, 1965, the day Foreign Ministers' meeting was due to take place (the date had been changed from June 24 to June 26), only thirty-five out of a total of sixty-five delegations had come to participate in the meeting. In fact the public justification for India's plea to postpone the conference was the absence of many African states as well as reluctance of many of those present in Algiers to participate in it. India interpreted it as conducive to disunity rather than unity among the Afro-Asian ranks and hence its delegation "worked hard" to seek postponement of the conference.¹⁰⁵

102 Ibid., June 29, 1965. The decision to postpone the summit conference and the Foreign Ministers' meeting to November 5 and October 28, respectively had been taken by the Standing Committee of Ambassadors at its extraordinary meeting on June 26, 1965. With the representatives of Indonesia, China and the UAR having abstained from the meeting, the Standing Committee had arrived at the decision unanimously. The Ethiopian representative sponsored the resolution and the Pakistani delegate co-sponsored it. See also *Foreign Affairs Record*, n. 99.

103 Ibid., June 30, 1965. On way back home from London (where he had gone to attend the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' meeting), on June 28, 1965, President Ayub Khan made a short three-hour halt at Cairo on a special request by Presidents Sukarno and Nasser. He, however, sought their agreement to Foreign Minister Bhutto joining them in their talks as his special representative.

104 Ibid., July 2, 1965.

105 In a statement to both Houses of the Indian Parliament on September 8, 1965, the Deputy Minister for External Affairs, Dinesh Singh, listed two reasons for postponement: "The appeal of the 13 Asian-African Heads of State/Government" issued in London on June 21, 1965 and the absence of a large majority of African states from the Algiers meeting. See *Foreign Affairs Record*, n. 99.

SECOND ASIAN-AFRICAN CONFERENCE

To the Indonesian leadership which had been straining its nerves to see that the Algiers conference took place as scheduled, it was nothing short of a diplomatic rebuff. It came to see clearly how by insisting on Malaysia's participation in the second Afro-Asian conference, and later, by openly canvassing for the postponement of the conference itself, India had been actively impeding Indonesia's aspirations for a regional as well as Afro-Asian role.

This further hardened the Indonesian attitude towards India. The Chinese and Pakistani propaganda against India only promoted further tension in the two countries' relations. The accumulated mass anger, whipped up by official statements and Press editorials, burst out into the open on June 23, 1965, the day on which India and other Commonwealth countries renewed their appeal for postponement of the conference. For the second time in the preceding two years and ten months, there were anti-Indian demonstrations and the stoning of the Indian Embassy in Djakarta. A 2,000-strong mob of the Indonesians first gathered at the National Front headquarters and later marched on to the Indian Embassy. The demonstrators included workers from the constituent parties of the National Front, especially, the PKI, and the NU. They raised slogans calling India an "imperialist stooge". They also carried banners which read: "Shastri and Tengku Abdul Rahman are imperialist henchmen." A delegation of the demonstrators handed over a memorandum to the Indian Ambassador, Ferala Ratnam, demanding among other things withdrawal of support to Malaysia.¹⁰⁶

This showed the degree of Indonesia's alienation from India growing ever since the first Conference of the Non-Aligned states in Belgrade in September 1961. The anti-Indian demonstrations in Djakarta in June 1965, second time since the "Sondhi Affair" in September 1962, could thus be related to India's continued lack of enthusiasm in and, at later stages, to its active efforts to seek postponement of, the second Afro-Asian conference. India's active moral and diplomatic support to Malaysia and its continued insistence on Malaysia's participation in the second Afro-Asian conference proved to be a major plank of its policy towards Indonesia and consequently a strong irritant to the Indonesian leaders.

In the following three months there was no let up in the Indonesian attitude of hostility towards India. The Indo-Pakistan conflict in September 1965 rather gave a further edge to it. Indo-

nesia came out openly in support of Pakistan against India. But the events following the coup on October 1, 1965, led to a drastic change in the pattern of domestic politics. On the allegations of complicity in the coup, the PKI became the target of attack. Side by side, there followed mob attacks on the overseas Chinese community in Indonesia. Both President Sukarno and Foreign Minister Subandrio, who had formulated and executed the policy of "axis" with China and who still insisted on the continuance of this policy, fell increasingly out of step with the demands and urges of the army leadership, of various anti-Communist political parties, mass organizations and student groups.

In October-November 1965, some parts of Indonesia were in the grip of a near civil war situation. Naturally, there were uncertainties about the directions of Indonesian foreign policy. Under pressure from various corners, Subandrio seemed to be losing his grip on the country's foreign policy. This became obvious when, at the 15-nation Ambassadorial Standing Committee meeting in Algiers on October 14, 1965, the Indonesian delegate refused to toe the Chinese line. Keeping in view anti-Communist and anti-Chinese wave in Indonesia and the inevitably adverse impact it could have on Indonesia's attitude towards China, the Chinese delegate had spoken against the holding of the second Afro-Asian conference scheduled for November 5, 1965. Whereas the Pakistani representative had supported the Chinese contention, the Indonesian representative had spoken in favour of holding the conference as scheduled.¹⁰⁷ As the Indonesian stand was opposed to the Chinese position, it could be noted as the earliest indication of a change in Sukarno's pro-China policy. Curiously enough, finding Indonesia opposed to the Chinese move to seek postponement of the conference, the Indian representative called for holding the conference as scheduled. Thus, for the first time since many years, the two countries, India and Indonesia, seemed to be adopting a common point of view towards the holding of the second Afro-Asian conference.

This change in Indonesia's pro-China posture got strengthened in due course of time. China continued its efforts to seek postponement of the conference. At the Standing Committee meeting on October 25, 1965, the Chinese delegate made a last-ditch effort to see that both the Afro-Asian Foreign Ministers' meeting and the summit conference were postponed. He proposed that a special

107 *The Hindu*, October 16, 1965.

Foreign Ministers' meeting, unrelated to the second conference of Afro-Asian States, be held in order to discuss his proposal for postponement. The Chinese proposal was co-sponsored by Cambodia and seconded by Pakistan. The Indonesian representative was, however, reported to have joined a majority of the participants including India in opposing the Chinese move and in urging for the convening of the conference as fixed. The Chairman of the Standing Committee, the Algerian Foreign Minister, Boute Flika, thus ignored the Chinese move and ruled that the Foreign Ministers' meeting preparatory to the second Afro-Asian conference be held as scheduled. This was a strong Afro-Asian rebuff to the Chinese manoeuvres.¹⁰⁸

Later, under the Chinese threat to boycott the conference,¹⁰⁹ were it held as scheduled, at a 10-hour long meeting on the night of October 31, 1965, the Foreign Ministers agreed in principle to adjourn the summit conference scheduled for November 5, 1965.¹¹⁰ The Foreign Ministers met again on November 2, 1965, and finally decided to postpone indefinitely the second Afro-Asian summit conference.¹¹¹

Thus, the second Afro-Asian conference, for which both China and Pakistan had offered active moral and diplomatic support to Indonesia during 1961-1965, failed to materialize. This removed a major irritant in the Indian-Indonesian relations.

108 A majority of the participants in the Standing Committee meeting on October 25, 1965, were opposed to China's proposal for postponement and wanted the conference to be held as scheduled. The semi-official Algerian news agency (APS), on October 27, 1965, criticized China for its postponement bid and said: "Today the situation is reversed. A majority of countries are asking not for postponement, but for the Conference to be held." See *The Hindu*, October 28, 1965.

109 The Chinese threat was contained in the Chinese Government statement issued on October 26, 1965. See text of the statement in *Survey of China Mainland Press* (Hongkong), no. 3568, October 29, 1965, pp. 22-23.

110 *The Hindu*, November 2, 1965.

111 *Ibid.*, November 3, 1965.

China's Role

During the period under study, China proved to be a significant external factor adversely affecting the Indian-Indonesian relations. Until 1961, however, it played only a marginal role. In the early years of the Indonesian independence this could be safely attributed to the severe criticism by the Chinese of the Indonesian nationalist leaders. A Chinese Communist analyst described the "Indonesian independence and liberation" as "superfluous", termed the Sukarno-Hatta leadership as *compradore bourgeoisie*, and even fascist stooges of the Japanese occupation period" and observed: "They have the same outlook as the Nehru's, Jinnah's, Luang Phibun Songgram's, Quirino's, Syngman Rhee's—and that of other feeble-minded bourgeoisie of the East."¹

Such bitter criticism by the Chinese of the Indonesian leaders was hardly conducive to the growth of normal relations between the two countries. It was in sharp contrast to the moral and diplomatic support that, at this stage, India was offering to the Indonesians against the Dutch. When following the second Dutch "police action" in December 1948, India decided to convene the Asian Conference in order to support Indonesia's case against the Dutch, the Chinese Communists did not view the Indian initiative favourably. Instead of supporting Indonesia, they criticized India and chose to minimize the significance of its role.²

Another reason which inhibited China from emerging as a powerful factor in Indian-Indonesian relations was the Chinese foreign policy stance of seeing the world as essentially divided into two ideological blocs, the imperialist and the anti-imperialist. As early as July 1, 1949, Mao Tse-tung categorically declared: "...we must lean to one side...either to the side of imperialism or to the

1 C. Chang, "New Developments in the Indonesian Situation", *China Digest* vol. 4, no. 12, October 19, 1948, p. 9 and Sha Ping, "Lessons from Indonesia"; *China Digest*, vol. 5, no. 12, April 5, 1949, p. 5.

2 "Asian Conference and Asia's Future" (The Observer), *China Digest*, vol. 5, no. 8, February 8, 1949, p. 13.

side of socialism. Sitting on the fence will not do, nor is there a third road.”³ Although it was this stance of the Chinese foreign policy which was later reflected in Sukarno’s concept of “NEFOS” versus “OLDEFOS”, at least at this stage the Indonesian leaders opted for a policy of non-alignment similar in essence to that of India. The ideological framework of the Chinese foreign policy left little scope for Indonesia’s “independent and active” foreign policy.

Indonesian Attitude Towards China Following the Bandung Conference, April 1955

During Prime Minister Chou En-lai’s visit to Indonesia in connection with the first Asian-African Conference in Bandung, the signing of the Dual Nationality Agreement on April 22, 1955 put the two countries’ relations on a different plain. By making what Professor Herbert Feith interpreted as “an unprecedented concession” over the overseas Chinese issue,⁴ China sought to earn the Indonesian goodwill and friendship. Subsequently, the Indonesian leaders reciprocated it by offering full support to China on the Taiwan question.⁵ It demonstrated, if anything, Indonesia’s readiness to share China’s opinion on American intervention in China’s affairs in the framework of the United States’ “Two-China” theory.

This led to a host of Indonesian goodwill and cultural delegations visiting China during 1956. In this connection Sukarno’s visit to China provided a very valuable opportunity. China used this occasion to play up the Indonesian feeling of national identity. Besides, showing a deep understanding of Sukarno’s top position in Indonesia, the Chinese Government sought to cultivate him by offering a massive welcome to him.

The statements and speeches made on various occasions during Sukarno’s visit revealed a close identity of views on the foreign

3 “On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship”, *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, (Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1961), vol. 4, p. 415.

4 Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*, (Ithaca, New York, 3rd printing, 1968), p. 390. See also Donald E. Willmott, *The National Status of the Chinese in Indonesia, 1900-1958*, (Monograph Series, Modern Indonesia Project) (Ithaca, New York, Cornell University, 1961), p. 47. Willmott quotes *Keng Po* of April 26, 1955 (a Chinese language daily from Djakarta) as having written that the Chinese delegation had “given in” to almost every proposal of the Indonesian delegation.

5 On his return home from China Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo observed: “China’s exercise of its sovereignty over Taiwan is purely a matter of internal affairs.” See *People’s China* no. 13, July 1, 1955, p. 12.

policy goals of the two countries. The Chinese were happy to note Sukarno's repeated emphasis on anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism.⁶ Besides, the two sides offered categorical support to each other on the specific issues of importance to each, viz., the issues of West Irian and Taiwan.⁷ Thus the two countries succeeded in founding the bases and field for mutual co-operation.

Sukarno's visit to China left deep impressions on his mind and, subsequently, had significant impact on political developments in Indonesia. With the gradual decline of democratic institutions, Sukarno's introduction of the concept of "Guided Democracy" in February 1957 and his decree of July 5, 1959, effecting return to the 1945 Constitution, made him an undisputed leader of Indonesia. Another parallel development was the emergence of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) as a strong factor in Indonesian politics. The two other encouraging factors for China were Sukarno's emphasis on discarding Communist-phobia in the domestic politics and his increasingly anti-colonialist posture in the field of foreign policy. The Chinese might have calculated that it would ensure the growing strength and political influence of the PKI on the one hand and Sukarno's increasing commitment to anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism on the other.

These developments were a source of satisfaction to China, and China continued to cultivate Sukarno by extolling him as a champion of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism in South-East Asia as well as in Afro-Asia. Moreover, China praised the Ten Bandung Principles whenever an occasion arose and joined Indonesia in celebrating the anniversaries of the first Asian-African Conference. China also continued to give militant moral and diplomatic support to Indonesia on the West Irian issue. Unlike India, China reacted favourably to the anti-Dutch activities in Indonesia, following the failure of the General Assembly of the United Nations to pass on November 29, 1957 an Afro-Asian Resolution on West Irian by a two-thirds majority.⁸ China also

6 In this connection, see Foreign Minister Chen Yi's statement in *Survey of China Mainland Press* (SCMP-Hongkong) no. 1392, October 18, 1956, p. 14.

7 See statements by Mao Tse-tung and Sukarno on West Irian and Taiwan questions as quoted in Wang-En-yuan, "President Sukarno in Peking" *People's China*, no. 21, November 1, 1956, pp. 11-12.

8 See "China and the World" column in *People's China*, no. 24, December 16, 1957, p. 44. The Afro-Asian Resolution had called upon the Netherlands and Indonesia to resume negotiations for resolving the West Irian dispute.

(Contd. on page 194)

offered full support to Sukarno's Government during the regional rebellions in 1957-1958.⁹ Besides, China was reported to have given some arms aid to the Central Government in Djakarta during these rebellions.¹⁰

Difficulties over the Overseas Chinese Issue and Patching up of Sino-Indonesian Differences

At a time when the two Governments were in the process of consolidating their relations, an issue of importance to both arose. It had a considerably adverse effect on their relations. The issue related to the overseas Chinese community in Indonesia.

The anti-Chinese actions which continued in Indonesia in spite of the Dual Nationality Agreement of April 1955, became still more severe following the Presidential Regulation of November 1959.¹¹ These could be related to the rough treatment meted out by Foreign Minister Chen Yi to Foreign Minister Subandrio during the latter's visit to China in October 1959.¹² On his return from Peking Subandrio was reported to have complained that in China he was "treated like a school boy".¹³ The Chinese adverse criticism and allegations of "unjustified discrimination and persecution" of their "compatriots" in Indonesia prompted Subandrio to say: "Frankly speaking, I and many other statesmen in Asia think that this attitude of People's China is a puzzle." He added that if China wanted to settle its claims regarding Indonesia or India by mere

For India's reactions to the anti-Dutch developments in Indonesia following the negative U.N. vote on the Afro-Asian Resolution on West Irian, see Chapter on the Background, p. 49.

- 9 "Statement on U.S. Intervention in Indonesia", by the Government of China, *Peking Review*, vol. 1, no. 12, May 20, 1958, pp. 21-22.
- 10 "India's Image in the Eyes of Indonesia", (South-East Asia Correspondent), *The Hindu* (Madras), March 10, 1965.
- 11 For an account of the anti-Chinese measures in Indonesia, see Donald E. Willmott, n. 4, pp. 49-50 and "Indonesia: Peking's Lengthening Shadow" (The Week's Notes), *Eastern Economist* (New Delhi-Weekly), vol. 33, no. 24, December 11, 1959. The Presidential Regulation prohibited the Chinese entry into rural areas and, in effect, meant to uproot the Chinese retail traders from there. See *The Statesman* (New Delhi), January 15, 1960.
- 12 See Colina MacDougall, "The Chinese in Indonesia", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, vol. 32, no. 8, May 25, 1961, p. 363.
- 13 Mahesh Chandra, "Soekarno Still Biggest Force in Indonesia: Alternative Leadership Hard to Find", *The Statesman* (New Delhi), May 27, 1960.

force, this could be regarded as outright expansionism.¹⁴ In his letter to the Chinese Foreign Minister he pointedly referred to "provocative external pressures and instructions" to the overseas Chinese. He also refuted Chen Yi's contention of Chinese Contribution to the development and growth of the Indonesian economy in these words: "On the strength of concrete evidences (of their anti-Indonesian bona fides), there is no reason whatsoever for the Indonesian people to feel indebted to the overseas Chinese, either in the past or at present." Subandrio also expressed his Government's determination to resolve all matters "without in any way prejudicing the principles of mutual respect between the two parties."¹⁵

This, in a sense, represented Indonesia's assertion of its sovereign rights in the face of China's attempt at intimidation. It demonstrated to the Chinese the fact that their relations with Indonesia could be based only on "the principles of mutual respect" and non-interference. China also could not afford to displease Sukarno who had been insisting on the establishment of a NASAKOM government (a government representing nationalist, religious and communist forces) at home and a radical anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist policy abroad. Moreover, China must have calculated that by resisting the Indonesians' demands on this issue, it would promote nothing but ill-will against itself among the Indonesian leaders and would, as well, jeopardize the chances of the PKI emerging as a dominant political force in the country.

These considerations seem to have weighed with the Chinese and prompted them to make efforts to defuse the overseas Chinese issue. Thus, by the middle of August 1960, they gave indications of doing so and set a process of normalization.¹⁶ The Indonesians on their part showed an equal degree of urgency in agreeing to resolve the dispute. Obviously, once China had consented to Indonesia's demands on the issue and agreed to show full respect for its sovereign status, there was nothing left for the Government to

14 T.V. Kunhi Krishnan, "Chinese Peril in Indonesia", *Swarajya*, (Madras—Weekly,) vol. 4, no. 27, January 9, 1960, p. 14. For the Chinese criticism, see Chen Yi's letter of December 9, 1959 to Subandrio and Renmin Ribao editorial of 1959, pp. 6-7 and pp. 8-9 respectively.

15 *Antara News Bulletin*, January 28, 1960. See also *The Statesman* (New Delhi), January 29, 1960.

16 The Chinese leaders indicated their soft approach by attending Indonesia's National Day celebrations in Peking on August 17, 1960. See Colina Mac-Dougall, n. 12.

press further. President Sukarno, who had praised the Chinese model, found himself nearer in ideological goals and aims to China and saw in it a great bulwark of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism, capable of and willing to help achieve the Indonesian foreign policy objectives in the region, also came to prefer friendly rather than a hostile China.

Thus, by the beginning of 1961 the two countries virtually succeeded in removing the major points of friction and estrangement between them. This is evident from the conclusion of the Sino Indonesian Friendship Treaty during Foreign Minister Chen Yi's visit to Indonesia in March-April 1961. The joint communique issued on this occasion listed the two countries' "full support" to each other on issues of importance to them.¹⁷ Chen Yi utilized this occasion to soften the ill-will created towards Subandrio during the latter's visit to China in October 1959. His visit also enabled the Chinese to perceive that their fundamental interests as regards the Afro-Asian unity and solidarity against colonialism and imperialism were "identical" to those of Indonesia.¹⁸ With the passage of time, this ideological convergence of the two countries' goals grew closer and led to the strengthening of their relations.

In this context President Sukarno's visit to China in June 1961 proved quite significant. As in October 1956, China utilized this opportunity to play up and cultivate the Indonesian leader by offering a "warm and brilliant" welcome to him.¹⁹ The joint communique, as usual, contained references of mutual support on issues of direct importance to the two countries.²⁰

Not surprisingly, the potentially difficult question of the overseas Chinese community in Indonesia received very little attention during these visits. In the light of China's overall objectives in Asia and Africa and especially in view of the increasing tension on the Sino-Indian borders at this stage, it was quite natural for China to minimize the importance of this issue. The interests of the overseas Chinese as well as those of the PKI also prompted China to maintain reticence on it.

Anti-Indian Motivations of China's Attitude Towards Indonesia

China's cordial posture towards Indonesia could be ascribed

17 *Peking Review*, vol. 4, no. 14, April 7, 1961, pp. 7-8.

18 *Ibid.*, p. 6.

19 *Ibid.*, vol. 4, no. 24, June 16, 1961, pp. 8-9.

20 *Survey of China Mainland Press* (SCMP—Hongkong), no. 2521, June 21, 1961, pp. 31-33.

to a growing realization in China of its isolation in Asia. China found itself estranged from its three neighbours, Burma, Nepal and India on the border question, and with three of the important non-aligned states, India, the UAR and Indonesia. Its dogmatic and big-power policies had distorted China's image in Asia and Africa. This forced Peking to undertake a reappraisal of its external relations and modify its policies towards certain countries.

Of all the countries in Asia, China perceived India to be its potential rival. Following the Tibetan rebellion in early 1959, the flight of the Dalai Lama to India and his reception by the Indian officials in April 1959, relations between India and China had already been "almost fatally poisoned". By then, for China the Indians had changed from votaries of the "Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence" into "expansionists" in league with the "British imperialists".²¹ Subsequently, China's claim to large chunks of Indian territory in the north-eastern and western sectors of its Himalayan borders led to a bitter boundary dispute between the two countries. The resultant tension on border dispute led in October 1959 to a clash between an Indian patrol party and the Chinese "frontier guards". The Chinese soldiers opened fire, killing nine and capturing ten Indian personnel.

The Sino-Indian border dispute, in due course, assumed the shape of a "vast political confrontation" between the two states. It became a function of the Chinese foreign policy to discredit India and its policy of non-alignment. Prime Minister Nehru, in this connection, became a special target of the Chinese attack. China undertook to demolish India's image by highlighting India's failures in the economic field. Nehru's policy of friendship with both blocs, of receiving economic aid from both, of making gradual progress under a system of mixed economy and a democratic framework, became subject of severe Chinese criticism. The major charge against India was, however, its growing dependence on the aid from the United States and other West European countries for economic and industrial development.

In ideological terms, China described India's non-alignment as a "myth", because, according to it, it was weighted in favour of the Western countries. China saw the world divided between colonialists and imperialists on the one side and anti-colonialists and anti-imperialists on the other. In this framework there was no

21 Vidya Prakash Dutt, *China's Foreign Policy, 1958-1962* (Bombay, 1964) pp. 196-98.

room for those who adhered to peaceful co-existence between the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. Pursuing a policy of non-alignment and peaceful co-existence, it was thus inevitable for India to become a subject of severe condemnation by the Chinese.

Looking upon India as "the chief obstacle to its objectives in Asia", China adopted a systematic policy of damaging India's image in Asia and Africa. China sought to portray India and its leaders as completely reactionary in domestic policies and the Indian foreign policy of non-alignment as a "myth".²²

Besides denigrating India in the eyes of the Afro-Asian and non-aligned states in general, China also attempted to isolate India from its neighbours. It successfully signed with Burma the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Non-Aggression and the Agreement on the Boundary Question in January 1960 and with Nepal a boundary agreement as well as an economic agreement in March 1960. China also changed its posture towards Pakistan and, in view of the latter's abiding hostility towards India, entered into a boundary agreement with it on March 2, 1963.

China's overtures towards Indonesia may thus be seen against the background of China's growingly hostile posture towards India. The major Chinese objective, which is easily perceivable from its attitudes on various occasions and towards various issues of conflict between India and Indonesia, was to drive a wedge between these two countries and to isolate India from its friends and neighbours.

China and the Belgrade Conference

The first Conference of the Non-aligned countries in Belgrade in September 1961 provided China with a significant opportunity to assess the nature and degree of differences between India and Indonesia. The differences as China perceived were both at ideological and personal levels. In the course of his address to the Conference, President Sukarno had elaborated his concept of conflict between the "NEFOS" and the "OLDEFOS" on the ideological front. Identifying the former as forces seeking "independence and justice" and the latter as the ones seeking domination through "imperialism—colonialism", he had categorically declared that between these two "there can be no co-existence."²³ China viewed it as marking a clear

²² Ibid., pp. 209-11.

²³ Government of the Republic of Indonesia, "Address by President Sukarno in the Opening Session of the Conference, 1 September 1961", *Indonesia and the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, Beograd, September 1961* (Djakarta, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1962), p. 24.

departure from Prime Minister Nehru's view of non-alignment and getting closer to its own interpretation of this policy described as "unidirectional—against the West".²⁴ Sukarno's view of the world in the framework of this concept was found to be congruent to its (China's) own ideological stance of seeing the world as divided into two blocs, the imperialist and the anti-imperialist, with no "third road" existing between them. As China thought, this would ensure Indonesia's commitment to a policy of opposition to colonialism and imperialism in the region, as well as in Asia and Africa. China also hoped that this would become the basis of co-operation and friendship between the two countries. If India persisted in its preference for non-alignment and peaceful co-existence between the two power blocs headed by the United States and the Soviet Union, it would automatically become the target of Indonesian hostility.

Besides noting ideological divergence between India and Indonesia, China also saw a growing sense of alienation between Prime Minister Nehru and President Sukarno. A significant pointer in this direction was Sukarno's ignoring of Nehru's invitation to visit New Delhi on way to Belgrade.²⁵ The two leaders had also, for the first time, expressed their divergent approach to issues of colonialism and world peace openly in a gathering of heads of state or government of twenty-five non-aligned countries. This showed the extent of conviction with which each held his opinion on these issues.

Having thus assessed the nature and degree of Indian-Indonesian differences, China geared its Press and other propaganda machinery to distort India's and Prime Minister Nehru's image among the Indonesian elite group. Both at ideological and personal level, it endeavoured to cultivate and play up the Indonesian leaders against the Indian Prime Minister. The Chinese Press took the line of argument that the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries was some kind of a continuation of the Bandung Conference.²⁶ The *People's Daily* viewed opposition to imperialism and "new and old colonialism" as the keynote of the Conference. It asserted: "This is the common voice of all peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America and also the common will of all people who cherish peace and justice."²⁷

24 Sheldon W. Simon. *The Broken Triangle : Peking, Djakarta and the PKI* (Baltimore, 1969), p. 16.

25 See Chapter on the Background, pp. 38-39.

26 *Peking Review*. vol. 4, no, 37, September 15, 1961, p. 7.

27 *The Statesman* (New Delhi), September 11, 1961.

Naturally, Nehru, who had refused to share this "common voice" and "common will" and attempted to give less importance to the issue of colonialism and imperialism, was subjected to Chinese criticism. Commenting adversely on Nehru's attitude in this connection, *Jenmin Jih-pao* (People's Daily) wrote in an editorial thus: "Somebody at the Conference advanced also this argument: 'The era of classical colonialism is gone and dead', and that anti-colonialist, anti-imperialist and anti-racial discrimination problems were secondary. Such argument is obviously and totally contrary to the facts." "In the face of...facts", it asked, "what purpose can the argument that 'colonialism is dead' serve except to give cover to colonialism and imperialism?"²⁸ It was as much an attack on Nehru's personal image as on his policy of non-alignment.

Side by side with its criticism of India and its leaders, the Chinese Press bolstered Sukarno and, by asserting that "colonialism and imperialism have not passed away", it fully endorsed his thesis as opposed to that held by Nehru.²⁹ *Renmin Ribao* (People's Daily), writing editorially, gave wide coverage to the anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist emphasis by various non-aligned Afro-Asian leaders. However, of all the participants in this Conference, it considered Sukarno's speech as "important".³⁰

China's efforts, in this connection, did not go unnoticed in India. The Indian Press was quick to perceive it. *The Hindu* published a dispatch titled "Belgrade Talks : Peking Runs Down Nehru's Role". Describing it as "tendentious press campaign", it observed that all efforts were being made towards minimizing the significance of Nehru's role at the Non-Aligned Conference. *The Hindu* noted *New China News Agency (NCNA)* taking cue from the Indonesian (and Pakistani) Press and flashing reports under the headlines such as "India's manoeuvres rebuked at the non-aligned countries' conference", "Indonesian paper criticizes India's attitude in Belgrade", and "Nehru criticized at Belgrade, says a Pakistani paper". The Indian daily also noted *NCNA*'s effort to make out that India's attitude at the Conference had virtually isolated it.³¹

28 *SCMP*, no. 2578, September 14, 1961, p. 30. See *People's Daily* correspondent Peng's notes from Belgrade. The fact that the Chinese correspondent omitted reference to the other half of Nehru's sentence which read: "though it survives and gives a lot of trouble yet", showed a deliberate effort on his part to paint a distorted image of the Indian Prime Minister.

29 *Peking Review*, vol. 4, no. 37, September 15, 1961, p. 6.

30 *Ibid.*, p. 5.

31 *The Hindu* (Madras), September 9, 1961.

It could be interpreted as a deliberate Chinese effort to highlight the Indian-Indonesian differences and simultaneously play up Sukarno and run down Nehru. By eulogizing Sukarno's stress on priority for the issue of colonialism and imperialism, China also endeavoured to divide the non-aligned countries into two groups, one supporting Sukarno's view and the other favouring Nehru's approach. It was, if any thing, a clear indication of China's intention to play a divisive role in Indian-Indonesian relations. No less was it a reminder to Nehru that the era of *Panch Sheel* and peaceful co-existence was over and had yielded ground to active rivalry and hostility between the two big Asian nations.

China and the "Sondhi Affair"

The "Sondhi Affair" during the Fourth Asian Games in Djakarta in September 1962 provided China with another such opportunity. China exploited the incident to strengthen Indonesian ill-will towards India. Realizing the potentialities of the incident, the Chinese Press gave wide publicity to the anti-Indian feeling brewing in Indonesia over Sondhi's statement of August 27, 1962. Prominent in its coverage was the Indonesian Minister of Trade Suharto's reaction against India.³²

On September 4, 1962, the second day of the anti-Indian demonstrations in Djakarta, the Chinese Press highlighted the incident. Besides publishing anti-Sondhi and anti-Indian statements emanating from Djakarta, it also reported the Pakistani and Ceylonese representatives' criticism of Sondhi's attempt to change the name of the Games, linking it with the prestige of Indonesia.³³ *Jen-min Jih-pao* came out with three articles critical of India.³⁴ In its issue of September 6, 1962, *People's Daily* editorially called G. D. Sondhi "A US imperialist agent", and criticized him for having "played a particularly inglorious role in aiding and abetting the sabotage activities of US imperialism."³⁵

32 SCMP, no. 2815. September 10, 1962. p. 23. It gives full text of Suharto's statement.

33 Ibid., no. 2816, September 11, 1962, p. 25.

34 Ibid., no. 2820, September 18, 1962, p. 37. The three articles were entitled (1) "Tens of Thousands of People in Djakarta Demonstrate Before Indian Embassy" (September 4, 1962); (2) "Fourth Asian Games Close in Djakarta: Frustrating Acts of Sabotage by US Imperialism and its Agents" (September 5, 1962); and (3) "Indonesian Public calls for formation of Afro-Asian sports Organisation" (September 6, 1962).

35 Ibid., no. 2817, September 12, 1962, p. 25.

By US sabotage it meant its "two-Chinas" theory which, by his insistence on seeking Taiwanese participation in the Games, Sondhi was alleged to have endeavoured to serve. In fact China's full-throated sympathy and support to Indonesia on the "Sondhi Affair" flowed primarily from the latter's successfully keeping the Taiwanese athletes out of the Games. China was satisfied to note that Indonesia had proved its genuine friendship based on commonly-shared ideals of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism, and that, by doing so, it had risked adverse world public opinion in its pro-Peking stance. In full acknowledgement of it, *People's Daily* wrote: "The Chinese people wish to express their great admiration and gratitude to President Sukarno and the Indonesian Government and people for their friendly attitude."³⁶

Exhibiting full awareness of the Indonesians' sentimental reaction to Sondhi's activities, *People's Daily* highlighted their allegations against him and observed that he had made "disgraceful efforts to wreck the Asian Games, impair the prestige of Indonesia and that of its leader President Sukarno."³⁷ It also misinterpreted Nehru's statement of September 4, 1962 as pro-Sondhi and hence anti-Indonesian. Referring to Nehru's hint at the possibility of Chinese "hand" in the anti-Indian developments in Djakarta, it asked: "Is this not itself proof that the Indian Government is openly supporting Sondhi?"³⁸ By deliberately omitting Nehru's criticism of Sondhi and his words of praise for the continuing goodwill of the Indonesian people towards the Indian people, it meant to impress upon the Indonesians that India and its Prime Minister were both anti-Indonesian and less respectful to President Sukarno.

China and Games of New Emerging Forces (GANEFO)

The "Sondhi Affair" did not end with the close of the Fourth Asian Games. The consequences flowing from it provided China with an opportunity to get closer to Sukarno and the elite group around him and establish rapport with them, both at ideological and personal levels. Reacting sharply to the decision of the International Olympic Committee on February 7, 1963 to "bar Indonesia from Olympic Games Competition for an indefinite period", *Peking Review* described it as a "revenge" on the part of "US imperialism and Sondhi" and offered China's full moral support to Indonesia's stand on the issue. It also gave a wide coverage to the anti-imperia-

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid., p. 26.

list statements emanating from both Djakarta and Peking and quoted the Chinese Vice-Premier Ho Lung as having stressed that "the Indonesian people...will never yield to any pressure."³⁹

Besides giving moral support to Indonesia on the question of holding the GANEFO (Games of New Emerging Forces, the call for which was given by President Sukarno, China also participated in the first GANEFO held in Djakarta in November 1963 in a big way. Moreover, China was reported to have given financial support to Indonesia in arranging the Games.⁴⁰ This way China earned a lot of goodwill among the Indonesian leadership and consequently succeeded in strengthening its ties with Indonesia.

During the period of study, two more issues which determined Indonesia's attitude towards India were the Malaysia issue and the second Asian-African conference. These were besides the West Irian question on which China continued to offer unreserved support to Indonesia. China utilized both these issues in strengthening Indonesian ill-will toward India. Its attitude on the Malaysia question, however, at least until April 1964, did not impinge directly on Indian-Indonesian relations, as it did in the case of the second Asian-African conference. China rarely criticized India for its pro-Malaysia attitude. Nevertheless, it utilized the Malaysia question in demonstrating its acceptance of Indonesia's regional power role in marked contrast to India's posture. Finding the Malaysia question both ideologically and strategically congruent to its policy goals in

39 *Peking Review*, vol. 6, no. 8, February 22, 1963, p. 9.

40 Justus M. van der Kroef, *The Communist Party of Indonesia : Its History, Programme and Tactics*, (Vancouver, Canada, 1965), p. 290. van der Kroef suggests the possibility that the PKI acted as middleman between Djakarta and Peking in providing the needed financial assistance to the Indonesian Government. The Chinese contribution was 18 billion rupiah worth of foreign exchange in the form of Malaysian currency and was equivalent to M\$ 53 million or US\$ 18 million. Indonesia was to pay 18 billion rupiah in exchange for it. See van der Kroef, "The Sino-Indonesian Partnership", *Orbis*, vol. 8, no. 2, Summer 1964, p. 351.

According to a Radio Malaysia report on November 21, 1963, China had agreed to destroy the 18 billion Indonesian rupiahs given to her by Indonesia. However, lavish spendings by the Chinese, North Vietnamese and other Communist athletes created suspicions that China had not destroyed the Indonesian money as promised. A check revealed that it was the same Indonesian money which China had promised to destroy. The Government of Indonesia even attempted to withdraw that money, but by then 85 per cent of it was already in circulation. Indonesia reportedly protested to China but kept the matter secret for fear of repercussions on the Games. See *Indian Express* (New Delhi), November 22, 1963.

the region and thus offering categorical support to Indonesia's policy of 'confrontation' against Malaysia, China also sought to show to Indonesia that India had not only lost enthusiasm against colonialism but also, by welcoming the Malaysia proposal, had demonstrated its opposition to Indonesia's aspirations for a regional role. China continued this policy until April 1964 when, in reaction to India's effort to tie the Malaysia question with the prospects of the second Asian-African conference, it came out in open criticism of India on this issue.

China and the Malaysia Question

At the early stages, China was as indifferent to the proposed Federation of Malaysia as Indonesia was favourable towards it.⁴¹ China's initial silence could, at least partly, be ascribed to its pre-occupation with its border dispute with India. China maintained its posture of near silence towards the Malaysia question until the Brunei revolt in December 1962. Within five days of the revolt, on December 13, 1962, *Jen-min Jih-pao* noted the political disturbances in Brunei, the gains achieved by the insurgents led by A.M. Azahari, leader of the Party Ra'ayat of Brunei, and the reactions in various countries. It devoted much space to the anti-Malaysia statements, demonstrations and declarations of solidarity with the Brunei rebels in Indonesia.⁴² In an article in *Peking Review*, one Mao Sun eulogized the aims and cause of the rebels in seeking freedom from British colonialism and charged the United States with the intention to 'step in' wherever British colonialism weakened.⁴³

Interestingly, China's categorical support to the Brunei rebels against the "British colonialists" coincided with a shift in Indonesia's initially indifferent attitude towards the Malaysia plan into one of hostility. An important factor that prompted China to adopt a posture of opposition to the Malaysia plan was its border dispute with India. Perceiving in Sukarno's anti-Malaysia policy Indonesia's ambitions of a regional role, China sought to use its support to Indonesia on the Malaysia issue as a *quid pro quo* for Indonesia's support to it on the Sino-Indian border dispute. In view of the fact that Indonesia was one of the six invitees to the Colombo Con-

41 China criticized the scheme of Malaysia in June 1962, over a year after the proposal for it had been mooted in May 1961. See "The 'Malaysian Confederation' Plot", *Peking Review*, vol. 5, no. 23, June 8, 1962, p. 21.

42. Mary F. Somers Heidhues, "Peking and the Overseas Chinese: The Malaysian Dispute", *Asian Survey*, vol. 6, no. 5, May 1966, pp. 277-78.

43, Mao Sun, "Uprising in Brunei", *Peking Review*, vol. 5, no. 51, December 21, 1962, pp. 12-13.

ference on the border dispute between China and India, the Chinese calculations were quite understandable. In contrast to India's attitude of welcoming the Malaysia scheme, China's opposition to it in favour of Indonesia was to secure Indonesia's neutrality, if not active support, to it against India.⁴⁴

A positive indication of Indonesia's pro-China attitude had come from the Fourth Asian Games in Djakarta in August-September 1962. By refusing to grant visas to the athletes from Taiwan, the Indonesian Government had given a practical demonstration of its refusal to agree to "Two-Chinas" policy. Besides, the "Sondhi Affair" had shown to China the degree of alienation which had developed between India and Indonesia. It would serve China's interest if it could exacerbate the growing Indian-Indonesian tensions.

It did not take much time to show that China's awareness of the potentialities of the Malaysia question, as regards India, were correct. It has already been examined how, during the six-power Colombo Conference, the Indonesian Foreign Minister tilted more in favour of China and ignored the Indian susceptibilities in the matter.⁴⁵ It could be considered a decisive gain of China's foreign policy achieved at the expense of India.

After the Colombo Conference, Subandrio's visit to China in January 1963, made in connection with the Colombo Conference proposals regarding the Sino-Indian border dispute, and Liu Shao-chi's visit to Indonesia in April 1963, provided China with important occasions to exchange views with the Indonesian leaders on the anti-Malaysia policy. All through his nine-day visit, Chairman Liu Shao-chi emphasized the imperialist and colonialist nature of the Malaysia project and, on this basis, offered full support to Indonesia's anti-Malaysia policy. Extolling Indonesia's anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist role, he once observed: "Indonesia's just stand of opposing the neo-colonialist scheme of Malaysia...constitutes a serious blow to the colonialists, old and new", and with this Indonesia "has become an important force opposing imperialism and colonialism and safeguarding the peace and security of Southeast Asia and Asia as a whole."⁴⁶

44 Strains in the Sino-Indian relations certainly prompted China to have Sukarno "neutral on its side". See "Chinese in Indonesia", *Economic Weekly* (Bombay), vol. 15, no. 21, May 25, 1963, p. 833.

45 See Chapter on Bilateral Relations and the Malaysia Question, pp. 111-112.

46 *Peking Review*, vol. 6, no. 16, April 19, 1963, p. 9.

Importantly enough, it could be considered as China's public acknowledgement of Indonesia's assumption of a power role concerning "peace and security" in the region as well as in Asia. It clearly contrasted with India's pro-Malaysia posture which, Indonesia thought, was antagonistic to its aspirations for a regional role.

One of the aims of Liu Shao-chi's visit to Indonesia, at this stage, was to ensure that Indonesia's stand on the Sino-Indian border dispute was not pro-India⁴⁷ China had every reason to be satisfied with the results of Liu Shao-chi's visit in this connection. The joint communique issued on this occasion noted President Sukarno's support to the Chinese view of opposition to foreign "intervention" in the Sino-Indian border issue. In an obvious reference to the American and other Western arms aid to India, it observed that "this kind of intervention would only undermine Asian-African solidarity and consequently put forth obstacles in the way towards peaceful solution of the dispute." Besides, the joint communique noted Indonesia's appreciation of the Chinese unilateral ceasefire and withdrawal, release of Indian prisoners of war as well as other measures taken by China "on her own initiative."⁴⁸ This showed the extent to which the Sino-Indonesian relations were developing at the expense of India.

Within about six weeks of Liu Shao-chi's visit, however, there erupted racial riots in Java, in which thirteen Chinese were reported killed and several hundred wounded. Besides, riots resulted in damage to property worth Rupiah 4 billion.⁴⁹ This demonstrated the seeming failure of the overall Chinese policy towards Indonesia since 1955, namely, befriending the Indonesian nationalist leaders at the expense of the interests of overseas Chinese in Indonesia.

China, however, felt reassured when President Sukarno declared on May 19, 1963 that the riots had been caused by "counter-revolutionaries as well as by foreign subversives", who exploited the Chinese minority problem, "because we have lately been in close contact with People's China."⁵⁰ This made it easier for China

47 R. Ramakrishnan, "Sino-Indonesian Relations", *Foreign Affairs Reports* (New Delhi—Monthly), vol. 14, no. 4, April 1965, p. 55.

48 *Peking Review*, vol. 6, no. 17, April 26, 1963, p. 10. See also *The Statesman* (New Delhi), April 22, 1963.

49 Justus M. van der Kroef, "The Sino-Indonesian Partnership", *Orbis*, vol. 8, no. 2, Summer 1964, p. 332.

50 *Antara News Bulletin*, May 21, 1963.

to link the "counter-revolutionaries" with "foreign subversives", that is "imperialists", working for the purpose of sabotaging "Sino-Indonesian friendly relations."⁵¹ To the satisfaction of China, Sukarno's statement also encouraged Chairman D.N. Aidit of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) to state that the recent "racialist acts of terror were anti-Soekarno, anti-Chinese and anti-Communist."⁵² Thus the two countries once again succeeded in patching up their differences on the overseas Chinese issue.

In the following few months China continued to offer full moral support to Indonesia on the latter's "Ganjang (Crush) Malaysia" Policy. Interestingly, all along the process of establishment of Malaysia and after, China's responses to the Malaysia issue followed a set pattern of being in opposition to those shown by India. For instance, when the outcome of the meetings of the leaders of Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines between May and August 1963 in Tokyo and Manila created in India a sense of relief and aroused hopes of a peaceful settlement of the Malaysia dispute,⁵³ China felt uneasy about these developments in the region. China found the Manila Agreements and the Maphilindo proposal, which were hailed by the Press in India, at variance with its interests and objectives in Indonesia and the region. China, however, chose to reserve its own comments and contended itself by giving wide coverage to the Indonesian Communists' views critical of the Maphilindo scheme.⁵⁴ In view of Sukarno and the entire non-Communist and anti-Communist elite group accepting and even hailing the Maphilindo scheme, China's reservations were quite understandable.

Later when India accepted the UN Enquiry report about ascertainment of the wishes of the people of Sarawak and Sabah, China outspokenly condemned it. Fully corroborating the Indonesians' views in the matter, the *NCNA* wrote: "This survey will go down in history as one of the quickest and crookedest public opinion polls ever held."⁵⁵ Unlike in India, where the Government and Press welcomed the inauguration of Malaysia on September 16, 1963, China used its publicity media for coverage of the anti-British and

51 *Peking Review*, vol. 6, no. 21, May 24, 1963, p. 20.

52 *Antara News Bulletin*, May 29, 1963. Aidit made this observation in the course of his address to the PKI's forty-third anniversary gathering in Djakarta on May 27, 1963.

53 See Chapter on Bilateral Relations and the Malaysia Question, p. 128.

54 For the anti-Maphilindo views as expressed by Aidit, See *Ibid.*, pp. 128-29.

55 Cited in Sheldon W. Simon, n. 24, p. 38.

anti-Malaysian demonstrations and statements emanating from Djakarta.⁵⁶ In its "Round the World" comments, *Peking Review* termed Malaysia as "An Unwanted Child" created "by Whitehall with Washington's blessings" in the face of "strong opposition from the people within the area it embraces—and beyond."⁵⁷ It could be interpreted as China's overall effort to broaden Indonesia's commitment to a policy of active opposition to both the British and the American interests and influences in South-East Asia, a policy, in the successful evolution of which the PKI made not a small contribution.

China continued to pursue its pro-Indonesia posture on the Malaysia issue as distinct from that of India until April 1964 when in response to the Indian proposal at the preparatory meeting of the second Asian-African conference in Djakarta to send invitation to Malaysia for participation in the conference, provoked it to come out in open criticism of India on the Malaysia question.

China and the Second Asian-African Conference

Besides the Malaysia question, another important issue which China found determining the Indonesian foreign policy attitudes towards India during 1961-1965 was Indonesia's demand for the convening of the second Asian-African conference. It was known to China that since the first such Conference in Bandung (West Java) in April 1955, Indonesia had been persistently calling for the convening of another such conference and India, for reasons of its own, had been lukewarm to the Indonesian demand in this connection.

On several grounds China found it advantageous to offer political support to Indonesia on this issue. Ideologically, Indonesia's demand was in accord with China's championship of Afro-Asian solidarity against imperialism and colonialism. Besides, China being out of the United Nations and barred from the gatherings of the non-aligned countries, (it being a "committed" country),⁵⁸ the second Asian-African conference was thought to

56 See *SCMP*, no. 3065, September 23, 1963, p. 20, no. 3066, September 24, 1963, and no. 3068, September 26, 1963, p. 16.

57 *Peking Review*, vol. 6, no. 39, September 27, 1963, p. 31.

58 *Afro-Asian Solidarity Against Imperialism*, (A collection of documents, Speeches and Press Interviews from the visits of Chinese leaders to thirteen African and Asian countries), (Peking Foreign Languages Press, 1964), p. 78. Prime Minister Chou En-lai used this term for his country while replying to a question relating to China's attitude towards a second conference of non-aligned states. He was addressing a Press conference in Algiers on December 26, 1963.

provide an important forum to it to project its Afro-Asian role. Also, since it represented an aspiration of the Indonesian leadership, China's support on this issue would increase its political influence among the Indonesians and thus make it difficult for the anti-Chinese elements in the Indonesian politics to indulge in activities aimed against the interests of the Chinese in Indonesia. Furthermore, China's support to Indonesia on this issue would, like the Malaysia issue, strengthen the PKI's influence in Indonesian politics and enable it to bring the Indonesian foreign policy in line with that of Peking. Anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism being the basis of the demand for the second Asian-African conference, it would enable China to seek Indonesia's wider and continuing commitment to joint efforts for the removal of all Western political, economic and military influences, both American and West European, from South-East Asia. Seen in the light of Indian-Indonesian relationship thus, if India continued to be hesitant to concede Indonesia's call for the second 'Bandung' conference as before, China would be in an advantageous position to portray India's role as being 'pro-imperialist' and one of working against Asian and African solidarity and, consequently, discredit the Indian leadership and its policy of non-alignment among the Indonesians.

With these possible considerations in mind, China supported the Indonesian demand in this connection. The first occasion China did it officially was during Foreign Minister Chen Yi's visit to Indonesia in March-April 1961. In the joint communique issued on April 1, 1961, Chen Yi joined Subandrio in stating that they "deemed it very necessary to convene a second Asian-African Conference in the shortest time."⁵⁹ It clearly contrasted with Prime Minister Nehru's reluctant attitude in this regard. The visits to China by President Sukarno in June 1961 and by Foreign Minister Subandrio in January 1963 and return visit to Indonesia by Chairman Liu Shao-chi in April 1963 provided China with other important occasions to reiterate its support to Indonesia's call for the second Asian-African conference.

By the end of 1963, China joined Indonesia at the summit level of diplomacy in canvassing support for the second conference of Asian and African states. In a bid to co-ordinate diplomatic activity with Indonesia, Prime Minister Chou En-lai paid a long two-and-a-half-month visit to ten African and three Asian countries

59 *Sino-Indonesian Relations, January 1960—April 1961* (Research Background), (Hongkong, Kowloon), 1961), p. 126.

between December 14, 1963 and February 29, 1964.⁶⁰ In the statements, speeches, Press conferences and welcome addresses made in all these countries Chou En-lai stressed the need to still further strengthen Afro-Asian solidarity against imperialism and colonialism.⁶¹ At certain places, such as Cairo, Algiers, Kindia (Guinea), Mogadiscio (Somalia), Karachi and Colombo, he reiterated China's support to Sukarno's proposal and suggested that the time was ripe for holding the second Asian-African conference.⁶² The Chinese leader was, nevertheless, only partially successful inasmuch as only seven out of the thirteen joint communiques issued during his visit contained the two parties agreement to state that the time was appropriate for such a conference.⁶³ The joint communiques issued in the remaining six countries, namely, the UAR, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Burma and Ceylon, omitted any direct reference on the issue.

It is interesting to note that the two of the states which Chou En-lai visited, the UAR and Ceylon, were, at this stage, taking active interest in the holding of a second non-aligned summit meeting. Although President Nasser and Prime Minister Mrs. Bandaranaike agreed with the Chinese Prime Minister on the need to strengthen Asian and African unity against colonialism and imperialism and to convoke the second Asian-African conference, they were reluctant to agree to the appropriateness of the present time for such a conference.⁶⁴

60 *Afro-Asian Solidarity Against Imperialism*, n. 58, pp. 440. The countries visited in Africa were the UAR, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Ghana, Mali, Guinea, the Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia. The Asian countries visited were Burma, Pakistan and Ceylon.

61 *Ibid.*, p. 50, p. 55, pp. 88-90, p. 97, p. 110, p. 144, p. 171, p. 195, p. 200, p. 265, p. 321, and p. 397.

62 *Ibid.*, pp. 18 and 34 (Cairo), p. 8 (Algiers), pp. 203-4 (Kindia-Guinea), p. 279 (Mogadiscio-Somalia), pp. 327, 332, 336 and 344 (Karachi, two other cities and Lahore in Pakistan), and pp. 398 and 409 (Colombo-Ceylon).

63 *Ibid.*, The countries in which such references of support were contained in the joint communiques were Ghana (p. 160), Mali (p. 184), Guinea (pp. 222-3), the Sudan (p. 242), Ethiopia (p. 259), Somalia (pp. 202-3), and Pakistan (p. 372).

64 *Ibid.* This is evident from Chou En-lai's replies at a Press conference in Cairo on December 20, 1963. He states thus: "A possibility exists of holding a Second Asian-African Conference. Both President Nasser and myself agreed that good preparations for this conference should be made. Only if good preparations have been made can a meeting be successful." See also *The Statesman* (New Delhi), December 22, 1963.

Obviously, the Afro-Asian response to Chou En-lai's overtures, in this connection, was not encouraging.⁶⁵ This was more than confirmed about a month later when ten out of the thirteen Afro-Asian countries visited by the Chinese Prime Minister, attended the preparatory meeting of the second conference of the non-aligned states in Colombo between March 23 and 27, 1964.⁶⁶

China's offer of top-level diplomatic support to Indonesia, at this stage, was in reaction to the efforts of certain Asian and African states, including India, to convene a second conference of non-aligned countries. Peking appears to have realized that if these countries succeeded in staging a second non-aligned summit meeting, it would delay for an indefinite time the prospects of the second Asian-African conference. By doing so China also sought to extend still further its influence and prestige among Indonesia's governing elite.

Prompted by these considerations, China chose various occasions to reiterate its support to Indonesia's call for the second 'Bandung' conference. Prominent among these occasions were Pakistan National Day Reception in Peking on March 23, 1964 and the third anniversary of the Sino-Indonesian Friendship Treaty in Peking on April 1, 1964.⁶⁷ On the opening day of the preparatory meeting in Djakarta on April 10, 1964, *Jen-m'in Jih-pao* editorially offered the Chinese people's warm support to Indonesia's efforts and sincerely wished the meeting every success.⁶⁸ In his general statement at the preparatory meeting, following his country's usual policy

As regards Ceylon, the joint communique issued on February 29, 1964 noted only Chou En-lai's opinion about the appropriateness of holding this conference then. Prime Minister Mrs. Srimavo Bandaranaike merely contented herself by agreeing that such a conference would serve a useful purpose and that her Government would participate in it. See *ibid.*, p. 421. By implication, it meant that Ceylon was not agreeable to holding it at this stage.

65 Colina MacDougall, "Chou's African Safari", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, vol. 43, no. 10, March 5, 1964, p. 513. Colina MacDougall described the meagre results of Chou En-lai's long tour of Africa and Asia as "a heavy defeat for Chinese policies".

66 These ten states were: Algeria, Ceylon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Morocco, Somalia, the Sudan, Tunisia and the U.A.R. See *Supplementary Documents for the Meeting of Ministers in preparation of the second Asian-African Conference* (Djakarta, Organizing Committee, 1964), pp. 13-14. It is a collection of documents.

67 *Summary of World Broadcasts* (SWB), FE/1513/A3/1-2, March 25, 1964, SCMP, no. 3192, April 6, 1964, p. 28 and SWB, FE/1518/A3/6, April 3, 1964.

68 SWB, FE/1525/C/2-3, April 11, 1964.

of cultivating the Indonesian leadership, Foreign Minister Chen Yi, leader of the Chinese delegation, paid tributes to President Sukarno and Foreign Minister Subandrio and highly commended the "Bandung Spirit" under the "light" of which over thirty Asian and African countries had achieved freedom.⁶⁹ He also praised the much publicized Indonesian principles of '*musjawarah*' (consultation/deliberation) and '*mufakat*' (unanimity) and expressed his "hope that all of us will follow these principles in the proceedings of our further sessions."⁷⁰ Besides, he put major emphasis on the need for strengthening Afro-Asian solidarity in the face of colonialist and imperialist forces.⁷¹ Chen Yi also made a pointed reference to the divergence between the Indian and Indonesian approach to issues of colonialism and world peace. He considered President Sukarno's pronouncement that "colonialism is not yet dead, as "perfectly true" and observed: "Imperialism and old and new colonialism are the sources of war. Failing to oppose the imperialist policies of aggression and war, there can be no talk about the defence of world peace."⁷² Although he omitted any direct reference to the question of invitation to Malaysia, by considering Indonesia's stand towards the people of North Kalimantan as "just" and by offering his country's "support" to them,⁷³ the Chinese Foreign Minister impliedly supported the Indonesians' position relating to this question.

While reacting to the Indian proposals regarding invitations to the Soviet Union and Malaysia, the attitude of the Chinese delegation showed that China was not as enthusiastic in offering support to Indonesia on the Malaysia issue as it was expected to be. Although the Chinese delegation joined the Indonesian and Pakistani delegations in carrying out intensive lobbying against the Indian proposals with regard to both the Soviet Union and Malaysia,⁷⁴ it reserved its vehement criticism only against the Indian proposal relating to the Soviet Union,⁷⁵ and left it to Indonesia to fight against the other Indian proposal concerning Malaysia.

69 *Meeting of Ministers in Preparation for the Second African-Asian Conference* (Djakarta, the Conference Secretariat, 1964), p. 81.

70 *Ibid.*, p. 86

71 *Ibid.*, p. 82.

72 *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3.

73 *Ibid.*, p. 83.

74 *Asian Almanac*, vol. 1, no. 42, April 12-18, 1964, p. 496, col. 2.

75 *Ibid.* During informal meetings with leaders of the Afro-Asian delegations, Chen Yi let it be known that "if the Soviet Union comes there, there will be a fight."

China's over-emphasis on exclusion of the Soviet Union and under-emphasis on exclusion of Malaysia, at this stage, could be ascribed to its unpreparedness to meet India's diplomatic offensive at the preparatory meeting. The Indian proposal regarding invitation to the Soviet Union and Malaysia had, besides for Indonesia and Pakistan, serious embarrassment in store for China. The Chinese difficulty lay in the fact that if it opposed Soviet Union's participation on the ground that it did not physically belong to Asia and Africa, its argument against Malaysia's inclusion would lose its significance. On the other hand, if it opposed Malaysia's entry (in support of Indonesia) on the ground that it was a neo-colonialist project, its opposition to the Soviet representation at the Afro-Asian conference would lose its credibility.

Nevertheless, China's evident lack of open support to Indonesia on the question of Malaysia's participation proved temporary and could be interpreted as the two countries' diplomatic strategy against the Indian proposals rather than some kind of coolness developing between them. On April 16, 1964, Chen Yi had a meeting with President Sukarno, lasting for three-and-a-half hours. Subandrio, who attended the meeting along with the Chinese Ambassador in Djakarta, Huang Chen, revealed later that the talks included "a thorough review of the Afro-Asian Conference."⁷⁶ It is quite conceivable that the two sides discussed the adverse impact the Indian proposals were expected to have on the prospects of the second Asian-African conference and devised ways to counter it. In a written statement issued at the time of his departure from Djakarta for Rangoon on April 17, 1964, Chen Yi referred to Swaran Singh's proposals to send invitations to the Soviet Union and Malaysia. As regards the Soviet Union, he described the Indian proposal as "improper, because, as everybody knows, the Soviet Union is not an African or Asian country." He was satisfied to note that the preparatory meeting had "negated this proposal." As regards Malaysia, he expressed his happiness that the meeting had "correctly handled this question". In this connection Chen Yi once again commended the Indonesian principles of '*Musjawarah*' and '*mufakat*' and denigrated the majority-minority way of putting

76 Ibid, p. 499, col. 3. See also *Indonesian Herald*, April 17, 1964. It gives information about Sukarno-Chen Yi meeting, but does not write anything about both Subandrio and Huang Chen attending the meeting and the former (Subandrio) revealing anything later.

things to vote.⁷⁷ It was an obvious attack on the position Swaran Singh had taken at the meeting.

In an editorial on April 18, 1964, *Jen-min Jih-pao* commented adversely on India's role at the preparatory meeting. It wrote thus : "At the preparatory meeting the Indian delegate, ignoring the principle that any invitation to a country to participate in the conference must have unanimous agreement, insisted on inviting a non-Asian, non-African country to the conference. He also proposed to invite 'Malaysia', knowing full well that it is a product of neo-colonialism. These actions can by no means be considered as conducive to the cause of Afro-Asian unity against imperialism."⁷⁸ It was a deliberate Chinese effort to convince the Indonesians as well as other Afro-Asians that India was pursuing pro-imperialist policies and hence proving an impediment in the way of Afro-Asian unity.

After the preparatory meeting in Djakarta, China tended to link its responses to the two issues of Malaysia and the second Asian-African conference. This was as a reaction to India's efforts at the preparatory meeting to tie the prospects of the conference with its proposal, among others, to send invitation to the new federation of Malaysia. The second Conference of Non-Aligned countries in Cairo in October 1964 provided China with still another opportunity to distort India's image among the Indonesians. China also used its Press in cultivating the Indonesian President by showing him as somewhat above all other Afro-Asian leaders in their fight against the forces of colonialism and imperialism. In an editorial on October 14, 1964, *Renmin Ribao* expressed its satisfaction that the "strong desire" of the African and Asian peoples and countries for independence found "its manifestation at the Second Conference of Non-Aligned countries." It also described the voice against imperialism and old and new colonialism as raised at the Cairo meeting, as the "mainstream of the conference". To all the

77 *Indonesian Herald*, April 18, 1964. See also *Asian Almanac*, vol. 1, no. 42, p. 497, col. 3 and *SWB*, FE/1532/C/1 and A1/5, April 20, 1964. In fact, a 6-nation committee comprising of Afghanistan, [Ghana, Cameroon, Morocco, Ethiopia and Syria, instituted to resolve the deadlock on the Indian proposal regarding invitations to the Soviet Union and Malaysia, had, in the face of lack of unanimity on April 14, 1964, agreed to defer the decision in this connection until the convening of the conference in March 1965. In this sense the statement of Chen Yi that the meeting had "negated" the Indian proposal, could not be considered correct.

78 *SWB*, FE/1532/C1 and A1-5, April 20, 1964.

Afro-Asian leaders who had done so, it paid high tributes. For Sukarno, however, *Renmin Ribao* reserved a higher place. It quoted excerpts from his speech demonstrating his thesis that colonialism "is not yet dead", and that there could be no peaceful co-existence between the 'new emerging forces' and the 'old established forces'.⁷⁹

As against this, *Renmin Ribao* termed India's (and Yugoslavia's) role at the Cairo Conference as "a small adverse current" in the "mainstream" of opposition to colonialism and imperialism. It criticized the Indian (and the Yugoslav) delegate for having done "everything they could to distort the essence of the policies of peaceful co-existence and non-alignment." It added: "They attempted to set the Conference...in opposition to the struggle against imperialism and colonialism by the people of various countries so as to achieve their objective of weakening and abolishing their struggle." The *Renmin Ribao* also charged "Indian Prime Minister Shastri" for having "tried to whip up an anti-China campaign in an effort to divert the focus of the struggle of the non-aligned countries and (to) serve U.S. imperialism." It added: "The Indian leader's despicable manoeuvres gained nobody's interest; apart from further exposing the real features of the Indian Government which has sold itself to U.S. imperialism and its collaborators, his activities achieved nothing whatsoever."⁸⁰

Peking Review also surveyed what it described as "world opinion" on the Non-Aligned Conference in Cairo and chose newspaper comments which were strongly critical of India's policies and attitude. It commented on Lal Bahadur Shastri's failure in imposing on the Conference his "line of peaceful co-existence with imperialism" as well as "in his foul anti-China manoeuvres", and in order to reinforce its charges, gave prominent coverage to the anti Indian views expressed in the daily newspapers, such as, *Nhan Dan* (Hanoi), *Harian Rakjat* and *Bintang Timur* (PKI and pro-PKI dailies from Djakarta), *Pakistan Times* (Lahore) and *Ludu* (pro-Communist newspaper from Rangoon).⁸¹ It would be interesting to examine the highly anti-Indian tone of the Indonesian dailies such as *Harian Rakjat* and *Bintang Timur* to which *Peking Review* gave prominent coverage. It quoted *Harian Rakjat* to say: "As a

79 *Peking Review*, vol. 7, no. 42, October 16, 1964, p. 8.

80 Ibid., p. 9. See also China's serious criticism of India and its leaders under the title 'Sheep's Head and Dog's Meat' in *ibid.*, p. 26. It charged India with "hypocrisy", double alignment and pro-U.S. attitude.

81 "World Opinion on Non-Aligned Conference" (signed R.J.Z.), *ibid.*, vol. 7, no. 43, October 23, 1964, pp. 14-15.

U.S. hireling, India tried to scare the people with a gruesome picture of the destructive effect of atomic weapons. But it did not say a single word for the national independence movement, which is sweeping Asia, Africa and Latin America." The passage it choose from *Bintang Timur* read: "India and Yugoslavia, which called themselves 'non-aligned' countries, in their frantic activity at the Conference to sell their 'peaceful ex-existence' policy", tried "to subordinate everything to their 'peaceful co-existence', even at the expense of the independence and liberation movements." *Peking Review* also cited the pro-Communist Indonesian daily to declare: "We shall never follow them."⁸²

China had reason to be satisfied with the strong fight the Indonesian delegation had put up against the proposals of the Indian delegation demanding priority for "peace and peaceful co-existence", urging abstention "from threat or use of force" and non-recognition of "any situation brought about" by these means, and pleading for dispatch [of a "special mission to persuade China to desist from developing nuclear weapons."⁸³ Aiming at strengthening anti-Indian feelings still further, China found it necessary to emphasize the Indian-Indonesian differences manifested at the second Non-Aligned Conference. President Sukarno's visit to Shanghai on November 4, 1964, within less than a month of his participation in the Cairo Conference, was thus a welcome occasion for China to show its appreciation of Indonesia's role at the Cairo meeting. Prime Minister Chou En-lai made it a point to receive President Sukarno in person. He, alongwith Vice-Premier Lo Jui-ching and Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Liu Hsiao, came especially from Peking to greet President Sukarno and accorded a "rousing welcome" to him at the Shanghai airport.⁸⁴

The Chinese leaders utilized this opportunity to exchange views with the Indonesian leader on various matters of mutual interest, a prominent issue being the prospects of the second Asian-African conference. Despite their joint diplomatic efforts, India and other non-aligned countries had succeeded in convening a second Belgrade-type meeting before they could arrange a second Bandung-type conference. It was, in a sense, a diplomatic defeat for both Indonesia and China and could be thought to have figured

82 Ibid.

83 See Chapter on India, Indonesia and the Second Asian-African Conference, pp 175-7.

84 *Peking Review*, vol 7, no. 46, November 13, 1964, p. 3.

prominently in the talks between Sukarno and Chou En-lai. Possibly, the two sides decided to reinforce their efforts in this direction. While speaking at a banquet in honour of President Sukarno, Chou Eh-lai gave a hint to this end, and, by way of re-assurance to the Indonesian leader, said ; "Together with the people of Indonesia and other Asian and African countries, we shall make good preparations for the holding of the second Asian-African Conference". Besides, in a continuing Chinese effort to cultivate Sukarno, Chou En-lai paid rich tributes to the Indonesian President for holding aloft the banner of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism at the conference of the Non-Aligned countries.⁸⁵

Sukarno responded with equal warmth and feeling pleased at the Chinese leader's appreciation of his role in Asia and Africa, said : "We are fighting against all imperialists and neo-colonialists, fighting for the establishment of a just and prosperous society and a new world of happiness for all mankind."⁸⁶

It was a significant remark as it indicated a change in the direction of Indonesian foreign policy .Although in the framework of his concept of struggle between the "NEFOS" and the "OLDEFOS", he had always opposed colonialism and imperialism and championed Afro-Asian unity, the main direction of his attack since the restoration of West Irian to Indonesia had been towards the British colonial interests and influence in South-East Asia. Despite China's as well as the PKI's repeated emphasis on considering the United States as leader of world imperialism and hence "enemy number one" of Indonesia, President Sukarno had been reluctant to treat the United States as such. His statement at the banquet in Shanghai on November 4, 1964 could thus be described as a pointer to Indonesia's agreement with China on the vital issue of considering the United States as the major enemy of the people of South-East Asia as well as of Asia and Africa. A near identity registered in the two countries' approach to the continued existence of the British and American economic, political and military influence in the region, thus, demonstrated the high degree of success China had achieved in its policies towards Indonesia.⁸⁷

85 Ibid., p. 4.

86 Ibid.

87 This increased India's anxiety about Indonesia getting still closer to China. There were apprehensions about China and Indonesia entering into a sort of secret military pact and agreement to divide Malaysia between themselves. Foreign Minister Subandrio himself hinted in this direction in the course of a closed door meeting in the office of the Indonesian mission at
(Contd. on page 218)

From the Chinese side, as a follow-up action Foreign Minister Chen Yi paid an unscheduled⁸⁸ visit to Indonesia between November 27 and December 3, 1964. This followed his visits to Algeria and Cambodia and stop-overs in the U.A.R. and Pakistan, where, among other things, he sought to push ahead the preparations for the second Asian-African conference. During his one-week stay in Indonesia, Chen Yi was engaged in intensive talks with President Sukarno, Foreign Minister Subandrio and other important government and political leaders. Among the subjects he discussed with the Indonesian leaders were the general international situation, the present stage of struggle between the 'new emerging forces,' and 'old established forces', the British and American involvement in Malaysia and Vietnam in the region, and the prospects of the second 'Bandung' conference. According to J. Leimena, who was present at Chen Yi's first meeting with the President, Chen Yi talked about the results of his recent visit to Algeria, the U.A.R., Pakistan and Cambodia. Crucial talks, however, took place on December 1, 1964, when Chen Yi and Subandrio had a long seven-hour 'special conference' on various issues of mutual interest. Indonesia's First Deputy Foreign Minister, Suwito Kusumowidagdo, who assisted Subandrio at the talks, revealed later that the two leaders had discussed thoroughly the international situation and the "present stage in the common struggle against Nekolim" (an Indonesian acronym for neo-colonialism, colonialism and imperialism). Other issues around which their discussions centred, as Kusumowidagdo disclosed, were the degree of preparations made so far for the successful convening of the Algiers conference as well as the manner in which Malaysia could be kept out of the conference.⁸⁹

The joint Press release issued at the end of Chen Yi's visit showed that the two leaders shared each other's opinion on the situation in the world, in South-East Asia and Afro-Asia. It revealed similarity of approach on the stage of struggle between

the United Nations on December 9, 1964. See S.B. Mookherji, "Whither Indonesia?", *Modern Review* (Calcutta—Monthly), vol. 118, no. 3, September 1965, p. 214.

88 *Asian Almanac*, vol. 2, no. 25, December 13-19, 1964, p. 918, cols. 2 and 3. This is evident from the fact that Subandrio cancelled his scheduled visit to New York from Tokyo and returned to Djakarta on November 29, 1964. In fact Chen Yi told the journalists on arrival in Djakarta that he had promised Subandrio to visit Indonesia towards the end of the year and that he felt it necessary to visit Indonesia "now".

89 Ibid.

the imperialist and colonialist forces and the anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist forces. It registered, in this connection, their agreement on the desirability of strengthening Afro-Asian unity and escalating the struggle against the 'old established forces'. Besides, there was discussion on the problems connected with the preparations for the Algiers conference in March 1965. The two sides reaffirmed to adhere to and carry out the decisions of the preparatory meeting in Djakarta in April 1964 and to further promote the spirit of 'musjawarah' (consultation) and 'mufakat' (unanimity). Whereas Chen Yi reaffirmed his country's support to Indonesia's 'Crush Malaysia' policy, Subandrio upheld restoration of China's place in the United Nations.⁹⁰

In a commentary broadcast on Radio Indonesia on December 4, 1964, the Indonesian Ministry of Information considered results of Chen Yi-Subandrio talks as of extreme significance in strengthening the "NEFOS" against the "OLDEFOS". The commentary noted the two countries' belief that the Algiers conference would be of great importance for the African and Asian countries. The talks were said to have strengthened the will of the two countries to promote unity among the Afro-Asian countries in their struggle against imperialism and showed an agreement to make the forthcoming conference a success.⁹¹

By the end of 1964 Indonesia had intensified its anti-Malaysia policy. It reacted sharply to the prospect of Malaysia getting a non-permanent member seat in the UN Security Council. On December 31, 1964, President Sukarno declared that in case Malaysia was seated in the Security Council, Indonesia would withdraw from the United Nations.⁹² Despite his warning when Malaysia became a member of the Security Council, Sukarno announced on January 7, 1965 Indonesia's withdrawal from the world body.⁹³

Whereas the Government of India regretted Indonesia's decision to quit the United Nations and requested it for reconsideration of it,⁹⁴ China came out openly and resolutely in support of Indonesia's action. In a statement issued on January 10, 1965, the Chinese Government described it as a "just, correct and

90 Ibid., pp. 918-9, cols. 3 and 1.

91 Ibid.

92 *Indonesian Herald*, January 2, 1965. Sukarno made this declaration in the course of his speech at a ceremony proclaiming Indonesia free from illiteracy.

93 Ibid., January 9, 1965.

94 See Chapter on Bilateral Relations and the Malaysia Question, p. 139.

revolutionary action.” It repeated its allegation of British-U.S. collusion behind Malaysia, considered Malaysia “as Israel” in South-East Asia and said : “It is perfectly just and right for Indonesia to withdraw from the United Nations.” It added : “We resolutely side with you.”⁹⁵

Foreign Minister Subandrio’s visit in January 1965 provided China with another occasion to reiterate its support to Indonesia’s decision to withdraw from the world body. While welcoming Subandrio at a rally in Peking on January 26, 1965, Chen Yi offered full support to Indonesia’s action and suggested the “setting up of another United Nations, a revolutionary one, so that rival dramas may be staged in competition with the existing U.S.—manipulated United Nations for people to make the comparison.” Chen Yi also reiterated China’s staunch support to Indonesia’s “just struggle” against Malaysia and for the people of North Kalimantan.⁹⁶

In various ways Subandrio’s visit was a major landmark in the two countries’ relations. Subandrio’s statements and the joint statement issued at the conclusion of his visit on January 28, 1965, revealed a still closer identity of views between the two countries on the issues relating to South-East Asia, Afro-Asia and the world. In the political field, fully in accord with the basis of approach towards the United States as laid during Sukarno’s visit to Shanghai on November 4, 1964, Subandrio stated : “We have a common enemy—imperialism headed by the United States and Britain. Our struggles are inseparable because they are based on a common ideal and are directed against a “common enemy.” On this basis, he declared ; “No force from within or without can divide them,”⁹⁷ It showed Indonesia’s readiness to discard earlier inhibitions in its relations with the United States and come out openly in support of China’s anti-U.S. stance in South-East Asia. China had, at last, succeeded in inducing Indonesia to support its anti-American policies in Vietnam in exchange for its continued anti-British and pro-Indonesian policy on the Malaysia question. The joint statement only confirmed this view. It noted the two countries’ “common

95 *Peking Review*, vol. 8, no. 3, January 15, 1965, p. 5. See Chinese leaders’ pro-Indonesian statements at p. 4 as well. See also *The Hindu*, January 11 and 14, 1965.

96 *Peking Review*, vol. 8, no. 5, January 29, 1965, p. 7.

97 *Ibid.*, no. 6, February 5, 1965, p. 4. Subandrio made this observation during his speech at a banquet he hosted in Peking in honour of the Chinese leaders.

opinion" on "the tense situation in Southeast Asia" and declared "that the U.S. imperialists' expansion of the war of aggression in Indo-China and the British imperialists' sending of military reinforcements to 'Malaysia' are aggressive activities carried out by the neo-colonialists and colonialists in this region in support of each other."⁹⁸

Ideologically, the joint statement for the first time juxtaposed President Sukarno's theoretical formulation of the struggle between the 'new emerging forces' and 'old established forces' with the Chinese view of the Afro-Asian struggle against imperialism and colonialism. Both the countries shared "the view that in the present international struggle there exist, on the one hand the imperialist forces, representing the old established forces of domination, exploitation, oppression and aggression, and on the other hand, the anti-imperialist, progressive and revolutionary forces, being the new emerging forces of the world today." They also "stressed that no peaceful co-existence is possible between the new emerging forces and the old established forces or between the imperialist forces and anti-imperialist forces."⁹⁹

Besides, the two sides also shared each other's view of the situation in Asia and Africa. Considering that the "convocation of the Second African-Asian Conference will be of great significance", they "reaffirmed their determined will to implement the resolutions adopted at the Djakarta Preparatory Meeting and continue to develop the spirit of the Bandung Conference of reaching unanimity through consultation." The two sides also "noted that imperialism and its followers are trying to forestall the Conference. They expressed their determination to work jointly with the other Asian and African countries for the convening and success of this conference."¹⁰⁰

Foreign Minister Subandrio's visit also contributed to the strengthening of the two countries' relations in the economic, trade, communications and military fields. The joint statement noted their decision "to strengthen their technical co-operation, expand their trade, develop maritime transportation between them and strengthen their friendly contacts in the military field." The tangible result of the talks in these fields was the conclusion of an agreement on economic and technical co-operation and a credit

98 For text of "China-Indonesia Joint Statement", see in *ibid.*, p. 7.

99 *Ibid.*, p. 6.

100 *Ibid.*, p. 7.

agreement. The two countries also decided to exchange delegations in various fields, including defence, for mutual benefit.¹⁰¹

Subandrio's visit, which led to these "major achievements", was considered to have marked "a new phase" in the two countries' relations. *Renmin Ribao* editorially hailed it as having "greatly strengthened the Sino-Indonesian comrade-in-arms relations of friendship and mutual help." Besides, while revealing a common approach towards Malaysia, it wrote: "Indonesia is in a just struggle in its confrontation with 'Malaysia'." It quoted Foreign Minister Chen Yi's warning to the United States and Britain as saying: "We warn the imperialists against any adventure in South-east Asia. Should they ignore this warning and insist on taking risks, the result can only be that Southeast Asia will become their burial ground." As regards the Algiers Conference, *Renmin Ribao* believed that "it will be a new milestone in Afro-Asian unity and co-operation. The imperialists are doing their best to sabotage the Conference. But we are convinced that the unity and concerted efforts of the Asian and African countries will ensure that Conference's success."¹⁰²

Misgivings in India

As it represented a near synchronization of the Indonesian-Chinese foreign policy goals in South-East Asia and Afro-Asia and marked, a clear shift in the Indonesian foreign policy away from non-alignment and peaceful co-existence and in favour of the Chinese world-view in which "third road" did not exist, it created misgivings in India as to the two countries' joint efforts against India's interests.

The Sino-Indonesian joint statement issued in Peking on January 28, 1965, confirmed India's fears about the two countries' intentions towards the region. Subandrio's "mission to Peking" was seen as marking "not only the beginning of a new chapter in the Sino-Indonesian relations but also the emergence of a new pattern in the alignment of nations in East and South-East Asia." In an article in *The Hindu*, K.V. Narain surveyed the implications of the Sino-Indonesian joint statement and observed that the two countries had lined up ideologically in a front against "imperialism,

101 Ibid., p. 8.

102 Ibid. p. 3.

Sukarno's short visit to Shanghai in November 1964, when, according to him, foundations for this 'axis' were laid. Chen Yi's unscheduled visit to Indonesia in late November 1964, followed by Subandrio's visit to China in late January 1965, he held, were aimed at filling the gaps. Commenting on the serious implications, the author of the article visualized a sort of link-up between Indonesia, China, North Korea, North Vietnam and Cambodia. "Thus, a sort of loose grouping or alliance of these five countries, Communist and non-Communist, is slowly taking place." Anticipating a threat from this combination to other countries in the region as well as India and making reference to Thailand and Malaysia, the author observed: "India has friendly relations with both these countries and it is in its best interests that these ties are maintained and strengthened."¹⁰³ As regards the military overtones of the Sino-Indonesian relations, Rakshat Puri of the *Hindustan Times* noted the presence of Lo Jui-ching, the Chief of the Chinese Armed Forces, alongwith Chou En-lai and Chen Yi, at the ceremony arranged to welcome Subandrio. Commenting on its importance, he speculated that Subandrio's visit could result in Chinese arms aid to Indonesia.¹⁰⁴

Between January and April 1965 China continued to participate actively in Indonesia's diplomatic offensive to make preparations for the Algiers conference. Chen Yi's visit to Afghanistan, Pakistan and Nepal and Chou En-lai's trip to Algeria, the UAR, Pakistan and Burma in March-April 1965 were important in this connection. During this period, China also sent a delegation of the National People's Congress to Africa. The Chinese delegation, led by Liu Ning-I, Vice-Chairman of its Standing Committee, paid a month-long visit to Guinea, Mali, the Central African Republic, the Congo (Brazzaville) and Ghana.¹⁰⁵

These visits at various levels showed the degree of importance that China attached to the successful convening of the forthcoming Algiers conference. It also, however, revealed to the Chinese leaders the constraints imposed upon their diplomatic offensive in this regard. These arose from India's continued insistence on

103 K.V. Narain, "Grim Potentialities of Sino-Indonesian Axis", *The Hindu*, February 13, 1965,

104 *Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), January 25, 1965.

105 *Peking Review*, vol. 8, no. 14, April 2, 1965, p. 28 and no. 16, April 16, 1965, p. 4.

seeking participation of the Soviet Union and Malaysia in the Asian-African conference. As the countries visited, by and large, showed disinclination to side either with China or with the Soviet Union and since no agreement emerged on the question of invitation to Malaysia, reference to these issues was omitted from the communiques and statements issued in these countries. A typical instance was provided by the China-Algeria Joint Communique signed in Algiers on March 31, 1965. It noted the two countries' support to the liberation movements in Asia and Africa but made no mention either of the struggle for independence in North Kalimantan or of the question of invitation to Malaysia and the Soviet Union.¹⁰⁶

China and the Tenth Anniversary Celebrations

After Indonesia's withdrawal from the United Nations in January 1965, the Tenth Anniversary (Dasa Warsa) celebrations of the first Asia-African Conference in Djakarta in April 1965 provided another important occasion to China to still further consolidate its influence among the Indonesian elite. Prime Minister Chou En-lai, with a large Chinese delegation including Foreign Minister Chen Yi, visited Djakarta between April 16 and 26, 1965. Significantly, Chou-En-lai was one of three Prime Ministers who represented their countries at the tenth anniversary celebrations in Djakarta.¹⁰⁷

The Chinese delegation and the delegations of the Communist and pro-China states such as North Korea, North Vietnam and Cambodia were given preferential treatment in the ceremonies. This became evident when some of the Asian delegates were not even allowed to speak to the Afro-Asian gathering.¹⁰⁸ During the Flag Parade on April 18, 1965 President Sukarno made a singular gesture of honour towards the Chinese when he rose to welcome

106 For text of the "China-Algeria Joint Communique", see in *ibid.*, no. 15, April 9, 1965, pp. 10-11.

107 The other two Prime Ministers were Kim Il Sung of North Korea and Pham van Dong of North Vietnam. Prince Souvanna Phouma of Laos was the fourth Prime Minister to join them on April 21, 1965.

108 Thanat Khoman, Foreign Minister of Thailand, when denied the opportunity to address the gathering, even went to the length of withdrawing from the celebrations. He withdrew because he was upset at the preponderance of Communist leaders at the celebrations. See *Straits Times*, April 21 and 28, 1965.

the Chinese delegate, shook hands with him and embraced him.¹⁰⁹

The one-week celebrations in Djakarta remained charged with the theme of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism. The tone was set by President Sukarno in his inaugural speech on April 18, 1965, and was later stressed by Prime Minister Chou En-lai and other leaders of pro-China and Communist states. The major enemy as it was made out to be was the United States.

In India it was seen as a show dominated by China, Indonesia and Pakistan, all displaying at this stage an openly hostile attitude towards India's leaders and its policy of non-alignment and peaceful co-existence. It was also noted with amazement how China, "a new-comer" a decade ago, was "seeking to dominate the Afro-Asian scene."¹¹⁰

Besides meeting the Indonesian leaders, Chou En-lai used this occasion to renew and strengthen his personal contacts with leaders of thirty-five countries attending the tenth anniversary celebrations. The intense diplomatic activity on the part of Chou En-lai was intended to win the Afro-Asian support for the militant Peking line in order to dominate the deliberations of the forthcoming Afro-Asian conference in Algiers. Chou En-lai also made it a point to extoll President Sukarno as "a leader with creativeness and revolutionary spirit". At a farewell banquet hosted by him at the Chinese Embassy in Djakarta. He paid high tributes to the Indonesian President for having made "an important speech" at the commemoration ceremony. He praised Sukarno for having emphasized that imperialism was not yet dead, that the struggle against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism had not yet ended and that there could be no talk of peaceful co-existence with imperialism. He described President Sukarno's speech as one containing "profound analysis of a whole series of major international problems of the present day", the one that "developed the Bandung spirit" and was "an embodiment of the revolutionary will of billions of Asian and African people."¹¹¹

109 President Sukarno did not give this honour to any other Asian and African delegate. It was in sharp contrast to the treatment meted out to leader of the Indian delegation. C. Subramaniam, the Indian Minister for Food and Agriculture, was even denied the opportunity to see President Sukarno. See Chapter on India, Indonesia and the Second Asian-African Conference, pp. 181-2.

110 "The Meaning of Bandung", (Editorial), *The Hindu*, April 21, 1965. See also a dispatch by a South-East Asia correspondent in *ibid.*, April 20, 1965.

111 *Peking Review*, vol. 8, No. 18, April 30, 1965, p. 6.

Besides, he paid wholesome tribute to the people of Indonesia, saying that "everywhere there pervades a militant spirit of fighting imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism" and that the "Indonesian people are not unworthy of the name of a revolutionary people". He concluded by assuring the Indonesians "that no matter what happens in the world, the Chinese people forever stand by your side."¹¹²

China's Role After April 1965

After the tenth anniversary celebrations, China continued to offer full support to Indonesia on keeping Malaysia out of the second Afro-Asian conference. The meetings of the Standing Committee of fifteen countries,¹¹³ instituted by the preparatory committee in April 1965, provided China with a forum to do so. When R. Goburdhun, the Indian Ambassador to Algeria and the Indian representative at a Standing Committee meeting on March 29, 1965, forcefully pleaded for Malaysia's participation in the second 'Bandung' conference, the Chinese delegate joined his Indonesian counterpart to thwart the Indian move. Likewise, when the Indian representative suggested that the Afro-Asian Foreign Ministers and Heads of state and or Government had every right to add to the list of invitees, the Chinese and the Indonesian delegates combined to block the discussion. They claimed that the list of invitees to the conference had been settled at the preliminary talks in Djakarta in April 1964. Countering their arguments, R. Goburdhun proposed that the decision on the question of invitations be left to the Foreign Ministers' meeting in June 1965. According to reports in the Indian Press, even though China and Indonesia strongly opposed the Indian move, substantial majority of the participants agreed to it.¹¹⁴

As regards the preparations for the second Afro-Asian conference, China continued its stance of offering diplomatic assistance to Indonesia to ensure its success. Chou En-lai once again left Peking for a one-week visit to Pakistan and Tanzania. The Chinese Prime Minister utilized the opportunity to meet leaders of various other countries during his brief stopovers between Karachi (Pakistan) and Dar-es-Salaam (Tanzania). These included the President and

112 Ibid.

113 Both China and India were among the fifteen Afro-Asian countries represented at the Standing Committee of Ambassadors instituted to resolve the deadlock on the question of inclusion of Malaysia and the Soviet Union in the Conference.

114 *The Hindu*, April 15, 1965.

Prime Minister of Iraq, Prime Minister Ali Sabry of the UAR and the Prime Minister of the Sudan.¹¹⁵

Chou En-lai's visit to Tanzania was significant in that it showed the limitations imposed upon the Chinese efforts for the Algiers conference. The China-Tanzania Joint Communiqué significantly omitted any reference to the question of participation by the Soviet Union and Malaysia in the ensuing conference in Algiers. It reflected Tanzania's resistance to the Chinese overtures on this issue and China's agreement to exclude the points of disagreement between the two countries.¹¹⁶

As the scheduled dates for the Foreign Ministers' meeting and the main conference in Algiers, viz. June 24, and June 29, 1965 respectively, drew near, Prime Minister Chou En-lai and Foreign Minister Chen Yi, heading a sixteen-member Chinese delegation, left Peking for Africa.¹¹⁷ The Chinese leaders reached Cairo on June 19, 1965, ten days before the conference was scheduled to be held. It showed China's anxiety about the prospects of the Algiers conference. The Chinese leaders desired to ensure through physical presence among the Afro-Asian delegates arriving in Cairo en-route to Algiers, that the efforts being made by some countries at postponing the conference did not succeed. China was not unaware of the efforts being made by India and some other Afro-Asian countries belonging to the Commonwealth to canvass support for the inclusion of the Soviet Union and Malaysia into the Algiers conference. China knew how in all the meetings of the fifteen-member ambassadorial level committee since April 1964, the Indian representative had been insistent on seeking participation by the Soviet Union and Malaysia. Their frequent visits to Asia and Africa during this period also must have convinced them that the Afro-Asian countries were, by and large, favourable to participation by Malaysia and non-committal on the issue of the Soviet Union.

It was at this stage that, like others, the Chinese were caught unawares by the political disturbances in Algiers, the venue of the second Afro-Asian conference. It was a coincidence that the coup in Algeria took place on June 19, 1965, the day when Chou En-lai and Chen Yi reached Cairo enroute to Algiers. The forcible change in the Algerian Government and political uncertainties flowing from

115 *Peking Review*, vol. 8, no. 24, June 11, 1965, pp. 3-4.

116 *Ibid.*, p. 8.

117 *Ibid.*, vol. 8, no. 26, June 25, 1965, p. 7. The sixteen-member Chinese delegation included the Chinese ambassadors to Indonesia and Pakistan and was accompanied by a large group of seventeen advisers.

it made the Chinese leaders all the more anxious about the successful convening of the conference. They fully realized that the coup in Algeria would provide some countries with a ready excuse to seek its indefinite postponement.

The realization prompted the Chinese leaders to direct their energies to foil such attempts. On June 20, 1965, the day following the coup in Algeria, the Chinese Ambassador in Algiers, Tseng Tao, sought an audience with Houari Boumedienne, the leader of the coup, and told him that Prime Minister Chou En-lai had expressed his total and unconditional support for the Algerian revolution and the Algerian National Council of the Revolution.¹¹⁸ Foreign Minister Chen Yi arrived in Algiers on June 22, and contacted the leaders of the new Algerian Government as well as the incoming Afro-Asian delegates. In the evening, accompanied by Vice-Foreign Ministers Chang Han-fu and Chiao Kuan-hua and the Chinese Ambassador in Algiers, he went to the airport to receive Foreign Minister Subandrio and the members of the Indonesian delegation accompanying him. The two Foreign Ministers were reported to have an amicable and cordial meeting.¹¹⁹ It is quite conceivable that the two leaders discussed the impact of the coup on the ensuing conference. They might have also discussed ways how to counteract propaganda carried on by some delegates to seek postponement of the conference. On June 23, 1965, the Chinese Foreign Minister had a friendly meeting with H. Boumedienne. In the course of his talks he reiterated his country's support to the Algerian National Council of the Revolution. He also expressed his country's determination, together with Algeria and other Afro-Asian countries, to make the conference a success.¹²⁰

On his part Chou-En-lai engaged himself in long parleys with President Nassar. The Chinese believed that an exchange of views with the UAR leaders "would contribute to the success of the Conference and help promote the Asian and African people's cause of solidarity against imperialism."¹²¹ On the day of his arrival in Cairo, i.e., June 19, 1965, the Chinese Prime Minister declared: "The Chinese Government consistently supports the convening of the second Afro-Asian Conference. Our attitude is positive. It has

118 *Indonesian Herald*, June 22, 1965.

119 *Ibid.*, June 24, 1965.

120 *Ibid.* June 25, 1965.

121 *Peking Review*, vol. 8, no. 26, June 25, 1965, p. 3.

been so in the past, and it remains so now.”¹²² On June 22, 1965, Chou En-lai was reported to have his fourth round of talks with the UAR leaders since his arrival. According to a Government spokesman in Cairo, the two leaders reaffirmed the necessity of holding the conference as planned. They also examined the proposed agenda for the Algiers conference and exchanged views on the basic principles which were to guide the conference.¹²³

Their reaffirmation of the necessity of convening the conference as scheduled, at this stage, could be attributed to two important developments, namely, the coup in Algeria and the appeal for postponement of the conference issued in London on June 21, 1965 by the leaders of the thirteen African and Asian countries belonging to the Commonwealth. In fact it was the coup which led Chou En-lai to change his date of departure for Algiers, which was June 23, 1965, and to prolong his visit in the UAR.¹²⁴

China also attempted to influence the Asian and African members of the Commonwealth in favour of sticking to the scheduled dates of the conference. On June 23, 1965, China's Charge d'Affaires in London, Hsiang Hsiung, appeared at the Marlborough House, the site of the conference of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers, in an effort to persuade the Afro-Asian members to attend the Algiers conference.¹²⁵ It was a sensational move in-as-much as it was designed to influence, by physical presence, the opinion of the Asian and African states belonging to the Commonwealth. It, however, failed to produce the desired results. This is evident from the fact that, undeterred by the Chinese pressure tactics, the thirteen Commonwealth states renewed their appeal to postpone the Algiers meeting as well as to refrain from sending their foreign ministers to attend the preliminary meeting scheduled for June 24, 1965.¹²⁶

During his visit to the Marlborough House, the Chinese Charge d'Affaires met both the President and the Foreign Minister of Pakistan for half-an-hour.¹²⁷ Significantly, it was in awareness of the fact that Pakistan was one of the thirteen Commonwealth

122 Cited in C.K. Cheng, “Anti-Imperialism: Keynote of the Second African-Asian Conference”, in *ibid.*, p. 5.

123 *Indonesian Herald*, June 24, 1965.

124 *Ibid.* For the text of appeal for postponement, see Chapter on India, Indonesia and the Second Asian-African Conference, p. 185.

125 *Ibid.*, June 25, 1965.

126 *Ibid.*

127 *Ibid.*

countries which had issued the appeal for postponement. It would be relevant here to note that, in order to seek a change in Pakistan's attitude towards the issue of postponement of the conference, Chou En-lai had joined Sukarno and Nasser in sending a cable message to President Ayub Khan.¹²⁸

Apparently, Pakistan's attitude in signing the appeal for postponement created additional anxiety for both China and Indonesia, which had been straining their nerves to ensure the successful convening of the Algiers conference as scheduled. Some adverse comments in the Indonesian Press on Pakistan's attitude to the second Afro-Asian conference at this stage reinforce this belief. In an editorial *Duta Masyarakat*, an Indonesian language daily belonging to the Nahdatul Ulama Party and known for its sympathies towards Pakistan, expressed concern at Pakistan joining others in calling for postponement and observed that "the present development really constitutes a test for Pakistan. We believe that President Ayub Khan and his assistants are not going to put Pakistan on a wrong road."¹²⁹

In contrast to Pakistan's attitude the Chinese and the Indonesian delegations continued to actively support each other in salvaging the conference. On June 24, 1965, the Standing Committee of Ambassadors met at the instance of the Algerian delegation and postponed the Foreign Ministers' meeting to June 26, 1965. Those represented at this meeting were the ambassadors of China, Ghana, Pakistan, India, Indonesia, Iran, Morocco, the UAR and Algeria. It was reported that the Chinese representative did not take active part in the meeting and was first to come out of the meeting room.¹³⁰

As the move for postponement, to which the Indian delegation at Algiers made a wholesome contribution,¹³¹ gathered momentum,

128 Ibid., June 25 and 26, 1965. It was reported that in their message to President Ayub Khan the three leaders expressed the hope that he would attend the summit meeting.

129 For translation of the editorial "Test for Pakistan", see *Indonesian Herald*, June 26, 1965.

130 *Indonesian Herald*, June, 25 and 26, 1965. This was a second postponement. The postponement for 24 hours was announced on the night of June 23, 1965. Lack of material preparations was the main plea for seeking this short postponement.

The countries not represented at the Standing Committee meeting on June 24, 1965 were Cambodia, Guinea, Malawi, Zambia, Tanzania and Ethiopia.

131 See Chapter on India, Indonesia and the Second Asian-African Conference, pp. 185-6.

both the Chinese and Indonesian delegations at Algiers felt highly embarrassed. It appeared that the Foreign Ministers' meeting as well as the main conference would have to be postponed. Various factors such as the disputes among the Arab countries, the differences among the African states, the still unresolved issue of participation in the conference by the Soviet Union and Malaysia, the still uncertain conditions in Algiers and the failure of a large number of African delegates to reach Algiers in time, only strengthened the move for postponement.

Not unexpectedly, therefore, the Standing Committee met for two-and-a-half hours on the night of June 26, 1965 and decided to postpone the conference to November 5, 1965 and the Foreign Ministers' meeting to October 28, 1965. The postponement was proposed by Ethiopia and Pakistan on the ground that many of the African and Asian countries were unable to attend the conference as scheduled.¹³² Curiously, China along with Indonesia and the UAR, did not send its representatives to this meeting. It is quite possible that the three countries, especially China and Indonesia, which had made all efforts to ensure successful convening of the conference, did not desire to be associated with the move for postponement until they were convinced that a majority of the representatives of the Standing Committee were in favour of postponement. Whatever might be the reason, the absence of the representatives of China and Indonesia enabled the Standing Committee to discuss and decide the issues in a less inhibitive atmosphere. According to C.S. Jha, Secretary to the Ministry of External Affairs of India, who accompanied the Indian delegation to the Algiers meeting, the delegates of six states spoke at the meeting and none of them against adjournment. C. S. Jha also revealed that there were some differences of opinion but harsh words were not used.¹³³

The Chinese delegation was embarrassed beyond limits. Despite all his efforts to seek the convening of the conference as scheduled, Foreign Minister Chen Yi had not succeeded in his objective. The Indonesian delegation led by Foreign Minister Subandrio needed to be reassured of China's continuing active support in the matter. In an *impromptu* interview with a small group of newsmen on June

132 *Indonesian Herald*, June 28, 1965, The decision about postponement was announced by the Algerian Minister of Justice after the Standing Committee meeting which was convened in lieu of the Foreign Ministers' meeting.

133 *Ibid.*, June 29, 1965.

27, 1965, however, Chen Yi appeared to be unperturbed about the decision for postponement. Surprisingly, the Chinese leader did not indicate whether postponement was a setback.¹³⁴

In a written statement at the airport issued on the eve of his departure from Algiers on June 28, 1965, the Chinese Foreign Minister stressed that the conference was postponed in order to make it a greater success. He also termed postponement as a failure on the part of the "imperialists" and "reactionaries" hostile to the Asian and African peoples.¹³⁵ It meant to dispel the impression of indifference about the fate of the conference, which Chen Yi had allowed to grow in his interview with some newsmen a day earlier.

In the meantime on June 26, 1965, the day when the Standing Committee decided to postpone the date of the conference, President Sukarno arrived in Cairo. Prime Minister Chou En-lai welcomed the Indonesian President and the top ministers and leaders of various Indonesian political parties accompanying him at the airport. The following day, both these leaders joined President Nasser in discussing reports of their Foreign Ministers in Algiers and considered measures concerning the Afro-Asian summit meeting. In view of the new developments, Chou En-lai and Sukarno decided to prolong their stay in Cairo. Together with Nasser, they also decided to recall their Foreign Ministers from Algiers and to have another meeting on June 29, 1965. This was to enable them to discuss the issues in the light of first-hand information presented by their Foreign Ministers.¹³⁶

To both Sukarno and Chou En-lai, who were directing all their efforts to convene the Algiers conference as scheduled, the decision about its postponement was nothing short of diplomatic defeat. They were not unaware of the active role played in this connection by India and some other countries. The reports of the Foreign Ministers conceivably highlighted the significant role played especially by the Indian delegation in Algiers in canvassing support for its view to postpone the conference.

Later, the Chinese Prime Minister and the Presidents of Indonesia and the UAR and the President of Pakistan, who made a brief halt at Cairo on way back home from London, entered into long

134 Ibid. Chen Yi devoted all his time to the Vietnam issue and did not even once make mention of the decision about postponement.

135 *Peking Review*, vol. 8, no. 27, July 2, 1965, p. 4.

136 *Indonesian Herald*, June 29, 1965.

parleys and had a "full and frank exchange of views on the Second Afro-Asian conference." According to a Press Communique issued in Cairo on June 30, 1965, the leaders of the four countries gave full consideration to the views of their Foreign Ministers and "endorsed the decision of the Standing Committee to postpone" the conference. In line with Chen Yi's written statement at Algiers on June 28, 1965, they refused to consider postponement as a "setback" and wished "to reaffirm their determination to hold it on November 5 in Algiers."¹³⁷

After a long 12-day stay in the UAR, Chou En-lai left Cairo for home on June 30, 1965. In the presence of Sukarno and Subandrio, who came to see him off at the airport along with Nassar and Ayub Khan, Chou En-lai observed that "the Chinese Government and people will continue to do their best for the success of the Conference."¹³⁸

In the meanwhile, in an article contributed to *Peking Review*, a Chinese analyst came out heavily against "imperialism and all reactionary forces" for having "tried their best to kill the spirit of Bandung and Afro-Asian solidarity." He, however, reserved his condemnation mainly for India. He charged the "Shastri Administration of India which are heavily dependent on U.S. doles" with having played a role destructive to the spirit of the conference. He observed: "In the past few weeks the Indian Government has been busy sending out ranking officials to more than 20 Asian and African countries to peddle its ideas which are aimed at wrecking the Algiers Conference in its first stage. It vehemently champions the admission of the Soviet Union and 'Malaysia' ". As regards Malaysia, he commented that India had assumed the task of seeking Malaysia's participation only "to please its patrons."¹³⁹

In his report from Algiers, the *Hsinhua* (New China) News Agency correspondent also launched a strong attack on India's role regarding the second African and Asian conference. He charged a "few countries" with harbouring "ulterior motives" and with having "tried to sabotage the Conference from the outset." In this connection the *Hsinhua* News Agency correspondent sarcastically

137 For text of "Press Communique on Talks Among Leaders of China, UAR, Indonesia, Pakistan, June 30", see *Peking Review*, vol. 8, no. 28, July 9, 1965, p. 5.

138 Ibid., pp. 3-4.

139 C.K. Cheng, n. 122, pp. 5-6, See also an editorial in *Renmin Ribao* of June 29, 1965 in *Peking Review*, vol. 8, no. 27, July 2, 1965, p. 5.

noted that although the Indian Foreign Minister failed to come to Algiers, the Indian delegate had called for the holding of the Foreign Ministers' meeting as scheduled. He also invited reference to disclosures that the Indian delegate, together with the delegates of certain other countries, had plotted for a motion at the Foreign Ministers' meeting to "recess" the African-Asian conference and for the formation of a "provisional committee". The correspondent saw in it an Indian effort to supersede the original Standing Committee and in fact to write off all the decisions taken at the preparatory meeting in Djakarta in April 1964, so that the conference could not be convened at all.¹⁴⁰

In conformity with its objectives China continued to play a damaging role till September 1965. The major Chinese effort, however, continued to be to still further tarnish the image of India, its leaders and its foreign policy of non-alignment. India's efforts to seek postponement of the second Afro-Asian conference provided China with an excuse to convince the Indonesian leaders that India was proving an obstacle to Afro-Asian unity in the struggle against colonialism and imperialism.

140 *Peking Review*, vol. 8, no. 27, July 2, 1965, pp. 6-7. The charges levelled against India by the *Hsinhua News Agency* correspondent may be seen in the light of the Indian efforts in the direction of postponement of the conference as examined in Chapter on India. *Indonesia and the Second Asian-African Conference*, pp. 185-6.

6

Pakistan's Role

Corresponding to the coolness in India's relations with Indonesia between September 1961 and September 1965, there developed a warmth in the relations between Indonesia and Pakistan. Pakistan had never counted for much in Indonesian foreign policy for various reasons, but in the four-year period following the first conference of Non-aligned states (held in Belgrade in September 1961) it acquired considerable significance.

There are three distinct phases in Indonesian-Pakistani relations. The first phase begins with the birth of Pakistan and extends to the end of 1960. During this period Indonesia's relations with Pakistan were "tactful rather than cordial"¹. The second phase was characterized by the search by the two countries for common goals and similar approaches to various issues of national and international importance. This search culminated in Indonesia's open and categorical support for Pakistan on the Kashmir question in April 1964. The third phase, a period of seventeen months, begins with the visit of Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, to Indonesia in April 1964 and ends with the outbreak of a war between India and Pakistan in September 1965.

FIRST PHASE

In its relations with Indonesia, Pakistan, as a political entity separate from India, had to start with certain disadvantages. It could claim centuries-old relations with Indonesia only as a part of India and not as Pakistan, a new state that emerged on August 14, 1947. Besides, leaders in Pakistan unlike their Indian counterparts had little personal contact with the leaders of Indonesia. None of the personalities to whom President Sukarno, Vice-President Mohammad Hatta and Prime Minister Sutan Sjahrir, owed and acknowledged inspiration, belonged to Pakistan. No Pakistani leader had offered to Indonesia the moral and diplomatic support

1 Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, *Minority Problems in Southeast Asia* (Stanford, Calif., 1955) p. 66.

of the kind that Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had given. Finally, whereas Pakistan came into being, and sought to perpetuate itself, on the basis of a hatred of India, Indonesia professed positive friendship with India. There was only one factor of advantage with Pakistan: both Pakistan and Indonesia were countries with predominantly Muslim populations. Islam thus became the basis of Pakistan's initial overtures to Indonesia. Incidentally, this was in tune with the major preoccupation of Pakistan during the first phase of its foreign policy—namely the forging of world-wide Islamic front—with India as a focus of enmity.

Pakistan's moral and diplomatic support for Indonesia's struggle for freedom became manifest during and after the second Dutch "police action" on December 18 1948. The Pakistan Government and the Constituent Assembly denounced the Dutch action. The Pakistani Foreign Minister, Chaudhri Mohanmad Zafrullah Khan, described it as "barbarous" and as "an affront to the soul of Asia and an outrage to human decency."² The mover of a motion of adjournment in the Constituent Assembly, Chaudhri Nazir Ahmad (West Punjab), termed it "naked Dutch aggression" which, he observed, "was condemned by every Pakistani."³ The anti-Dutch sentiment so dominated the deliberations of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan as to prompt the Indonesian representative to Pakistan, Idham Chalid, to say: "The expression of indignation against the Dutch was very emphatic."⁴

The Press in Pakistan also gave wide coverage to the news relating to the consequences of the Dutch action on December 18, 1948. *Dawn* editorially described the Dutch action as "a perfidious attack on the Indonesian Republic" and "the latest war of colonial plunder."⁵ The title it gave to one of its editorials on the Dutch was "Murderers of freedom."⁶

Although the Government of Pakistan emphasized that its moral support to Indonesia was a part of its general opposition to colonialism in Asia, it looked upon Indonesia as a country specially deserving of its sympathy, because of its predominantly Muslim population. "In the present instance", said the Pakistani Foreign

2 *Dawn* (Karachi), December 24, 1948. The Foreign Minister also disclosed that his Government had already made a "strong representation" to the Dutch Charge d' Affaires in Pakistan.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid., December 21, 1948.

6 "Murderers of Freedom" *Dawn*, December 25, 1948.

Minister, "the fact that over 90 per cent people of Indonesia are Muslims means that their griefs and sufferings are their (the Pakistani peoples) own."⁷

Pakistan gave moral support to the cause of Indonesian freedom both in and outside the United Nations. Pakistan also joined the eighteen-nation Asian Conference on Indonesia in New Delhi in January 1949. The Government in Karachi declared a holiday for December 27, 1949, the day on which the Dutch transferred sovereignty to the Republic of Indonesia. Indonesia also became the first of the two countries in South-East Asia, to which Pakistan sent full-fledged ambassadors.⁸

The Indonesians were not unmoved by these gestures. President Sukarno paid a visit to Pakistan soon after his sojourn in India in January 1950. Indonesia signed a Treaty of Friendship with Pakistan on the same day (March 3, 1951) that it signed such a treaty with India, thus laying the foundations of mutually beneficial relations.⁹

Pakistan hoped that owing to the common ties of religion and the Treaty of Friendship of March 1951, it might be able to tilt

7 Ibid., December 24, 1948.

8 Mushtaq Ahmad, "Pakistan Policies in South East Asia", *Pakistan Horizon* (Karachi), vol. 4, no. 2, June 1951, p. 84.

9 Interview with Mohammad Roem, former Indonesian Foreign Minister, in Djakarta on October 6, 1969.

Mohammad Roem told the author that when the question of signing a treaty with India came up, the Pakistani Ambassador met him and urged him to sign the treaty with his country first and the treaty with India on a subsequent day, so that Indonesia's preference for Pakistan as a Muslim country might be highlighted. This put Roem in a dilemma. For Indonesia, a choice between India and Pakistan, at that stage, was difficult. In view of the moral, diplomatic, and material support given by India during the struggle for freedom, Indonesia's anxiety for friendly relations with India was quite natural. But then Indonesia was in need of friends, and Pakistan was an Islamic state, one that was till recently a part of India. Indonesia did not, therefore, wish to do anything that might annoy Pakistan. The result was a policy of equal friendship with both India and Pakistan. Roem told the Pakistani Ambassador how India was the first country to establish a diplomatic mission in Indonesia. Besides, the Indian representative had visited him before he (*i.e.*, the Pakistani Ambassador) did. At this the Pakistani Ambassador urged him to sign the treaty with India in the morning and the treaty with Pakistan in the evening. This was a clever move on the part of Pakistan, Roem observed, and it was difficult to object to it. The treaties were, therefore, signed accordingly, thus enabling Pakistan to assert truthfully that, in fact, the two treaties were signed on the same day.

Indonesia in its own favour in its disputes with India. However, at least until the end of 1960, Indonesian-Pakistani relations remained just correct. Although President Sukarno had paid a visit to Pakistan as early as 1950, the President of Pakistan was not able to reciprocate it till December 1960.

A major foreign policy issue before Indonesia during this phase was the question of West Irian. Pakistan always supported Indonesia's position as against the Dutch. It found opportunities to express its moral support for Indonesia on the question in the General Assembly of the United Nations. It found opportunities to do so also in conferences like the one held at Bogor (West Java) in December 1954 and the Bandung Conference of April 1955. In a public speech at Bogor, the Pakistani Prime Minister, Mohammad Ali Bogra, said: "We strongly condemn colonialism wherever it exists and we sympathise with your attitude to the Irian question."¹⁰ But like India, Pakistan also pleaded that the West Irian dispute should be settled in a peaceful way.¹¹

Pakistan hoped that in exchange for its support for Indonesia on the West Irian question, Indonesia would support it in its quarrel with India over Kashmir. Indonesia, however, did not do so. Indeed, right up to April 1964, Indonesia continued to maintain an impartial posture towards the Indo-Pakistani quarrel over Kashmir. On various occasions, the Indonesian leaders expressed the "hope that the Indian and Pakistan nations can solve the Kashmir problem in an atmosphere of brotherhood and peace."¹² They also made several attempts to mediate between the two countries and help settle the Kashmir issue. On March 6, 1951, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Mohammad Roem, said that his Government was ready to mediate, if asked.¹³ This offer was repeated by the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Soenario, in April 1954.¹⁴

There were several reasons for Indonesia's attitude of impartiality on the Indo-Pakistani dispute over Kashmir. First, as opposed to the theocratic nature of the state of Pakistan, India and

10 *Pakistan Times* (Lahore), December 30, 1954.

11 *Antara News Bulletin* (Djakarta), December 11, 1960. This is obvious from one of the statements made by President Ayub Khan during his visit to Indonesia in December 1960. He expressed the hope that the West Irian question would be settled in a peaceful way.

12 Government of Indonesia, Ministry of Information, *Indonesian Affairs* (Djakarta), March 1951.

13 Thompson and Adloff, n. 1, p. 65.

14 *Ibid.*

Indonesia were both secular countries. Although, through its Press and other media, Pakistan attempted to give an exaggerated picture of communal riots in India in order to distort India's secular image in the eyes of the Indonesians, it did not succeed in enlisting Indonesian sympathy as against India. Indonesia's ruling elite with President Sukarno at the top, with their commitment to secularism, tended to prefer a secular India to a theocratic Pakistan. India held out Kashmir as a symbol of its secularism and, on that basis, endeavoured to convince the Indonesian leadership of the dangerous implications of Pakistan's plea that as a majority of the people of Jammu and Kashmir professed Islam, the state should go to Pakistan.¹⁵ Secondly, from the very beginning, Indonesia adopted a foreign policy fundamentally similar to that of India. Sharing each other's interpretation of the implications of the cold war the two countries refused to align themselves with either of the military blocs. Non-alignment permitted them a high degree of leverage in dealing with the super-powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. It afforded them freedom of action in any dispute in the cold war and enabled them to ensure that their independence was not compromised.

Pakistan, however, opted to join the US-sponsored military alliances like South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). It did so because it felt that there was a threat to its security from India and that alignment with the Western bloc offered the best means of neutralizing it. It also hoped to persuade the West to pressurize India into surrendering Kashmir.

Both India and Indonesia had expressed their strong opposition to the military alliances of the West. Their opposition stemmed from the belief that by exploiting internal regional dissensions and by raising the bogey of Communism, the Western Powers were

15 To Prime Minister Nehru, Pakistan's plea for the application of the two-nation theory was not acceptable. Neither he nor any other Indian leader had ever accepted it as a basis for India's partition. Nehru believed that if Kashmir was given to Pakistan just because a majority of its people professed Islam, it would threaten the lives of religious minorities in both the countries. While commenting on a question posed by a Pakistani correspondent in London on September 20, 1962, Nehru asked what would happen to the 50 million Muslims in India and eight or nine million Hindus in Pakistan in the event of the fate of Kashmir being decided on the basis of religion. See *Indonesian Herald* (Djakarta), September 22, 1962.

extending the Cold War. Divergence in the foreign policies of Indonesia and Pakistan constituted an important factor that kept the relations between the two countries at a low key. In the light of Indonesia's growing relations with the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and other countries of the Communist bloc, all of which were set against Western military pacts and bases in South and South-East Asia, Pakistan even feared that Indonesia might eventually join up with the Communist bloc. The general elections held in Indonesia in 1955 and the regional elections held there in 1956-57 brought the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) to the fore as the fourth largest party in the country to confirm Pakistan's fear.

Although there never arose a situation of hostility between Indonesia and Pakistan, thanks to domestic, religious and cultural factors, their relations continued to remain less than cordial until Pakistan changed its policy of excessive dependence on the West in its foreign policy and relations. Pakistan failed to destroy India's image as a secular, forward-looking country in the eyes of Indonesia's leaders; and Indonesia continued to pursue a policy of impartiality as between India and Pakistan on the Kashmir question. While giving his "personal impressions" of his visit to Indonesia, Rais Ahmad Khan, a Pakistani scholar, wrote thus: "They desire closer relations with us. In official circles, however, the Indian influence seems to be stronger."¹⁶ He also stressed that in Indonesian eyes India's neutrality was attractive whereas Pakistan's dependence on the West was repulsive. Correlating it to Indonesia's attitude towards the Kashmir question, he wrote: "This in fact is responsible for the extremely lukewarm attitude of Indonesia towards the Kashmir dispute."¹⁷ The Pakistani scholar correctly noted that as a result of Pakistan's joining the Western bloc, "Indonesia... (had) receded into the background of our foreign policy."¹⁸ Similarly, although the Pakistanis continued to be treated as brothers in Islam, the country as such received no particular importance in the foreign policy of Indonesia.

As against this, Indonesia's relations with India grew apace. Indonesia's sense of gratitude to India for its ungrudging moral, material and diplomatic support during the struggle for freedom from Dutch rule and its commitment to socialism at home, together

16 Rais Ahmad Khan, "Pakistan in South-East Asia", *Pakistan Horizon*, vol. 11, no. 4, December 1958, p. 283.

17 Ibid., p. 284.

18 Ibid., p. 283.

with the long-standing personal friendship between the leaders of the two countries, made India's position in Indonesia unassailable and also impeded the growth of cordial relations between Indonesia and Pakistan.

Even in December 1960 there was little significant change in the pattern of Indonesian-Pakistani relations. But certain developments both within Pakistan and outside indicated a possibility of change. Indeed these developments made perceptible impact on Pakistan's foreign policy towards Indonesia and the countries of the Communist bloc.

In September 1960, John Fitzgerald Kennedy, a Democratic candidate, was elected to the American Presidency¹⁹ The new American President's pro-Indian sympathies were well-known in Pakistan.²⁰ A feeling developed that under President Kennedy the United States might tend to ignore the interests of its allies. The Government of Pakistan, therefore, undertook a serious study of the foreign policy options open to it and came to conclusion that the best course would be to reduce its excessive dependence on the West gradually and diversify the sources of economic and military aid it needed. This did not mean snapping links with the West; it only meant restoration of the balance by pursuing a policy of establishing cordial relations with the two great countries of the Eastern bloc, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. A reorientation of policy on these lines would ensure a high degree of leverage with the countries of the Western bloc, secure Soviet neutrality on the Kashmir question and promote friendship with China, a big Asian neighbour that was most likely to be bitterly hostile to India for a long time. Moreover, a change of policy in favour of anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist forces in Asia and Africa would go a long way in restoring Pakistan's image in Indonesian eyes.

19 John F. Kennedy was inaugurated as President on January 20, 1961. However, the result of the Presidential election was already known in September 1960.

20 In March 1958, as a Senator, Kennedy had introduced a resolution in the Senate, which *inter alia*, read; "...the Congress recognizes the importance of the economic development of India...it is in the interest of the United States...to assist India to complete successfully its current programme for economic development." See "Western Arms Aid to India", *Pakistan Horizon*, vol. 16, no. 4, Fourth Quarter, 1963. p. 333. For the text of Kennedy's resolution, see USA, *Congressional Records*, vol. 104, (1958), p. 5250.

Another development that was expected to make a difference in Indonesian-Pakistani relations was the eclipse of parliamentary democracy in both the countries. The idea of basic democracy as it developed in Pakistan following Mohammad Ayub Khan's assumption of the office of President in October 1958; was found akin to President Sukarno's concept of Guided Democracy.

President Ayub Khan visited Indonesia early in December 1960 and received a tumultuous welcome.²¹ While welcoming him, President Sukarno recalled the valuable services rendered by "Pakistani" soldiers in 1945, and added that "that is also why the Indonesian people receive the Chief of State of the people of that country with the sincerest brotherly feeling and profoundest sympathy."²²

Addressing a huge rally at Bandung on December 7, 1960, President Ayub Khan explained to the Indonesians why Pakistan had joined the military alliances of the West. He emphasized that by its membership of the alliances Pakistan was only seeking to safeguard its independence against the pressures brought to bear upon it by some Asian nations.²³ The reference was clearly to India. Ayub Khan sought to force the Indonesian leaders to choose between India and Pakistan. He put the blame for all Indo-Pakistani disputes squarely on India. Sensing the strength of the Indonesian sentiment against colonialism, he expressed Pakistan's willingness to join Indonesia in eliminating colonialism and imperialism in the world.²⁴ However, even at this stage, the Indonesian leaders refused to take sides and maintained their earlier posture of friendliness towards both India and Pakistan. Ayub Khan's explanation that Pakistan had aligned itself with the West for "reasons of self-defence"²⁵ failed to convince President Sukarno. Sukarno said in the same rally in Bandung: "We, the Indonesian nation, are friendly towards these

21 For highlights of President Ayub Khan's visit to Bogor, see *Indonesian Observer* (Djakarta), December 12, 1960,

22 *Antara News Bulletin*, December 5, 1960. In fact, there were no Pakistani soldiers in 1945, Pakistan having come into existence only in August 1947. The reference is obviously to the Indian Muslim and other soldiers who defected to the Indonesian side and actively supported Indonesia's struggle for freedom against the Dutch. In calling them "Pakistani", Sukarno was only trying to please his guest, the President of Pakistan. See Government of Indonesia, Ministry of Information, *Illustrations of the Revolution, 1945-1950* (Djakarta, 1954), edn. 2.

23 *Indonesian Observer*, December 8, 1960.

24 *Ibid.*

25 *Antara News Bulletin*, December 11, 1960.

two nations, both with India and Pakistan. And...we are also desirous in maintaining friendly relations with all countries.”²⁶ These words left Ayub Khan in no doubt about Indonesia's deep commitment to secularism and non-alignment, which, in practical terms, meant continued friendship with India. Sukarno also showed no enthusiasm for Ayub Khan's idea of a united Islamic bloc against India.

Understandably, the President of Pakistan was not satisfied with Indonesia's theme of friendship with India. That explains why, while speaking at a Press conference in Djakarta on December 10, 1960, he did not offer categorical support to Indonesia's demand for the convening of a second Asian African conference. When asked about the prospects of such a conference, President Ayub Khan replied that the countries of Asia and Africa should first carefully examine what benefits such a conference was likely to bring them. Lest it should be interpreted as outright rejection of the proposal to hold such a conference he added that this opinion of his did not mean he was against it.²⁷ Even the joint statement issued by the two sides on December 10, 1960, only noted that there were discussions on “the question of exploring the possibility of holding an Asian-African conference at the earliest possible time.”²⁸ On the West Irian question also Ayub Khan withheld support for Indonesia's policy of employing all means, including force, against the Dutch. Indeed the Pakistani leader expressed the hope that the West Irian question would not be solved in a military way.²⁹ The joint statement omitted direct reference to the West Irian question. It merely reaffirmed the belief of the two Presidents that colonialism “in all its forms and manifestations must be eradicated from the world in the interest of peace, prosperity and stability.”³⁰

Naturally, in view of its less-than-categorical attitude towards the West Irian issue and the convening of second Asian-African conference, Pakistan could hardly hope to obtain Indonesia's support on the Kashmir question. The joint statement made no mention of the Kashmir question. It only said : “Strong support was also voiced for the principle of self-determination for all people struggling under

26 Ibid. See also *Antara News Bulletin*, December 8, 1960.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid. See also text of “Pakistan-Indonesia Joint. Statement”, *Pakistan Horizon*, vol. 14, no. 1, First Quarter, 1961, pp. 77-78.

29 *Antara News Bulletin*, December 11, 1960.

30 For the text of the Indonesian-Pakistani joint statement, see n. 28,

foreign domination.”³¹ And these words, by no stretch of imagination, could be taken to mean Indonesia’s support for Pakistan in its quarrel with India on the Kashmir question.

Official and Press circles in Indonesia focussed on both similarities and differences in the domestic and foreign policies of the two countries. The First Minister, Djuanda Kartawidjaja, said that “from our side we have given clarifications about guided democracy and the Manipol-Usdek as the outlines of the State policy” and that “Pakistan too has come to the conclusion that the Western type parliamentary democracy is no longer suitable” to it. He added: “Whereas the foreign policies of both countries are quite different, there are many similarities in their development policies.”³² “Indonesia pursues a different foreign policy than (sic) Pakistan”, said Foreign Minister Subandrio.³³ Summing up its impressions of President Ayub Khan’s visit to Indonesia, the *Antara News Bulletin*, in its weekly review, commented that “Indonesia and Pakistan differ almost as much as they have in common.”³⁴

On his part Ayub Khan realized that he would not succeed in eliciting Indonesia’s support for his country on the Kashmir question by harping only on the common bond of Islam and that the Indonesian leadership preferred the secularism of India’s polity and leadership to the theocracy in Pakistan. It is thus clear that politically President Ayub Khan’s one-week visit to Indonesia was a failure. In other matters, however, it did pay dividends. For instance, on December 10, 1960, two Presidents signed a cultural agreement on bilateral co-operation in the field of art and science.³⁵ Besides, “to promote economic relations”, they decided on exchange of trade delegations between the two countries “at the earliest possible opportunity”³⁶. Pakistan hoped that by strengthening its cultural ties with Indonesia and providing it with certain inducements in the field of trade and commerce over and above what India had been able to do, it might succeed in persuading Indonesia to change its attitude to the Kashmir question.

Ayub Khan’s visit proved useful in other ways, too. It enabled him to make a first-hand assessment of the tone and temper of the

31 Ibid.

32 *Indonesian Observer*, December 6, 1960.

33 *Antara News Bulletin*, December 7, 1960.

34 Ibid., December 12, 1960.

35 Ibid., December 11, 1960. For text of the Cultural Agreement, see *Indonesian Observer*, December 12, 1960.

36 For the text of the “Indonesia-Pakistan Joint Statement”, see n. 28.

Indonesian leadership and of the major foreign-policy objectives of Indonesia. It helped him in identifying the areas where Indonesia and Pakistan might co-operate to mutual advantage and even act in concert. The President of Pakistan saw that by extending support to Sukarno's anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist sentiment, by endorsing his demand for a second Asian-African conference and by pursuing a policy that was active and independent like Indonesia's in relation to the two Power blocs, Pakistan might improve its relations with Indonesia at the cost of India. However, since all this would mean a departure from the country's earlier policy of placing exclusive reliance on alliance with the West, it had to wait till the circumstances in the international field took a different turn.

Above all, the visit enabled President Ayub Khan to establish personal rapport with Indonesia's leaders at the highest level and to forge "most fruitful contact" with them. In his parting message to President Sukarno, he expressed his "earnest hope that we will have further opportunities of meeting each other in the future."³⁷

Second Phase

A perceptible change in the U.S. policy in Asia provided Pakistan with a justification for reviewing its earlier policy of alignment and considering other options. After Kennedy's assumption of the office of the President, there was a growing feeling in Pakistan that the Western countries were going "out of the way to support neutralists against their friends". This became "a cause for great concern".³⁸ President Ayub Khan contested the argument that the American arms aid to India was meant to strengthen India against the People's Republic of China alone. Indeed he declared that a militarily stronger India posed a threat not so much to the security of China as to that of Pakistan and other countries in the neighbourhood of India.³⁹ Commenting on the implications of America's

37 *Antara News Bulletin*, December 12, 1960.

38 Mohammad Ayub Khan, *Speeches and Statements*, vol. 4 (July 1961—June 1962) (Karachi, n.d.), pp. 12-16. See President Ayub Khan's TV interview to Welles Hangen, correspondent of National Broadcasting Corporation (NBC) in Karachi on July 10, 1961, on the eve of his visit to the United States.

39 *Ibid.*, p. 4. In his interview to John Scally of the American Broadcasting Company, President Ayub Khan said: "We feel that India...will gain more strength if...she obtains more arms from the United States of America. We have no doubt in our mind that those arms shall be used to intimidate Pakistan."

India-oriented policy for India's neighbours, he hinted at options open to these latter. He observed that if India's "military power", increased, the states situated in the neighbourhood of India would feel more and more insecure and look to "somebody else" for protection. And he predicted that "they would seek protection from China and (that) China will be willing to give it."⁴⁰

The compulsions of geo-politics also made a change in Pakistan's foreign policy inevitable. The growing rift between India and China on the border question pointed to the possibility of a realignment of forces in Asia to Pakistan's advantage. If Pakistan could, by a radical shift in policy, lay the basis of close friendship with China, it would enable Pakistan to secure Soviet neutrality on the Kashmir question; recover a certain amount of leverage in its relations with its Western allies, gain respectability in the Asian-African opinion and especially in Indonesian eyes. Many in Pakistan believed that friendship with China to the north of India⁴¹ and with Indonesia to the south-east of India, would be of far greater help in dealing with India than the alliances with the West. Certain important events during 1961 and 1962 strengthened this view in Pakistan.

Pakistan evolved a dual strategy towards Indonesia. Positively, through a gradual shift away from its Western allies, especially the United States, and towards China and the Soviet Union, Pakistan sought to improve its image in Indonesian eyes. Negatively, it reinforced its propaganda aimed at tarnishing India's image in Indonesia. The picture of India the Pakistanis endeavoured to portray was internally that of a country inhabited by a caste-ridden,⁴² poverty-stricken, chauvinistic and intolerant people, a country that was secular and democratic only in name; and externally that of an ambitious and aggressive country, a country that threatened the existence of its small neighbours. Simultaneously, it made an attempt to play up Indonesia's leadership and play down India's.

The Conference of Non-aligned countries in September 1961 and the action taken by India against Portuguese colonialism in Goa in December 1961 provided Pakistan with two valuable

40 Ibid., pp. 7-8.

41 "A Warning to Pakistan", *Dawn*, December 20, 1961.

42 Addressing a 200,000-strong mass rally in Bandung (West Java) on December 7, 1960, President Ayub Khan traced the origin of Pakistan to 100 million Muslims' fears of Hindu domination. He said that the Muslims felt that because of the rigid caste system of the Hindus, they might become untouchables and fall from one slavery to another.

opportunities to promote ill-will between India and Indonesia. The first opportunity arose when Sukarno declined Nehru's invitation to visit New Delhi enroute to Belgrade and instead, decided to have a brief stop-over at Karachi Airport.⁴³ The Pakistanis felt jubilant; for the Indonesian President had publicly preferred Pakistan to India for the first time since independence. Besides, Sukarno expressed his fondness for the people of Pakistan by saying that he liked "Pakistan and...the people here. There is a lot of goodwill amongst us."⁴⁴

Although Sukarno's stop-over at Karachi Airport was for technical reasons, his refusal to respond to Nehru's invitation to visit India on way to Belgrade gave a hint that some kind of coolness had developed between the two leaders at a personal level. Pakistan tried to turn this coolness into antipathy. In this effort, *Dawn*, a prominent English daily, played a significant role. On the opening day of the Conference of Non-aligned states on September 1, 1961, it editorially expressed its doubt whether any meaningful "contribution" to the solution of present-day international disputes and issues was possible "by people professing and practising Mr. Nehru's brand of neutrality or non-alignment which has no basis in sincerity or honesty." It eulogized other non-aligned leaders like Presidents Nasser, Tito, Sukarno and Nkrumah.⁴⁵ It gave wide publicity to views and statements critical of Nehru, alleged that the Indian Prime Minister was enthusiastic neither about the Asian-African struggle against colonialism nor about the fate of the Arabs in Palestine.⁴⁶ It also endeavoured to make use of Nehru's unwillingness to endorse Indonesia's demand for convening a second Asian-African conference. It reported that most Asian-African states including the United Arab Republic had agreed to President Sukarno's proposal to hold such a conference. Ejaz Husain, *Dawn's* European correspondent, felt that Nehru's opposition to the holding of such a conference was due to a fear that Pakistan and China might attend it.⁴⁷ *Dawn* said that Nehru was isolated on most of the issues,⁴⁸ and predicted that India was likely to lose its prestige further among the

43 See Chapter on The Background, pp. 38-39.

44 *Dawn*, August 30, 1961.

45 "The Neutral Summit", *ibid.*, September 1, 1961.

46 *Ibid.*, September 3, September 5, September 8, and September 11, 1961.

47 *Ibid.*, September 6, 1961.

48 *Ibid.*, September 8, 1961.

non-aligned group.⁴⁹

On December 18, 1961, about three-and-a-half months after the Belgrade Conference, India took action against Portuguese colonialism in Goa and liberated all the Indian territories under the Portuguese rule. With a view to "exposing" India and its aggressiveness towards its small neighbours, President Ayub Khan said: "India's invasion of Goa has fully exposed India's desire to grab and devour all surrounding countries." Pakistan, he feared, would be the first country to suffer under India's "invasion programme".⁵⁰ A spokesman of the Pakistani Foreign Office described India's action as "naked militarism". "The mask is off", he declared. "Their much proclaimed theories of non-violence, secularism, and democratic methods stand exposed."⁵¹

Dawn took up the theme and pictured the Indians as invaders.⁵² It said in an editorial: "With the characteristic bravery of a coward, the Indian elephant has attacked the Goan mosquito, and...the invading hordes of India have occupied almost all the Portuguese territory."⁵³ It also gave prominent coverage to world Press and public opinion critical of India on this issue. It used headlines like "Nehru's 'imperialism' Condemned."⁵⁴

To Pakistan's discomfiture, this kind of anti-Indian propaganda failed to evoke any encouraging response from the Indonesian side. Indonesia, *Dawn* acknowledged, was one of the three countries in the world which supported India's action in Goa.⁵⁵ In conformity with their commitment to anti-colonialism, Indonesia's leaders hailed India's action. A spokesman of the Indonesian Foreign Office, in a statement in Djakarta, extended his country's "every sympathy" to the Indian people and the Government in

49 Ibid., September 4, 1961. The paper said: "If Bandung saw the rising influence of China at India's expense Belgrade may similarly witness the rising of an African voice in world affairs also at the expense of India." See also *Pakistan Times* (Lahore), September 9, 1961. Commenting editorially on Nehru's predicament at Belgrade, it said: "...Nehru lacked enthusiasm for Belgrade and Belgrade lacked enthusiasm for Nehru."

50 *Dawn*, December 19, 1961.

51 Ibid., See also *The Statesman* (New Delhi), January 6, 1962.

52 *Dawn*, December 19, 1961. Its front-page headline read: "Indian Invaders Approach Goa Capital".

53 "A Warning to Pakistan", *ibid.*, December 20, 1961.

54 Ibid., December 19 and 20, 1961.

55 Ibid., December 19, 1961. The other two countries it mentioned were the Soviet Union and the United Arab Republic.

their action against the Portuguese. "We are fully aware that India is compelled to use force in spite of the fact that India is a peace-loving nation", he observed. "There can be no compromise with colonialism."⁵⁶ The Indonesian delegate to the U.N. Trusteeship Committee, at its meeting in New York on December 20, 1961, described Goa's liberation as "a most joyful occasion."⁵⁷ Colonel Latief Hendraningrat, Chairman of the Indonesian Parliament (DPR-GR), criticized the American attitude to India's action in Goa and said that it showed "lack of understanding towards the problem of colonialism and the liberation movements related to it." He also described it as "a liberation movement and not as aggression as propagated by the colonialists and their allies."⁵⁸ This was, in fact, a strong rebuttal of the anti-Indian propaganda carried on by Pakistan, which was, in technical and practical terms, one of the "allies" of the "colonialists". The *Indonesian Herald* editorially asked the Western nations not to be shocked by India's action. "They should fully understand that this is only a matter of course, although long overdue", it observed.⁵⁹

In 1962 there were three important events which enabled Pakistan to play a role in Indian-Indonesian relations. These were : Pakistan's active role in West Irian after the Indonesian-Dutch Agreement signed on August 15, 1962 ; the so-called "Sondhi Affair" during the Fourth Asian Games held in Djakarta in September 1962; and the Chinese attack on the northern borders of India in October 1962.

The Agreement on West Irian provided that before the final transfer of administration to the Republic of Indonesia on May 1, 1963, West Irian would remain under the administration of the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority for a period of seven months starting on October 1, 1962. The United Nations requested India to depute six Army officials for service in West Irian. Accordingly, India selected Brigadier General Inderjeet Rikhey to lead the United Nations Military Team. However, at Indonesia's request Pakistan was chosen to dispatch 1,000-strong contingent to work in

56 *Antara News Bulletin*, December 19, 1961, and *The Statesman* (New Delhi), December 19, 1961.

57 *Antara News Bulletin*, December 22, 1961.

58 *Ibid.*

59 *Indonesian Herald*, December 18, 1961, and *The Statesman* (New Delhi), December 19, 1961.

West Irian.⁶⁰ This enabled Pakistan to establish contacts with Indonesia in the military field and earn Indonesian goodwill.

In September 1962, on the eve of the Fourth Asian Games in Djakarta, G.D. Sondhi, Senior Vice-President of the Asian Games Federation, issued a statement supporting the participation of Israel and Taiwan in the Games. This provided Pakistan with a valuable opportunity to hit at India, as the *Indian Express*, an English daily from New Delhi, editorially put it.⁶¹

Ignoring G.D. Sondhi's actual status as Senior Vice-President of the Asian Games Federation, Pakistani media gave wide publicity to Sondhi's views, and said that they truly reflected the attitude of the Government of India. Pakistan's aim was to impress upon Indonesia, as well as upon the Arabs, that India was pro-Israeli and hence pro-imperialist. Zafar Ali, a spokesman of the Pakistani delegation (jointly with M.S. Osman, a spokesman of the Ceylonese delegation), condemned Sondhi "for attempting to change the name of the Asian Games and impair the prestige of Indonesia." He also described him as "not a good Asian."⁶²

Anti-Indian feeling was running high in Djakarta. Pakistan assessed the nature of developments against India and sought to exploit them to its advantage.⁶³ *Dawn* published an account of the closing ceremony of the Games under a prominent heading : "Asian

60 "Pakistan And The World" (Quarterly Survey) *Pakistan Horizon*, vol. 17, no. 4, Fourth Quarter, 1964, p. 326.

Recounting the outstanding features of Pakistan's relations with Indonesia, *Pakistan Horizon* noted that "Indonesia selected Pakistan from which the United Nations Force for West Irian was to be drawn." "This was", it observed, "in appreciation of the staunch support given by Pakistan to Indonesia on the West Irian issue."

Thus India, which had made no mean contribution to the strengthening of Indonesia's case on the West Irian question in the United Nations, was ignored.

61 *Indian Express* (New Delhi), September 5, 1962.

62 *Dawn*, September 4, 1962. See also *Indonesian Herald* (Djakarta), September 1, 1962. Zafar Ali, in the statement, stressed that "these games will be the Fourth Asian Games. Nobody has any right to interfere in our affairs. All of us, members of the Asian Games Federation stand by the Indonesian side...Whoever acts against the interest of Asia is not a true Asian. We will fight against all kinds of foreign interference and aggression. All Asian nations should be united for the development and welfare of sports."

63 For a survey of the developments in Djakarta in September-1962, see Chapter on Bilateral Relations and The Malaysia Question", pp. 99-102.

Games Come to an End—Indians booed at Closing Ceremony”.⁶⁴ This showed Pakistan's determination to vitiate relations between India and Indonesia. Not only did it use the Sondhi episode to do damage to Indian-Indonesian relations, but it also became the chief beneficiary of the Indian-Indonesian misunderstanding. Taking a cue from Indonesia's Trade Minister Suharto's statement issuing instructions against trade relations with India,⁶⁵ Pakistan was encouraged to step in and fill the gap.

China's invasion of India's northern borders in the very next month was another event of importance to Pakistan. Its significance, so far as Indian-Indonesian relations were concerned, lay in the opportunity it gave to Pakistan to re-orient its policy towards its Western allies and move closer to China and other countries of the Communist bloc. When the Western Powers, especially the United States, promptly acceded to Prime Minister Nehru's request for supply of arms to meet the Chinese invasion, Pakistan took exception to their response. It felt that it had been let down and that its vital national interests were being sacrificed in favour of a non-aligned country, a country which in its eyes posed the direct threat to its security and very existence. President Ayub Khan said that he saw “a complete and fundamental change” in the American policy towards the sub-continent.⁶⁶ Public opinion in Pakistan was wholly disenchanted with the policy of alliance with the West and the United States and demanded closer relations with China.

Pakistan now sought to improve relations with China, the Soviet Union and the Communist states of Eastern Europe. Its overtures to China culminated in the conclusion of a boundary agreement between the two countries on March 2, 1963. The two countries also signed a trade agreement in January 1963, an air agreement in August 1963 and a barter deal at the end of September 1963. Pakistan also sought to promote trade relations with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe which were members of the Warsaw Pact. The fact that Pakistan was signing trade and other agreements with the countries of the Communist bloc for the first time in its history represented a change in its outlook and a determination on its part to free itself from total dependence on its

64 *Dawn*, September 5, 1962.

65 See *Indonesian Herald*, September 1, 1962.

66 Mohammad Ayub Khan, *Friends, Not Masters : A Political Autobiography* (London, 1967), p. 129.

Western allies.⁶⁷ This was certain to improve Pakistan's image in Indonesia and convince President Sukarno that Pakistan was cutting itself loose from the Old Established Order Forces (OLDEFOS) and getting closer to New Emerging Forces (NEFOS).

Pakistan also intensified its propaganda with a view to putting pressure on the countries of the West and getting them to stop military aid to India. In order to cultivate China and strengthen anti-Indian feeling in Indonesia, it sought to refute the Indian thesis that China was an aggressive, ambitious and expansionist state, that China had invaded India, and that India's arms build-up was meant only to meet the Chinese attack on India's territorial integrity. It charged India with harbouring evil designs against its small neighbours. The Pakistani Foreign Minister, Z A. Bhutto, interpreted the Sino-Indian "conflict" as "no more than border warfare" and blamed India for seeking massive arms aid from the West on the pretext of a security threat from China. "It is obvious", he observed, "that Nehru has refused a peaceful settlement of the dispute with China in order to derive from it the maximum advantage in the form of massive aid rushed to India by the Western Powers."⁶⁸ On the basis of reports made available by the New China News Agency (NCNA), the Press in Pakistan gave the Chinese version of the Sino-Indian war, and attempted to demolish India's image in Indonesia and elsewhere by portraying India as the aggressor in that war.⁶⁹

Indonesia's policy of treating China and India on a par and its refusal to accept India's contention that China had committed aggression encouraged Pakistan to believe that its propaganda against India was going down well with the Indonesian elite. However, at least up to June 1963, Pakistan's anti-Indian propaganda in Indonesia did not produce any appreciable results. This is borne out by the various statements made by the leaders of Indonesia during their visit to Pakistan in June 1963. For instance, addressing a Press conference in Karachi on June 26, 1963, Foreign Minister Subandrio attributed Western arms supply to India to the latter's differences with China, and expressed his "hope" that "it is for that

⁶⁷ 'Pakistan and the World Quarterly Survey', *Pakistan Horizon*, vol., 16, no. 4, Fourth Quarter 1963, pp. 356-57.

⁶⁸ Z.A. Bhutto, *Foreign Policy of Pakistan* (Karachi, 1964), p. 55, and p. 40.

⁶⁹ *Dawn*, October 19, October 20, and October 21, 1962. On October 19, it carried the headline: "Indians Cross MacMahon Line, Attack Chinese... Action Follows Delhi Cabinet Meeting"; on October 20, it wrote: "Chinese Border: Indian attack on Western Sector also"; on October 21, its headline ran: "All-Out Offensive by India on China Border".

purpose.”⁷⁰ He emphatically stated that if an independent nation wanted to build-up its strength, that was its own affair. “It is not for us to make any comment on other countries. Sovereign nations should judge for themselves.”⁷¹

As regards the Kashmir question, Subandrio told the journalists in Karachi that Indonesia would not venture any judgement on the merits of the quarrel. Any solution acceptable to both India and Pakistan would be welcome to Indonesia, he declared.⁷² Talking to newsmen in Bangkok next day, he reiterated Indonesia's preparedness to mediate “if pressed”, but also stressed that it “will not offer services”.⁷³

President Sukarno's visit to Pakistan

President Sukarno paid his third visit to Pakistan in June 1963. Both officially and through its Press and other media, Pakistan went all out to win Sukarno over to its side. Several important English dailies of Pakistan described the visit as “epoch-making” and “historic”. There was a flood of editorials, comments, and articles about Indonesia and President Sukarno in Pakistani newspapers. Special supplements were brought out in honour of Sukarno. The newspaper write-ups clearly manifested Pakistan's hope of inducing Indonesia to join it in a line-up against India.⁷⁴ *Dawn* called Sukarno “a great Asian” in one of its editorials and highlighted the contrast between India's forcible seizure of Goa and Indonesia's commitment to the principle of avoiding the use of force in resolving the West Irian question.⁷⁵ *The Morning News* praised the Indonesian President as an Asian leader of great stature who “should prove more than a match” for those “forces of brown imperialism” that were “threatening” the nations of resurgent Asia.⁷⁶ The idea was to play off Sukarno against Nehru, who, according to the Pakistani Press, represented the “forces of brown imperialism”. During his visit to Murree, a hill resort in West Pakistan, the Indonesian President was presented with an address of welcome which extolled him as a “symbol of

70 *Antara News Bulletin*, June 27, 1963.

71 *The Statesman* (New Delhi), June 27, 1963.

72 *Antara News Bulletin*, June 27, 1963.

73 *Ibid.*, June 23, 1963, and *The Statesman* (New Delhi), June 28, 1963.

74 *The Statesman* (New Delhi), June 25, 1963.

75 See *Antara News Bulletin*, June 25, 1963.

76 *The Morning News* came out with an editorial entitled “Welcome to a Great Leader”. See *Antara News Bulletin*, June 25, 1963.

freedom in Asia and the greatest son of Indonesia, who spoke for millions of Muslims all over the world.”⁷⁷

Sukarno reciprocated with warmth. Speaking at Murree on June 25, 1963, the Indonesian leader stressed the need for “close co-operation and real kinship” between the two countries.⁷⁸ He interpreted the “tumultuous welcome” accorded to him as a spontaneous gesture which manifested the brotherly feeling that the Pakistanis had for the Indonesian people.⁷⁹ In his address to the Pakistan National Assembly, he declared : “Both Indonesia and Pakistan are introducing new political structures in their respective efforts to create the institutional vehicles through which our people may return to their ancient greatness.” He continued : “Your form, you call the ‘Basic Democracies’. Our Indonesian form, we call ‘Guided Democracy’.” Although, he added, these might be “made-up” forms of democracy, “this is something we are proud of, not the reverse.”⁸⁰

However, the joint communique issued at the conclusion of President Sukarno’s visit to Pakistan showed that Indonesia had not changed its earlier policy of neutrality on the Kashmir question. It merely expressed the hope of the two Presidents “that in view of the need for strengthening...Afro-Asian solidarity, an honourable and equitable settlement of the problem of Kashmir would be reached in the near future.”⁸¹

Pakistan thus failed to bring about any favourable change in Indonesia’s official attitude to the issue of Western arms aid to India and to the Kashmir question. Even President Ayub Khan’s direct request for Indonesia’s “powerful support” for his country’s

77 Ibid., June 28, 1963.

78 Ibid., June 26, 1963.

79 Ibid., June 28, 1963.

80 See Government of the Republic of Indonesia, Department of Information, *New Nationhoods and New Forms* (President Sukarno’s address to the National Assembly of Pakistan, Rawalpindi, June 26, 1963) (Djakarta, 1963), p. 6.

81 For the text of the joint communique, see *Pakistan Horizon*, Third Quarter, 1963, pp. 277-9.

The only indication of the possibility of a change in Indonesia’s attitude towards the Kashmir question came in President Sukarno’s address to the National Assembly of Pakistan on June 26, 1963. Towards the end of that address, Sukarno appreciated Pakistan’s persistent call for a peaceful solution of the intractable Kashmir question. He thus suggested, by implication, that it was India which refused to come to terms with Pakistan. See *New Nationhoods and New Forms*, n. 80, p. 22. See also *The Statesman* (New Delhi), June 29, 1963.

claim to Kashmir yielded no tangible results.⁸² In other matters, however, Sukarno's visit was quite satisfactory from the Pakistani point of view ; for the leaders of Pakistan did elicit encouraging response from Sukarno to their proposal that the bilateral relations should rest on the basis of their common religion. The joint communique expressed the determination of the two Presidents to strive for closer Indonesian-Pakistani bonds "as is appropriate between brothers in Islam and based on the ten principles of Bandung".⁸³ The Pakistanis were also happy to find Sukarno putting stress on similarities in the domestic and foreign-policy postures of the two countries.

Pakistan's growing relations with the countries of the Communist bloc and especially with China, its agreement to attend the games of NEFOS and its readiness to work for the holding of a second Asian-African conference "in the near future" combined to create a favourable attitude in Indonesia towards Pakistan. Although Pakistan continued to be a member of the American-sponsored military alliances and allowed American bases on its territory, for Sukarno it had become one of the active members of the NEFOS. While speaking at the banquet arranged in his honour on June 24, 1963, the Indonesian President had said that close collaboration between his country and Pakistan was essential to rally the NEFOS of the world against the old established order marked by domination, exploitation and suppression. He had declared that "there will always be very close cooperation between the two countries."⁸⁴ He had succeeded in enlisting Pakistan's "full, immediate support to the newly emerging forces". In his address to the National Assembly, Sukarno had stated in a jubilant mood that Pakistan "now like Indonesia looks forward to the holding of a world revolution, from the basis founded by the Bandung principles."⁸⁵ So, from the Indonesian point of view, two notable achievements of Sukarno's visit to Pakistan were Pakistan's agreement on basic matters relating to the holding of a second Asian-African con-

82 On June 24, at a State banquet in Karachi, Ayub Khan had praised Sukarno for the liberation of West Irian from colonialism, and said : " This remarkable achievement of your nation encourages us to believe that you will lend your powerful support for a similar struggle being waged in this (Indo-Pakistani) sub-continent. "See *Antara News Bulletin*, and *The Statesman* (New Delhi), June, 26, 1963.

83 *Antara News Bulletin*, June 28, 1963,

84 *The Statesman* (New Delhi), June 26, 1963.

85 *Antara News Bulletin*, June 27, 1963.

ference and its preparedness to take part in the projected Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFOS).⁸⁶

From a long-term perspective, Sukarno's visit to Pakistan in June 1963 indicated how Indonesian-Pakistani relations were going to develop further at the expense of India. By giving full support to Indonesia's demand for a second Bandung conference and by showing ideological proximity to the concept of NEFOS versus OLDEFOS, Pakistan had, to a great extent, succeeded in presenting a more friendly image of itself than India's. It now expected that in view of the sharp deterioration in Indian-Indonesian relations after the Sindh episode in 1962, Indonesia would abandon its attitude of neutrality to the Kashmir question and come out openly in favour of Pakistan. And this is what happened less than a year later.

Pakistan now became an active supporter of the demand for a second Asian-African conference. When Indonesia invited various Asian-African governments to send their representatives for a preparatory meeting, Pakistan accepted the invitation with alacrity. This was in sharp contrast to India's reluctant, hesitant attitude towards the conference. In response, Indonesia's attitude to Pakistan grew more and more cordial.

Pro-Pakistani Shift in Indonesia's Attitude

Foreign Ministers of twenty-two nations met in Djakarta from April 10 to April 15, 1964, to prepare the ground for a second Asian-African conference. This was an important event in the history of Indonesian-Pakistani relations ; for it provided the two countries with an opportunity to work in close co-operation. The Pakistani Foreign Minister, Z.A. Bhutto, highlighted the importance that his country attached to Indonesia's friendship by preferring to attend this meeting in Djakarta rather than the annual SEATO Ministerial Conference held in Manila between April 13 and 15, 1964.⁸⁷ Indeed this established Pakistan's *bona fides* as a champion of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism in Indonesian eyes.

Even more important for Pakistan was the joint communique issued on April 16, 1964, by the Foreign Ministers of Indonesia and Pakistan ; for this communique "called for an early solution of this (Kashmir) dispute in accordance with the wishes of the people of the state and other provisions as envisaged in the Security Council

86 Ibid., June 28, 1963. Subandrio told the Indonesians so on his return to Djakarta.

87 "Pakistan and the World : Quarterly Survey", *Pakistan Horizon*, vol. 17, no. 2, Second Quarter, 1964, p. 109.

resolutions which were accepted by both India and Pakistan.”⁸⁸ This was a clear departure from the earlier Indonesian stance on the Kashmir question. Now Indonesia was no longer eager to maintain an attitude of neutrality between India and Pakistan. It regarded India now as a stumbling-block in the realization of its foreign policy objectives.

Pakistan had at last achieved a big diplomatic gain. It had forged close relations with Djakarta and Peking without appreciably impairing its ties with the United States and other Western allies ; and more importantly, it had succeeded in isolating India.

Pakistan's diplomatic triumph in enlisting Indonesia's clear and direct support on Kashmir question made India fear that Indonesia might also join those who were pressurizing it into submission on the Kashmir question. Under the influence of the PKI Sukarno had moved close to China. Pakistan's relations with China, too, were getting increasingly friendly. Pakistan's preparedness to accommodate Indonesia's demands in the sphere of foreign policy had rendered it acceptable to the leaders of Indonesia. Clearly, an anti-Indian alliance was taking shape.

The immediate reason for a shift in Indonesian policy towards the Indo-Pakistani quarrel over Kashmir was the proposal made by the leader of the Indian delegation, Swaran Singh, at the preparatory meeting to invite Malaysia to participate in the proposed Asian-African conference. Both India and Pakistan wanted Malaysia to attend the conference ; but whereas Pakistan maintained a non-committal attitude to the question of Malaysia's participation and avoided giving offence to Indonesia, India, for its own reasons, actively supported it. The Indonesian-Pakistani joint communique showed that Pakistan was a beneficiary of the bitterness that India's attitude towards Malaysia's participation in the second Asian-African conference had roused in Indonesia.

88 For text of joint communique, see *ibid.*, pp. 201-2. Only two months earlier, in February 1964, President Ayub Khan had, jointly with Prime Minister Chou-En-lai, issued a similar communique. This communique had “expressed the hope that the Kashmir dispute would be resolved in accordance with the wishes of the people of Kashmir as pledged to them by India and Pakistan.” See *Dawn*, February 26, 1964. This was a significant development ; both China (in February 1964) and Indonesia (in April 1964) chose, for the first time, to discard their non-committal and impartial attitude towards the Kashmir question and came out openly in favour of Pakistan.

THIRD PHASE

The Indonesian-Pakistani joint communique issued in Djakarta in April 1964 virtually laid the basis for the close relations that developed subsequently between the two countries. In the diplomatic and political field, Pakistan collaborated with Indonesia in furthering the prospects of a second Asian-African conference. It also started taking active part in Asian-African gatherings. President Sukarno's two-day visit to Pakistan in September 1964 strengthened Indonesia's relations with that country still further. The joint communique issued on September 19, 1964, at the conclusion of his visit, reiterated Indonesia's pro-Pakistani position on the Kashmir question.⁸⁹ As regards the efforts of the two countries to convene a second Asian-African conference, it expressed agreement between the two Presidents that "continuing collaboration between Pakistan and Indonesia would not only contribute to the success of the Conference but would also promote the cause of Asian solidarity and world peace."⁹⁰ On the question of Malaysia's participation, Pakistan stuck to its neutral posture. The joint communique merely expressed President Ayub Khan's concern over the increasing tension between Indonesia and Malaysia and his hope that there would be an early solution of the problem "through peaceful means probably through the Afro-Asian Conciliation Commission."⁹¹ Perhaps there was a vital difference in the approaches of India and Pakistan to the issue. Whereas Pakistan managed to maintain a discreet silence over Malaysia's participation in the second Asian-African conference, India, for its own reasons, vocally supported and canvassed Malaysia's case. Naturally, by doing so it annoyed the Indonesian leaders and Pakistan utilized the anti-Indian feeling to its own advantage.

Pakistani-Indonesian Relations in the Field of Trade and Commerce

The growing cordiality in political relations naturally made a favourable impact on Indonesian-Pakistani ties in the field of trade.

89 "Pakistan-Indonesia Joint Communique", *Pakistan Horizon*, vol. 17, no. 4, Fourth Quarter, 1964, pp. 403-04.

90 Ibid. See also *Guardian* (Rangoon), September 22, 1964.

91 *The Guardian* (Rangoon), September 22, 1964.

The move for the setting up of an Afro-Asian Conciliation Commission was initiated by President Macapagal of the Philippines at a summit meeting attended by President Sukarno, Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman, and himself in Tokyo on June 20, 1964.

A trade agreement had been signed as early as 1953 but it had not been implemented to the satisfaction of the two countries. Even as late as 1963-64, trade between the two was meagre. In 1963-64 Indonesia's exports to Pakistan were of the order of just over Rupees (Pakistani) 1.5 million, whereas imports from Pakistan amounted to Rupees 6.2 million.⁹² In order to strengthen relations the two countries now decided to do something concrete. In July 1964 they concluded a trade agreement. Sukarno's visit to Pakistan in September 1964 facilitated further progress. The joint communique issued at the end of the visit spoke for the need for wider collaboration between the two countries in the economic and cultural fields. It recorded agreement between the two sides to pursue "vigorously the task of establishing close co-operation" in these fields "along the pattern set by the Regional Co-operation for Development (RCD) between Pakistan, Iran and Turkey."⁹³ The threads were taken up during Foreign Minister Subandrio's visit to Pakistan (from February 16 to 19, 1965). There followed, almost immediately, three conferences in quick succession on economic and cultural co-operation. A major result of the first conference (held in Lahore in February 1965) was a trade protocol (signed on March 8, 1965) envisaging a total bilateral trade worth Rupees 75 million for the calendar year 1965, a little less than ten times the figure for 1963-64.⁹⁴ This was in addition to Pakistan's offer of a credit of \$ (US) 10 million to Indonesia in January 1965.⁹⁵ The Pakistani Ambassador to Indonesia, M. A. Hussein, described the trade protocol as marking a "new era" in the relations between the two countries. The *Morning News* editorially called it "another milestone in the cordial relations that bind the two fraternal Asian countries." In its characteristic style, it added: "At a time when arms supplied by Big Powers have emboldened the Indian imperialists to deny the inalienable human right of self-determination to the people of Kashmir, the agreement signed between Indonesia and Pakistan serves as a beaconlight to the Afro-Asian nations."⁹⁶

These conferences ultimately led to a notification on August 19, 1965, announcing the formation of an Indonesian-Pakistani

92 *Pakistan Times*, March 9, 1965.

93 "Pakistan-Indonesia Joint Communique", n. 89, p. 404.

94 *Pakistan Times*, March 9, 1965. See also *Indonesian Herald*, March 12, 1965.

95 *Ibid.*, March 9, 1965. See also *Indonesian Herald*, January 14, 1965.

96 *Morning News* (Karachi), March 8, 1965.

Economic and Cultural Co-operation Organization (IPECC) on the pattern of the RCD between Pakistan, Iran and Turkey. This fulfilled the Sukarno-Ayub Declaration of September 1964. It also represented a significant achievement for Pakistan in-as-much as it enabled it to open up newer channels of communication and to institutionalize its trade and cultural relations with Indonesia. Indeed Pakistan stole a march over India in the matter. Thus, by August 1965, by doggedly pursuing its policies towards Indonesia and its leaders, it succeeded virtually in eliminating India as a contender for the friendship of Indonesia.

Developments in Political Relations

In the meantime, the Indonesian-Pakistani relations in the field of politics and diplomacy continued to grow. President Sukarno's visit to Pakistan in September 1964 had laid a firm basis for co-operation and collaboration between them. By fully supporting Sukarno's concept of "NEFOS" versus "OLDEFOS" and at the same time focusing Indonesia's attention on India's alleged ambivalence towards anti-colonialism, Pakistan sought to burnish its own image as a revolutionary, anti-imperialist Asian-African country and tarnish India's. In this too, it met with considerable success, as can be seen from a front page article published at this time in the *Indonesian Herald*. The article criticized India for giving up its earlier stance of championing the cause of freedom in Asia and Africa and for showing indications of "neo-alignment". In contrast, it praised Pakistan for showing "signs of dealigning herself with 'NECOLIM' powers."⁹⁷

Dawn gave wide coverage to this article under the caption "India now toeing neo-colonialist line, says Jakarta daily".⁹⁸ This shows how the Pakistani Press sought to enhance Pakistan's prestige among the Indonesians at the expense of India.

The year 1965 provided fresh opportunities to the two countries to consolidate their political relations. In February 1965, Foreign Minister Subandrio paid a three-day visit to Pakistan. On February 19, 1965, he declared "that Pakistan and Indonesia are one." He assured the people of Pakistan that he would be most pleased "to continue to work for the strengthening of the solidarity of both the

97 "The Year 1964 in Review", *Indonesian Herald*, December 30, 1964. NECOLIM (also written necolim) is an acronym for 'neo-colonialism, colonialism, and imperialism'.

98 *Dawn*, January 2, 1965.

countries.”⁹⁹

The Press in Pakistan as usual gave wide coverage to all anti-Indian articles and comments that had appeared in the Indonesian Press during Subandrio's visit to Pakistan. The *Pakistan Times* seized upon an editorial published in the *Indonesian Herald* which reflected the Pakistani image of India. This editorial which showed what a serious transformation India's image in Indonesia had undergone, noted that from being the “Brahman of the Afro-Asian world” and a champion of “the cause of the Afro-Asian continents in the fight against imperialism”, India had “become the outstanding apologist and collaborator for neocolonial domination over these very countries.” From a nation of self-respect in the early years of freedom, it had “become a nation isolated and pitied.”¹⁰⁰

Pakistan took much comfort from the fact that India's image was fast crumbling in Indonesian eyes. It also felt jubilant over the improvement of its own image at all levels. All the same the type and basis of support Pakistan was getting from Indonesia was different from what it fervently desired. From the beginning, Pakistan had entertained hopes of forming an Islamic front against India. But Sukarno's secular tendencies had stood in the way at least so far as Indonesia's membership of such a front was concerned. It was by demonstrating its readiness to loosen its ties with the NEKOLIM Powers that Pakistan had finally succeeded in eliciting sympathy and support from Indonesia. The major cementing bond between the two countries even now was not so much Islam as the idea of Asian-African solidarity, anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism. India's earlier image in Indonesia suffered damage not because it was a state with a Hindu majority but because, in Indonesian eyes at least, it had lost its earlier enthusiasm for fighting against Western colonialism and imperialism and had become dependent on the Western Powers for economic and military aid.

Pakistan persisted in its objective of winning Indonesia over to its own way of thinking. It was anxious that Islam should form the basis of Indonesian-Pakistani relations. The week-long Asian-African Islamic conference of thirty-three nations held at Bandung in the first half of March 1965 provided Pakistan with a valuable opportunity to carry on an anti-Indian campaign. Speaking at a plenary session, the leader of the Pakistani delegation, Hamid

99 *Pakistan Times*, February 24, 1965.

100 *Indonesian Herald*, February 10, 1965, and *Pakistan Times*, February 18, 1965.

Ahmad Khan, made a serious attack on Indian secularism. The two major themes of his speech were certain alleged communal riots in India and the question of Kashmir.¹⁰¹ In a paper on the fate of the Muslim minority in India the Pakistani delegate denounced the Government of India for its alleged failure to protect the rights and properties of its Muslim citizens and sometimes even their lives.¹⁰²

The Pakistani Press made an attempt to render Islam synonymous with anti-colonialism. *Dawn* came out with an editorial entitled "Islam and Colonialism". It held that Islam alone could serve as a "unifying force" for the eradication of the last vestiges of colonialism in Asia and Africa.¹⁰³ In other words, only those who professed Islam were champions of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism, and those who did not were *ipso facto* in the colonialist and imperialist camp. Indeed this was a subtle attempt to pin-point the enemy—India which, according to it, abetted colonialism by standing in the way of Asian-African solidarity. It was also meant to give a religious colour to Sukarno's concept of "NEFOS" versus "OLDEFOS".

It is difficult to say with certainty what impact this Pakistani move had on President Sukarno. It is significant that the Indonesian President himself inaugurated the Islamic meet. In his opening address, Sukarno exhorted the gathering, in the name of Islam, to seek freedom from NEKOLIM. He said: "Let us make our countries free from imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism because they have oppressed and suppressed Islam; they have put Islam in chains." He added: "Break, break this chains (sic) so that Islam can prosper and blossom in our countries."¹⁰⁴ This might be interpreted to mean that Sukarno was equating Islam with freedom from colonialism. In fact, the plenary session of the conference later commended President Sukarno as "the champion of Islam and Freedom."¹⁰⁵

However, one thing is certain: Sukarno's secular bent of mind could hardly countenance religious bigotry. If he was now against India, the reasons were other than religious. As for Pakistan, it was its strident advocacy of Asian-African solidarity and anti-imperialism that won for it Sukarno's goodwill.

101 *Pakistan Times*, March 9, 1965.

102 *Dawn*, March 9, 1965.

103 *Ibid.*, March 8, 1965.

104 *Indonesian Herald*, March 8-9, 1965.

105 *Ibid.*, March 12, 1965.

Not all the leaders of Indonesia were, however, as secular, and some of them were taken in by the Pakistani propaganda. Subandrio was prominent among these. Speaking at a reception he gave on March 6, 1965 to the delegates of the countries participating in the conference at Bandung, Indonesian Foreign Minister declared that Islam "should be made the tool of human revolution".¹⁰⁶ Besides, in spite of protests from the participating Indian delegate that the Pakistani leader's speech was tantamount to interference in India's internal affairs, the Pakistani delegate was permitted to continue with his attack on India's secularism.¹⁰⁷ It showed that the Islamic basis of Indonesian-Pakistani relations was working itself out as a neat reality.

An outstanding result favourable to Pakistan was that the conference called upon the world Islamic community to present a united front whenever a non-Muslim state committed aggression against a Muslim state and to give all possible assistance to the victim of aggression.¹⁰⁸ Pakistan thus succeeded in enlisting Indonesia's support against India, which, being Hindu-majority state, was, according to the Pakistani definition, a non-Muslim state.

In April 1965 Pakistan joined the tenth anniversary (Dasa Warsa) celebrations of the first Asian-African conference. It did so as a full-fledged member of the NEFOS. Z.A. Bhutto, who led the Pakistani delegation, is reported to have received the "warmest hug from Foreign Minister Subandrio".¹⁰⁹ This was in marked contrast to the treatment meted out to India's Food Minister and leader of the Indian delegation, C. Subramaniam. The way the Indian Flag disappeared from the Flag Parade and the cool manner in which the Indian delegation was treated, demonstrated how far apart the two countries had travelled since the signing of the treaty of "perpetual peace and unalterable friendship" in March 1951.¹¹⁰

During the tenth anniversary celebrations, Pakistan pursued a two-pronged policy. Official circles projected their country as a revolutionary New Emerging Force, whereas the Press confined itself to attacks on India's secular image. In his speech on April 18, 1965, Bhutto, technically speaking still the Foreign Minister of a country allied militarily or otherwise with the imperialist

106 *Dawn*, March 8, 1965.

107 *Pakistan Times*, March 9, 1965.

108 *Indonesian Herald*, March 15, 1965.

109 *Sunday Standard*, (New Delhi), April 18, 1965.

110 See n. 9.

Powers of the West, considered it "our historic mission" to eliminate "imperialism and colonialism" from the world and urged the need to invoke "the spirit of Bandung which builds the world anew."¹¹¹ He also paid a fulsome tribute to President Sukarno as "an originator of the movement for African-Asian solidarity."¹¹²

As for the Pakistani Press, *Dawn* editorially stressed Pakistan's "complete identification with the spirit which Bandung generated" and highlighted the constant threat posed to smaller neighbours "by Indian expansionism". It added: "One development which is highly disruptive of Afro-Asian solidarity is the emergence of Indian chauvinism and neo-colonialism, which is receiving direct encouragement from certain Western powers."¹¹³ In an attempt to slight India, it splashed a news item about the charges made by the Indonesian Minister-Co-ordinator, Ruslan Abdulgani, in an article circulated by Antara, the official Indonesian News Agency. Abdulgani had charged Prime Minister Nehru with an attempt during the Bogor Conference in December 1954 to smuggle Israel into the main Asian-African Conference. He had also said that the credit for defeating the attempt should go to the Prime Ministers of Indonesia and Pakistan.¹¹⁴ The Pakistani Press also discussed why India had refrained from sending its External Affairs Minister, Swaran Singh, to participate in the tenth anniversary celebrations. The *Pakistan Times* interpreted India's action as an insult to President Sukarno, and as evidence of India's declining interest in Asian-African solidarity.¹¹⁵ Yet another piece of news that appeared in the Pakistani Press and which *Dawn* highlighted was dispatch reportedly filed by a correspondent of the *Sunday Standard* from Djakarta. According to *Dawn*, the dispatch described Sukarno as "a pleasure-loving playboy" and lamented India's surging prestige in the following words: "Today India is forgotten: Nehru is forgotten; Nehru's name is being defaced from the Bandung papers and instead efforts are being made to inscribe those of Mr. Chou and President Ayub."¹¹⁶ The *Pakistan Times* gloated over "new cracks in Indonesia's relations with India", and noted that "President Sukarno

111 For full text of Foreign Minister Bhutto's speech in Djakarta, see *Dawn*, April 20, 1965.

112 Ibid.

113 "The Bandung Spirit", *ibid.*, April 18, 1965.

114 *Ibid.*, April 19, 1965. Ruslan Abdulgani was Secretary-General of the first Asian-African Conference in Bandung in April 1955.

115 *Pakistan Times*, April 20, 1965.

116 Ibid.

did not even once in his long speech mention India.”¹¹⁷

The preparatory meeting held in Djakarta in April 1964 had fixed the second Asian-African conference to meet somewhere in Africa on March 10, 1965, and had left the choice of the precise venue to the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Now the OAU suggested that the Government of Algeria should play the host. To enable Algeria to make arrangements, the date was postponed from March 10, 1965 to June 29, 1965. To India's growing embarrassment, Djakarta, Peking, and Rawalpindi jointly carried on a vilification campaign against India's attitude to the question of inviting the Soviet Union and Malaysia.

Although Pakistan wanted Malaysia to participate,¹¹⁸ it did not say so in so many words for fear of displeasing Indonesia. In fact, India's insistence on seeking Malaysia's inclusion in the second Asian-African conference was a source of continuing embarrassment to Pakistan. To support the Indian proposal was to annoy the leaders of Indonesia, and this was something it did not wish to do, its objective being to drive a wedge between Indonesia and India. On the contrary, to reject the Indian proposal was to annoy and alienate the leaders of Malaysia.

Pakistan's dilemma did not end with the preparatory meeting in Djakarta, where Foreign Minister Bhutto had somehow managed to get away with some sort of a neutral posture on the question of Malaysia's participation.¹¹⁹ The Standing Committee of Ambassadors of fifteen Asian and African countries held several meetings between April 1964 and June 1965, and each time Pakistan found itself in a predicament: it was faced with the apparently insurmountable difficulty of having to choose between Indonesia and Malaysia.¹²⁰ After the Standing Committee meeting on March 29, 1965, for instance, the most generous construction that official circles in New Delhi could put on Pakistan's attitude to the question

117 *Dawn*, April 19, 1965.

118 Speaking to newsmen in Singapore on April 16, 1965, Bhutto had said: "Malaysia, like Pakistan is a member of the Commonwealth, and both are independent states. I don't see why Malaysia should be excluded." *Ibid.*, April 18, 1965.

119 See pp. 257-8 of this chapter.

120 Pakistan was one of the fifteen members of the Standing Committee instituted by the preparatory meeting in April 1964 to resolve the deadlock over the question whether Malaysia and the Soviet Union should be invited to participate. There were in all eleven meetings of the Standing Committee between April 1964 and June 1965.

of Malaysia's participation was that it was "ambivalent."¹²¹

Ambivalent or otherwise, Pakistan managed to keep its friendly relations with Indonesia unimpaired. This can be seen from a statement reportedly made by the Deputy Foreign Minister of Indonesia, Ganis Harsono. Ganis Harsono charged India with "hurriedly and prematurely" throwing its "weight" behind Malaysia, and advised it to follow the example of Pakistan, which according to him, had adopted a neutral posture on the issue of Malaysia's participation in the proposed second Asian-African conference.¹²²

India was anxious lest China, Indonesia, and Pakistan should create an embarrassing situation for it in the Algiers conference on June 29, 1965, especially in regard to its disputes with Pakistan and China. Indeed it wanted the summit conference to be put off until such time as, by its diplomatic efforts or otherwise, it had succeeded, to some extent, in neutralizing the combined hostility of those three countries. The *coup d'état* in Algeria on June 19, 1965, five days before the scheduled meeting of the Foreign Ministers there, made India's task easier. India took advantage of the political uncertainties and risks to personal security arising from the disturbances in Algiers. On June 21, 1965, Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri joined twelve other Heads of State or Government of the Asian-African members of the Commonwealth in London in issuing an appeal for a postponement of "the Afro-Asian Conference for the present."¹²³ In Algiers, India's official delegation, consisting of C.S. Jha, Secretary to the Ministry of External Affairs, and four members of the Indian Parliament, also made every effort to mobilize Asian-African opinion for a postponement. Having thus made sure of support from various Asian and African representatives, India decided to sponsor a formal resolution in the Foreign Ministers' meeting, rescheduled for June 26, 1965, asking for an immediate adjournment of the Foreign Ministers' meeting and for an indefinite postponement of the summit conference.¹²⁴

121 Personal information.

122 As reported by B.K. Tiwari of the *Indian Express*, *Indian Express* (New Delhi), April 23, 1965.

123 Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, *Foreign Affairs Record* (New Delhi), vol. 11, no. 9, September 1965, p. 260. Nine of the signatories belonged to Africa, and four to Asia. The Asians included President Ayub Khan.

124 Ibid. The delegations of Ceylon, Japan, Laos and Thailand agreed to co-sponsor the resolution calling for postponement.

President Ayub Khan of Pakistan made an unsuccessful attempt to persuade delegates to cold-shoulder India's appeal.¹²⁵ Later, finding a substantial majority of the Asian-African members of the Commonwealth favouring India's plea for postponement, he also signed the appeal. On reaching Algiers on his way home from London on June 26, 1965, Foreign Minister Bhutto agreed with the decisions of the fifteen-nation Standing Committee to postpone the conference to November 5, 1965.¹²⁶ On June 28, 1965, President Ayub Khan made a brief halt in Cairo on his way back from London to exchange views with President Nasser, as well as with President Sukarno and Prime Minister Chou En-lai (who had also arrived there).¹²⁷ Presumably he gave them an account of the efforts made by India in London to mobilize Asian-African opinion in favour of postponing the Algiers conference. In any case he stirred up president Sukarno further against India and its leaders. He must also have attempted to justify his own signing of the appeal for postponement in view of a substantial majority of the Asian and African members of the Commonwealth coming out in favour of the move. A couple of days later, after he had left, Foreign Minister Bhutto joined the discussions in Cairo as his special representative. Pakistan also joined China, Indonesia, and the United Arab Republic in issuing a joint communique in Cairo on June 30, 1965, confirming the decision to postpone the conference.

In the meantime, for the second time in three years, there were strong anti-Indian demonstrations in Djakarta. People had continually been fed on the Chinese and Pakistani propaganda against India, and official and Press statements had added fuel to the fire. The Indian Embassy in Djakarta was even stoned on June 23, 1965. Pro-Pakistani elements in the Nahdatul Ulama Party and

125 T.B. Miller and J.D.B. Miller, "Afro-Asian Disunity : Algiers, 1965", *Australian Outlook* (Canberra), no. 3, December 1965, p. 316.

126 *Indonesian Herald*, June 29, 1965. On June 26, 1965, in view of the substantial opinion built up by India in favour of postponement, the Standing Committee unanimously decided to postpone the summit conference to November 5, 1965 and the Foreign Ministers' meeting to October 28, 1965. The representatives of China, Indonesia, and the United Arab Republic did not attend this meeting. The Ethiopian delegate sponsored the postponement resolution, and the Pakistani delegate co-sponsored it. See *Foreign Affairs Record*, n. 123.

127 *Indonesian Herald*, June 30, 1965. President Ayub Khan broke journey in Cairo on special request from President Nasser and Sukarno.

pro-Chinese PKI, which dominated the Nation Front, led the attack on the Indian Embassy.

Clearly, far from remaining a friend, India had, by the middle of 1965, become a subject of acute Indonesian hostility. Pakistan had been able to supplant India altogether in the affections of the leaders of Indonesia. In an article contributed to *Pakistan Horizon*, the Indonesian Ambassador to Pakistan, Brigadier-General Roekmito Hendraningrat, wrote "that the people of Pakistan have an amount of goodwill and affectionate feelings for their brethren in Indonesia such as would be hard to find in the relations of any other two countries."¹²⁸ Referring to the bases of friendship, the Indonesian Ambassador wrote: "Pakistan, being a prominent member of the NEFOS, is fortunately very close to Indonesia." He added: "Apart from the indestructible ties of Islam, our political, economic, and cultural interests also seem to be complementary." Explaining why Indonesia supported Pakistan on the Kashmir question, Roekmito Hendraningrat observed: "As Indonesia was firmly supported by Pakistan in its just struggle to regain West Irian, I am happy to say that Indonesia too has come forward to support the right of self-determination of the people of Jammu and Kashmir, as it has always supported freedom movements elsewhere in Asia and Africa." In the light of growing economic collaboration between the two countries, the Indonesian Ambassador visualized "further cementing of our ties."¹²⁹

Indonesia and the Indo-Pakistan Conflict

In August-September 1965, *i.e.*, less than three months of the developments in Algiers, Pakistan decided to disturb the *status quo* in Kashmir by force, with support from Indonesia and China fully assured. By the first week of September 1965, thousands of Pakistanis, the so-called *mujahids*, had crossed over to the Indian side of the ceasefire line in Kashmir. India's security forces took appropriate countermeasures. This finally led to war between India and Pakistan. The major flare-up ensued when, on September 6, 1965, the Government of India decided to launch a diversionary counter-offensive at points of its choosing in order to checkmate Pakistan's aggressive thrusts into Indian territory.

128 Roekmito Hendraningrat, "Some Aspects of Indonesian Foreign Policy", *Pakistan Horizon*, vol. 18, no. 2, Second Quarter, 1965, p. 131.

129 *Ibid.*, p. 142.

China and Indonesia openly expressed sympathy and support for Pakistan. China sent a 72-hour ultimatum to India and threatened to open a new front in the north. Indonesia declared its readiness to provide even military support to Pakistan. All this bore out India's suspicion that the three had formed an anti-Indian combination. The Government of Indonesia and Indonesian Press did not mince words in branding India an aggressor. On September 7, 1965, Sukarno reportedly told newsmen: "Especially now, the sympathy and prayer of the Indonesian people are dedicated to the people in Pakistan who are...fighting fiercely to maintain the sovereignty and freedom of their country and people."¹³⁰ On the same day, in his capacity as Chairman of KOTI (Supreme Operational Command), the Indonesian President called a special session to "discuss what kind of help Indonesia will send Pakistan."¹³¹ Clearly, in Sukarno's eyes, India was the aggressor and Pakistan a victim of aggression. This view was fully shared by Arudji Kartawinata, Chairman of the Indonesian Parliament (DPR-GR).¹³² At a meeting with the Chinese Ambassador in Djakarta, Yao Tjung-ming, on September 7, 1965, Chairman D.N. Aidit of the PKI expressed his agreement with the Chinese view that "the just struggle" of the people of Kashmir and Pakistan "against India's aggression" should be fully supported. He also declared that "the Indian aggression" conflicted with the Bandung spirit.¹³³ These official statements in Indonesia were in line with what Indonesia's Ambassador to Pakistan, Brigadier-General Roekmito Hendraningrat, had stated in Dacca on August 1, 1965, on the occasion of the inauguration of the Indonesian Consulate there: "The Indonesian Government and the 105 million Indonesian people are giving you full political and moral support without any reservation." Identifying "Islamic religion and Afro-Asian solidarity" as "common" and "solid foundations" of Indonesian-Pakistani relations, Roekmito Hendraningrat had asserted that "no power or force on earth can disturb our close relations."¹³⁴ The present outflow of sympathy and

130 "The India-Pakistan War: A Summary Account", *Pakistan Horizon*, vol. 18, no. 4, Fourth Quarter, 1965, p. 364. See also *Dawn*, September 8, 1965.

131 Ibid. See also the editorial in the *Times of India* (New Delhi), September 13, 1965.

132 *The Statesman* (New Delhi), September 10, 1965, and *Indonesian Herald*, September 10, 1965.

133 *Harian Rakjat*, September 9, 1965, and *The Statesman* (New Delhi), September 10, 1965.

134 *The Statesman*, (New Delhi), September 10, 1965.

support for Pakistan was thus an active expression of Indonesian goodwill.

The Indonesian Press came out with open and severe condemnation of India. The *Indonesian Herald*, the *Djakarta Daily Mail*, *Angkatan Bersendjata*, *Harian Rakjat* and *Bintang Timur*—all joined the chorus of condemnation. In their editorials, commentaries, and news dispatches, they accused India's armed forces of using "barbaric methods". They also endeavoured to bolster up the morale of the armed forces of Pakistan by giving fantastic accounts of their alleged victories against India.¹³⁵

Anti-Indian feeling manifested itself in huge demonstrations as well. The Indian missions were stoned, their property damaged, and violence offered to members of the Indian community in Djakarta and other towns. On September 3, 1965, about 1,500 members of Nahdatul Ulama Party demonstrated outside the Indian Embassy in Djakarta, shouting anti-Indian and pro-Pakistani slogans.¹³⁶ Another big demonstration took place three days later.¹³⁷ The feeling against India took a violent turn when India commenced its diversionary counter-offensive on September 6. On September 9, the Indian Embassy was ransacked. Three cars were set on fire. The Indian Information Service was taken over by violent Indonesian mobs.¹³⁸ There were reports that the Indian Consulate in Medan (North Sumatra) was also seized.¹³⁹ By an order, property of the local Indians was placed under the supervision of Government.¹⁴⁰ Naturally, members of the Indian community were highly perturbed. They were without protection against violent mobs on the rampage under the direction of the pro-Chinese and pro-Pakistani elements. Besides, in mass rallies, demands were made for severance of diplomatic relations with India, to stop imports from there, and to boycott all Indian films.¹⁴¹ The mob fury against India had the clear support of Indonesia's leaders. This is proved, for instance, by President Sukarno's statement of

135 See, for instance, *Indonesian Herald*, September 11, and September 15, 1965, *Angkatan Bersendjata* (Djakarta), September 9, 1965, *Djakarta Daily Mail*, September 11, 1965, and *Bintang Timur*, (Djakarta), September 13, 1965.

136 *The Statesman* (New Delhi), September 4, 1965.

137 *Ibid.*, September 7, 1965.

138 *Ibid.*, September 10, 1965.

139 *The Hindu*, September 22, 1965.

140 *Ibid.*

141 *Antara News Bulletin*, September 20, 1965, and *Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), September 21, 1965.

September 7, 1965, expressing satisfaction at the anti-Indian demonstrations of the previous day by youth organizations at the Indian Embassy in Djakarta.¹⁴²

The Indo-Pakistani conflict of 1965 thus represents the high-water mark in Pakistan's relations with Indonesia. It is interesting to note that Indonesia's solidarity with Pakistan was not just confined to moral support. Indonesia went so far as to ask Ceylon officially for permission to use Ceylonese airports for transferring to Pakistan some military aircraft manned by personnel from the Indonesian Staff College.¹⁴³ President Sukarno also sent the Chief of the Indonesian Air Force (AURI), Air Vice-Marshal Omar Dhani, on a secret mission to China in the middle of September 1965. The purpose, as it transpired later, was to obtain spare parts for the aeroplanes that he was planning to send to Pakistan for giving tangible support to Pakistan against India.¹⁴⁴ In this connection, certain startling facts came to light five years after the Indo-Pakistani conflict. There was a report in *Merdeka* that the AURI had exchanged six Russian-made MiG-19 planes for six Super Constellations from Pakistan. *Merdeka* quoted the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Marshal Suwoto Sukendro, as saying that the exchange was made because Indonesia lacked spare parts for the MiGs. Informed Air Force sources stated in Djakarta on October 9, 1970 that Indonesia had given Pakistan eight MiG-19 jet fighters during the Indo-Pakistani War of September 1965. They said that the planes were sent as a gift under a secret agreement between Sukarno and Ayub Khan, which was implemented by the former AURI Chief of Staff, Air Vice-Marshal Omar Dhani. The jets which were manned by Indonesian personnel led by Colonel Rusman, went to Pakistan without clearance from the Soviet Union, the country from which Indonesia had acquired them. Later, when the Indian Ambassador, N.B. Menon, approached Foreign Minister Adam Malik for clarifications in the matter, Adam Malik stated that President Suharto's Government had never given or sold MiG planes to Pakistan. How about President Sukarno's Government

142 "The India-Pakistan War : A Summary Account", n, 130, p. 354.

143 *The Hindu*, September 13, 1965. Ceylon, however, refused Indonesia the permission to do so. This was in keeping with Ceylon's policy of "real non-alignment".

144 This was disclosed during the trial (by a Special Military Tribunal) of Omar Dhani, December 5—December 24, 1966. See Government of Indonesia, Department of Information, *Facts and Figures*, No. II/FF/Penlugri/Vol. IV/69 (Djakarta, 1969), p. 15, p. 18 and p. 33.

then ? Commenting on Adam Malik's observation, Anwar Sani, Acting Head of the Information Directorate of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry, said that it referred only to the term of office of the present Government. Without committing himself on the question whether Sukarno's Government had sent MiGs to Pakistan, he added : "It is well known that Soekarno backed Pakistan on the Kashmir dispute."¹⁴⁵

Sukarno's Government is reported to have given material support to Pakistan in the naval field as well. In a dispatch from Karachi, a correspondent of *The Times* of London reported on December 18, 1965 that Indonesia had lent Pakistan a flotilla of six Russian-built craft, including two submarines. This was the most "conspicuous contribution" to have been made by any of Pakistan's friends to its depleted arsenal after the Indo-Pakistani War was over. The flotilla consisted of two submarines, two missile-carrying boats in size between a frigate and a large motor torpedo boat, and two similar vessels without missiles. It was reported that the Indonesian flotilla had gone to the Pakistani waters on a "goodwill visit" and that the craft had been either "lent to the Pakistani Navy or...made over to it."¹⁴⁶

Much of this information and more about Indonesia's material support to Pakistan is corroborated by Air Marshal (now retd.) and former Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan Air Force, M. Asghar Khan, himself. In a book published in 1979, he mentions about his carrying a letter from President Ayub Khan to President Sukarno. Responding to the Pakistani plea for military aid against India, Sukarno said : "Your dire need ? It is our dire need." The Indonesian leader equated India's attack on Pakistan with an attack on Indonesia and declared that they (the Indonesian Government) were duty-bound to give Pakistan all possible assistance. The Pakistani emissary was told to consider Indonesia as his own country and take away from there whatever he found would be useful to Pakistan in this emergency. The Indonesian leaders also suggested that, by way of additional help to Pakistan, Indonesia could "take over" the Andaman group of islands. When approached by President Ayub Khan's emissary, the Indonesian Naval Commander-in-Chief

145 For these pieces of information, see *Times of India* (Bombay), October 17, 1970, and *The Hindu*, October 15, 1970. See also *Asian Recorder* (New Delhi), vol. 16, no. 49. December 3-9, 1970, p. 9885, cols. 2 and 3.

146 *The Times* (London), December 18, 1965. See also *Hindustan Times*, December 23, 1965.

Martadinata said : "A look at the map will show that the Andaman and Nicobar islands are an extension of Sumatra and are in any case between East Pakistan and Indonesia. What right have the Indians to be there ?" He assured the Pakistani guest that "the Indonesian Navy will immediately commence patrols of the approaches to these islands and carry out aerial reconnaissance missions to see what the Indians have there."¹⁴⁷

The meeting of the Supreme Operational Command on September 7, 1965 and the subsequent pro-Pakistani statements by Sukarno naturally made India apprehend danger from the Indonesian side. It created an additional element of anxiety in the minds of the leaders of India about the security of the country. The country was exposed to danger on all sides—west, north, north-east, and south-east.

India, therefore, reacted strongly to the anti-Indian and pro-Pakistani activities in Indonesia. The Indian Press expressed resentment and even indignation.¹⁴⁸ In both Houses of Parliament, Indonesia's leaders were seriously criticized. Some Members even demanded that India should sever its diplomatic ties with Indonesia. The Government of India, however, refused to be hustled into taking any extreme action. In a statement in the Rajya Sabha on September 21, 1965 on the violent incidents in Indonesia, India's Minister for External Affairs, Swaran Singh, regretted that the "police on duty...did nothing to prevent the demonstrators." It was, he added, "clear beyond doubt, that the Indonesian Government could not discharge its international obligation of giving protection to foreign missions stationed in Indonesian territory." He categorically described as "unfriendly" the violent and unruly demonstrations that had been allowed to be held in Indonesia and in which Indian diplomatic missions had been ransacked and much damage done to Indian interests and property. Nevertheless, he refused to oblige those who demanded severance of diplomatic ties with Indo-

147 M. Asghar Khan, *The First Round: Indo-pakistan War 1965* (Sahibabad, U.P., 1979), pp. 44-47. When approached, the Chief of the AURI Air-Vice Marshal Omar Dhani, agreed to give four out of the total of 12 MiG-21, all the MiG-17 and a few MiG-12 aircraft to Pakistan. It was agreed that these aircraft should be dismantled and crated by the AURI and carried in Indonesian ships. The Indonesian Naval Commander, Martadinata, also ordered immediate transfer of the two soviet-supplied submarines and four 'OSSA' missile boats to Pakistan. These arrived in Pakistani waters after the cease-fire.

148 See, for instance, the editorials in *The Hindu* of September 8, 1965 and the *Times of India* (New Delhi) of September 20, 1965.

nesia. He observed that "it will not be in our interest to do so."¹⁴⁹ In his statement in the Lok Sabha on September 25, 1965, Dinesh Singh, India's Deputy Minister for External Affairs, expressed his Government's "great regret" over the anti-Indian happenings in Medan and Djakarta. However, he was sceptical about the extent of the Government of Indonesia's involvement in them. He was convinced that the people of Indonesia were not one with their Government in those activities and that friendliness still marked the relations between the two peoples.¹⁵⁰

In view of the centuries-old cultural and commercial relations between the two countries, the Government of India's restraint in the matter could only be considered right. Severance of diplomatic relations between India and Indonesia would have only suited the pro-Pakistani and pro-Chinese elements in Indonesian politics. It would also have jeopardized the long-term relations with a big and potentially great country of South-East Asia, lying at a distance of just about 90 miles from the Andaman and Nicobar group of Indian islands across the Bay of Bengal.

149 Government of India, Rajya Sabha, *Debates*, vol. 53, pt. 2, September 21, 1965, cols. 4808-14.

150 Government of India, Lok Sabha, *Debates*, series 3, vol. 46, session 12 of 1965, September 22, 1965, cols. 6950-5.

Process of Normalization

September 1965—December 1967

If September 1965 witnessed Indonesia's open hostility towards India in favour of Pakistan, it also saw an important event in the history of Indonesia since independence. On the night of September 30, and in the early hours of the morning of October 1, six top Indonesian army generals were kidnapped and killed. This was as a result of a *coup d'état* alleged to have been master-minded and led by the PKI.¹ It led to a chain of events which, in due course, came to have profound impact on the pattern of internal politics as well as external relations of the country. The PKI and the ruling elite with Sukarno at the top, which had led Indonesia into a sort of anti-India combination with China and Pakistan, were eliminated, discredited and replaced. In the drastic reversal of the Indonesian domestic and foreign policy postures India found an opening for restoration of her relations with Indonesia.

Action Against the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI)

The PKI, which had played a significantly negative role in Indian-Indonesian relations and contributed substantially to strengthening anti-Indian sentiment among the Indonesians, particularly since the Chinese invasion of India in October-November, 1962, became a target of attack from all sides. Old resentments resulting from the PKI's one-sided actions against those belonging to the PNI and the Nahdatul Ulama (NU) and other Muslim parties and groups

1 The six Army generals included Lieutenant-General Achmad Yani, Commander-in-Chief of the Indonesian Army. See *Straits Times*, October 7, 1965.

The allegation about the PKI's involvement in the coup was made by General Suharto, Commander of KOSTRAD (Strategic Reserve Command), who smashed the coup in Djakarta within 24 hours. He did it on October 4, 1965, while supervising the dead bodies of the murdered generals. See Nugroho Notosusanto and Ismail Saleh, *The Coup Attempt of the "September 30 Movement" in Indonesia* (Djakarta, 1968), p. 62. The coup leaders gave unto themselves the name of "September 30 Movement".

in the densely populated areas of East and Central Java and Bali in 1964, coupled with the “mental terror”² which kept these dormant for so long, burst into the open.

The army leadership encouraged the anti-Communist parties and groups to form a united front against the PKI.³ Within two days of the coup there emerged a “Coordinating Body for Crushing the Counter-Revolutionary 30th September Movement” under the chairmanship of H.M. Subchan, a leader of the NU Party. On October 8, the passions roused since the findings of the dead bodies of the Army generals—found an outlet. The offices of the PKI-affiliated women’s, students’ and labour wings and the houses of Communist leaders were ransacked and put to fire.⁴

On its part, the Army Command imposed a temporary freeze on the PKI’s activities, captured thousands of Communists, ordered the purge of the elements involved in the coup in all Government agencies including the Air Force, the Parliament (DPR—GR) and the Supreme Advisory Council (DPA).⁵

Finding the leaders of the Army taking decisive action against the PKI, the anti-Communist parties and groups set to settle old scores. In a few months following the coup hundreds of thousands of Communists and their sympathizers were put to death.⁶ By an Order issued on March 12, 1966, the day following his assumption of authority under the Presidential Order of March 11, 1966, General

2 In an interview with Arnold C. Brackman, Mohammad Natsir, former Prime Minister of Indonesia and leader of the banned Masjumi Party, explained that the post-coup murders could be characterized as a “psychological explosion” among a repressed people who had suffered grievously from the PKI’s “mental terror”. See Arnold C. Brackman, *The Communist Collapse in Indonesia* (New York, 1969), p. 118.

3 O.G. Roeder, *The Smiling General, President Suharto of Indonesia* (Djakarta, 1969), p. 24.

4 *Indonesian Herald*, October 9 and 12, 1965, and *Straits Times*, October 9, 11 and 12, 1965.

5 *Straits Times*, October 7 and 9, 1965, *Indonesian Herald*, October 16, 1965, *Sunday Standard* (New Delhi), October 17, 1965, *Hindustan Times*, October 19, 1965, and *Times of India*, October 19, 22 and 23, 1965.

6 On January 15, 1966, Sukarno put the toll of killings at seventy-eight thousand. The highest number of those killed was reported from East Java (54,000), followed by Bali (12,500), Central Java (10,000), and North Sumatra (2,000). See *Angkatan Bersendjata* (Djakarta), February 10-11, 1966. Some unofficial sources, however, put the toll between one hundred fifty thousand, which is generally considered “reasonable” and “one or two million”. See Brackman, n. 2, p. 114. See also Vishal Singh, “Soekarno and the New Regime in Indonesia”, *India Quarterly*, vol. 23, no. 4, October-December 1967, p. 327.

Suharto dissolved and banned the PKI in Indonesia.⁷ This put an official seal on the all-round repression of the PKI since the coup.

Six days later, on March 18, 1966, Suharto, as the Mandatory of President Sukarno, announced taking fifteen ministers of Sukarno's Government into "protective custody."⁸ Foreign Minister Subandrio being one of those arrested, it was a particularly welcome development in so far as Indian-Indonesian relations were concerned. It was he who had been mainly responsible for evolving a policy of "axis" with China and collusion with Pakistan against India.

Replacement of Sukarno

With the PKI eliminated and with certain important ministers removed from the political scene, Sukarno found himself in a serious predicament. He lost his powers in three stages, with every stage creating a momentum for the next to follow. Starting from the coup when the Army leadership began to build up anti-Communist pressures on Sukarno, the first stage culminated in the Presidential Order of March 11, 1966, according to which Sukarno agreed to relinquish his executive authority to General Suharto. The Fourth Plenary Session of the MPRS, the highest legislative body in Indonesia, from June 20 to July 5, 1966, which took away legal competence of Sukarno's "title of Great Leader of the Revolution", "revoked" his title of President for life and declared that from then on "the issue of new Presidential Regulations is not to be justified", marked the second stage.¹⁰ The third stage was reached when, at the Special Session from March 7 to 12, 1967, the MPRS prohibited "Sukarno from conducting political activities till the general elections", revoked its "mandate...and all powers of Government as stipulated in the 1945 Constitution" and appointed General Suharto "as Acting President."¹¹

7 For the texts of the Presidential Order of March 11, 1966, and Suharto's Order of March 12, 1966, see Roeder, n. 3, pp. 207-8, and 214-15 respectively.

8 *Indonesian Herald*, March 19, 1966.

9 See Roeder, n. 3, pp. 207-8.

10 Government of the Republic of Indonesia, *Decisions of the Fourth Plenary Session of the Majelis Permusjawaratan Rakjat Sementara (The Provisional People's Consultative Assembly, 20th of June-5th of July 1966*, Special Issue No. 005/1966 (Djakarta, Department of Information, 1966), pp. 33, 35 and 37-39. See also *The Statesman* (New Delhi), July 7, 1966.

11 Government of the Republic of Indonesia, *Decisions of the Special Session of the Majelis Permusjawaratan Rakjat Sementara (The Provisional People's Consultative Assembly), 7th March-12th March 1967*, Special Issue No. 031/1968 (Djakarta, Department of Information, 1968), p. 7.

During this period Sukarno's continued resistance to the growing demand of the Army leaders and the newly emerged student groups, such as the KAMI (University Students' Action Command) and the KAPPI (School Students' Action Command), to take action against the PKI, led to diminution of his political power. The military trials of some ministers, such as Jusuf Muda Dalam, Minister for Central Bank Affairs, Foreign Minister Subandrio and Air Vice-Marshal Omar Dhani and others, led to still further erosion of his prestige and authority in the eyes of the people.

Thus President Sukarno, under whose leadership Indonesia had colluded with China and Pakistan against India and offered moral, diplomatic and even material aid to Pakistan in its war with India in September 1965, was ousted from his position of two decades of supreme leadership of the country.

Side by side with a change in the domestic scene, an important external factor in Indian-Indonesian relations, China, also found itself out of favour with the new Indonesian leaders. In the liquidation of the PKI China lost one of the supporters of its policies in Indonesia, South-East Asia and Afro-Asia. It would be worth recalling here that the PKI had played an important role in damaging Indonesia's relations with India and ultimately led the country into an "axis" with China and a few other small East and South-East Asian countries, such as North Korea, Cambodia and North Vietnam.¹²

Strains in Indonesian-Chinese Relations

Strains in Indonesia's relations with China openly manifested on October 16, 1965, and culminated in the suspension of relations in October 1967. During the interregnum of two years, a drastic change in the pattern of domestic politics, involving liquidation of the PKI and gradual replacement of the old with the new leadership, strengthened these strains. However, major contribution in this direction came from the Indonesians' actions against the PKI, the overseas Chinese community and the Chinese diplomatic and consular missions in Indonesia and from the pattern of China's responses to these and certain foreign policy postures of the new leaders.

12 See Government of the Republic of Indonesia, *Reach to the Stars: A Year of Self-Reliance* (Address by President Sukarno on the Twentieth Anniversary of Independence, August 17, 1965), (Djakarta, Department of Information, 1965), p. 16.

The first mob demonstration and sacking of the office of the Chinese Commercial Counsellor in Djakarta on October 16, 1965 set the tone of the subsequent anti-Chinese actions in Indonesia. The hand-bills stuck on the walls of the Chinese office building indicated how China and the overseas Chinese came to be bracketed with the PKI for involvement in the coup.¹³ The demonstration had been provoked by the Chinese refusal to abide by the Government's instruction to fly their flag half-mast during the period of mourning for the murdered Indonesian army generals. Besides an official protest lodged by the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Chinese Ambassador, Yao Chung-ming, was reported to have been summoned to the Presidential Palace and told that by its "lapse" the Chinese Embassy had left the impression of China's involvement in the coup.¹⁴

Berita Yudha and *Angkatan Bersendjata*, the two Army newspapers from Djakarta, made a major contribution to propagating a link-up between the PKI, the overseas Chinese and China. On October 6, 1965, *Berita Yudha* doubted if the 'September 30 Movement' could depend "only on their own material strength without material and moral support and assistance from broad strata at home and abroad."¹⁵ Four days later, *Angkatan Bersendjata* alleged that the 'September 30 Movement' "chose October 1, the National day of the People's Republic of China, to start a national tragedy."¹⁶

The historical prejudices apart, a generally prevalent impression about the overseas Chinese' financial help to the PKI¹⁷ coupled

13 The slogans read: "China stage-managed the September 30 Movement: Drive out all Chinese immediately", "The Indonesian Communist Party is armed by China: Hang the Chinese!", "China is the wire-puller behind the Indonesian Communist Party: Severe diplomatic relations with China at once!" See *Survey of China Mainland Press* (SCMP) (Hongkong), no. 3564, October 25, 1965, p. 33.

14 *Hindustan Times*, (New Delhi), October 14, 1965 and *Angkatan Bersendjata* (Djakarta), October 16, 1965. See also "China's Involvement in Indonesian Coup" (editorial), *Thought* (New Delhi—Weekly), vol. 17, no. 43, October 23, 1965, p. 4.

15 See English translation in *Peking Review*, vol. 8, no. 43, October 22, 1965, p. 10.

16 Ibid.

17 See George M. Kahin, "Indonesia" in Kahin, ed., *Major Governments of Asia* (Ithaca, 1963), p. 618. According to Kahin, many Indonesian officials are convinced that most of the Indonesian currency funds given by the overseas Chinese to the Chinese Embassy in Djakarta and its Consulates

with the rumours about China's dispatch of arms to it,¹⁸ helped in strengthening the anti-overseas Chinese and anti-China feelings in Indonesia. Following the developments in Djakarta, various Javanese cities and towns witnessed similar mob demonstrations and actions against the overseas Chinese community.

China's Responses

Although belatedly, in its first-ever reaction to the post-coup developments in Indonesia the *New China News Agency* surveyed how the PKI became the focus of attack from the Army and Muslim groups, used the term "hooligans" for anti-PKI, anti-Chinese and anti-China forces and alleged that the Indonesian Army was stirring up anti-Chinese sentiment and implicating China in the September 30 movement.¹⁹ In the following months China grew more and more anxious about the anti-China stance in Indonesia. The Chinese criticism against the Army leaders grew as the latter succeeded in establishing itself by March 1966 at the expense of Sukarno's political authority and influence.

The inevitable result for China was to fall more and more into disrepute in Indonesia. Indonesia's image of China in the period after the coup underwent a serious modification. From an axis partner in August-September, 1965, China came to be looked upon as a threat to political stability and economic development of Indonesia and other states in the region.

The new Indonesian leaders accused China of interference in Indonesia's internal affairs. In a major policy speech in the Indonesian Parliament (DPR-GR) on May 5, 1966, the new Foreign Minister, Adam Malik, blamed China for having launched, since the coup, "irresponsible" and "humiliating" attacks, causing reactions within the Indonesian society. Stressing that in spite of

elsewhere in Indonesia and to the Bank of China were made available to the PKI. See also, "The Would-Have-Been Dictator" (By a special correspondent), *Thought*, n. 14, p. 5; and John O. Sutter, "Two Faces of Konfrontasi: 'Crush Malaysia' and the GESTAPU", *Asian Survey*, vol. 6, no. 10, October 1966, p. 531.

18 See P.H.M. Jones, "Bubbling Cauldron", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, vol. 50, no. 3, October 21, 1965, p. 109 and O.G. Roeder, "Old Comrades", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, vol. 50, no. 5, November 4, 1965, p. 189.

19 *Peking Review*, vol. 8, no. 43, October 22, 1965, p. 7. The caption of the NCNA description, which was dated September 19, 1965, read: "Sudden, Drastic Changes in Indonesian Political Situation".

these and other Chinese provocations, "the Government in principle would like to maintain normal and good relations with the RRT (People's Republic of China)", Adam Malik reminded China of Article 4 of the "Bandung Dasasila" (Ten Principles), which called for "abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country."²⁰

Revelations made in the course of trials of some Indonesian ministers, such as Foreign Minister Subandrio and Minister/Air Vice-Marshal Omar Dhani, confirmed the Indonesian apprehensions about China's intentions.²¹ These suggested a close link-up between China and the Indonesian Communist Party, thus further clouding Indonesia's relations with China.

Besides the anti-PKI, anti-Chinese and anti-China wave, China's reactions to the new Indonesian foreign policy postures on various issues contributed to developing strains in its relations with Indonesia. The first such issue that provoked China's reaction was Indonesia's successful bid to end confrontation with Malaysia. China was critical of Indonesia's approaches to end its earlier policy of confrontation against Malaysia. In its note to the Indonesian Government on June 9, 1966, the Chinese Foreign Ministry referred to the changes that had occurred in the Indonesian foreign policy since the coup and observed: "You have launched a massive campaign against China and Chinese nationals. You have stopped confrontation against 'Malaysia'. You regard the vicious enemies of the Indonesian people as your friends, and their close comrades-in-arms in opposing imperialism and colonialism as your enemies."²² *Renmin Ribao* termed the Indonesian-Malaysian agreement of August 11, 1966 as "a big betrayal...of the Indonesian people's interests", "a big treachery to the Afro-Asian people's cause of unity against imperialism" and "another glaring exposure of the reac-

20 Government of the Republic of Indonesia, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy as Based on the Pantja Sila Principles*, Special Issue 003/1966 (Djakarta, Department of Information, 1966), p. 11. Adam Malik became Foreign Minister on March 18, 1966, the day Subandrio and fourteen other earst-while ministers were taken into custody.

21 See "Special Military Tribunal Trial of Coup Leader, Ex-Foreign Minister Dr. Subandrio: 1st October—22 October 1966", p. 35 and p. 46, and "Special Military Tribunal Trial of Coup Leader Ex-Air Force Chief Ex-Vice-Marshal, Omar Dhani, 5 December—24 December 1966", p. 18 and p. 33, in Government of the Republic of Indonesia, *Facts and Figures*, no. 11/FF/Penlugri/vol. IV/69 (Djakarta, Department of Information, 1969).

22 *Current Background* (Hongkong), no. 841, November 17, 1967, p. 27.

tionary features of the Indonesian Right-wing generals' clique which has hired itself out to U.S. imperialism." Describing the new regime's repeated professions of pursuing "an independent and active foreign policy" as "sheer humbug", it charged that it "has become a new lackey of imperialism for the suppression of the national liberation movement in South-east Asia."²³

Indonesia's re-entry into the United Nations on September 20, 1966, was another event which caused irritation in Peking. Sharply reacting to the new Indonesian Government's decision to this effect, the *NCNA* described it as "another move by the Indonesian right-wing military regime to curry favour with U.S. imperialism." Besides, it also saw in it an Indonesian attempt to follow policies which would ally it with the Soviet Union in opposition to China.²⁴

When later, in its endeavour to restore normal relations with India, the new Indonesian Government sent its Foreign Minister Adam Malik to India in September 1966, Peking perceived in it "an anti-China stepped up collusion" between the two countries. Criticizing both India and Indonesia for their similarity of approach to various issues like Vietnam, Kashmir and Malaysia, and towards the United Nations, *Peking Review*, under its "Round The World Survey" column, concluded: "The identity of views on many subjects...between the Indonesian Rightists and the Indian reactionaries merely shows that they are birds of a feather."²⁵ China repeated a similar charge of anti-China collusion between India and Indonesia when the Indian Minister for External Affairs, M.C. Chagla, reciprocated Adam Malik's September 1966 visit in January 1967.²⁶ Belittling India's economic capability, the *NCNA* wrote on January 19, 1967, that "although the Indian economy was in a mess, Mr. Chagla had boasted without shame that India could use her skill to help countries in South-east Asia."²⁷

ASEAN,²⁸ which Acting President Suharto's Government had been instrumental in evolving as a stabilizing factor in the region,

²³ *Peking Review*, vol. 9, no. 37, September 9, 1966, pp. 34-35.

²⁴ *News from Hsinhua News Agency* (London), no. 3167, September 21, 1966, p. 6. See also *Guardian* (Rangoon), September 22, 1966.

²⁵ *Peking Review*, vol. 9, no. 38, September 16, 1966, p. 23.

²⁶ *News from Hsinhua News Agency* (London), no. 3288, January 22, 1967, pp. 17-18.

²⁷ *Djakarta Times*, January 20, 1967. See also *Hindustan Times*, January 21, 1967.

²⁸ ASEAN which stands for Association of South-East Asian Nations was established in August 1967 and comprised of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, (Contd. on page 283)

became still another point for Peking's resentment. *Peking Review* termed the ASEAN as a "Puny Counter-Revolutionary Alliance" of "the handful of U.S. Imperialism's running dogs in South-east Asia." It added : "This set up is an out-and-out counter-revolutionary alliance rigged up to oppose China, Communism and the people."²⁹

China's adverse reactions to Indonesia's new foreign policy initiatives combined with its serious criticism of the new Indonesian leaders for encouraging anti-PKI, anti-Chinese and anti-China mob actions, ultimately led the two countries' relations to the brink of a collapse. However, the actual process of rupture in the two countries' relations, which started in January 1967, took nine months to complete. The two Governments announced the closure of their diplomatic missions in each other's country in the last week of October 1967. The fast momentum of developments in the two countries' relations made it difficult to determine the exact source of provocation. But the end result was that the Djakarta—Peking axis, which the P.K.I., President Sukarno and Subandrio had built so assiduously until September 1965, came to be broken.

This period also saw a precipitous fall in Indonesia's image of China. In September 1967 *Angkatan Bersendjata*, the Army newspaper, was quoted to have condemned China for having exposed itself as a dangerous threat to its neighbours. With reference to India-China clashes on Sikkim borders, it was cited to have written thus :

Peking is carrying out theft tactics by shouting 'thief' while it does all the stealing. What is happening with India now may happen with other countries in future because Marxism and Maoism are nothing but imperialism in disguise.³⁰

Thailand and the Philippines. Even the idea of forming a new regional group could be traced to Adam Malik. It was believed that regional co-operation was on the agenda of the talks held between the Foreign Ministers of Indonesia and Malaysia in Bangkok in May 1966. Indication to this effect was given by Adam Malik himself. He revealed in an announcement after the Bangkok Accord that he had proposed the formation of a new regional group and that the three ASA (Association of South-East Asia) members—Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand—had already decided to join. See *New York Times*, June 3, 1966.

29 *Peking Review*, vol. 10, no. 34, August 18, 1967, pp. 39-40. The comment was made in the 'Round The World Survey' column of this journal.

30 See *Hindustan Times*, September 15, 1967. In its issue of September 14, 1967, *Angkatan Bersendjata* considered China's accusation that India was aggressor as "ridiculous".

Obviously, the new Indonesian elite group had come to share with India its image of China, which, following the Chinese attack on India's northern borders in October 1962, the old Indonesian elite led by Sukarno and Subandrio had refused to do. October 1967 thus saw virtual suspension of relations between Indonesia and China. It started with still another mob attack on the Chinese Embassy on October 1, 1967. It was counted to be "43rd armed raid on the Chinese diplomatic missions in Indonesia."³¹ This day, marking the anniversary of the launching of the coup, hundreds of Indonesian demonstrators were reported by the Chinese to have ransacked the Embassy building and burnt, among other things, portraits of Mao Tse-tung. According to a Chinese Foreign Ministry protest note of October 5, 1967, twenty members of the Chinese Embassy were wounded. The Chinese Charge d'Affaires ad interim also sustained wounds from gunfire.³²

In the tense situation that this incident generated, Indonesia's relations with China came to be at the "lowest point".³³ A week later, on October 9, the Indonesian Government, in a communique issued after an emergency cabinet meeting, decided about severance of diplomatic relations.³⁴ Explaining to the reporters on October 10, 1967, Adam Malik attributed suspension of relations with China to the "increase of Chinese subversion in this country."³⁵ Later, in its note of October 23, 1967, the Government of Indonesia announced the closing of its Embassy in China and the withdrawal of all the Embassy personnel; it also demanded the closure of Chinese Embassy in Indonesia, the Chinese Consulates in Djakarta, Medan and Bandjarmasin and Makassar and withdrawal of all the personnel of the Chinese Embassy and consulates before October 30, 1967.³⁶

China took reciprocal action after four days. On October 27, 1967, the Government of China announced the closure of its diplo-

31 *Peking Review*, vol. 10, no. 45, November 3, 1967, p. 5.

32 *SCMP*, no. 4038, October 10, 1967, pp. 31-32.

33 *Starits Times*, October 3, 1967.

34 *Daily Telegraph* (London), October 10, 1967. During a meeting with the Pressmen on October 10, 1967, however, Adam Malik stated that the Foreign Department statement of October 9, 1967, concerning efforts to seek withdrawal of the Indonesian Embassy staff in Peking, did not mean a severance of diplomatic relations with China. Nevertheless, he said, if this request were not granted by China, it would practically mean freezing of relations between the two countries. See *Djakarta Times*, October 11, 1967.

35 *Times of India* (New Delhi), October 11, 1967.

36 *Peking Review*, no. 31.

matic mission in Indonesia. In a lengthy statement it observed *inter alia* that "these ugly clowns like Suharto and Nasution have revealed even more thoroughly their true feathers as traitors and will surely end up in dropping on their feet the rock they have lifted."³⁷ And thus the Djakarta-Peking Axis lay in a shambles.

Indian Assessment of Post-Coup Developments in Indonesia

The Indian Press took cognizance of the developments taking place in Indonesia. Within four days of the coup, *The Hindu* observed in an editorial that "the collapse of the coup" meant "a defeat for the pro-Communists in Indonesia." It also suggested the possibility that it might mark an end to the tendency of moving closer to Peking and a beginning of "re-assertion of purely nationalistic elements in Indonesia."³⁸ When, within a few days, the anti-Communist wave turned anti-China as well, the *Times of India* predicted "a turning point in the hitherto friendly relations between China and Indonesia", and suggested that "the latest developments in Indonesia will have an adverse effect on China's foreign policy."³⁹ It observed editorially that "it seems reasonably clear that the concept of NEFOS or the 'new emerging forces' and Sino-Indonesian relations have been major casualties of the Army's seizure of power." In the gradual emergence of a new leadership in Indonesia it saw an opening for India and prophesied that realism of the new Indonesian leaders would "enable New Delhi to reconsider its relations with Indonesia and seek its co-operation in the cause of stability in this part of the world."⁴⁰ An editorial in *The Hindu* concluded with the remarks that "the old Peking-Djakarta axis has been badly damaged and is not likely to be rebuilt in the near future."⁴¹

Notwithstanding these speculations in the Indian Press, the Government of India maintained silence over the developments in Indonesia. The cautious approach in New Delhi was quite understandable. In the first six months, until March 1966, the new Indonesian leaders remained pre-occupied with their activities against the PKI and its sympathizers, in and out of the Press, Parliament, educational institutions and administration. They devoted a part of their attention to neutralizing the influence of the close advisers of President Sukarno. In an uncertain situation such as this, involving

37 *Current Background*, no. 841, November 17, 1967, p. 64. See also *Times of India* (New Delhi) October 29, 1967.

38 *The Hindu* (Madras), October 4, 1965.

39 *Times of India*, October 20, 1965.

40 *Ibid.*

41 *The Hindu*, October 25, 1965.

a serious conflict between the new and the old leaders and the forces backing them up, it would have been premature to make an official comment on it. The Government of India wanted to watch the situation for some time until it crystallized this way or that way.

India was, of course, aware of the internal and external factors which had colluded in damaging its relations with Indonesia. As early as September 1962, Prime Minister Nehru had suspected Chinese involvement in the anti-Indian mob actions in Djakarta during the Fourth Asian Games.⁴² It was the National Front of all the political parties, including the PKI, the NU and the PNI, which had held demonstrations against India and sacked the Indian Embassy in Djakarta.⁴³

India also knew well that besides the PKI, all the Islamic parties and groups had been privy to an open and active pro-Pakistani shift in Indonesia's foreign policy during 1961-1965. There were reasons to believe that Pakistan's anti-Indian propaganda had found a high degree of receptivity among the leaders of the banned Masjumi Party as well as the NU which was the religious adjunct of Sukarno's Nasakom (Nationalism, Religion and Communism) arrangement. By April 1964, Indonesia's openly hostile attitude towards India on the Kashmir issue had demonstrated the degree of influence Pakistan had succeeded in mustering at various levels of the Indonesian leaders. It was Pakistan's decisive gain at the expense of India, the latter having lost because of its failure to consolidate personal rapport with the Indonesian leaders. Now the Islamic parties and youth fronts had, after the coup, actively joined the army in settling old scores with the PKI. In such a political situation silence on the part of Government of India was all the more necessary to avoid any future complications.

Fortunately for India, the "triumvirate", that emerged as a result of the President's Order of March 18, 1966, included Adam Malik, a top Murba Party leader, reputed for his secular and nationalist attitudes. The other two were General Suharto, who smashed the coup in Djakarta, and Sri Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX of Jogjakarta, an anti-communist and a famous freedom fighter.⁴⁴ As

42 See Chapter on Bilateral Relations and the Malaysia Question, p. 104.

43 Ibid., p. 103.

44 With the removal and arrest of fifteen erstwhile ministers on March 18, 1966, a new Cabinet Presidium came into being. This included, among others, Adam Malik, Suharto and Hamengku Buwono. Adam Malik was made Minister Co-ordinator for Foreign Affairs/Foreign Economic Relations. See *Indonesian Herald*, March 19, 1966.

expected, the new leaders soon came out with a new foreign policy stance. In a Press statement on April 4, 1966, Adam Malik, the new Foreign Minister, observed: "In the conduct of its foreign policy this Government will seek the broadest possible international co-operation, politically, economically, socially as well as culturally." He stated that the new Government would "endeavour to strengthen its relations with any country, when such relations are beneficial and fruitful to our national interest and to the welfare of the people." Clarifying his point still further, Adam Malik remarked: "Indonesia's foreign policy will be aimed at the extension of economic and financial co-operation between Indonesia and the outside world, both East and West, as long as such co-operation does not harm Indonesia's national interests."⁴⁵ It implied that inhibitions imposed upon Indonesia's "independent and active" foreign policy by Sukarno's concept of "NEFOS" versus "OLDEFOS" were making way to a pragmatic policy of co-operation with all without any regard to ideology. Besides, Adam Malik's hint at a peaceful settlement of the Malaysia question and at the possibility of Indonesia's rejoining the United Nations, from which it had withdrawn in January 1965, gave clear indications of a change-over from an isolationist policy of "axis" to one of good-neighbourliness and international co-operation.

India, which had helplessly viewed its relations damaged by various forces during the Sukarno era, found in it an indication of a possible normalcy in its relations with Indonesia. The encouraging trends that emerged in April 1966 were confirmed a month later. While addressing the Indonesian Parliament (DPR-GR) on May 5, 1966, Adam Malik expressed his Government's intention "to pursue a realistic Asian-African policy" and put special emphasis on reconsidering relations with India. "Particularly with regard to India", the Indonesian Foreign Minister said, "the Government intends to smoothen relations with India and thoroughly review Indonesia's relations with that country." Commenting on India's importance, he observed: "It may not be forgotten that India belongs to one of the important countries in international politics, especially on Asian-African and non-bloc politics (sic). Indonesian-Indian relations have lately been shrouded by misunderstanding towards one another. The Government shall strive to clear the atmosphere between Indonesia and India and thus smoothening and

⁴⁵ *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, m. 20, pp. 4-5.

giving substance to those relations.”⁴⁶

On Kashmir dispute also Adam Malik struck a new note when he expressed his Government’s “hope that the Tashkent Agreement be implemented sincerely by both parties in order to help promote African-Asian solidarity.” Although he expressed his Government’s conviction “that the best way to solve a problem like the Kashmir dispute is the democratic way, which gives an opportunity to the people concerned to determine their own destiny”,⁴⁷ he left no one in doubt about Indonesia’s shift from a posture of total support to Pakistan on the Kashmir issue.

Malaysia question and Indonesia’s relations with China were two other important points Adam Malik touched upon in the course of his speech in the Indonesian Parliament. As regards Malaysia question, he expressed his Government’s desire to settle it peacefully and thus contribute to the promotion of peace, stability and security and mutual co-operation in the region.⁴⁸ Adam Malik’s views as regards China’s attitude towards Indonesia have been surveyed elsewhere.⁴⁹

It was reassuring to India to find the post-coup Indonesia discarding its policy of axis with China and reverting to its earlier policy of peaceful relations with its neighbours. There had been a general belief in India that every step nearer China had led Indonesia away from India, and that Indonesia’s hostility towards India was the result largely of Chinese intrigues.⁵⁰ It would be gratifying to India if the new Indonesian leaders refused to play the role of a “junior partner to Peking adventurers.”⁵¹

Two Countries’ Eagerness to Normalize Relations

In the following days the new Indonesian leaders expressed their eagerness to normalize their relations with India. Speaking at a Press conference in Djakarta on June 9, 1966, Adam Malik said : “Relations with India have been rigid in the past two years.

46 Ibid., p. 13.

47 Ibid., p. 14.

48 Ibid., pp. 7-10.

49 See this Chapter, pp. 280-1.

50 “India and Indonesia”, (editorial), *Indian Express* (New Delhi), April 22, 1966.

51 M.S. Venkataramani and S. Krishnamurthy, “Political and Economic Chaos in Indonesia-I, Lessons of an Ordeal”, *Commerce* (Bombay), vol. 12, no. 2869, April 30, 1966, p. 760.

We would like to improve the relations.”⁵² A month and a half later, on July 19, 1966, the Indonesian Foreign Minister told newsmen in Djakarta that his Government had been trying to bring relations with India to “normal proportions”. He made this observation after attending a formal ceremony at the Foreign Ministry, marking the presentation by the Indian Ambassador, Perala Ratnam, of U.S. \$5,000 worth of textiles and medical supplies for flood victims in Central Java. He described it as a token of friendship from India.⁵³

While commenting on his proposed visit to several Asian and African countries in the first week of August 1966, the Indonesian Foreign Minister revealed that he would first of all go to India “to improve relations”. In order to restore confidence among Afro-Asian nations and to assure that Indonesia was determined to revert to its earlier policy of non-alignment, he said: “We have to convince our former friends, including the new nations of Africa and Asia, that we are going to resume once more a strong role in international affairs on the basis of a free and active foreign policy.”⁵⁴ This statement by Adam Malik, made less than a month before his five-day visit to India, starting from September 3 to 7, 1966, was significant in that it meant to restore confidence and mutual understanding with New Delhi.

From August 1966, a number of Indonesian official and other goodwill delegations started coming to India. A three-member delegation of Indonesian journalists, led by J.S. Hadis of *Berita Yudha*, visited India in August 1966 itself.⁵⁵ This was followed by two official delegations and one students’ delegation in September 1966. Five-day visit by Foreign Minister Adam Malik was followed by three-day visit by Sri Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX, Presidium Minister for Economic and Financial Affairs.⁵⁶ Two leaders of the

52 *The Statesman* (New Delhi), June 10, 1966. At the Press conference the Indonesian Foreign Minister said that he was looking forward to a visit to New Delhi, possibly in July 1966, and hoped to meet the Indian Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, and External Affairs Minister, Swaran Singh. He also indicated that strained relations between the two states might be eased soon.

53 *Guardian* (Rangoon), July 21, 1966.

54 *The Statesman* (New Delhi), August 8, 1966.

55 *News from Indonesia*, August 23, 1966. The other two members of the delegation were Dharto Wahab of *Duta Masjarakat* (NU Party language daily) and Sjafaat of *Mertju Suar* (another language daily). *News from Indonesia* is a news sheet brought out by the Indonesian Embassy in New Delhi.

56 *Times of India*, September 22, 1966.

University Students' Action Command (KAMI), Yozar Anwar and David Napitupulu, visited New Delhi on around September 22-23, 1966, on way home from Nairobi, where they had gone to attend an international students' conference.⁵⁷ In October 1966, a five-member Indonesian parliamentary delegation, headed by Subagio Reksodipuro, visited India.⁵⁸

The eagerness of the Indonesian leaders to resume normal relations with India prompted the latter to grasp the opportunity, discard its cautious approach and encourage new Indonesian policy postures. The Government of India thus broke its silence and came out with full support to the Indonesian efforts to end Sukarno's policy of confrontation against Malaysia. The Indonesian-Malaysian accord in Bangkok on May 31, 1966, was a welcome news to India. It represented the new Indonesian leaders' effort to re-adopt good-neighbour policy, conspicuously absent in the four years preceding the coup.

Viewing it as symbolic of their desire to contribute to peace, stability and economic progress in South-East Asia, Swaran Singh, India's Minister for External Affairs, observed : "India is all for it (settlement)". He was talking to newsmen at the Cairo Airport enroute to Paris on May 31, 1966.⁵⁹

Agreement to end the policy of confrontation was a concrete evidence of the growing capability and political credibility of the new Indonesian leaders in relation to President Sukarno. It was also a confirmation of their determination to pursue pragmatic foreign policy as outlined in the new Foreign Minister's statements of April 4 and May 6, 1966.⁶⁰ Hence it prompted the Government of India to encourage such a policy.

About two months later, in a statement in the Rajya Sabha on August 8, 1966, Swaran Singh expressed his great happiness over the steps being taken by Indonesia and Malaysia to end the "unfortunate confrontation which had bedevilled (their) relations". "These are our friendly countries", he said, and added that resumption of friendly relations between the two "will contribute to stability

57 *Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), September 24, 1966.

58 *Ibid.*, October 11, 1966. Other members of the delegation were (1) Sutakno Djatikusumo, (2) Nja Yusda, (3) Mrs. Walandow, and (4) Muhammad Burroh.

59 *The Hindu*, June 1, 1966.

60 For text of Adam Malik's statements of April 4 and May 5, 1966, see *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, n. 20, pp. 3-5 and 6-21 respectively.

and for lowering tension and for the development of healthy relations.”⁶¹ He reiterated these sentiments in a statement in New Delhi on August 18, 1966.⁶²

The Government of India had also all along been assessing the Indonesian situation as well as the new leaders’ overtures for normalizing relations. This became obvious from Government replies to questions relating to Indian-Indonesian relations in the Rajya Sabha on August 23, 1966. The Minister of State for External Affairs, Dinesh Singh, expressed his Government’s distress at the mass murders in the post-coup months in Indonesia. He rebutted a Communist member, Niren Ghosh’s charge that the Government of India was jubilant over a “reactionary turn as was evident from the butchery of the people” in Indonesia. But he also refused to identify the new Indonesian leaders with “reactionary trends” and put the blame for these killings on the old regime. He observed: “Unfortunately this reactionary trend came into Indonesia a few years ago.”⁶³

While justifying his Government’s warm response to the overtures for amity made by the new Indonesian leaders, swaran Singh put the blame for sharp deterioration in relations in 1965 on certain “forces” belonging to the old regime. He remarked that “as soon as those forces which were keeping the normal thinking and the normal reactions of the people suppressed were relaxed, the people came into their own and our relations with the people and the Government of Indonesia are now good.”⁶⁴

His argument was in keeping with his statement in the Rajya Sabha ten days earlier. On August 8, 1966, Swaran Singh had noted with great happiness “that the present Government of Indonesia have expressed their desire to strengthen and improve relations between Indonesia and India.” He had referred to the “rude shock” the two countries’ relations received in the last “two or three years”, leading to “sharp deterioration” and then to “climax” during the Indo-Pakistan conflict. Believing in the inherent goodwill the Indians and Indonesians have for each other, he had stated that despite “temporary set-backs” to mutual relations, the Government of India patiently continued to hope “that the day was not far

61 Government of India *Foreign Affairs Record* (New Delhi, Ministry of External Affairs), vol. 12, no. 8, August 1966, p. 200.

62 Ibid., p. 212.

63 Government of India, Rajya Sabha, *Debates*, pt. 2, vol. 57, August 23, 1966, col. 3536.

64 Ibid., col. 3540.

off when our relations would revert to the normal equation of friendship and understanding and comradeship." He added : "There are distinct signs of that developing now and taking a concrete shape."⁶⁵

Despite persistent opposition by Communist members, the Government of India came out clearly in favour of improving and strengthening close relations with Indonesia. During question hour in the Rajya Sabha on August 23, 1966, the Government view on the subject drew applause from all sections of the House except the Communists who were isolated.⁶⁶

Adam Malik's Visit to India

The Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik's five-day visit to New Delhi in the first week of September 1966 provided a valuable opportunity to the Indian leaders to establish personal contacts with one of the top representatives of the newly emerging leadership in Indonesia and to know, at first hand, their attitudes on political and economic problems.

The Indian Press gave wide coverage to Adam Malik's visit and greeted the Indonesian leader and his delegation with favourable editorials and comments. Considering it as "of great significance" for the two countries' relations, the *Indian Express* commented that it marked "the beginning of a new chapter in Indonesia's history." Viewing retrospectively, it observed that, in the pre-coup period Indonesia's anti-Indian policies on Sino-Indian conflict as well as on Kashmir issue, under "Chinese machinations", had led Sukarno and Subandrio to offer "moral as well as material help to Pakistan."⁶⁷ In an editorial, the *Hindustan Standard* expressed its jubilation over the turn the two countries' relations were expectedly taking. It expressed satisfaction over the identity of views the Indonesian and Indian Foreign Ministers had reached on various issues and observed thus : "This is as it should be, India and Indonesia are neighbours, both spatially and politically." It noted further : "Both are natural friends and there is no reason why they cannot go back to the days of warm friendship of a few years ago." It concluded by cautioning both the States against a third party intervention in their mutual relations. "Indo-Indonesian Friendship", it said, "must be based on such solid

65 *Foreign Affairs Record*, n. 61.

66 *Times of India* (Bombay), August 24, 1966.

67 *Indian Express* (New Delhi), September 5, 1966.

foundations that no third country could in future damage it. The two countries must learn from experience and should not allow any other power to bedevil their amity." In this connection the editorial described India's offer of a credit of Rupees Ten Crores to Indonesia as an expression of the former's "earnest...desire" for friendship with the latter.⁶⁸

The Indian-Indonesian talks at the highest level, during Adam Malik's visit, revealed an identity of views on various issues of vital importance to each country. India was happy to find a change in Indonesia's attitude towards China. Addressing a Press conference in New Delhi on September 5, 1966, the Indonesian Foreign Minister regretted that China had not "reciprocated" Indonesia's "good intentions". "We are going to resist any influence forced upon us from outside", he declared, while commenting on the prospects of Sino-Indonesian relations.⁶⁹

India was also satisfied to find a shift in Indonesia's position on the Kashmir dispute. At his Press conference, Adam Malik confirmed his earlier views on the Kashmir question and said: "The Kashmir question can be settled on the basis of the Tashkent declaration without interference of a third party."⁷⁰ His views were similar to India's official position which called for bilateral solution of the Kashmir dispute in the framework of the Tashkent declaration. Hence it marked a significant departure from the pro-Pakistani stand taken by Sukarno's regime since April 1964. In the joint communique issued at the conclusion of his visit Adam Malik reiterated his Government's equal friendship towards both India and Pakistan and "expressed the hope that the outstanding problems between India and Pakistan would be solved through peaceful negotiations for which the Tashkent Declaration provided a basis."⁷¹

Another achievement as noted in the joint communique was the two Governments' reaffirmation of "their faith in the principles of non-alignment as an instrument for the prevention of war and consolidation of peace, for alleviating international tensions and developing international co-operation."⁷² Significantly, it marked an

68 *Hindustan Standard* (Calcutta), September 6, 1966. A crore is equal to 10 millions.

69 *Times of India* (Bombay), September 6, 1966.

70 Ibid.

71 Government of India, *Foreign Affairs Record*, vol. 12, no. 9, September 1966, p. 232.

72 Ibid., p. 231.

end to Sukarno's 'beacon-light' foreign policy, and a policy of 'axis' based on his concept of conflict between the "new emerging forces" and the "old established order forces", which saw the world divided into two camps and in which non-alignment became totally irrelevant.

Besides, the joint communique put "special emphasis...on the further development of relations between India and Indonesia and mutually beneficial co-operation in all fields." It expressed "their desire for taking concerted steps in furthering and strengthening their relations in the economic, technical and cultural fields." As a manifestation of it, the two sides "agreed to reactivate" the existing Cultural Agreement concluded in December 1955 between India and Indonesia. They felt that exchange of visits and cultural delegations would help to enlarge the scope of co-operation between the two countries.⁷³

With the understanding in the political field developing between the two States, it was natural to expect them to lay a firm basis of mutual co-operation in the economic and cultural fields. It is correct that in the trade and economic fields the two countries had, for various reasons, left much to be desired. It is also correct that many provisions of the Cultural Agreement of 1955, which was to remain in force for a period of ten years, had remained in abeyance before and after 1961. But the fact remained that neither of the two countries had abrogated the Cultural Agreement officially although, in the four years preceding the coup it had practically become as good as non-existent. The Government's desire to "reactivate" it was, in this sense, a good augury for mutual relations and a step in the right direction. If reactivated, it would provide the framework in which the two countries could make meaningful contribution to strengthening bilateral relations in the cultural field.

Relations in the Field of Trade and Commerce

In the trade and economic field also there appeared to be much scope. Sukarno's emphasis on "Nasakom" politics and on foreign policy of "axis", had isolated Indonesia, with disastrous consequences for its economy. By abandoning Sukarno's policies at home and abroad, the new Indonesian leaders had given ample evidence of their shift in emphasis from politics to economics and their desire to use foreign policy as an instrument to serve the long-neglected

economic needs of the people.⁷⁴

In view of this development the basis of future friendship between the two countries was to be their willing co-operation in the field of trade and economy. Besides, in the light of Indonesia's massive economic difficulties, India's readiness to offer material incentive for growth in bilateral trade was to determine the development of friendly relations between them. In interviews with Frank Moraes, Chief Editor of the *Indian Express*, Foreign Minister Adam Malik and Minister of Finance, Sri Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX, had expressed their warm goodwill for India. At the same time, both had stressed that goodwill was a bilateral business and that much depended on how India reciprocated.⁷⁵ In a written reply General Nasution had also told Frank Moraes that the two countries' relations "are expected to become normal gradually like those of the Bandung spirit period." But then he had also observed: "Indonesia wants to co-operate with all nations, particularly Asian and African countries, but, of course, it also depends on the attitude of the countries concerned."⁷⁶ The implication was clear. Any country, which desired to bring normalacy in its relations with the new regime in Indonesia, would have to seek basis of friendship in the economic field. India, in this sense, could be no exception.

Various Indian national dailies also carried out a similar assessment of the Indonesian attitudes towards India. There were suggestions that the two countries' future relations would primarily

74 Major theme of Adam Malik's Press conference on April 4, 1966, was to make "foreign policy...serve the national interest and not the other way round", as was the case in the pre-coup period. Stressing his Government's determination to adopt a "balanced policy" in order to meet "the most urgent needs of the people, such as food and clothing", he had declared: "The Indonesian Government is of the opinion that foreign policy should be aimed at the achievement of the welfare of the people. In this regard, Indonesia's foreign policy will be aimed at the extension of economic and financial co-operation between Indonesia and the outside world, both east and west, as long as such co-operation does not harm Indonesia's national interests." See *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, n. 20, pp. 3-5.

75 Frank Moraes, "Indonesia in Asia—III", *Indian Express* (New Delhi), August 24, 1966. This article, third in the series, was based on Frank Moraes's observations and impressions gathered in interviews with various top leaders of the new regime during his visit to Indonesia in the last week of July and first week of August 1966.

76 Ibid.

depend on India's offer of economic aid.⁷⁷ Commenting on the new Indonesian leaders' successfully ending the confrontation policy and on their realizing the urgencies of the domestic situation, the *National Herald*, in an editorial "New Trends", saw in it Indonesia's readiness to do a "political fence-mending with a number of its neighbours who had been quite unnecessarily alienated." It also linked India's offer of a credit of Rupees Ten Crores with Djakarta's desire to normalize relations with New Delhi, interpreting it as the latter's warm response to the former's desire.⁷⁸

In pursuance of the two countries' eagerness to normalize their relations in the trade and economic field, as evident in the joint communique issued at the end of Adam Malik's visit to New Delhi, the two Governments did not delay in taking the follow-up action. Only two weeks later, a high-level Indonesian delegation led by Sri Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX, the new Presidium Minister of Economic and Financial Affairs of Indonesia, paid a three-day official visit to India from September 20 to 22, 1966. This was reciprocated by a three-day visit to Indonesia of an Indian delegation led by Minister of Foreign Trade, Manubhai Shah, from December 26 to 28, 1966.

This exchange of trade delegations was important in that it enabled the two Governments to understand each other's difficulties and limitations in the field of bilateral trade and economy. It also enabled the Government of India to know that it was round the pivot of economic co-operation that future relations between the two countries were to be built. At a meeting with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi on September 21, 1966, the leader of the Indonesian delegation was understood to have told her that Indonesia was keen not only to normalize political relations but also economic ties with India.⁷⁹

Apart from working out the details of India's offer of a credit of Rupees Ten Crores, Sultan Hamengku Buwono's visit to India was more of an exploratory nature. Both the Indonesian and Indian

77 "Indonesia Revamps Foreign Policy" (By South-East Asia Correspondent), *The Hindu*, July 1, 1966. It extensively quoted from Adam Malik's first foreign policy statement at his Press conference in Djakarta on April 4, 1966, and analysed the change perceptible in Indonesia's foreign policy resulting from its shift of emphasis from politics to economics.

78 *National Herald* (Lucknow), August 26, 1966.

79 *Times of India*, September 22, 1966.

delegations discussed the details of a new trade agreement and prepared "a draft agreement (envisaging) the promotion of closer economic and commercial relations between the two countries and the expansion and diversification of trade between them."⁸⁰ The two sides also agreed to extend bilateral co-operation in the technical field. The first step in this direction was India's offer of training facilities for a few Indonesian officers through the Reserve Bank of India.⁸¹

The Indian-Indonesian talks were important in that these marked "the beginning of a new chapter of fruitful economic co-operation between the two countries and ensure (d) that the economic co-operation between them would be extended to other fields in the near future." In this sense, these talks represented "positive steps to strengthen traditional bonds of friendship and to build up economic co-operation between the two countries for mutual benefit."⁸²

About three months later, during a three-day visit to Indonesia in December 1966, an Indian delegation led by Manubhai Shah, Minister of Foreign Trade, pursued talks on bilateral trade and economic co-operation. This resulted in the signing of a two-year trade agreement on December 28, 1966.⁸³ The two countries were resuming mutual give and take in the field of trade and economy. The agreement contained proposals for carrying out studies for joint ventures, agreement to exchange "at least two businessmen's delegations in 1967", to hold "exclusively national exhibitions" in each other's country, and India's offer of co-operation in the technical field. The two sides also agreed to arrange periodical meetings of their senior officials so as to "review the working of the Trade Agreement and the progress of the various measures for increasing technical and economic co-operation between

80 Government of India, *Foreign Affairs Record*, vol. 12, no. 9, September, 1966, p. 232. The text of the joint communique issued on September 22, 1966, appears at pp. 232-3.

81 Ibid.

82 Ibid.

83 For text of India's Trade Agreement with Indonesia, see Government of India, *India's Trade Agreements, As in Force on January 1, 1968* (New Delhi: Ministry of Commerce, 1968), pp. 159-61. The Trade Agreement came into force provisionally with immediate effect and was to be effectively valid for two years from the date of ratification by the two Governments.

the two countries.”⁸⁴

The Indian Minister, Manubhai Shah, described it as a historic occasion because, he said, “We shall be able to lay a strong foundation not only for political and historical friendship, but also for economic relationship between our two countries.”⁸⁵ His feelings were in accord with the two countries’ expectations as expressed in the joint communique, “that not only would normal trade relations between the two countries be restored soon but that, as a result of all these steps, there would be considerable expansion of trade and economic co-operation between the two countries in the near future.”⁸⁶

On the political plain, the process of strengthening Indian-Indonesian relations was continued by a visit to Indonesia by the Indian Minister for External Affairs, M. C. Chagla, in January 1967. By sending its External Affairs Minister on a return visit, India desired to seek confirmation of Indonesia’s changed policy and attitude towards Pakistan and China and towards the region. It would enable the Indian Government to make a first-hand assessment of how far Indonesia had reverted to a correct posture of non-alignment and good-neighbourliness.

M.C. Chagla’s Visit to Indonesia

During a brief stop-over at Singapore Airport, enroute to Djakarta, M.C. Chagla stated that the two countries’ relations had “considerably improved”. Earlier at Santa Cruz Airport in Bombay, before leaving for Indonesia, he had stated that, among other things, he would try to “activise” the existing cultural agreement which had for long been in a state of “suspended animation”. About China, he had remarked : “One cannot help discussing China wherever one goes...China is the big question mark of the future.”⁸⁷

On reaching Djakarta on January 16, 1967, Chagla found the political atmosphere quite different from the one witnessed by Swaran Singh in April 1964, and by C. Subramaniam, leader of the Indian delegation to the Tenth Anniversary Celebrations of the Bandung Conference (Dasa Warsa Celebrations), in April 1965. Replying to a newsman at the welcoming ceremony at the Djakarta Air-

84 Government of India, *Foreign Affairs Record*, vol. 12, no. 12, December, 1966, pp. 316-17.

85 *Antara News Bulletin*, January 18, 1967.

86 *Foreign Affairs Record*, n. 84, p. 316.

87 *Hindustan Times*, January 17, 1967.

port, India's External Affairs Minister remarked that the two countries' relations had been clouded in the past, "but the sun is breaking through now."⁸⁸

One of the three major issues causing anxiety to India was Indonesia's attitude towards Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. More than once the new Indonesian leaders had indicated their reversion to the posture of impartiality between the two countries. Nonetheless, India had continued to entertain fears which it now sought to remove through personal assurances. India had not yet forgotten that only about fifteen months ago Indonesia had offered arms and other material and moral support to Pakistan in its conflict with India and thus threatened India's security. Hence it formed an important issue in the discussions which the Indian Minister had with the Indonesian leaders.

At a Press conference in Djakarta on January 19, 1967, the Indian Minister for External Affairs revealed that during his talks with the Indonesian leaders he had hinted at Pakistan's "collusion" with China in the latter's aggressive policy towards India. Spelling out implications of arms supplies to Pakistan and his Government's reaction to it, he observed :

Pakistan faces no threat from China or from Russia or from India. Therefore any military assistance or supply of arms to Pakistan by anyone would mean strengthening China. India has made it clear that any supply of arms to Pakistan will be considered a hostile act against her⁸⁹.

It represented an Indian effort to convince the new Indonesian leadership that Pakistan's thesis of anticipated threat of aggression from India or from any other quarter was just a false pretext to seek more and more arms supplies against India. In effect, it strengthened China which colluded with Pakistan against India. To his satisfaction, M.C. Chagla found the Indonesian leaders quite receptive to this argument. Basing its information on PTI sources, an English daily from New Delhi reported M. C. Chagla as having said that Indonesia won't give arms aid to Pakistan. It also referred to assurances by General Suharto, Chairman of the Presidium of Ministers, and Adam Malik, Foreign Minister, to the Indian Minister that any commitment for military assistance to Pakistan

88 Ibid. He was welcomed at the Airport by Indonesia's Foreign Minister, Adam Malik.

89 *The Statesman* (New Delhi), January 20, 1967.

as given by the previous regime would not be honoured. Adam Malik was believed to have informed his Indian counterpart that the naval crafts and military personnel stationed since then (September 1965 Indo-Pakistan conflict) in the Pakistani waters or Pakistani territory have been withdrawn.⁹⁰

This was a major achievement of M. C. Chagla's visit to Indonesia. He seemed to have been able to carry conviction with the Indonesian leaders that both legally and constitutionally Kashmir had become a part of India since 1947. Besides, he successfully impressed upon them that Kashmir, being a Muslim majority state, was a symbol of India's secularism. Hence India could not agree to a plebiscite in Kashmir as demanded by Pakistan.⁹¹

The second major issue was Indonesia's posture towards China. In the light of growing estrangement between Indonesia and China following the coup in 1965, and in view of the resultant fall in Indonesia's image of China, India could be sure of Indonesia's coming in line with its own view of China as an aggressive, expansionist state, threatening the security and integrity of its neighbours. There was a feeling in India that President Sukarno had been "mainly responsible for propelling Indonesia in the direction of China under the guise of waging a campaign against neo-colonialism."⁹² But if China's alleged complicity in the coup led it into more and more disrepute among Indonesia's new leaders, Sukarno's persistent advocacy of maintaining "axis" with Peking,⁹³ led, in part, to erosion of his personal and political prestige and power.

M.C. Chagla disclosed at his Press conference on January 19, 1967, that the two Governments had similar views about the "danger to world peace from China and Chinese expansionism through

⁹⁰ *Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), January 21, 1967.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*

⁹² "Indonesia's Foreign Relations" (editorial), *The Hindu*, January 20, 1967.

⁹³ This is obvious from Sukarno's address to the Organisation of "1945 Generation" as late as September 6, 1966. He described himself as Marxist, accused the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of attempting to overthrow him, felt amused at the MPRS's resolution to outlaw Communism and Marxism, and stressed that the strategy for defeating imperialism was for China to strike a blow against the American troops in Vietnam from the North while Indonesia struck from the South. See *New York Times*, September 7, 1966. Perhaps this was the most forthright explanation of Indonesia's regional ambitions, evident in Sukarno's policy of confrontation against Malaysia, and of the basis of Indonesian-Chinese "axis", with a suggestion of division of South-East Asia between themselves.

military and subversive methods.” He also indicated agreement between them on the view that “expansionism of China should be contained not through military methods but through the economic development of South-East Asia.” We believe, he added, “the best way to contain Chinese expansionism is for India and Indonesia to strengthen themselves economically. They are the two most important countries in South-East Asia.”⁹⁴ The joint communique issued at the end of the Indian-Indonesian talks confirmed M.C. Chagla’s contention inasmuch as it registered the two sides’ disapproval “of foreign intervention in the domestic affairs of the South-East Asian countries.”⁹⁵

Indonesian view of China was getting closer to India’s. In a statement in the General Assembly of the United Nations on November 28, 1966 on the restoration of the lawful rights of China in the United Nations, the Indonesian Ambassador to the United Nations, Roeslan Abdulgani, had favoured China’s representation on legal and not only on political grounds as was the case earlier. For the first time since many years, the Indonesian delegate had made a distinction between the legal and political aspects of the question of China’s representation at the United Nations. He had stated thus : “We uphold peaceful co-existence based upon mutual benefit and interest, and reject at the same time interference in the domestic affairs of others.” Expressing Indonesia’s new mood towards China, he had said regretfully but emphatically : “We cannot remain passive towards hostile and unfounded allegations. The more so since what was vitally at stake in the October events last year in Indonesia was the very survival of our State Ideology, the Pantja Sila, against dogmatic, intolerant and extreme left-radicalism using and misusing political opportunism and economic adventurism.”⁹⁶

Closely linked with the issue of China was the question of Indonesia’s attitude towards South-East Asia. During the Sukarno era until the coup in 1965, Indonesia had pursued a policy of confrontation against its neighbour Malaysia. Apart from having

94 *The Statesman* (New Delhi), January 20 1967.

95 Government of the Republic of Indonesia, *DOCUMENTA DIPLOMATICA* no. 3, 1967 (Djakarta, Biru Research Umum, Department Luar Negeri (Foreign Affairs), 1967, p. 52. For full text of the Indian-Indonesian joint communique, see Government of India, *Foreign Affairs Record*, vol. 13, no. 1, January 1967, pp. 5-6 and *Djakarta Times*, January 20, 1967.

96 *GAOR*, session 21, plen. mtg. 1479, November 28, 1966, pp. 11-12.

adverse effect on domestic politics and economy, this policy had led Indonesia into an estrangement with non-aligned India, to an "axis" with China and, finally to withdrawal from the United Nations and resultant isolation. Implied in Sukarno's concept of New Emerging Forces versus Old Established Order Forces had been Indonesia's veering away from the policy of non-alignment and peaceful co-existence. Indonesia under Sukarno had, in theory, extolled the ten principles of the Bandung Conference of April 1955 which, in practice, it had tended to disregard. Thus, in actual effect, it had abandoned the good-neighbour policy in favour of "Crush Malaysia" policy and showed to the world that, instead of proving a stabilizing factor in the region, it had grown to be a source of political and economic instability.

By bringing to an end Sukarno's policy of confrontation against Malaysia, the new leaders in Indonesia had shown their readiness to assume a stabilizing posture in the region. India had offered its ungrudging moral support and encouragement to this policy as it arose out of a shift in Indonesia's scale of priorities from politics to economics.

In fact, M.C. Chagla was encouraged to find that the Indian thesis of putting emphasis on domestic economic development through a policy of non-alignment, peaceful co-existence and international co-operation (which Jawaharlal Nehru had quite early put forward to Indonesia during his visit to that country in June 1950), was getting wide acceptance among the Indonesian leaders. To his satisfaction, for the first time in its post-independence history Indonesia had found leaders who showed marked preference for economic rather than political development.

M.C. Chagla's talks with the Indonesian Foreign Minister revealed that both were also agreed as to the manner of containing Chinese expansionism in South-East Asia. Both disapproved military alliances and suggested economic development through regional co-operation as an effective method to do so. In a television interview in Djakarta on January 17, 1967, M.C. Chagla had stated that an economically viable and strong South-East Asia could meet the danger of aggression. He believed that instead of increasing the strength of a country, military alliance and pacts only tended to reduce it to the position of a satellite.⁹⁷ Two days later, at a

97 *Antara News Bulletin*, January 19, 1967. Later, at a dinner, M.C. Chagla reiterated his Government's views on economic and political viability of

Press conference he observed that increasing economic strength of both India and Indonesia was "the best way to contain Chinese expansionism."⁹⁸ Finding the Indonesian leaders receptive to the idea of regional co-operation, the Indian Minister for External Affairs was reported to have suggested the establishment of an Asian Council and Common Market, embracing the South-East Asian states, Japan and Australia.⁹⁹ Lest it should create an adverse reaction from among the Indonesian leaders, he endeavoured to reserve for India only a side role and contented himself by assuring "Indonesia of India's full support to any initiative Indonesia might take to bring about a regional grouping for promoting greater economic co-operation in South-East Asia."¹⁰⁰

The joint communique later confirmed similarity of views of the two Governments as regards the region. Both sides "agreed that security in South-East Asia was, in the first place, the responsibility of the South-East Asian nations themselves." They disapproved "foreign intervention" in the region and "viewed with concern the use of economic and financial assistance as an instrument of political pressure on developing countries."¹⁰¹

Besides Indonesia having agreed to give up its anti-Indian approach on the Kashmir dispute and shown an attitude towards China and towards South-East Asia more or less similar to that of India, the joint communique issued on January 19, 1967, revealed that the two Foreign Ministers had found themselves agreed on all other issues of foreign policy. They "reaffirmed their faith in the policy of non-alignment as an instrument for strengthening peace and fruitful co-operation in the international community." They also agreed on the strengthening of the ten Bandung principles. They shared each other's views on the Vietnam question, on the Apartheid policy in South Africa, on the problem of eliminating "all forms of imperialism and colonialism", and on nuclear weapons' explosions. They "condemned subversion and the use or the threat of use of force as a means of settling bilateral or inter-

South-East Asia in these words : "We are only anxious that the economic development of the countries in the region should be speeded up because that is the only guarantee against external threats and subversion." See *Hindustan Times*, January 21, 1967.

98 *The Statesman* (New Delhi), January 20, 1967.

99 *News from Hsinhua News Agency* (London), no. 3401, May 17, 1967, pp. 11-12.

100 *India News* (Washington), February 3, 1967, p. 6.

101 *DOCUMENTA DIPLOMATICA*, n. 95, p. 52.

national disputes.”¹⁰²

As regards bilateral relations, the joint communique “expressed their hope that economic, commercial and technical co-operation between the two countries would be further developed as a result of these visits. They agreed in principle to maintain regular contacts at official level annually to review progress in the strengthening of bilateral relations. They also agreed to reactivate the Cultural Agreement between Indonesia and India ratified in 1958 and to work out detailed arrangements in this regard.”¹⁰³

The Indian External Affairs Minister’s visit to Indonesia in January 1967 was an important landmark in the two countries’ relations. M.C. Chagla himself stated that “the best result of his visit was the strengthening of relations between India and Indonesia.”¹⁰⁴ Apart from showing promises of growing healthy relations in the field of politics, culture, trade and economy, it indicated the common resolve of the two nations to contribute to the strengthening and stabilising of South-East Asia. Identity of approach on various issues had grown to such an extent as to prompt the Indonesian Foreign Minister to tell India’s External Affairs Minister (who, said the former, “is very dear to us”) that “you can now feel that there are no real problems between India and Indonesia.”¹⁰⁵ Commenting on the results of M.C. Chagla’s visit, Adam Malik said, on another occasion, that the two countries’ relations “have immensely improved.” He added: “India and Indonesia now stand shoulder to shoulder in foreign policy matters.”¹⁰⁶

The Indian Press was jubilant on the achievements of M.C. Chagla’s visit to Indonesia. *The Hindu* commented thus: “We have no doubt that the friendship between India and Indonesia, which flourished for so many years after independence, will be restored as the result of Mr. Chagla’s visit.”¹⁰⁷ Reporting complete agreement

102 Ibid., pp. 52-35. See also *The Hindu*, January 20, 1967.

103 Ibid.

104 *Hindustan Times*, January 21, 1967. While speaking in Bombay on January 23, 1967, M.C. Chagla observed: “We have not only restored the relations as they had been before but they have become better than before.” See *Times of India* (Bombay), January 24, 1967.

105 *Antara News Bulletin*, January 19, 1967, and *Djakarta Times*, January 20, 1967. Adam Malik made these remarks at the dinner hosted by him to his Indian counterpart in Djakarta on January 17, 1967.

106 *Hindustan Times*, January 21, 1967.

107 “Indonesia’s Foreign Relations” (editorial), *The Hindu*, January 20, 1967.

on all matters discussed by the Indian and Indonesian Ministers, *The Statesman* observed that "differences that existed between India and Indonesia have disappeared and there is now perfect understanding between the two countries."¹⁰⁸ Commenting editorially, another prominent English daily expressed happiness over the turn of events in the two countries' relations. Viewing retrospectively, it attributed the Indian-Indonesian strains during the Sukarno era to "erratic policies" of Sukarno rather than to "a clash of national interests", and observed: "India and Indonesia are by far the most important countries in the Indian Ocean area and their security is interlinked. The misunderstanding between them which developed some time ago could have undermined the security of the whole region."¹⁰⁹ *The Indian Express* commented on Indonesia's new posture towards China, towards axis policy and on prospects of its relations with India. It wrote: "The disillusionment with China has changed all that. China is now recognized as a menace, the Peking-Djakarta-Rawalpindi axis is at an end, and everything points to the traditional amity between India and Indonesia being restored." It added: "The restoration of friendly ties between India and Indonesia will prove an important stabilizing factor in the region."¹¹⁰

A New Phase in Indian-Indonesian Relations

M.C. Chagla's visit to Indonesia thus marked a new phase in India's relations with that country. It initiated the process of re-establishing mutual goodwill and understanding which had characterized the early nineteen-fifties. The year 1967 thus witnessed a steady flow of goodwill delegations from one country to the other. At least three Indian delegations visited Indonesia during this year. A four-member Indian handloom and handicraft delegation headed by T.N. Lakshminarayan, Secretary, Department of Industries, Labour and Housing of the Government of Madras, paid a four-day visit to Indonesia from February 3 to 7, 1967. It was with a view to explore the prospects of increasing export (to Indonesia) of handloom and handicraft goods as also to study the consumers' tastes and other allied factors.¹¹¹ Apart from discussing the development

108 *The Statesman* (New Delhi), January 19, 1967.

109 "Identical Approach" (editorial), *Times of India* (New Delhi), January 20, 1967.

110 *Indian Express* (New Delhi), January 23, 1967.

111 *News From Indonesia* (New Delhi), February 11, 1967.

of handloom and handicraft industries, the two sides explored the possibilities of training of handloom skilled labourers by Indian experts.¹¹² Another Indian delegation, composed jointly of the Indian Jute Mills' Association, Calcutta, and the Calcutta Jute Fabrics Shippers' Association, visited Djakarta during the same month. Its purpose was to assess Indonesian requirements for jute bags.¹¹³ In the third week of June 1967 an Indian businessman, John P. George, Director, Island Sea Foods Company Ltd., Cochin (South India), visited Djakarta to survey possibilities of importing shrimps and lobsters from Indonesia. Besides studying the marketing potential, John P. George was reported as having evinced particular interest in setting up business in Indonesia in this field.¹¹⁴

From Indonesian side, a five-member parliamentary delegation led by H.A. Sjaichu, the Speaker of the Indonesian Parliament (DPR-GR), visited India in October 1967. It was second Indonesian parliamentary delegation in a year, the first having come in October 1966.¹¹⁵ The Indonesian Speaker came to India at the joint invitation of the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha and the Speaker of the Lok Sabha.¹¹⁶ While explaining the purpose of his visit to some Asian countries, including India, on the eve of his departure from Djakarta, Sjaichu said that his mission was aimed at promoting closer relations with certain Asian countries, especially with their parliaments. Another purpose, he added, was to give information about recent developments in Indonesia and to facilitate smooth economic and trade relations between Indonesia and these Asian countries.¹¹⁷ Being one of the top leaders of the Nahdatul Ulama (NU) Party, Sjaichu's visit to India was quite significant. It would enable the new Indonesian leaders to remove misunderstandings in India created by the NU Party's pro-Pakistani attitude on Kashmir dispute during the period of this study until the coup in 1965.

In a statement at a Press conference in New Delhi on October 21, 1967, the Indonesian Speaker emphasized that Indonesia greatly

112 Ibid., February 6, 1967.

113 Ibid.

114 Ibid.

115 See this Chapter, p. 289.

116 Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, *Report, 1967-68*, p. 31.

117 *Djakarta Times*, October 3, 1967. Other members of the Indonesian parliamentary delegation were : H. Osmar Ismail (NU Party), Rasjid Sutan Radja Mas (PNI), Utomo (Parkindo—Indonesian Catholic Party) and Fahmi Idris (KAMI—University Students' Action Command).

desired to promote friendship and co-operation with India in both cultural and economic fields. This co-operation, he added, would enable the two countries to play an important and constructive role in preserving world peace. He stated that since both Indonesia and India were facing similar political, economic and social problems, they had wider ground for engaging in close co-operation in order to accelerate development of the two countries in all fields positively and profitably.¹¹⁸

One of the fields in which the two countries' relations showed distinct signs of improvement was the attempt by the two Governments' to re-establish relations at personal level. These had been under strains following the Belgrade Conference in September 1961. Even close and frequent consultations on various issues of regional and international importance at diplomatic level, which characterized the Indian-Indonesian relations during the nineteen-fifties, had virtually stopped. For two years, the Indian Ambassador in Djakarta had not been invited to make his usual Republic Day Address over Radio Republic Indonesia.¹¹⁹ For the last three years preceding M.C. Chagla's visit to Indonesia, the Indian diplomatic mission had been in a state of virtual isolation. In December 1966, on invitation from the Indonesian Minister of Education and Culture, Sarino Mangupranoto, the Indian Ambassador, Perala Ratnam, attended and addressed the Congress of the Taman Siswa educational institution in Jogjakarta (Central Java). He also visited the headquarters of the Diponegoro Division under Major General Surono and received cordial hospitality wherever he went. The Indian Ambassador also took this opportunity to meet the leaders of the Indian community in Tjirebon and Semarang (the cities in Central Java where the PKI was a dominant factor). He was fully satisfied over the friendly relations subsisting between the Indians and Indonesians there.¹²⁰

118 Ibid., October 25, 1967.

119 This was revealed by the Indian Ambassador, Perala Ratnam, in the course of his address on the 17th anniversary of the Republic of India. Speaking before Radio and Television in Djakarta on January 25, 1967, he regretted "that it was not possible for me to address you all in the last two years." He however, added : "The clouds of misunderstanding have now passed and we are happy that relations between our two countries have become normal and we have resumed old contacts." See *News from Indonesia* (New Delhi), February 6, 1967.

120 Ibid., December 24, 1966.

The two countries also sought to resume and strengthen contacts in the cultural field. Their efforts to reactivate the 1955 Cultural Agreement during Adam Malik's visit to India and M.C. Chagla's visit to Indonesia have already been surveyed. An important activity in this field was Government of India's invitation, among others, to a Jogjakarta Ramayana Ballet from Indonesia. The 45-member Indonesian Ramayana Ballet, led by Prince Paku Alam VIII, Governor of Jogjakarta, came to participate in an East-West Theatre Arts Seminar and Festival, organized in New Delhi by Bharatiya Natya Sangh, in collaboration with the Indian National Commission for UNESCO and the Ministry of Education. The function took place in New Delhi from October 24 to 30, 1967.¹²¹

Still another field in which there were distinct signs of improvement in Indian-Indonesian relations was bilateral trade. Deterioration registered in this field during 1961-65 has already been surveyed elsewhere.¹²² The trade figures for 1965-66, 1966-67 and 1967-68 are as follows :

India's Trade With Indonesia¹²³

(Repees in crores)

	1965-66	1966-67	1967-68
Imports	2.22	0.08	0.11
Exports	0.81	1.07	5.86
	— — — —	— — — —	— — — —
Balance of Trade	(--) 1.41	(+) 0.99	(+) 5.75

The above figures show that the Indian exports to Indonesia, which dwindled to a record low level of Rupees 81 lakhs rose to Rupees 107 lakhs during 1966-67 and Rupees 586 lakhs during 1967-68. Barring the Indian export figures of 1961-62 (Rupees 697 lakhs), the figure registered during 1967-68 was the highest during 1961-67. This was largely the result of an Indian credit of Rupees ten crore afforded to Indonesia in September 1966.¹²⁴

The sharp rise in Indian exports to Indonesia was, however, not matched by Indian imports from there. Indian imports which stood at Rupees 222 lakhs during 1965-66 dwindled to an all-time

121 Government of India, Ministry of Education, *Report 1966-67*, pp. 202-3.

122 See Chapter on Bilateral Relations and the Malaysia Question, pp. 146-47.

123 *India's Trade with Some Asian Countries* (New Delhi, Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, 1969), p. 15.

124 For Indian-Indonesian trade figures since 1961-62, see Chapter on Bilateral Relations and the Malaysia Question, pp. 146-47.

low of Rupees 8 lakhs during 1966-67 and Rupees 11 lakhs during 1967-68. This was due to a sharp fall in India's imports of petroleum products from Indonesia, a priority import item mentioned in Schedule "A" attached to the Trade Agreement of December 1966.¹²⁵

Although rise in Indian exports indicated encouraging trends, a big deficit in trade balance as registered by Indonesia *vis-a-vis* India (Rupees 99 lakhs and 575 lakhs during 1966-67 and 1967-68 respectively) showed an unbalanced and unsatisfactory development in the two countries' relations, which seemed to be growing satisfactorily in other fields.

125 In fact petroleum products had all along been the major Indonesian export item to India. Out of the total Indonesian exports of Rupees 222 lakhs (to India) during 1965-66, petroleum products alone amounted to Rupees 202 lakhs. See *India's Trade With Some Asian Countries*, n. 123.

Postscript

Interaction During 1968—1980

The interaction resumed since Indira Gandhi became Prime Minister in January 1966 and General Soeharto took over as Acting President in March 1967 was intensified during the former's five-day official visit to Indonesia from June 28 to July 2, 1969. Being the first Indian Prime Minister's visit in fourteen years since Nehru attended the first Asian-African Conference in Bandung in April 1955, it was hailed in Indonesian Press as "a historical event of great significance".¹ The Indian Prime Minister referred to her earlier three visits to Indonesia with her father, the late Prime Minister Nehru, and expressed the hope that her visit will be "one more link in the long chain of friendship that binds our nations."² The two sides exchanged views on various international issues and those relating to China, South-East Asia and the Indian sub-continent. The similarity of approach registered during M.C. Chagla's visit to Indonesia during January 1967 and Adam Malik's visit to India in February 1969 was reiterated and confirmed. The Joint Communique noted a common approach of the two countries towards issues such as Vietnam, the strengthening of the United Nations, and the growing disparities between the developed and the developing countries. It also called for promotion of trade and economic relations among the Asian nations on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. The two sides considered such co-operation as necessary in order "to further consolidate peace and stability in the region and to give meaningful expression to economic

1 Cited in K.N. Ramachandran, "India-Indonesia Relations", in K. Subramaniam, ed., *Self-Reliance and National Resilience* (New Delhi, 1975), pp. 131-78. This is a collection of papers submitted at the India-Indonesia Seminar held at New Delhi from April 23 to 25, 1975 under the joint auspices of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (Ministry of Defence of the Government of India) and Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Djakarta.

2 See *Times of India* (Bombay), June 29, 1969.

and social progress in the countries of Asia.”³ The foundations of friendship laid during Indira Gandhi’s visit were reinforced by India’s offer of a tied loan of \$6.7 million (around Rs. 5 crore) to Indonesia for the purchase of capital goods from that country. This was indicative of India’s wish to contribute, however modestly, to the implementation of Indonesia’s first Five-Year Development Plan.⁴

As the process of consolidation of bilateral relations was on, three issues showed divergence of approach and created minor irritations. These related to India’s stand on the Conference on Cambodia as sponsored and organized by Indonesia in May 1970, Indonesia’s attitude towards the developments in the Indian sub-continent, and its reservations about the Indo-Soviet Treaty.

Conference on Cambodia

In April 1970 Marshal Lon Nol overthrew Prince Norodom Sihanouk-led neutralist government in Cambodia. Soon after the South Vietnamese armies and the American forces launched massive attacks on the Cambodian territory with the objective of destroying the Vietcong sanctuaries and cutting off of its supply lines along the Ho Chi Minh trail. Thus, for the first time, the war in Vietnam was extended to Cambodia in a direct fashion. This clearly exposed the connivance of the United States with the developments in Cambodia. On the other hand, Sihanouk established a government-in-exile in Peking with the clear objective of over-throwing the pro-U.S. government led by Marshal Lon Nol. It is in these circumstances that President Soeharto’s Government initiated the move for organizing a conference on Cambodia in order to explore the possibilities of bringing about peace in that country.

Among other countries, Indonesia approached India and sought its concurrence to the convening of such a conference. The Indonesian Government hoped that India would be willing to participate in it. But India’s assessment both as to the timing and composition of the proposed conference differed with that of Indonesia. India believed that a conference of this type at this juncture “would

3. Fort ext of the Joint Communique, see Government of India, *Foreign Affairs Record* (New Delhi, Ministry of External Affairs), vol 15, no. 7, August 1969, pp. 139-40, See also *Times of India* (Bombay), July 3, 1969.

4 “Selling Engineering goods in Indonesia”, *The Journal of Industry and Trade* (New Delhi, Ministry of Commerce and Trade of the Government of India), p. 964.

not help ease tension and would only divide the Asian countries and militate against our efforts to maintain contacts with all parties and our position as chairman of the International Commission for Supervision and Control.”⁵ India thought an answer to the crisis in Indochina lay in an early convening of a new Geneva-type conference. In case it was not feasible, India favoured a conference of “uncommitted” Asian nations to discuss the situation in Cambodia in order to find a solution to the impasse there.⁶ While India did not formally reject the Indonesian proposal, it implied India politely declining the Indonesian invitation. Indonesia, however, went ahead with its plans. The 11-nation conference on Cambodia met in Djakarta in May 1970. The Indonesian Government regretted India’s unwillingness to participate in it. In his concluding speech at the conference the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Adam Malik, indirectly criticized India’s approach. He referred to “some friends” having “doubts as to the usefulness” of the conference and said; “Indonesia regrets that their willingness to participate in the Conference was made dependent upon that of socialist countries also.”⁷

For various reasons, India had declined the invitation to participate in the conference. In the circumstances in which it was being held, India believed that it would only serve to legitimize the gains of American intervention. Moreover, most of the countries participating in the conference were allies of the United States. The External Affairs Minister, Swaran Singh, later considered it as “heavily weighted in one direction.”⁸ Some of them, such as Thailand and South Vietnam, in fact, maintained their forces in Cambodian territory. Besides, China and North Vietnam had already denounced the proposed conference. Nothing useful could be expected from a conference the composition of which ensured preponderance of the U.S. allies. Hence India’s disinclination to attend it. Subsequent events proved the Indian assessment to be correct. But, at that stage, Indonesia felt disappointed, particularly because this was the first major regional initiative taken by the new leadership in Indonesia since it took over in 1966. It was quite natural that India’s attitude would be misunderstood by the Indonesian leaders.

5 Government of India, *Ministry of External Affairs Report for 1970-71* (New Delhi), p. 21.

6 *The Statesman* (New Delhi), May 2, 1970.

7 *Asian Recorder* (New Delhi), 1970, p. 9613.

8 Swaran Singh made this observation in a statement in reply to Rajya Sabha Debate on Foreign Affairs in New Delhi on August 26, 1970. For text of Swaran Singh’s statement, see Government of India, *Foreign Affairs Record* (New Delhi, Ministry of External Affairs), vol. 16, no. 8, August 1970, p. 153.

Based on their own assessment of the situation in Indochina, the two countries continued to show divergence of approach to the issue of Cambodia. Indonesia manifested its opposition when the issue of admission of the Royal Government of National Union of Kampuchea (RGNUK—the Cambodian Government-in-exile headed by Prince Norodom Sihanouk) and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam (PRG-RSV) arose at the third Conference of Non-aligned countries at Lusaka in early September 1970. Joined by Malaysia, Singapore and Laos, it again strongly opposed the move when, at their meeting in George Town (Guyana) in February 1973, the Foreign Ministers of non-aligned countries made their first recommendation in favour of admission of the RGNUK and the PRG-RSV. Indonesia, Malaysia and Laos even went to the extent of walking out in protest against this recommendation. Indonesia once again protested when the preparatory meeting of the non-aligned countries in Kabul (Afghanistan) in June 1973 recognized the status of the RGNUK headed by Sihanouk. The admission of these two governments to the non-aligned movement became a highly controversial issue. Indonesia and other South-East Asian non-aligned states such as Malaysia, Singapore and Laos, opposed their admission because, according to them, these were not legally constituted governments. Moreover, the governments of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Laos continued to maintain close political relations with the American-backed governments of Cambodia and South-Vietnam headed respectively by Marshal Lon Nol and General Nguyen Von Thieu.

Indonesia thus continued to oppose the representation of Cambodia and South Vietnam at the non-aligned meetings by the RGNUK and the PRG-RSV. At the fourth Conference of Non-aligned countries in Algiers in September 1973, Indonesia, joined by Malaysia and Singapore, the other two non-aligned members of the ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations), refused to accept that part of the Declaration of the Conference which called upon the non-aligned countries to recognize the RGNUK and the PRG-RSV. These countries protested against the decision to seat these two governments at the Non-aligned Conference and entered their reservations to this effect.⁹

The Government of India, however, assessed the situation in Indochina differently. While reserving its comments, it had gone

⁹ "Expanding Third World" (editorial), *The Hindu*, September 11, 1973. See also *Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), September 9, 1973.

along with the overwhelming majority opinion at the non-aligned preparatory meetings at George Town and Kabul in favour of the admission of the RGNUK and the PRG-RSV. This was in spite of the fact that it continued to have diplomatic relations with the Cambodian government based in Phnom Penh and Consular relations with the South Vietnamese government based in Saigon. At the Summit Conference at Algiers, India once again reserved its comments ; but unlike Indonesia, it entertained no reservations to the Declaration of the Conference. It clearly showed a divergence of approach on the part of India and Indonesia to the developments in Indochina. It seemed the Government of India assessed that the tide of events in Cambodia and Vietnam were clearly in favour of the RGNUK and the PRG-RSV and that the American—backed governments of Cambodia and South-Vietnam had no longer any possibility of survival.¹⁰

Bangladesh Question

The two countries registered a difference of approach to the developments in the Indian sub-continent in 1971. Instead of seeking a reasonable political solution of the problems in the eastern wing of the country (East Pakistan), the Pakistani military leaders resorted to a policy of brutal repression there. This led to an exodus of about nine million refugees into the contiguous Indian states. Overburdened by it and highly disappointed with the intransigent attitude of the Pakistani leaders, India decided to support the liberation struggle in East Pakistan. This eventually led to the separation of East Bengal from Pakistan and the emergence of a new sovereign political entity, Bangladesh, in the sub-continent in December 1971.

Indonesia saw the developments in the sub-continent in a different way. Despite approaches at the highest level, the Indonesian leaders did not feel convinced of the correctness of India's position in the matter. The reasons for the Indonesians' reservations on the issue were obvious. They viewed it as the case of a foreign intervention promoting the cause of a dissident movement leading to bifurcation of an existing political unit. They were apprehensive India's action would establish a precedent with dangerous possibilities for their own as well as other countries in South-East Asia beset with similar problems. Explaining worries caused to Indonesia and other states in the region by India's "active part" in the developments in the sub-continent, an Indonesian intellectual

10 *Hindustan Times*, September 9, 1973.

Dr. Sutomo Roesnadi, observes: "The events in the sub-continent create undesirable precedents, and cause uneasiness among India's neighbours."¹¹

In fact the Indonesian apprehensions were quite misplaced because the situation in the sub-continent was quite different. Any way Indonesia refused to pronounce on the crisis created by president Yahya Khan's policy of brutal military repression in East Pakistan. It also observed silence on the urges and aspirations of the liberation movement there, considering it nothing more than a domestic affair of Pakistan, a technically correct stand. The Indonesian leaders were, however, "concerned" with the problems of millions of East Bengal (East Pakistan) refugees being pushed into India. In the course of talks with the Indonesian leaders during his visit to Indonesia in August 1971, the Indian External Affairs Minister, Swaran Singh, explained the economic and political problems faced by India by the exodus from East Bengal. The Indonesian leaders seemed to be inclined to agree with the Indian assessment of the situation. In the Joint Communique issued on August 14, 1971, Swaran Singh and Indonesian Foreign Affairs Minister, Adam Malik, expressed the "urgent need" for the creation of such conditions as would be "conducive for the return of East Bengal refugees to their homes."¹² This implied Indonesian agreement with the Indian view that the responsibility for the present unstable situation in the sub-continent lay with the Pakistani leaders themselves.

On the emergence of Bangladesh as an independent political entity in December 1971, Indonesia did not take long to recognize the realities in the Indian sub-continent. It stopped considering the issue of Bangladesh as an internal affair of Pakistan and accorded recognition to Bangladesh on February 25, 1972.

Indo-Soviet Treaty

Still another issue that prompted Indonesia to entertain certain reservations about India's attitude was the Indo-Soviet Treaty signed in August 1971. It created a strong impression in Indonesia that India had abandoned non-alignment and become a client state of the Soviet Union.¹³ The Indonesian leaders were apprehensive of

11 O. Sutomo Roesnadi, "Indian-Indonesian Relations--Past, Present and Future", in K. Subramaniam ed., n. 1, pp. 179-86. Sutomo Roesnadi is a Ph. D. from the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University.

12 *The Hindu* (Madras), August 15, 1971. See also *Indian Express* (New Delhi), August 15 and 16, 1971.

the growing Soviet penetration and the increasing super-power rivalry in the Indian Ocean area as well as in South-East Asia. Pursuing anti-Communist policies at home since the overthrow of President Sukarno following the coup in 1965, the Indonesian ruling elite, both military and civilian, have always looked upon the Soviet Union as a source of support to the Indonesian Communist Party. But India had its own reasons for entering into a treaty with the Soviet Union. This was designed to offset the consequences of a possible Sino-American collusion in favour of the repressive Pakistani military regime. During his visit to Indonesia, a visit which was overshadowed by the Indo-Soviet Treaty, Swaran Singh sought to dispel the Indonesians' misgivings about it. In the course of his talks in Djakarta, he explained India's position in the matter and, to an extent, succeeded in convincing the Indonesian leaders that India's non-aligned and independent policy had remained unaffected by the Indo-Soviet Treaty.¹⁴ Nevertheless, divergence in the Indian and Indonesian perceptions of the growing Soviet influence and role in the Indian Ocean littoral as well as in South-East Asia remain. There are fears in some Indonesian circles that "ever-increasing ties" between India and the Soviet Union "might have an impact on future relations between India and Indonesia."¹⁵

Search For a New Equation

Notwithstanding the difference of approach shown by the two countries to various issues of regional and global importance, the decade of the nineteen-seventies is characterized by a serious search on their part for newer avenues and fields of bilateral co-operation. Side by side with the annual foreign minister-level consultations that provided opportunities for exchange of views and co-ordination of approaches to various regional and international issues, there was a conscious effort on the part of the two countries to establish new bridges of friendship and new forms of interaction. The reasons were quite obvious. As far as trade and economic relations were concerned, the hopes generated by the developments since General

13 For an assessment of the Indonesian views, see V.T. Sambandan, "Renewal of Friendship with Indonesia", *The Hindu*, June 26, 1975.

14 "Talks bring India, Indonesia closer" (a dispatch from Djakarta), *Indian Express*, August 16, 1971.

15 O. Sutomo Roesnadi, n. 11. See also Dilip Mukerjee, "New Delhi and Jakarta : Search for an understanding", *Times of India* (New Delhi), August 9, 1975.

Soeharto took over as Acting President in March 1967, had not materialized. The Trade Agreement of December 1966 remained operative till October 1970¹⁶, and for a number of years there was no trade agreement between the two countries. Till 1975, India's share in Indonesia's total exports did not rise above .03 per cent (1968-69 and 1969-70) and in case of imports it reached the level of one per cent only in 1967-1968 (1.2 per cent) and 1968-1969 (1%). Similarly, Indonesia's share in Indian exports and imports never reached the level of one per cent. This was despite the fact that there was substantial increase in Indian exports to Indonesia.¹⁷ As a side effect, the disturbing trend of decline in Indian imports from that country continued to be unrectified. Perhaps this was a direct result of India having stopped imports of sulphur-free Indonesian crude since the middle of nineteen-sixties, because of its heavy costs¹⁸, and the inability of the two countries to identify specific export commodities needed by each other. Whatever Indian justifications, it failed to measure up to the Indonesian expectations. It could not provide a stable long-term market for a major Indonesian export commodity. The Indonesians gained the impression that India was too pre-occupied with its own problems and was far more interested in West Asia and Africa than in South-East Asia. It needed practical co-operation involving some sacrifices rather than emotional rhetoric to build enduring links of friendship with a neighbour like Indonesia.

India's trade with Indonesia had always tended to be linked with credits. India had been offering credits to Indonesia in order to boost its trade. But by 1970-1971, the Indian credit line was reported to have dropped to as low as a little over Rs. 1 million.¹⁹ As a

16 On March 28, 1969, the two-year Trade Agreement of December 1966 was extended upto October 25, 1970.

17 Indian exports to Indonesia rose from a modest Rs. 10.7 crores in 1966-1967 to Rs. 58.6 crores in 1967-1968; these, however, declined to an annual average of Rs. 41.6 crores during 1973-1974 and 1974-75. Indonesian exports to India during these years never rose above Rs. 2.9 crores (1972-73). Indonesia's adverse balance of trade with India rose from Rs. 9.9 crores in 1966-1967 to Rs. 57.5 crores in 1967-1968. However, it declined to an annual average of Rs. 39.8 crores during 1973-1974 and 1974-1975. For these figures, see table on India's trade with Indonesia in "Indonesia : Bright Prospects ahead" *Commerce* (Bombay), vol. 127, no. 3270, Annual Number 1973, p. 97.

18 Until 1964-1965, the Caltex refinery at Visakhapatnam was importing Minas crude produced from Sumatra Oil fields. See Dilip Mukerjee, no. 15.

19 India granted a credit of Rs. 20 million in 1966-67, Rs. 75 million in 1967-68 and Rs. 29.5 million in 1968-69. See "Indonesia : Bright prospects ahead", n. 17, p. 99. (one crore=ten million).

result, Indonesian imports from India had been on the decline. This needed to be checked and specific areas of co-operation identified in order to promote and expand bilateral trade relations.

The two countries' eagerness to do so became evident in the Joint Communique issued in Djakarta on August 8, 1974. The two Foreign Ministers, Swaran Singh and Adam Malik, inter alia, "exchanged views and proposals for the further strengthening and development of relations". They also "emphasized the importance of further intensifying and expanding co-operation."²⁰ The two Foreign Ministers also signed an agreement demarcating the continental shelf boundary between India and Indonesia. Keeping in view some Indonesians' territorial ambitions for the Andaman and Nicobar Islands of India, as revealed during the Indo-Pakistani conflict of September 1965,²¹ the agreement was quite significant. As the agreement was designed to take care of the possible future frictions on the sea-bed resources in their respective seas, it was hailed in India as signalling "a new phase" and "an important landmark" in the two countries' relations.²²

There were several reasons which prompted the two countries to give a forward thrust to their bilateral relations at this stage. The anti-Japanese riots during Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka's visit to Indonesia in January 1974 (called 'Malari-Mesalah lima-belas January Affair') brought home to the Indonesian leaders the urgency of reducing their country's increasing dependence on Japan.²³ This could be done by diversifying its sources of capital aid and trade. At this stage itself, India, a non-aligned and a developing third-world country, was emerging as one making strides in the fields of scientific, technological and industrial development. The tremendous progress made in the development and growth of industrial and technological capabilities and skills in various fields through its five-year plans enabled India to offer its participation in the economic development programmes of Indonesia and other developing

20 *News from Indonesia* (New Delhi, Indonesian Embassy), no. 31/430/74, August 9, 1974, pp. 1-4.

21 See Chapter on Pakistan's Role, pp. 272-73.

22 See editorial in *the Statesman*, August 12, 1974. See also *Indian Express*, August 15, 1974. The agreement was also described as "a re-assertion of the forces of geo-politics". See *Hindustan Standard* (Calcutta), August 12, 1974.

23 With US \$ 180 million aid to Indonesia in 1973-74, Japan had surpassed the United States as a donor country in the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia. The United States' aid this year amounted to \$ 150 million. See "Indonesia : Bright Prospects ahead", n. 17, p.99.

countries. Besides, in the light of the fast deteriorating situation in Indochina, suggesting a possible fall of the pro-American Governments in Phnom Penh and Saigon, Indonesia was reassessing its role in South-East Asia. Some top military Advisers of President Soeharto, such as Generals Omar Dhani and Ali Murtopo and Deputy Chief of Armed Forces, General Surono, visited India as part of the Indonesian group to participate in the India-Indonesia Seminar in New Delhi in April 1975.²⁴ In the background of the fall of the Lon Nol Government in Phnom Penh on April 17, 1975, a free and frank exchange of views on regional and global issues as well as on bilateral relations between the Indonesian military generals and scholars and some Indian scholars at the Seminar was quite significant. No contradiction was found in the explanations of India's approach to the policy of self-reliance and Indonesian strategy of national resilience, since both these ideas had evolved from the philosophy of non-alignment. Also there was a "consensus on the desirability of having the Indian Ocean as a Zone of peace and the ASEAN region as a region of peace, freedom and neutrality."²⁵ In fact, this was a reiteration of the two country's well-known positions on these issues. There were, however, differences of opinion on certain issues such as the Indo-Soviet Treaty of August 1971, the emergence of Bangladesh as separate political entity in the Indian sub-continent in December 1971 and India's nuclear capability as manifested in India's peaceful nuclear explosion at Pokharan (Rajasthan) in May 1974. These differences arose from the two countries' different perceptions of the developments in the South and South-East Asian regions as well as in the Indian Ocean littoral.²⁶

These differences notwithstanding, the two sides recognized the necessity and usefulness of frequent exchange of views between the leaders and scholars of the two countries. The Indonesian military generals used this opportunity to know at first hand India's growing scientific and technological capabilities in the field of industrial development. Their assessment led to intensification of the Indian Indonesian interaction.

24 The India-Indonesia Seminar took place in New Delhi from April 23, to 25, 1975, under the auspices of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, and Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Djakarta. The papers contributed to the Seminar were later published in the form of a book. See K. Subramaniam, ed., *Self-Reliance and National Resilience* (New Delhi, 1975). 192 pp.

25 Ibid., p. ix.

26 See O. Sutomo Roesnadi, n. 11. See also Dilip Mukerjee, n. 15.

President Fakhruddin Ali Ahmad's Visit to Indonesia

An important opportunity to exchange views on the various facets of India's collaboration in the Indonesian development effort as also on various regional and international issues was provided by President Fakhruddin Ali Ahmad's five-day visit to Indonesia from May 26 to 30, 1975. While speaking at a banquet hosted in his honour by President Soeharto, the President of India, *inter alia*, referred to the necessity of mutual co-operation among the developing countries and to the growth of bilateral ties and said that Indonesia's reserves of natural resources were "happily abundant", while India had made its own efforts to develop technology in directions relevant to the requirements of developing countries. The scope for interaction between our two countries, he observed, "is accordingly vast and I am confident that the efforts we have jointly been making to identify specific areas for economic co-operation will yield positive and mutually beneficial results in the immediate future."²⁷ This visit also provided the Indian president with an occasion to discuss with the Indonesian leaders the developments in Indochina following the fall of Marshal Lon Nol-led government in Phnom Penh and General Thieu-led government in Saigon in April 1975. While talking to the visiting Indian journalists accompanying the Indian President, Foreign Minister Adam Malik noted the two countries' similarity of approach to the developments in Indochina and stated: "We both welcome the developments and henceforth there should be no more military bases in the region." He attributed this similarity of approach to the fact that the two countries "view these developments as continuation of the nationalist struggle for independence of the Indochinese people."²⁸ It was a significant remark. It meant the Indonesian leaders shared the Indian view that the developments in Indochina marked, if anything, the victory of nationalism in the area.

Foreign Minister Adam Malik's Visit to India

The discussions on bilateral relations were resumed during Foreign Minister Adam Malik's six-day visit to India from July 27

27 Government of India, *Foreign Affairs Record* (New Delhi, Ministry of External Affairs), vol, 21, no. 5, May 1975, p. 159. See also *Time of India* (New (Delhi), May 27, 1975.

28 See *Hindustan Times*, May 31, 1975, and *Times of India* (New Delhi), June 1, 1975.

to August 1, 1975. Close on the heels of the Indian President's visit to Indonesia in May 1975, it provided still another opportunity to the leaders of the two countries to exchange views on regional and international issues. The joint statement issued on the conclusion of Adam Malik's visit showed the two sides had identical approaches to all important issues.²⁹ While commenting editorially on the close identity of views on various issues and the mutually-shared desire for co-operation in various fields, an English daily from New Delhi asserted that India and Indonesia are re-discovering each other and forging close ties again."³⁰ The Indonesian leader also utilized this opportunity to pay a three-day visit to Kashmir. On his return to New Delhi, a journalist asked him about Indonesia's attitude towards the Indo-Pakistan dispute on Kashmir. Putting the matters straight, Adam Malik posed a counter question: "Is there a problem?" Replying himself, he declared that "for us there is no problem."³¹

The two Foreign Ministers also took up threads on trade and economic relations. They discussed the broad outlines of a report on trade agreement and, on the final day, exchanged a draft trade agreement and decided that it be discussed by the experts. The two sides also discussed the question of setting up joint ventures in Indonesia with Indian assistance in capital and technical know-how. Foreign Minister Adam Malik welcomed the Indian capital in setting up joint industrial projects in Indonesia and showed interest in obtaining buyers' credit facilities for importing certain equipment needed for these projects. Indonesia agreed to send a team of experts to see for itself the level of Indian technical capabilities and consultancy services before any decision on certain projects could be taken.³²

Forging New Links

It was certainly a welcome trend. The two sides had shown a degree of seriousness in coming to grips with the technicalities of bilateral co-operation and suggested newer forms of economic

29 For text of India—Indonesia Joint Statement, see Government of India, *Indian and Foreign Affairs Review* (New Delhi, Ministry of External Affairs), vol. 13, no. 20, August 1, 1976, p. 10.

30 *Indian Express*, August 4, 1975.

31 *The Statesman* (New Delhi), August 2, 1975.

32 *Times of India*, July 29 and 30, 1975 and *The Statesman* (New Delhi), July 30, 1975.

links. The tangible result of these talks was readiness of the two sides to finalize the terms of a new trade agreement in a bid to augment bilateral trade. India appeared inclined to provide credit up to Rs. 50 crores on usual terms (interest charge of about 9 per cent and repayment in 8 to 10 years, with a grace period of two years). India also agreed to extend to Indonesia buyers' credits on commercial terms for setting up industrial and other projects with Indian collaboration.³³ Finally the buyers' credit upto \$ 50 million was offered to Indonesia in July 1976 when the Indian Minister for Revenue and Banking, Pranab Kumar Mukherjee, visited that country. The Indian credit of \$ 50 million carried an interest rate of 8.5 per cent and was to be routed through the Industrial Development Bank of India. After two days of discussions with the Indonesian leaders, Pranab Kumar Mukherjee disclosed that there were four Indian-Indonesian joint ventures already in production and five more were in different stages of implementation. In addition, project reports on twenty more joint ventures were being discussed. India's contribution would be in the form of machinery and technical knowhow and cash credits would be provided only in exceptional case.³⁴

One visible result of this growing interaction was appreciable growth registered in the two countries' trade. The total trade turn over of Rs. 40.61 crore during 1969-70 grew to be Rs. 63 crore in 1976-77 and Rs. 75 crore in 1977-78. Another tangible result was in the field of setting up of Indian joint ventures in Indonesia. By the middle of 1978, there were eight Indian joint ventures in operation and ten others were reported to be in various stages of establishment. By 1978 also India came to have the highest overseas investment in Indonesia.³⁵ There was still another encouraging development in the two countries' relations. On November 15, 1978, the Indian Bank signed a technical assistance agreement with an Indonesian Bank (Bank Ramayana) in Djakarta in order to assist in the expansion of its (latter's) operations, including development of small-scale industries and joint ventures in Indonesia. In Indonesia where no foreign equity participation by foreign banks is permitted, it was a significant agreement enabling the Indian Bank to have a link up there.³⁶

33 Inderjit, 'New Delhi and Djakarta move closer', *Economic Times* (New Delhi), August 5, 1975.

34 *The Hindu*, July 31, 1976.

35 Ibid.

36 *Patriot* (New Delhi), November 16, 1978.

These and other gains of mutual co-operation were reviewed in depth during the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Kusumaatmadja's visit to India in the middle of November 1978. The two Foreign Ministers, Kusumaatmadja and A.B. Vajpayee, felt that co-operation between the two countries had deepened and broadened in various directions, in particular, in the field of agriculture, science and technology.³⁷ In the Joint Communiqué issued at the end of the talks, it was said that the two countries were also negotiating for an agreement on co-operation in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy. The Joint Communiqué noted that these negotiations had contributed to deeper understanding and better appreciation of each other's interests.³⁸

Thus, as the year 1978 wore thin, the two countries were well set on the road to intensifying and expanding their bilateral co-operation in the fields of trade, economy, industry, science and technology. It definitely augured well for the two countries' relations in the future, as new enduring bridges of friendship were in the process of being built. Some encouraging developments in the two countries' relations took place in 1979. On March 2, 1979, an exclusively Indian engineering exhibition under the aegis of Indian Export Promotion Council was inaugurated in Djakarta by Vice-President Adam Malik. With nearly 160 Indian firms, both in the public and private sector, participating in it, the exhibition aimed at projecting Indian expertise, capabilities and achievements in the engineering industry through display of capital machinery and equipment as well as fabricated engineering products with technology suitable for adoption in Indonesia and other ASEAN countries.³⁹ The next day, the two countries signed an agreement on co-operation in the fields of technology and natural resources, especially in the mining sector. According to this agreement, signed in Djakarta during the Indian Steel and Mines Minister, Biju Patnaik's visit, India agreed to help Indonesia

37 *Hindustan Times*, November 17, 1978. Dr. Moechtar Kusumaatmadja had become Foreign Minister of Indonesia ad interim in October 1977. A.B. Vajpayee became India's Minister for External Affairs in the Janata Party Government headed by Prime Minister Morarji R. Bhai Desai, when the Indian National Congress led by Mrs. Indira Gandhi was defeated in the elections in March 1977.

38 *Economic Times* (New Delhi) and *Times of India* (New Delhi), November 17, 1978.

39 *Hindustan Times*, March 3, 1979.

conduct natural gas prospecting for the purpose of supporting steel and other mining industries.

The interaction between the two countries continued at a satisfactory pace and their efforts finally consummated in the signing of a trade agreement in Djakarta on June 3, 1979. The agreement as such provided for most-favoured-nation treatment to each other in the matter of customs, trade, foreign exchange regulations and shipping. Signed during the Indian Minister of Commerce, Mohan Dharia's visit to Indonesia, the agreement also provided for consultations at the request of either of the two parties in respect of any matter relating to bilateral trade.⁴⁰ This was followed up by the Indonesian Minister for Industries, A.R. Suhud's visit to India in September 1979. There were inter-ministerial discussions on the scope for promoting long-term bilateral economic co-operation. Taking up threads from the agreement signed during the Indian Minister for Steel and Mines, Biju Patnaik's visit to Indonesia in March 1979, the two sides discussed the possibility of Indian co-operation in the establishment of small-scale industries in Indonesia. The discussions also focussed on the possibility of Indonesia's supplying cement, paper, edible oil and petroleum crude to India. The Indian Minister was reported as having asked his Indonesian counterpart for the supply of three million tonnes of Indonesian crude to India per year.⁴¹

Indian-Indonesian Joint Industrial Projects

Based on mutual understanding and realization of each other's needs and capabilities, the process of Indian-Indonesian interaction in the fields of trade, commerce and industry got a further spurt in the first half of 1980. During his visit to Indonesia on May 8-9, 1980, the Indian Minister of State for Industries, Charanjit Chanana, held talks with the Indonesian leaders on the modalities of establishing joint industrial ventures in Indonesia. He offered Indian technical knowhow and assistance for a number of projects on cement, paper, sugar and aluminium. Among those agreed to were the expansion of an already existing cement factory (raising its production capacity to 2,000 tonnes per day), and the establishment and expansion of an aluminium smelter plant and a paper and pulp factory on turnkey basis. Besides, India would help

40 *Times of India* (New Delhi), June 5, 1978.

41 *Ibid.*, September 25, 1979.

Indonesia in establishing a sound heavy electrical industry apart from setting up power stations for it. The Hindustan Machine Tools submitted a proposal for the establishment of a training centre in order to set up a mini-industrial estate in the field of metal work for simple machine tools. The National Small Industries Corporation (NSIC) submitted a preliminary report identifying 78 small-scale industries. The Indonesian experts were expected to visit New Delhi by September 1980 for finalizing the plans. India would also supply a sugar plant and had offered to supply mini-sugar plants to Indonesia.⁴²

In the Joint statement issued on May 9, 1980, India was reported to have accepted specific time schedule for the completion of various joint projects covering cement industry as well as numerous small scale industries in Indonesia. The two countries also agreed to co-operate in the fields of agriculture and power generation.⁴³ Another achievement of Charanjit Chanana's visit to Indonesia was the signing of a memorandum of understanding on May 9, 1980. India proposed to supply 4.5 lakh (1 million = 10 lakhs) tons of iron ore pellets annually to Indonesia for a period of three years. The supplies were expected to begin by October 1980 itself. Pending completion of pelletization facilities at Mangalore as part of the Kudremukh project, the supply of pellets would be arranged by a joint sector undertaking, Pale Plant, in Goa.⁴⁴ India would import 500 tonnes of sponge iron from the Krakatao Steel Plant in Indonesia to use as a substitute for scrap which is in short supply. According to Press reports, if this experiment succeeded, Indian imports of sponge iron from Indonesia would grow.⁴⁵

An important feature of Charanjit Chanana's visit was President Soeharto's acceptance of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's invitation to visit India sometime in November 1980.⁴⁶ Significantly, it

42. All these and other pieces of information were disclosed at a Press conference by Charanjit Chanana on his return to New Delhi. See *Economic Times* (New Delhi), May 14, 1980.

43. *Times of India*, May 11, 1980.

44. *Economic Times*, May 18, 1980. See also *The Hindu*, May 18, 1980. The agreement about the supply of iron ore pellets from Kudremukh had been concluded in February 1979.

45. *Ibid.*

46. Charanjit Chanana had carried a personal message from the Indian Prime Minister to the Indonesian President. While back in New Delhi, he hinted at the possibility of President Soeharto's visit in November 1980. See *Indian Express*, May 14, 1980.

was for the first time that a probable time schedule for the Indonesian President's visit to India was fixed and was very much expected that it would be adhered to.⁴⁷

In the light of the above, it would be correct to say that the scope and nature of Indian-Indonesian interaction was being broadened and deepened. In their eagerness to reduce their dependence on Japan and the multi-national corporations, the Indonesian leaders were realizing the potentialities of intensifying bilateral co-operation with India. Their awareness of the capabilities of India in the fields of industrial, scientific and technological development had been growing since the mid-nineteen seventies. India had reached a stage of lower and medium level technological development which was most suited to the labour-intensive planned economic development programmes of Indonesia and other developing Asian and African countries.

Misunderstandings on India's Attitude Towards Kampuchea

As the two countries were finding newer avenues of bilateral co-operation beneficial to them, a problem arose to have slightly adverse impact on their developing relations. This related to the Government of India's announcement on July 7, 1980 to recognize the new government in Phnom Penh led by Heng Samrin.⁴⁸ Although the two countries' perceptions of the developments in Indochina and of the Vietnamese role in the region since the early and mid-nineteen seventies had been by and large similar, their approach to the developments in Kampuchea had registered a degree of divergence. Since Indira Gandhi became Prime Minister of India in January 1980, the Government of India had been sounding Indonesia and other members of the ASEAN group about its position on the issue. Even in its election manifesto, the Indian National Congress led by Indira Gandhi had declared its intention to accord recognition to the new government of Kampuchea. Nevertheless, certain factors had been delaying India's action in the matter. These included India's anxieties about the adverse repercussions its recognition of Heng Samrin-led government might have on the developing equation

47. As expected, President Soeharto paid a four-day visit to India from December 1 to 4, 1980.

48 India's decision to accord recognition to the Heng Samrin-led government of Kampuchea was announced in the Lok Sabha, the Lower House of Indian Parliament, by Dr. P.V. Narasimha Rao, the new Minister for External Affairs in Indira Gandhi's cabinet. See *Hindustan Times* and *Times of India* of July 8, 1980.

with Indonesia and other members of the ASEAN group, its assessment of the extent of viability and stability of the Heng Samrin-led government in Phnom Penh and the Soviet armed action in Afghanistan.⁴⁹ India's anxieties about the ASEAN reactions should be seen in the light of its assiduous efforts to prepare the ground for a dialogue with these countries in the fields of industry, science and technology initiated since long and reinforced since the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Dr. Kusumaatmadja's visit to India in November 1978. India's concern flowed from the fact that the entire ASEAN group including Indonesia condemned the Vietnamese armed action against Pol Pot-led government in Kampuchea and the Soviet armed intervention in Afghanistan, called for withdrawal of the Vietnamese and Soviet troops from these two countries respectively, and tended to view these developments from the angle of Sino-Soviet rivalry in the region.

It was India's concern about the possibly adverse ASEAN reactions which over-shadowed the two-day Indian-ASEAN dialogue in Kuala Lumpur on May 15 and 16, 1980. Apart from discussing the modalities of Indian-ASEAN co-operation in various fields, the Indian delegation led by Eric Gonsalves, Secretary (East), Ministry of External Affairs, possibly sought to convince his ASEAN counterparts about the genuineness and usefulness of India's intention to accord recognition to the Heng Samrin-led government in Kampuchea. The ASEAN, however, wanted India to "delay" this act at least until the United Nations General Assembly session in October 1980.⁵⁰ Keeping in view the situation inside Kampuchea, where Pol Pot-led Khmer Rouge guerrillas still threatened peace and stability, Eric Gonsalves disagreed with the senior ASEAN officials on the issue of withdrawal of the Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea. He had already hinted at India's approach to the issues relating to Indochina at a Press conference in Singapore on May 11, 1980. Referring to a comparatively complicated situation in Kampuchea, he had observed that India and ASEAN had the common objective of not getting involved in Great Power rivalries, alliances and confrontations. Nevertheless, the ASEAN group differed slightly with India on how to achieve a settlement in that country.⁵¹ Clarifying India's position, he had observed: "I don't think ostracizing

49 See *Indian Express* (New Delhi), May 3, 1980.

50 Ibid., June 27, 1980. See also excerpts from a letter addressed to the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi by Carlos Romulo, Chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee, in Ibid., July 17, 1980.

51 *Tin.es of India* (New Delhi), May 12, 1980.

Vietnam or isolating Kampuchea is the answer to the problem.” He had stressed that this would still further increase Vietnamese dependence on the Soviet Union.⁵² After two-day talks with the senior ASEAN officials in Kuala Lumpur, Eric Gonsalves stated on May 17, 1980 that there would be “anarchy” in Kampuchea if Vietnamese troops withdrew right now. India, like ASEAN, was against the presence of foreign troops, but “there are certain realities about the Kampuchean situation from which one cannot shy away”, he asserted. He assured the ASEAN that its views would be considered while India recognized the Heng Samrin-led government and said: “We do not consider ASEAN’s views on this matter as an interference in our internal affairs.” Appreciating ASEAN’s interest in the Indian move, he asserted that India’s opinion on the destiny of Kampuchea was not different from ASEAN’s long-term objectives even though they might adopt different lines of action in the future.⁵³

The divergence in approach to the problem of Kampuchea as adopted by India and the ASEAN group, including Indonesia, was still further emphasized when India’s Minister for External Affairs, P.V. Narasimha Rao, failed to join in the dialogue the Foreign Ministers of ASEAN were scheduled to have with their counterparts from Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Japan, the United States and India, in Kuala Lumpur from June 27 to 29, 1980. Although, according to an official spokesman in New Delhi, Narasimha Rao’s visit to Kuala Lumpur had been cancelled because of his mother’s illness,⁵⁴ the ASEAN did not take kindly to it. Indonesia and other partners in the group expressed disappointment over the inability of the Indian External Affairs Minister to take part in the dialogue with their Foreign Ministers. Some of the participants interpreted it as an indication of the impending Indian recognition of the Heng Samrin-led government.⁵⁵ Encouraged by the unanimous support of all the Foreign Ministers who participated in the dialogue, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers reportedly stated that even if India did recognize the Heng Samrin—led government in Phnom Penh, they and other like-minded countries could bring

52 *The Statesman*, May 12, 1980. See also *The Hindu*, May 12, 1980.

53 *Times of India* (New Delhi), May 18, 1980.

54 *Indian Express*, June 27, 1980.

55 *Ibid.*, June 28, 1980. All other Foreign Ministers who participated in the dialogue with their ASEAN counterparts endorsed the latter’s condemnation of Vietnam’s occupation of Kampuchea and its border forays along Thailand and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

enough votes to help the toppled Pol Pot-led government retain its seat at the United Nations General Assembly.⁵⁶ As to their general stand on the developments in Kampuchea, the joint statement issued by the Foreign Ministers of the ASEAN on this occasion called for the establishment of a neutral and independent government in that country based on the principle of self-determination and complete withdrawal of foreign forces from there.⁵⁷

Thus, when India announced its decision to recognize the Heng Samrin-led government in Phnom Penh on July 7, 1980, quite an adverse reaction in the ASEAN capitals was very much expected. In a letter addressed to the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, Chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee, Carlos Romulo, expressed the ASEAN's grave "disappointment" over India's move and said that it had "aggravated the situation in the region." The letter conveyed the ASEAN's "deep regret" that by its act the Government of India had ignored the representation made by the ASEAN countries to delay its decision. It noted that in spite of the traditionally close links between India and the ASEAN, India had become the first major non-Communist country to recognize the Heng Samrin government. The letter also asserted that India's move was tantamount to "condoning the Vietnamese aggression" against a non-aligned country.⁵⁸

Healthy Trends in Indian-Indonesian Relations

Surprisingly, however, the Indonesian reaction was not as critical of India's decision as the reaction of other members of the ASEAN group, such as Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines. For instance, while commenting on India's announcement to recognize the Heng Samrin regime, a senior official in Djakarta was content to say that "India should have postponed the recognition until a political solution has been reached on the Kampuchea problem. We regret India's move."⁵⁹ Obviously, Indonesia had just gone along with its ASEAN partners in criticizing India on the question of its according recognition to the Heng Samrin's government. The implications of India's move were better understood in Djakarta than in Singapore, Bangkok, Manila or even Kuala Lumpur. While giving his impressions of ASEAN's attitudes towards

56 Ibid., June 27, 1980.

57 *The Tribune* (Chandigarh), July 9, 1980.

58 *Indian Express*, July 17, 1980.

59 *The Tribune* (Chandigarh), July 9, 1980.

India's decision in this regard, Professor Vishal Singh noted that comparatively the degree of hostility towards India was minimal in Djakarta than in other ASEAN capitals.⁶⁰

It was a healthy trend in Indian-Indonesian relations. The two countries seemed to have abandoned emotionalism that characterized their relations during the fifties and sixties and reached a stage of maturity that prompted pragmatism based on their understanding of each other's needs, limitations and capabilities. Their divergence of approach to certain regional and international issues notwithstanding, the two countries refused to allow political differences between them to have an adverse impact on their otherwise fast developing interaction in the fields of trade, commerce, industry, science and technology. The nineteen-seventies thus seemed to be closing on a very encouraging note for future prospects in the Indian-Indonesian relations.

Problems and Prospects

As the two countries were in the process of intensifying and broadening their bilateral relations, they were finding a number of problems. Some of them were as follows : First, India's offers in the field of joint ventures had to fit in with the over-all priorities and programmes as envisaged in Indonesia's economic development plan on the one hand and with the joint ventures undertaken in Indonesia in collaboration with the developed West European countries, the United States, Japan and multinational corporations on the other. This needed a lot of effort to identify areas in which India's contribution could be more meaningful for mutual benefit. Secondly, in a joint venture the choice of a suitable partner is necessary. In view of the fact that Indonesia had just begun to develop a new entrepreneurial class, having business and managerial expertise and acumen, the difficulty of Indian businessmen in this field was quite obvious. It was known that out of a total of some 130 Japanese joint ventures in Indonesia, in 70 the partners were Chinese businessmen. But the Indonesian businessmen had wide and varied connections at various levels in the administration. Moreover, their services in getting licences and permits had to be "assigned a cash value."⁶¹ Thirdly, under restrictions on capital transfer

60 Professor Vishal Singh was giving his impressions of his recent visit to the ASEAN countries at a talk at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University on October 31, 1980. He is Professor of South-East Asian Studies Division of the School of International Studies.

61 See Dilip Mukherjee, *Indonesia Today* (New Delhi, 1974), p. 31.

imposed by the Government of India,⁶² the Indians willing to invest their capital in Indonesia's economic development were finding some difficulties. Their difficulties arose from the fact that the Indonesian partners were not coming out with their own share of equity and would like the Indian partner to put in their share as well to be adjusted against future profits. This, in some cases, impelled the Indian capital investor to search for capital either in the open market where the interest rates were highly exorbitant and inhibitive or in places like Singapore and Hongkong. This was causing serious impediments and discouragement to potential Indian investors. Fourthly, there was a gap in communications. The Indian capital investors were not fully aware of several difficulties involved in the process, nor were they knowledgeable about the situation in Indonesia. Perhaps one could say they didn't do their homework well before they entered the field.

Nevertheless, none of these and many other difficulties could be considered to be insurmountable, given proper thinking, guidance and knowledge and proper and reasonable inducements on the part of the two Governments. For instance, in the choice of an Indonesian partner in a joint venture, an Indian businessman in Indonesia could be prompted to come forward. The Indian businessmen in Indonesia have long experiences of market potentialities and business activities in that country. They (about 10,000 of them are concentrated in Java) might be resistant to a switch-over from their quick-profit trade and commercial vocations to industrial projects which have a hybernation period of at least two to three years. And yet perhaps it might be possible to enlist some of them in this mutually beneficial task. For this purpose, the services of the Organization of Indonesian and Indian businessmen based in Djakarta could be utilized.⁶³

If these and some other difficulties were taken care of, and there was no doubt this could be done, there was every likelihood that the Indian-Indonesian interaction would be highly consolidated and expanded. In view of the enormous potentialities of interaction in the trade, economic, scientific, technological and industrial field, the prospects seemed to be bright indeed. What needed to be constantly done was to go on reviewing the implementation of

62 In the matter of Indian joint ventures, the Government of India only allowed transfer of machinery and technical knowhow.

63 This Organization was set up in Djakarta on February 10, 1977 for the purpose of promoting bilateral economic relations. See *The Statesman* (New Delhi), February 13, 1977.

various bilateral projects, identifying various areas of co-operation, endeavouring to remove ignorance about each other's resource endowments and capabilities in various fields, and seeking ways to co-ordinate and co-relate India's enormous scientific, technological and industrial capabilities with Indonesia's economic development programme under the third Economic Development Plan (Repelita III) launched since April 1979. The building of new bonds of friendship in these fields would naturally reinforce the existing mutual understanding on regional and international issues and generate reservoir of mutual goodwill which was more or less everlasting. These bonds would prove to be sound shock-absorbers in case there were differences on political matters.

The prospects of the two countries' relations could be still brighter if the two Governments, given the political will which is definitely not lacking at present, devise ways and means to adopt and pursue a cultural policy which ensured, in a regular fashion, give and take through exchange of students, scholars and teachers between the two countries. This could be done by bringing about a new cultural agreement, since the cultural agreement of December 1955 has all along been in a moribund state and, in fact, was to last only for ten years. After all the two countries have centuries of cultural and commercial relations. It would be in the fitness of things to establish various channels of communication at the people-to-people level in order to reinforce mutual goodwill and understanding. This would, in course of time, still further brighten the prospects of Indian-Indonesian relations, thus proving a strong factor for peace and stability in the region.

Conclusions

The Indian-Indonesian relations since independence have followed a zig-zag course. During the first decade, the commonly shared ethos of the old and recent past prompted an essentially sentimental approach to bilateral relations. Following the signing of the Treaty of Friendship in March 1951, the two countries no doubt established mutually beneficial co-operation between the three services of their armed forces. They also established channels of communication and mutual consultations at various levels. The foreign policies pursued and approaches to various regional and international issues adopted by both were also basically similar. They however, failed to evolve an institutional mechanism for interaction in the fields of trade and commerce. Mere sentimental rhetoric could hardly be a meaningful substitute for building of ties in these fields. Similarly, in the field of cultural relations, the hopes generated by the Cultural Agreement of December 1955 failed to materialize. The two countries' failure in providing regular, long-term markets for each other's goods and to ensure regular flow of men and materials from one side to the other was bound to have an adverse impact on their bilateral relations. In fact, as the priorities diverged, political differences arose and misunderstandings on certain issues grew at the top level of leadership, bilateral relations were allowed to stagnate and even decline. This was the net result of sentimentalism that characterized the Indian-Indonesian relations during the nineteen-fifties.

Even the pattern of domestic politics, as it evolved in India and Indonesia following independence, did not prove to be conducive to good relations between them. During the nineteen-fifties, unlike in Indonesia, India achieved a measure of political stability which permitted its leaders to pursue policies of planned economic development. Although, with Goa remaining under the Portuguese and West Irian under the Dutch, the two countries faced similar tasks of completing their independence, whereas India concentrated its efforts to give economic content to political freedom, Indonesia

chose to give priority to removing Dutch colonialism from West Irian. Sukarno's emphasis on liberation of West Irian, which grew with the growing internal threats to his own position, led to radicalization of politics in Indonesia. Dutch intransigence on the West Irian issue had much to do with it. Political instability and mounting security threat enabled Sukarno to discredit democracy and assume full executive powers under the old 1945 Constitution. The Indonesian Communist Party, which since the general elections in 1955, was emerging as a strong power factor in Indonesian politics, fully supported Sukarno's policies. Thus in the process of evolution of "Guided Democracy", the forces and factors which emerged stronger, such as Sukarno himself, the PKI and the Indonesian Army, did not have any commitment to economic development under a democratic framework as understood in India. This was bound to have an unfavourable impact on Indian-Indonesian relations.

As the nineteen-sixties began, the reservoir of mutual goodwill generated during the last phase of Indonesia's struggle for independence had almost dissipated itself. The trends emerging from the background were certainly not encouraging for future prospects. In the absence of shock-absorbing ties in trade, commercial and cultural fields, the divergence in priorities became more marked, the world-view of the top leaders, Nehru and Sukarno, sharply differed, and personal rapport between them suffered a degree of erosion leading to a wide communication gap. The sentiment of mutual sympathy and support, which somehow kept the relations going in the first decade of independence, yielded ground to mutual antipathy, rivalry and hostility. Differences on political issues tended to have disproportionate impact on relations in general. These also permitted some internal and external forces and factors to join hands in driving a wedge between India and Indonesia. The degree of success achieved by these was reflected in Indonesia's pro-China tilt on the Sino-Indian border dispute in 1962-1963 and in the moral and material support it offered to Pakistan during the Indo-Pakistan conflict in September 1965.

In fact India viewed its relations with Indonesia helplessly and inexorably touching the lowest ebb during the Sukarno era. Although there is no question of minimizing the adverse role played by various forces and factors, the major blame for India's helplessness in the matter should go to India itself. It had failed to realize the importance of a sentimental neighbour like Indonesia demanding

friendship on its own terms. It had allowed a decade to pass without devising and implementing long-term commercial and cultural policies in order to consolidate people-to-people relationships with that country. The six-power Colombo Conference on the Sino-Indian border dispute in December 1962 and the Indo-Pakistan conflict in September 1965 showed the degree of India's isolation and Indonesia's alienation from it. A new alignment of forces in Asia as it emerged by this time demonstrated how Pakistan and Indonesia had joined hands with China in their commonly shared hostility towards India.

In the beginning of the decade itself, the two countries' foreign policies showed indications of divergence in approach if not in fundamentals. India was apprehensive that the radical anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist group among the Afro-Asian non-aligned states, including Indonesia, might contrive at the formation of a third bloc, something unacceptable to Nehru's line of thinking. It induced India, at the non-aligned preparatory meeting in Cairo in June 1961, to propose expansion of the area of non-alignment by including border-line cases into the non-aligned group of states. Indonesia, however, opposed the Indian thesis and identified itself with a majority of Afro-Asian opinion favouring restrictive approach in the matter. Sukarno's explanation of his concept of "NEFOS" versus "OLDEFOS" at the Belgrade Conference only confirmed India's fears in this regard. The objectives of India's non-alignment, namely, avoidance of confrontation, nuclear or otherwise, between two Big Powers and, thereby, promoting chances of world peace and international co-operation, so necessary for economic and industrial development of the newly-free Asian and African countries, seemed to be losing their relevance in Sukarno's view of the world.

Divergence in the two countries' foreign policies during the first half of this decade related to their different approaches to the issue of colonialism in general. Whereas India preferred and even counselled a peaceful, negotiated approach towards eliminating remnants of colonialism in Asia and Africa, Indonesia refused to believe in the efficacy of this approach, and instead suggested employment of all means including force to do so. Besides, if Nehru sought priority for preservation of world peace through big-power negotiations, Sukarno refused to give importance to big-power conflicts and emphasized on considering colonialism as the major single source of international tension. He also wanted to create a new international force, described by him as "NEFOS", in which

China would play a significant role. This could not be supported by India.

The Belgrade Conference in September 1961 provided the leaders of the two countries with the first ever opportunity to express their divergent views openly. Sukarno's emphasis on seeking priority for the problems of colonialism and imperialism in Asia and Africa conflicted directly with Nehru's view of treating everything including problems of colonialism as "secondary" to the urgency of maintaining world peace. India, no doubt, succeeded in its objectives of getting issued an appeal for peace to the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union and of avoiding the use of condemnatory language against the colonialist powers. India's success was despite the fact that the majority of participants in the Conference did not share its views on colonialism. It showed the extent to which Prime Minister Nehru, the leader of the Indian delegation to the Conference, was going out of step with the Asian-African opinion on colonialism.

The Indonesian leaders on their part were not fully satisfied with the results of the Belgrade Conference. Indonesia had failed in getting a specific reference of Conference support on the West Irian issue as well as on its demand for a second Asian-African conference. As it was more than what the Indonesian leaders could swallow, they tended to put the blame for their failure on India and its Prime Minister. They were, however, at least partially satisfied on another score. The Conference had showed up Indonesia and its leader, President Sukarno, as champion of Asian-African struggle against colonialism and imperialism.

India's attitude towards the West Irian issue and the Indonesian demand for the second Asian-African conference strengthened the divergence. India's continued emphasis on using peaceful means for elimination of Dutch colonialism from West Irian, even after it expelled the Portuguese from Goa with force, created an impression among the Indonesians that India was not enthusiastic about the liberation of West Irian from the Dutch. Evidently, when the West Irian dispute was resolved in August 1962, Indonesia ignored India's moral and diplomatic support to it on this issue and preferred to choose Pakistan for despatching a military contingent to West Irian during the administration of the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority.

As regards the second Asian-African conference, the fall-out from the "Sondhi Affair" in September 1962 and Indonesia's

almost pro-China attitude on the Sino-Indian border dispute, made India all the more hesitant towards it. Indonesia's growing intimacy with China and Pakistan, two hostile neighbours of India, created fears in India that these three might join and create embarrassing moments for it at such a gathering. During 1963, India joined the UAR and Ceylon in making concerted efforts to stage a second Belgrade-type conference. This was as a counter to the efforts of Indonesia, China and Pakistan to convene a second Asian-African conference. It was because India believed that this type of conference would automatically keep both China and Pakistan out and that it would make Indonesian demand for the second Bandung-type conference more or less superfluous. But Indian efforts in this direction created an impression in Indonesia that India was resistant to its role in South-East Asia as well as in Asia and Africa. Indian proposals about the composition, timing and venue of the conference, made at the preparatory meeting in Djakarta in April 1964, only strengthened this Indonesian impression.

About five months later, at the second Conference of Non-Aligned countries in Cairo in October 1964, Sukarno made a blistering attack on the policy of non-alignment and peaceful co-existence. For him non-alignment, which did not oppose "OLDEFOS", meaning thereby, colonialism, imperialism and neo-colonialism, was already aligned with these forces. He ruled out peaceful co-existence between the "NEFOS" and the "OLDEFOS". In the light of India's attitude of moral sympathy and support to Malaysia (a project which Indonesia considered to be neo-colonialist and imperialist), and its negative attitude towards the second Asian-African conference, it was natural for India to lose its image in Indonesia.

By the close of 1964 and the beginning of 1965, anti-Indian feeling in Indonesia rose to a high pitch. On account of India's continued insistence on seeking Soviet and Malaysian participation in the second Asian-African conference, the Indonesian Press portrayed Indian foreign policy as neo-colonialist and pro-imperialist. This was as a reaction to India's diplomatic assistance to Malaysia in getting a non-permanent seat in the Security Council. It was also meant to exert pressures on Lal Bahadur Shastri's Government in New Delhi to give up its insistence on Malaysia's representation at the Asian-African conference. By April 1965, even Sukarno discarded his earlier restraint and openly criticized India and its leadership for its pro-Malaysia policy. He even bracketed India with the "OLDEFOS". This led in June 1965 to repetition of anti-Indian demonstrations in Djakarta and elsewhere in Indonesia.

During the period of Guided Democracy in Indonesia, India's friendly attitude towards the Federation of Malaysia, its efforts to link the Malaysia issue with the prospects of the second Asian-African conference, and finally, to seek postponement of this conference itself, were interpreted in Indonesia as pro-colonialist and pro-imperialist. It was on this basis that the PKI and People's China worked for distorting India's image in Indonesia. On the other hand, it was on the basis of uncompromising attitude of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism, that Indonesia developed a policy of "axis" with China and a few other pro-China states in East and South-East Asia. This remained the corner-stone of Indonesian foreign policy as based on Sukarno's concept of "NEFOS" versus "OLDEFOS" and, as such, a major source of conflict between India and Indonesia until the coup in September 1965.

The nature of personal relationship between Nehru and Sukarno proved to be an important factor determining relations between India and Indonesia in the course of this study. The fund of mutual goodwill between them created during Indonesia's struggle for freedom against the Dutch showed signs of diminishing by the close of nineteen fifties. So much so that on the eve of the Belgrade Conference in September 1961, Sukarno even declined Nehru's invitation to visit New Delhi on way to Belgrade. The Belgrade Conference left a feeling of bitterness between them. Nehru's refusal to give priority to the issues of colonialism over and above the issue of world peace was interpreted in Indonesia as a personal affront to Sukarno. Marking as it did an end to personal rapport between the two leaders, it was bound to have serious repercussions on the two countries' relations.

In the following years, the two leaders tended to disregard each other's susceptibilities on the issues of vital interest to their countries. If Sukarno's Government took a neutral stance and tilted towards China on the Sino-Indian border dispute, Nehru's Government and later Shastri's Government took stands on the question of Malaysia and on the issue of the second Bandung-type conference quite opposed to that of Indonesia. Consequently, the Indonesian leader tended to see his Indian counterpart as a hindrance to the realization of Indonesia's regional as well as Afro-Asian objectives.

Although, keeping in view long-term prospects of Indian-Indonesian relations, Nehru made an effort to resume dialogue with

Sukarno,¹ it failed to produce any tangible results. The communication gap developing between the two leaders since the Belgrade Conference and strengthened by the "Sondhi Affair" during the Fourth Asian Games in Djakarta in September 1962 showed no signs of bridging.

Following Prime Minister Nehru's death in May 1964, when the Government led by Lal Bahadur Shastri did not indicate any change in its attitude towards the Malaysia question and the second Asian-African conference, the Indonesian leaders felt disappointed. Thus, when Sukarno and Shastri met at the second Conference of Non-Aligned countries in Cairo in October 1964, there was no personal rapport between them.

In course of time, indifference to each other's vital interests turned into mutual antipathy between the leaders of the two countries. So much so that at the Tenth Anniversary celebrations in Djakarta in April 1965, when India chose to be represented by a person even below the rank of its Minister for External Affairs, Sukarno ignored the presence of the Indian delegation by refusing to give audience to its leader. In the following days Sukarno started criticizing the Indian leaders directly. This led in June 1965 to strong anti-Indian demonstrations in Djakarta and elsewhere in Indonesia.

Malaysia issue, which came to have a serious impact on the Indian-Indonesian relations during the Sukarno era, represented a point of conflict between the two countries at the regional level. Particularly after the Brunei revolt in December 1962, Indonesia came out clearly against the proposed Federation of Malaysia. Viewing in the Malaysia scheme a danger to the Communist movement in the region as well as to the Chinese interests, the PKI both initiated and strengthened Indonesia's commitment to anti-Malaysia

1 Interview with Dinesh Singh, New Delhi, February 23, 1972. Dinesh Singh, Deputy Minister for External Affairs (later Minister for External Affairs) revealed to this author that he carried a personal letter of Prime Minister Nehru to President Sukarno in July 1963. When asked about the main purpose of his visit, Dinesh Singh disclosed that it was to facilitate resumption of dialogue between Nehru and Sukarno. He told Sukarno about the declining health of Nehru and extended on behalf of Nehru an invitation to the Indonesian leader to visit New Delhi. Although Sukarno accepted Nehru's invitation, he left the date to be fixed later. It was, in fact, another way of saying no to Nehru's invitation. In view of personal irritations piling up due to divergence of approach to various issues of vital importance to the two countries since the Belgrade Conference, it could hardly be expected that Sukarno would visit India at that stage.

policy. By the time Foreign Minister Subandrio announced a policy of 'confrontation' against Malaysia in January 1963 (about eight months before it came into being), all the forces and factors, including the PKI, the President and the Army leadership, for their own reasons, arrived at a consensus about opposition to the proposed scheme of Malaysia.

An important implication of Indonesia's policy of confrontation was its aspiration for a power role in South-East Asia. In the process of evolution of Malaysia, however, the Indonesian Government and the PKI showed difference of approach to the issue. Whereas Sukarno, the Army leadership and all other non-Communist groups opted for "Maphilindo" (a concept of a loose confederation of three states, Malaya, the Philippines and Indonesia), a scheme based on racial feelings of Malay unity and providing a framework in which Indonesia could play a regional power role, the PKI viewed it as dangerous to its own interests as well as those of the Chinese in Indonesia and elsewhere in the region and came out in open although guarded criticism of this scheme. The PKI, in line with China's policy, continued to be in the forefront of Indonesia's anti-Malaysia policy and always egged Sukarno on to opposing Malaysia as well as those who supported Malaysia.

India, from the beginning, welcomed the formation of the proposed Federation. Finding Indonesia, however, becoming hostile to it, India became cautious in its approach to the issue. Against the background of diminishing Indonesian goodwill towards it (as demonstrated during the Fourth Asian Games in September 1962) and in the light of Indonesia's growing cordiality with China, it was not desirable to provoke Indonesian leaders on the Malaysia issue. There were apprehensions in India that in the six-power Colombo Conference in December 1962, Indonesia might openly go against India in favour of China on the Sino-Indian border dispute.

Later, however, India openly welcomed inauguration of Malaysia in September 1963. Still later, at the preparatory meeting of the second Afro-Asian conference in Djakarta in April 1964, Indian delegate succeeded in linking the issue of Malaysia with the prospects of the conference itself. This was the net result of an Indian proposal at the preparatory meeting to invite Malaysia to the conference.

Thereafter, India, on various occasions, offered moral and political support to Malaysia. India also gave diplomatic assis-

tance to Malaysia to get a non-permanent seat in the Security Council in December 1964. This showed how far India was prepared to go in ignoring Indonesia's feelings in regard to Malaysia.

It did not mean, however, that India was becoming totally indifferent to Indonesia's attitudes. In India, there was awareness of the PKI's role in the Indonesian policy of opposition to Malaysia. The PKI had also unsparingly criticized India on a number of occasions and showed the extent to which it shared China's hostility towards India. India, in fact, desired that Indonesia-Malaysia dispute be resolved peacefully through bilateral negotiations or through a third party mediation. It even threw feelers to mediate in the dispute between the two countries.

But since India's open pro-Malaysia attitude led to hard feelings in Indonesia, India's overtures in this regard proved to be of little use. Ultimately, it was India's pro-Malaysia attitude and its insistence on Malaysia's representation at the second Asian-African conference in Algiers which led, in June 1965, to eruption of Indonesians' feelings into anti-Indian demonstrations in Djakarta and elsewhere.

During this period, the divergence in the two countries' foreign policies led them to forge links with different countries. Whereas India's non-alignment always tilted it towards developing its relations with both the Super Powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, Indonesia's foreign policy based on Sukarno's concept of "NEFOS" versus "OLDEFOS", in course of time, led it into closer relationship with China. Whereas the dynamic character of Indian non-alignment enabled India to achieve a measure of success in making itself an area of agreement between the two Big Powers, rigidity in Indonesia's foreign policy posture of dividing the world into "NEFOS" and "OLDEFOS" led it into isolation.

Especially India's links with the Soviet Union and Indonesia's links with China became more marked as a result of the two countries' conflicting attitudes on issues of interest to them. India sought Soviet support and goodwill in order to neutralize the combined hostility of Indonesia, China and Pakistan. For this, India took advantage of the Sino-Soviet schism, insisted on Soviet representation at the second Asian-African conference and, thereby, forced upon Indonesia a sort of choice between China and the Soviet Union. In fact, India's continued insistence on Soviet participation which earned Soviet goodwill for India, created tensions in Indonesian-Soviet relations and led Indonesia still closer to

China. China's active moral and political support to Indonesia on the issues of Malaysia and the Second Asian-African conference and increasingly pro-China and anti-Soviet line followed by the PKI, helped this process.

In January 1965, following Indonesia's withdrawal from the United Nations, both the United States and the Soviet Union seemed to have lost much of their influence in Djakarta. In August 1965, Sukarno's announcement of "axis" with China marked the zenith of Indonesia's relations with that country. In contrast, with both the United States and the Soviet Union losing their image in Indonesia, the Indian-Indonesian relations seemed to be touching the lowest ebb.

During the Guided Democracy period, India and Indonesia assumed postures and pursued policies which showed indifference, bordering on disregard of each other's vital interests. Indonesia's tilt in favour of China in the Sino-Indian border dispute and support to Pakistan on the Kasmir dispute proved as much disappointing to India as India's attitude of sympathy and support to Malaysia and of continued hesitation towards Indonesia's demand for the second Asian-African conference. In fact both the countries just ignored each other's feelings on issues of vital importance to them. This establishes the fact that in the framework of their foreign policies, neither Indonesia figured prominently in Indian calculations nor India did so in Indonesian calculations. An important field in which a country's importance in the calculations of the other could be meaningfully assessed is their co-operation in the field of culture and trade and commerce. The progress in the area of cultural relations was never encouraging. Various provisions of the Cultural Agreement of December 1955 remained mostly unimplemented. India's failure to seek and strengthen common points of understanding with Indonesia reflected the lack of a culture policy designed to promote channels of communication at various levels. Non-utilization of the framework provided by the Cultural Agreement, in this connection, showed lesser degree of importance India attached to Indonesia. Similarly, in the field of trade and commerce, the two countries failed to measure up to the expectations generated during the early nineteen fifties. Till the mid-sixties the two countries' performance in this field continued to be highly disappointing. They failed to achieve the total bilateral trade figure as envisaged in the communique issued at the time of the Trade Agreement of April 1963. This could be attributed to their unwillingness to evolve an institutional framework

for regular flow of trade between them.

China and Pakistan proved to be two external factors adversely affecting the Indian-Indonesian relations till Sukarno was at the helm of affairs in Indonesia. China's initially hostile posture towards the Indonesian leadership, its foreign policy stance of looking the world as essentially divided into two blocs—imperialist and anti-imperialist, and the issue of the overseas Chinese community in Indonesia inhibited it from emerging as a negative factor during the nineteen fifties. Likewise, Pakistan's theocratic basis and its policy of alignment with Western bloc led by the United States being unacceptable to the secular and non-aligned leadership of Indonesia, it failed to seek Indonesia's support against India. By the early nineteen sixties, however, prompted by their own considerations, these two countries came to share with each other an avowedly hostile policy towards India. It reflected a high degree of opportunism when a Communist China and a theocratic and aligned Pakistan joined hands against a secular, socialist and non-aligned India.

Keeping in view the implications of its border dispute with India, China sought to iron out its differences with Indonesia by making "unprecedented" concessions on the overseas Chinese issue. It formed part of China's overall policy of isolating India from its neighbours and alienating Indonesia from it. On the other hand, certain changes in the domestic and foreign policies of Pakistan brought it nearer to Indonesia. At this stage, a degree of coolness developing in the Indian-Indonesian relations in general and between Nehru and Sukarno in particular made their anti-Indian propaganda quite receptive among the ruling elite in Indonesia. Both the countries sought to distort India's non-aligned, socialistic and secular image. They also sought to exploit the Indian-Indonesian differences on certain issues, such as the question of Malaysia and Indonesia's demand for convening a second Bandung-type conference, to their own advantage. These two issues, however, showed up contradictions in their approaches as well as caused embarrassments to both these countries. This resulted from India's insistence on inviting both Malaysia and the Soviet Union to the second Asian-African conference and thus linking the question of Malaysia with the very prospects of holding the conference itself. The two countries, however, succeeded in containing the contradictions and in maintaining their developing equation with Indonesia. Viewing President Sukarno's concept of "NEFOS" versus "OLDEFOS" as echoing its own image of the world in which

there was no "third road", and keeping an eye on the internal political developments in Indonesia, China offered full-throated support to Indonesia in its policy of confrontation against Malaysia. Joined by Pakistan, it also offered active, high level diplomatic support to Indonesia in holding the second Asian-African conference. This was not the case with India which continued to insist on Malaysia's (and Soviet Union's) participation in the conference as also, at later stage, made active efforts to seek postponement of the conference itself. Thus whereas China and Pakistan became important members of the "NEFOS", India's prestige in Indonesia suffered still further decline.

During 1961 and 1965, both China and Pakistan pursued certain policies and adopted certain postures which were solely designed to drive a wedge between India and Indonesia. They exploited certain occasions to do so. They sought to project India's image as pro-imperialist and the one opposed to Afro-Asian unity and solidarity against colonialism and imperialism. By implication, they endeavoured to show up India as a roadblock to Indonesia's aspirations for a regional as well as Afro-Asian role. By putting the blame for Indo-Sino and Indo-Pakistani disputes squarely on India, they emphasized in their propaganda meant for Indonesia that India's professions of good neighbourliness, secularism, democracy and non-alignment were only in name and had no practical value.

In their efforts, both China and Pakistan were actively supported by the pro-Chinese Indonesia Communist Party (PKI) and the pro-Pakistani Nahdatul Ulama and all other Muslim parties and groups in the Indonesian politics. An anti-Indian and pro-Pakistani shift in Indonesian policy during these years also reflected the desire of all the non-and anti-Communist parties and groups in Indonesia to assert themselves against the PKI, which was emerging as a very powerful factor in the NASAKOM politics and getting closer to the centre of political power in the country. Whatever the domestic political implications and compulsions, both China and Indonesia came out with open support to Pakistan during the Indo-Pakistani conflict in September 1965. This showed the degree of success both these countries had achieved in virtually alienating Indonesia from India.

At the end of the Sukarno era and the beginning of the New Order in Indonesia, a new chapter in the Indian-Indonesian relations began. Fully realizing the potentialities of a drastic change in the domestic and foreign policies of Indonesia following the 1965 coup, India came out with open support to the new Indonesian

leadership and its new peace-loving, good-neighbourly and non-aligned policies. For once there was a perceptible shift of Indonesian priorities from politics to economic development. This opened up new vistas for interaction. For the first time it was realized in India that the political fence-mending had to be primarily based on a pragmatic search for a new equation in the field of trade, commerce and cultural relations. This meant promoting mutual confidence lost during the period of Guided Democracy, removing the communication gap by establishing regular channels of communication and consultation in order to co-ordinate approaches to regional and international issues of importance to both, identifying needed commodities for bilateral trade, adopting commercial policy, opening up newer avenues of interaction and building newer bridges of friendship and co-operation. This phase of relations was thus characterized more by pragmatism than by sentimentalism.

During the nineteen seventies, the search for a new equation was still further intensified. It received impetus from Indonesia's desire to diversify its sources of capital aid and investment for economic, industrial and technological development as also from its realization of India's growing capabilities in these fields and from the reciprocal desire of the latter, in line with its own interests, to share with the former and other developing countries of the Third World the gains of its industrial, scientific and technological development.

In the process of intensification of their bilateral relations, however, the two countries came to show divergence of approach to certain issues relating to South and South-East Asia which caused some misunderstanding between them. It could not be considered surprising because differences related to their own perceptions of their interests. In fact no two sovereign nations in the modern state system need necessarily to think and act alike. They have to weigh all pros and cons of their actions in consonance with their own vital interests. Significantly, however, the two countries sought to iron out their political differences through various channels established since 1966. The degree of success achieved in building enduring links in various fields had a benign impact of its own and the political differences were not allowed to disturb the otherwise intensifying process of interaction. In other words, sentimentalism in the Indian-Indonesian relations was relegated to the background and pragmatism had its sway. It definitely augured well for future relations between the two countries.

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List of Persons Interviewed

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Ali Algadri, a member of the PSI and former Indonesian Consul in Bombay, Surabaya, November 7, 1969.

Ali Sastroamidjojo, former Prime Minister and Chairman of the PNI, Djakarta, September 24, 1969.

Anak Agung Gde Agung, former Foreign Minister of Indonesia, Djakarta, October 17, 1969.

Boerhanoedin Harahap, former Prime Minister and leader of the Masjumi Party, Djakarta, February 1970.

Dinesh Singh, former Indian Minister for External Affairs, New Delhi, February 23 and 25, 1972.

Djamaluddin Malik, prominent NU Party leader, Djakarta, December 30, 1969.

H. Abdulla Sidik, former Chairman of the NU Party (East Java Province), Surabaya, November 17, 1969.

H.A. Sjaichu, Speaker, Indonesian Parliament (DPR-GR), Djakarta, January 15, 1970.

Hadisubeno Sorrowerdojo, prominent PNI leader (Central Java), Semarang, December 2, 1969.

Hadiwidjojo (Prince), Rector, National Saraswati University Surakarta, November 4, 1969.

Hamid Algadri, a PSI leader, Djakarta, October 21, 1969.

Dr. Hardi, prominent PNI leader and Member of the Supreme Advisory Council of Indonesia, Djakarta, December 31, 1969.

Haroenal Rasjid S.H., Dean, Faculty of Law, Andalas University, Padang (West Sumatra), February 19, 1970.

I.B. Adajana Manuaba, Head, Department of Physiology, Faculty of Medicine, University of Udayana, Denpasar (Bali), November 12, 1969.

Ibu Fatmawati, wife of President Sukarno, Djakarta, October 16, 1969.

Idham Chalid Chairman of NU Party and Minister for Social Affairs, Djakarta, January 27, 1970.

- Igusti Ngurah Gde Ngurah (Professor), Rector of University of Udayana, Denpasar, November 12, 1969.
- Igusti Ngurah Pindah, Vice-Governor, Bali, Denpasar, November 11, 1969.
- J. Leimena, former Acting President of Indonesia and leader of the Parkindo (Indonesian Christian Party), Djakarta, January 28, 1970.
- K.M. Kannampilly, Indian Ambassador to Indonesia (now retired), Djakarta, December 18, 1969.
- Kapto Sunoto, Head, Foreign Information, Department of Information, Djakarta, September 3, 1969.
- Karmani Wirjatmowaroyo, S.H., Leader of the NU Party (Central Java) and Member of the MPRS, Semarang, December 2, 1969.
- M. Zamroni, Chairman, Development Working Group, Indonesian Parliament (DPR-GR), Djakarta, January 29, 1970.
- M.A.A. Nawawi (Drs.) Vice-Governor, South Sumatra, Palembang, February 10, 1970.
- M.R.A. Baig, India's First Secretary and Head of the Chancery in Indonesia during 1950, New Delhi, August 19, 1971.
- Moechtar Lubis, Editor of *Indonesia Raya*, Djakarta, January 23, 1970.
- Moekarto Notowidigdo, former Foreign Minister and Indonesian Ambassador to India, Djakarta, October 11 and December 29, 1969.
- Mohd. Chudori, Deputy Editor-in Chief, *Antara* National News-agency, Djakarta, February 1970.
- Mohd. Isnaeni, Deputy Speaker of the Indonesian Parliament and leader of the PNI, Djakarta, October 30, 1969.
- Mohd. Hatta, former Vice-President of Indonesia, Djakarta, October 15, 1969.
- Mohd. Natsir, former Prime Minister and leader of the Masjumi Party, Djakarta, October 4, 1969.
- Mohd. Roem, former Foreign Minister and leader of the Masjumi Party, Djakarta, October 6, 1969.
- Osep, a prominent PNI leader (Osa Maliki—Osep group), Djakarta, October 22 and 28, 1969.
- Pringgodigdo (Prof.), old associate of President Sukarno, Surabaya, November 7, 1969.
- R. Koenandar Poedjosoedarmo (Lt. Col.) Walikota (Mayor) of Surakarta, Surakarta, November 22, 1969.

R.K. Nehru, former Secretary-General of the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, January 23, 1971.

Rishikesh Shaha, former Nepalese Foreign Minister and diplomat, New Delhi, April 20, 1971.

Roesihan Anwar, Editor of *Pedomani* (a prominent language daily from Djakarta), October 22, 1969.

S. Harnopidjati, Rector, North Sumatra University, Medan, February 23, 1970.

Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, former President of the rebel government of PRRI/Permesta (1958), Djakarta, October 8, 1969.

Mrs. Sjahrir, wife of late Prime Minister Sutan Sjahrir, leader of the PSI, Djakarta, October 6, 1969.

Soekiman Wirjosandjojo (Dr. in medicine), former Prime Minister and leader of the Masjumi Party, Jogjakarta, November 27, 1969.

Soenarjo (prof.), former Foreign Minister and diplomat, Djakarta, September 24 and October 1, 1969.

Soeroso (Drs.), Rector of the University of Gadjah Mada, Jogjakarta, November 26, 1969.

Soetardi, B.C., associated with the Editorial Board Management of *ANDIKA* (Weekly), Surakarta, November 1969.

Subagio Reksodipuro, prominent PNI leader, Djakarta, December 30, 1969.

Subadio Sastrosatomo, Prominent PSI leader, Djakarta, December 25, 1969.

Subchan, Z.E., Vice-Chairman of the MPRS and a prominent leader of the NU Party, Djakarta, October 15, 1969.

Subardjo Djoyoadisuryo, former Foreign Minister and also President, Indonesian Institute of International Affairs, Djakarta, September 23, 1969.

Sudarisman Purwokusumo, former Mayor of Jogjakarta and a PNI leader, Jogjakarta, November 26, 1969.

Sukadji, Dean, Faculty of Economy, Gadjah Mada University, Jogjakarta, November 27, 1969.

Sukarni Kartodiwirjo, former Ambassador to China and prominent leader of Murba Party, Djakarta, January 26 and 30, 1970.

T.B. Simatupang, former Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Armed Forces, Djakarta, October 13, 1969.

Tjokroadisumarto, former Indonesian Ambassador to Pakistan, Djakarta, January 2, 1970.

W. Dhana, Bupati (Regent), Denpasar (Bali), Denpasar, November 13, 1969.

Wedastara Suyasa, former Vice-Chairman of PNI in Bali, Denpasar, November 11, 1969.

Widya Latif (General), Press Officer and Personal Assistant to President Soeharto, Djakarta, March 3, 1970.

Wilopo, former Prime Minister and PNI leader, Djakarta, October 25, 1969.

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